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THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 









THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS 
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 

TORONTO 



THE 
THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

WITH SOME APPLICATION TO 

PRESENT CONDITIONS IN EUROPE 



BY 

H. H. POWERS, Ph.D. 

Sometime Professor of Economics in 
Stanford University 



Jforo lark 

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

1916 

All rights reserved 



r?7S 



Copyright 1916 

By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Set up and electrotyped. Published, May, 1916 




MAY 25i9i6 
©CI.A431208 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

I have written this book because I could not help 
it. No professional or other necessity calls me away 
from the tranquil field of art into the turmoil of mod- 
ern strife. But who does not scorn tranquillity in 
a time like this? Into this titanic struggle my heart 
enters with all the passionate sympathy of which it 
is capable. Were I young and free to follow the 
heart's behests, I should long ago have found my 
place in the trenches or in a soldier's grave. I know 
what my colours would be. 

But I am neither young nor free, and my lot is 
cast with a people who, although all unwittingly in 
the storm centre, has another and a more difficult 
task. It is theirs to awake to the fact that their isola- 
tion is gone forever, theirs to accustom themselves 
to the strange consciousness, half irksome and half 
exhilarating, of contact with growing peoples, theirs 
to learn the laws of growth and the logic of its 
inevitable pressure. As the chief custodian of the 
world's future peace, we must understand the nature 
of war. We shall not bridle its violence so long 
as we see in it only the tyranny of monarchs or the 
caprice of naughty nations. It is folly to parley with 
protoplasm. It is wicked to malign the intelligence 
and the integrity of peoples. 

Can I contribute ever so little to that deeper in- 



vi THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

sight and juster judgment which shall save our people 
from criminal confidence and from fool's errands 
across the sea? A single fact encourages me to 
make the attempt. I am more or less familiar with 
every country now at war except Servia. I was for 
some years a resident in Paris, and a like period in 
Berlin. I have mingled with the crowds in their 
thoroughfares, studied in their universities, learned 
their speech and made friends within their gates. 
I know the byways of Britain from Dover to Aber- 
deen. I have seen the shrines of the Moslem and 
the minarets of Stamboul, and have travelled through 
the empire of the Czars from the Caucasus to the 
Baltic and the far eastern sea. Italy I know better 
than I know my own country, and Greece is my Holy 
Land. I have found shelter in the homes of Nip- 
pon, and looked down from the Black Mountain of 
Montenegro. And I know that these folk are human, 
men of like passions and like virtues with ourselves. 
As I have their case from their own lips I have been 
compelled to recognise the inexorableness of the des- 
tiny that confronts them. The wanton selfishness 
and unprovoked aggression of their policy, the cun- 
ning deception of their leaders and the stupid delu- 
sion of the led, all this of which we hear so much 
at home, has a far away and unreal sound to one in 
whose ears still linger the accents of these human 
voices. To such an one it is easy to accept the premise 
which is fundamental to our inquiry. All peoples 
are serious and sincere, and their governments as 
well. There is probably not a monarch in Europe 
who would not surrender his throne in the interests 



THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE vii 

of his people. It is doubtful if there is one who does 
not understand better than we what those interests 
are. Every nation in the present war has its case, 
a case which it need not be afraid to present be- 
fore the bar of humanity. Each has done the only 
thing that it could do, as judged by the standards 
which we habitually apply to our own national con- 
duct. Any other assumption than this would be 
supremely unplausible ; any other would be highly un- 
just. This assumption must be our working hy- 
pothesis. The passions of partisanship will not 
teach us the lessons of the war. 

Can I, feeling these passions to the full, hold them 
in abeyance, and give each of these peoples its due? 
Such is my contract with the reader. What will be 
his contract with me? Will he listen patiently, even 
though righteous indignation ebbs, and the fervid 
glow of partisanship fades into the dull grey of com- 
monplace justice? Or will he throw the book aside, 
impatient of one who thus gives aid and comfort 
to the enemy? With the few who continue to the 
end I hope to join in a confession of faith. 



THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 



THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 



CHAPTER I 

THE TANGIBLE THINGS 

The great war in Europe is now advanced into its 
second year. The surprise and consternation which 
it at first occasioned has now passed. It has become 
a matter of course, and looked at more calmly and 
in longer perspective, it seems more clearly a thing that 
had to be, an inevitable result of forces slowly 
gathered and organised through many decades. To 
the more philosophically minded this war, despite its 
magnitude, is slowly slipping into its place as merely 
one of a long series, fought on much the same ground 
and by much the same peoples, ever since history first 
lifted the curtain from this part of the world. It is 
even possible that the series is not finished, that the 
approaching settlement will leave some or all of the 
parties dissatisfied, and that peace will again be only 
a truce to be broken at a convenient season. Indeed, 
how can the settlement be satisfactory when one party 
declares that its fundamental demand is control of 
the sea, and the other just as positively insists that 
there can be no peace until that control is broken? 
Certainly one of these parties must be disappointed, 
possibly both. Conflict of interest is equally positive 

3 



4 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

on other points. Neither party can brook the success 
of the other, and both will resent a compromise which 
holds the prize beyond their grasp. Try as we may 
in the intervals of truce to moderate these conflicting 
ambitions, it is not clear that even a sullen acquiescence 
can be permanently secured. Slowly the conclusion is 
forced upon us that this may not be — that it prob- 
ably is not — the last great war. Before us, as be- 
hind, extends the devastating trail of war, until it 
fades on the horizon of vision beyond which history 
and prophecy are alike unable to penetrate. 

As our thoughts have thus unconsciously turned 
from the war in Europe to the greater fact of war in 
Europe, the whole centre of interest has shifted. A 
year ago the whole world was busy reading blue books 
and white books and orange books, and so on through 
all the colours of the spectrum. Whole pages in our 
daily papers were devoted to legal analyses of their 
contents with a view to convicting the diplomats of 
one group or the other of conspiracy and duplicity in 
the negotiations preceding the outbreak of war, and 
so of fastening upon them the responsibility for its 
horrors. More popularly, the monarchs of the war- 
ring states were the objects of interest and inquiry, 
those who have loved the limelight coming in for a 
preposterous share of popular interest and condemna- 
tion. To-day a lawyer's analysis of diplomatic cor- 
respondence would hardly find readers, while the most 
observed of monarchs is scarcely mentioned for 
months at a time. With the consciousness that war 
in Europe is a recurring rather than an isolated 
phenomenon — that it is a European habit, so to 



THE TANGIBLE THINGS 5 

speak, rather than an accident — there naturally 
comes the realisation that it is due to longstanding 
causes, and that diplomats and monarchs have been 
its agents, rather than its responsible originators. 
Hence there is less talk about banishing the Kaiser to 
St. Helena, as a means of insuring peace. Other 
panaceas, like the abolition of secret diplomacy, the 
settlement of boundaries by popular vote, and the like, 
are far less confidently urged than a year ago. There 
is a growing consciousness that the causes of this per- 
ennial warfare in Europe are not to be found in the 
mere surface froth of human volition, and it is hope- 
less to look there for a cure. 

The writer of these pages offers no panacea for 
the appalling evils of war. Such suggestions as he is 
able to offer looking toward the amelioration of hu- 
man misery in this connection are of the most modest 
character, and are at best of remote and gradual ef- 
ficacy. Long before the question " What is the 
cure ? " must come the question, " What is the mat- 
ter?" The sufferer may be impatient at the time 
spent in this preliminary inquiry. He wants relief. 
But it is quite clear that he must be patient if he would 
be cured — had better be patient even if it proves that 
he cannot be cured. During the past year the great 
sufferer has learned much of this patience. We can 
therefore more hopefully ask, what is the matter, 
than we could a year ago. 

Even this inquiry must be greatly narrowed to 
bring it within the compass of one moderate volume. 
It is clear, for instance, that this, like other human 
ills, is due to ignorance and selfishness. If we fix 



6 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

our attention upon these causes, and trace them in 
their special forms and concrete applications, we can 
easily persuade ourselves that these are the sole 
causes of war, and that enlightenment and broadened 
interest in humanity are the only cure. There is 
abundant truth in this assumption to justify any pos- 
sible effort at amelioration along these lines. The 
unwearying effort to extend the scope of arbitration 
and to promote friendship and community of inter- 
est among nations deserves the heartiest encourage- 
ment and support of all well-wishers of humanity, 
and despite the appalling scope of the present war 
there is much to encourage the friends of this cause. 
We are aghast that a single group can put ten million 
soldiers under arms, but is it not significant that so 
large a part of mankind can make common cause? 
Even concede that this community of action is due 
to the pressure of a common danger, and that it can- 
not be relied upon to outlive the present situation, it 
still means much that so large a number of men have 
seen this common danger and have been able to lay 
aside old jealousies and make mutual sacrifices to 
avert it. And this community of action did not begin 
with the war, and is not likely to end with it. Look 
at a map of France in the twelfth century, or of Ger- 
many even in the early nineteenth century, and see if 
men have made no progress toward cohesion and 
regular community of action. It is just because men 
have so greatly widened their horizon and have de-j 
veloped so much community of action, that these lat-' 
ter-day conflicts are so terrible. By all means let the 
process of enlightenment go on. If certain of these 



THE TANGIBLE THINGS 7 

efforts come in for disparaging criticism in this book, 
it is not because they are wrong in principle but be- 
cause they are shortsighted and fatuous, as all such 
efforts may be. The chief remedy — perhaps we 
may say the only remedy — for ills that flesh is heir 
to, is to be found in the increased intelligence and 
forbearance of men. 

But it is not the psychological or moral factor in 
the problem that it is here proposed to consider. 
We are concerned rather with the other side of the 
problem, the environment in which man finds him- 
self, its characteristics and eccentricities, and the 
trouble that they make. For purposes of present 
discussion we will assume that men are a constant 
quantity, permanently endowed with the same limited 
intelligence, the same ideals, the same resentments 
and suspicions. This, of course, is not quite true, 
though it is perhaps nearer true than the sanguine 
reformer is wont to think. There are always those 
who try to hitch the car of urgent reforms to the 
slow moving force of human evolution, as Mark 
Twain tried to ride down to Grindelwald on a glacier. 
They are right in a way. The glacier really does 
move, and perhaps quite in the direction assumed, but 
as an agency in transportation it is likely to be dis- 
appointing. The practical man or movement will 
reckon with the glacier pretty much as a fixture. 

But whether men change little or much, we must 
eliminate this factor if we are to isolate our problem. 
This is the invariable procedure in all scientific in- 
quiry. We merely dissipate our energy and evade 
the issue, if each time our inquiry gives us a hard 



8 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

nut to crack, we go off on a tangent and say: " If 
all men would obey the golden rule there would be no 
difficulty." There is grave reason to fear that all 
men will not obey the golden rule for a long time to 
come, no matter what our insistence upon it. And if 
they did, is it quite clear that there would be no 
difficulties, no problems, to solve? Is it not probable, 
rather, that stubborn facts of situation and environ- 
ment have much to do with men's failure to obey the 
golden rule? Be that as it may, it is these facts of 
environment which we have set ourselves to investi- 
gate, and in our investigation we shall take men as 
they are, finite in intelligence, selfisn and suspicious, 
rarely capable of viewing their interests broadly, or 
of subordinating present to future good, yet dream- 
ers withal, and seldom long free from the spell of 
conscience and generous ideals. It is with no dis- 
paragement of these ideals or denial of man's higher 
destiny, that we assume for convenience of analysis 
that for a considerable time men will continue to 
feel toward their neighbours and rivals much as they 
have felt, and that they will judge their own and rival 
interests by the familiar standards. Measure this 
period by decades or by centuries, as sanguine or sober 
temperament may dictate, it is the reality just now, 
and it is both legitimate and useful to study the prob- 
lems which this reality presents. If our study dis- 
closes the fact that there are certain very real things 
which the nations are fighting about, things which 
with all intelligence and good-will must still involve 
serious hardship to one or another of the group, 
we shall at least have contributed something to that 



THE TANGIBLE THINGS 9 

intelligence which the idealist invokes as the solution 
of the problem, and we shall have aided the task of 
forbearance and good-will by a better understanding 
of the burden that is laid upon them. 

What do nations fight for? Or, more definitely, 
what may a nation fight for, with a fair prospect of 
commanding the sympathy and approval of disinter- 
ested men? What, in a word, may be fairly ac- 
counted as just causes of war? 

Defence of its own soil must undoubtedly come 
first. No doubt there are times when the invasion 
of a nation's territory has a large measure of justi- 
fication, as the result of long continued unneighbourli- 
ness and provocative acts, but the nation that takes 
the initiative in such an invasion assumes a heavy re- 
sponsibility and must usually expect but grudging 
sympathy from a jealous world. The sanctity of ter- 
ritory is a solemn tenet of our political philosophy, 
akin to the sanctity of life in individual relations, and 
to repel invasion is as well recognised a right as the 
right of individual self-defence. Even if a nation 
has forfeited the sympathy of the world, and the 
right of the invader is grudgingly conceded, it never 
forfeits the right of self-defence, and the duty of its 
citizens to rally to its defence is never questioned. 
So firmly established is this principle of national self- 
defence that even the most confirmed pacifists usually 
freely concede it. No considerable body of men in 
the world has pronounced more emphatically against 
war than the various bodies of socialists in Europe, 
and yet they have always declared in favour of a war 
in defence of national territory (and " honour," the 



io THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

latter a vague category of grave potentiality, as we 
shall have occasion to learn). So obviously justi- 
fied is the principle of defence that pacifists have 
usually thought this the place to draw the line. If all 
nations could be brought to recognise the principle 
of defence as the only justification of war, obviously 
there would be no war, for no one would be the ag- 
gressor, and so there would nowhere be the need of 
defence. 

But, like most principles, the application is not so 
simple. The well known revision of the golden rule, 
do the man that would like to do you, and do him 
first, is obviously sound as a principle of war, and un- 
der this principle aggression may easily be justified as 
good defensive tactics. In fact, it almost invariably 
is so justified by the aggressor, who is not insensible 
to the strength of the defender's plea, and as any war 
is usually preceded by menace, invasion can always be 
construed with some degree of plausibility as a de- 
fensive act. It is interesting to note that in the 
present conflict, however clearly the outside world 
makes out its case of aggression, the socialists and 
other pacifists in each nation seem to have been fully 
persuaded that their own nation is fighting a defen- 
sive war. 

Closely akin to the foregoing is the necessity often 
laid upon a nation of seizing territory adjacent to 
its boundaries in the interest of a more defensible 
frontier. The logic of such a procedure is less recog- 
nised, but it is quite inexorable. The man who re- 
pels a robber in his own house, is not more obviously 
within his rights than the man who puts a lock upon 



THE TANGIBLE THINGS n 

his front door. The latter is simply more prudent. 
Unfortunately, in the case of a nation's household, 
the lock is the work of nature and can usually be se- 
cured only at the expense of a neighbour. A cartoon 
of 1 87 1 represents the French peace envoys as pro- 
testing against Bismarck's demand for the surrender 
of Strassburg and Metz. " Strassburg! Why, that 
is the key to France." " Certainly, and it shall re- 
main so; only we will lock the door from the other 
side," was the chancellor's reply. This was undoubt- 
edly the chief motive for the annexation of these two 
mountainous border provinces. The recent seizure 
of the Khyber Pass by the British, to assure the 
defence of northern India is another instance. 

It is plain that the principle of defence, thus con- 
strued, is transmuted completely into the principle of 
aggression. Yet its motive may be wholly that of 
defence, as in the case of the Khyber Pass above 
mentioned, and the justification fully accorded to the I 
principle of defence may be claimed for strategic ag- j 
gressions of this sort, with much plausibility. For J 
the pacifist to insist upon the maintenance of an inde- 1 
fensible frontier, it may be argued, is to invite war 
and also to insure defeat. Placed thus in the un- 
comfortable position of seeming to favour war, the 
pacifist is compelled either to admit a much broader 
justification of war, or to deny it any justification I 
whatever, even the most obvious right of self-defence. 
When events thus put vague beliefs to the test, the 
immense majority of men recognise the broader justi- 
fication of war, seeing in offence or defence only a 
question of tactics, and stand shoulder to shoulder, 



12 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

pacifist and coercionist alike, in defence of their com- 
mon heritage. If the German socialists can, with 
practical unanimity, recognise the German role in 
the present war as a purely defensive one — as they 
honestly do and can — there is little to hope from 
limiting war to the defensive. Aggression, indeed, 
is little more than a name for defence, as seen from 
the other side. 

Quite distinct from the defence of territory, yet 
indissolubly bound up with it, is the defence of in- 
dependence. The freedom to choose one's own 
course of action is the very essence of nationality, 
as it is of manhood, and encroachment upon it is a 
subtle attack upon national existence. Nothing is 
more insidious than for a nation to form the habit 
of yielding to argument or pressure from a powerful 
neighbour. The essence of freedom may thus en- 
tirely disappear, while the semblance of independence 
remains as a deceptive mask. When the king of 
Syria, on his way to attack the king of Egypt, yielded 
to the advice of a Roman legate to return home and 
abandon the campaign, we are prepared for the un- 
noticed transformation of Syria a little later into a 
Roman province. It is a sound instinct which impels 
men everywhere to resent interference with their na- 
tional freedom of action, even though the guidance 
proffered be reasonable and considerate. This is the 
essence of the vaguely defined term national hon- 
our. 

Men who prize the privilege of choice in their in- 
dividual lives can hardly deny the validity of the 
principle as applied to the collective life of men. 



THE TANGIBLE THINGS 13 

But the right, though indisputable, is again difficult 
of application. Matters between citizen and citizen, 
or between the citizen and his own state, are usually 
willingly left to the state in question, though the right 
of neighbouring Mexico to maintain anarchy on 
our borders, and even the right of far-away Turkey 
to massacre her Armenians, is not fully conceded. 
But outside of the home circle lies the broad circle 
of international relations, where interests are sure to 
conflict, and where complete liberty of action for any 
one nation is clearly impossible. To adjust the fron- 
tiers of privilege is more difficult than to adjust the 
frontiers of territory. There is the same manoeu- 
vring for position, the same strategy, the effort to 
forestall and outwit as in the more concrete matter of 
frontier, and that in a field less concrete, less defin- 
able and permanent. It is clear that nations may be 
in perfect agreement as to their territorial bounda- 
ries, and yet find themselves in mortal conflict over 
questions of privilege and freedom of national action. 
The pacifist is wont to decry this whole body of in- 
terests on account of the conventional use of the 
word, honour, as its designation. It is easy to cite 
cases where the appeal to honour has been made on 
behalf of unjust claims and tyrannical action. None 
the less the word as used in this connection stands 
for very real interests, quite as well worth maintain- 
ing as those of territory itself. 

We will not stop here to consider how far disputes 
in this field can be settled by other means than war. 
For the present we are concerned only to note that 
these interests are very real ones, quite as dear to 



i 4 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

men's hearts as the possession of a particular terri- 
tory, and that men can and do differ much with regard 
to them. This is one of the things about which wars 
are fought. 

Commerce is a prominent interest in modern in- 
ternational conflicts, one more discussed in our day 
than any other. It is popularly supposed, at present, 
to be the animating motive in the building of colonial 
empires, which is so conspicuous a feature of the 
present age. The justice of this opinion may be 
questioned, but the importance of commerce as a fac- 
tor in international relations and a possible cause of 
war cannot be denied. 

The commercial motive for acquiring colonies is 
obvious, if popularly exaggerated. Many of the col- 
onies belonging to European powers were at first 
nothing but trading posts, with guards to defend the 
property and life of the alien trader, not at all to 
control or politically administer the country. But 
this armed protection involved conflicts with native 
rule and a necessary increase of authority on the part 
of the trading company until it ultimately resulted 
in political rule. India is a well known example of 
this evolution. The British East India Company, 
when first it established trading posts in that country, 
had not the remotest idea that India would one day 
be a part of the British Empire. To carry on a 
profitable commerce with the inhabitants and to pro- 
tect its property and trading posts in a country not 
always able or willing to afford the needed protection, 
was their only thought. But all things conspired — 
their growing wealth, accumulated grievances, and 



THE TANGIBLE THINGS 15 

not least the attacks of other European powers — to 
develop their military establishment to a point where 
it aroused the fear and hostility of native rulers. 
Conquerors in the wars with these rulers, they could 
not do otherwise than assume the administration of 
the conquered districts, until at last we have the 
anomaly of a trading company ruling and admin- 
istering an empire. This once appreciated, England 
could not fail to realise the unsuitableness of a trad- 
ing company for the guardianship of a people's inter- 
ests, and her assumption of these responsibilities was 
inevitable. Such was the role which commerce un- 
wittingly played for a couple of centuries, both in 
India and elsewhere, in the building of empires and 
their incident wars. 

All this is at an end, however. There are no ter- 
ritories now in process of evolution toward colonies 
under the guidance of militant commerce, for the 
simple reason that no farther areas are available for 
appropriation in this way. China at one time seemed 
a possibility, and the presence of fortified outposts 
of foreign powers, like Hong Kong, Tsingtao, Wei- 
hai-wei, and Port Arthur, all in foreign hands, to- 
gether with the foreign " concessions " of Canton, 
Shanghai, Tientsin and Hankow, patrolled and 
guarded by foreign gendarmes, are strongly sugges- 
tive of the earlier stages of Indian conquest. But 
there is little likelihood that the later chapters will 
follow. Even if China's power to protect herself 
be doubted, the jealousy of the great powers and their 
relative equality of position would make such an as- 
similation impossible. China will probably escape 



1 6 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

subjugation. She will in any case never be subdued 
by a trading company. 

But commerce as a cause of war is not therefore 
dead. Indeed, it sometimes seems to be more active 
than ever. For whereas commerce was once the i 
handmaid of political power, political power seems 1 
now to be the servant of commerce. Never were 
colonies more prized or more eagerly sought than 
now. Whether the colony be acquired by deliberate 
design, or thrust upon us by the most unforeseen acci- 
dent, it is held with equal tenacity, in full faith that 
it will contribute to national greatness and power. 

It is commonly assumed that the motive for this 
colonial expansion is commercial advantage, and as 
such it has been the subject of vigorous controversy. 
Many volumes have been written to prove that col- 
onies are seldom remunerative, even when acquired, 
and that they never pay the cost of a war of acquisi- 
tion. These arguments seem conclusive, and when 
it is remembered that the rulers of colonies seldom 
find it practicable to exclude traders of other nations, 
and that in many cases outsiders are accorded exactly 
the same privileges as citizens of the ruling nation, 
we are confronted by the curious and seemingly ir- 
rational fact that nations acquire and administer col- 
onies at immense cost, and then share them with rival 
and even unfriendly nations on terms of complete 
equality. 

It is impossible to reconcile such action on the part 
of intelligent and practical nations with the theory 
that commerce is the motive for colonial expansion. 
As a commercial proposition colonies do not pay. It 



THE TANGIBLE THINGS 17 

is doubtful whether they ever will pay. As commer- 
cial propositions they resemble the doings of the gen- 
tleman farmer who produces eggs at a dollar apiece. 
The fact that individuals make money and exert a 
certain influence on their government to continue the 
expensive experiment very inadequately explains the 
unanimity, the positive enthusiasm, with which the 
expensive colonial luxury is endorsed and maintained. 
The fact would seem to be that the motive for 
acquiring colonies is to be sought rather in a nation's 
ideals than in the field of material advantage. Two 
men were once discussing the relative advantages of 
renting and owning a house. Said the one : " You can 
make money by renting a house." Replied the other : 
" I don't own a house to make money. I make money 
to own a house." The answer was final and com- 
plete. Even the most sordid intelligence must recog- 
nise that the making of money is not a rational 
end, but a means to something beyond. In the get- 
ting of money there is some degree of agreement. 
The aim is tangible, and the procedure more or less 
formulated. The intelligent observer may fairly 
criticise the participants as " business-like " or the re- 
verse. But when it comes to the spending of money, 
we usually recognise that there is no accounting for 
taste. The final good which lies beyond money, and 
for which money is, is too intangible and too varied 
to permit of formulation or criticism. The lover 
of fine horses will find it inexplicable that a man should 
pay hundreds of thousands for shabby relics of the 
old masters, but he seldom challenges the legitimacy 
of the expenditure, knowing that to another his own 



1 8 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

choice is equally inexplicable. But both agree that 
their money is for something beyond itself. Dispar- 
age each other's choice as they will, they would both 
join in a far deeper contempt for the miser with 
whom money was an end. 

It is an amazing fact that while all men recognise 
the existence of a realm of intangible, ideal inter- 
ests toward which all individual effort justly tends, 
they often assume that nations have only material and 
concrete aims. To put it concretely, nations may 
help us make money, but they may not help us spend 
it. National aims must be severely practical. It 
is rational to own a house on which we lose money, 
but it is not rational to own a colony on which we 
lose money. But why not, if our taste is for col- 
onies? Such a taste, with its white man's burden 
and its enormous expenditure of energy, its per- 
plexities and its dangers, may be inexplicable to those 
otherwise minded, like the taste for football or 
classical scholarship or life in the smart set. But 
judge it as we may, the one completely unreasonable 
thing is to overlook it. Never is the idealist so mis- 
taken as when he assumes that other men are mate- 
rialists and without ideals. Nations, like individuals, 
seek material advantage, not for itself, but for the 
sake of ideal ends which refuse to give an account of 
themselves in terms of material things. This na- 
tional idealism we must consider in its place. For 
the present it is sufficient to note that commercialism 
is not the chief motive for colonial expansion. Col- 
onies were formerly acquired unintentionally, as an 
incident to commercial exploitation. But just as the 



THE TANGIBLE THINGS 19 

nation has relieved the trading company of the burden 
of their administration, so national idealism has taken 
from national thrift the burden of their justification. 
Colonies may not pay, any more than children and 
many other things that men deem it not irrational to 
want. And yet nations want colonies just the same, 
and refuse to be argued out of their desire. 

But if the commercial motive is not so prominent 
in colonial policy as is sometimes assumed, it has ac- 
quired new force in another quarter with the devel- 
opment of trade between nations, and in particular 
of sea-borne commerce. The enormous development 
of maritime commerce in the last forty years has not 
only vastly increased the importance of this national 
interest, but it has quite revised its method and 
changed its required facilities. With the use of 
larger vessels and the introduction of new methods 
for handling freight, former harbours have become 
inadequate and new ones have risen into sudden prom- 
inence. Convenient relation to new rail lines and 
canals have played their part in the huge commercial 
readjustment. Considerations of defence have com- 
plicated the problem. Old defences are obsolete, and 
locations chosen long ago are not always suited to new 
methods of defence. Seas once safe can now be 
closed by rival powers. Altogether the whole ap- 
paratus of commercial and national life needs to be 
remade, and commerce is insistent upon the acquisi- 
tion of sites once unnecessary. In particular, it may 
be accepted that the most urgent demand of every na- 
tion is adequate access to the sea. To be denied such 
access is to be condemned to hopeless inferiority and 



20 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

backwardness. Industry is strangled, commerce re- 
pressed, and even the national intelligence and cul- 
ture seriously stunted, if the nation is denied access 
to the highway of the world. Strangely enough, it 
is the peoples that are best equipped in this respect 
who are least appreciative of this need in others. 
The American people have never known what it was 
to be even moderately circumscribed in this particu- 
lar. We have harbours to spare, and in at least one 
case have acquired a whole series of useless harbours 
that are the natural property and convenience of an- 
other nation. With this affluence of commercial fa- 
cilities, this plethora of outlets into seas that no power 
can close, we hardly appreciate the position of a 
power like Austria, with an outlet only at one small 
corner, and that into waters which her neighbours 
completely control. We are like the man who said 
the moon was more useful than the sun, because the 
moon came in the night when it was dark, and the 
sun came in the day time, when it was light enough 
anyway. Sheer surfeit has made us incapable of un- 
derstanding old world hunger. 

The impatient pacifist will here object: " But why 
can a nation not use a harbour without owning it? 
Have not the Germans for years shipped through 
Antwerp, the Swiss through Genoa, the Canadians 
through Portland? And is not this commerce wel- 
comed and protected? " Undoubtedly, and yet there 
is an instinct, the outgrowth, it may be, of a troubled 
past rather than of a wiser present, which refuses 
to be satisfied with these alien facilities. Would a 
man build on a lot which had no access to the high- 






THE TANGIBLE THINGS 21 

way? Access might be freely offered across a neigh- 
bour's premises, and the relations might be of the best, 
but prudence would still demur. An element of in- 
security would inhere in such an arrangement. To 
say nothing of the tedious and expensive formalities 
which seem to be inseparable from all international 
arrangements of this sort, the sense of security for 
national interests will not cease to urge the acquisi- 
tion of whatever may be needful to the rounded 
equipment of national life. 

Here again idealism complicates the calculations 
of simple commercial expediency. How many a man 
has bought an additional bit of land which he did 
not need, and at an exaggerated price, merely to 
round out his premises and satisfy a vague ideal of 
trimness and completeness? It might not pay Ger- 
many to acquire Antwerp, but even the knowledge of 
this fact may not prevent her trying to do so. Look 
at the map and see how obviously nature intended the 
coastline of Belgium and Holland to be the boundary 
of Germany. How exasperatingly these severed 
border provinces with their Germanic population 
mutilate a natural geographical and political unity. 
Prove all you like that it isn't worth the price, the 
German will bid high to thus round out his premises. 

One more commercial interest deserves brief no- 
tice, namely the demand for valuable natural re- 
sources, mineral deposits, timber, and the like. One 
of the motives for annexing Lorraine was the pres- 
ence of valuable mineral deposits, the exploitation of 
which has contributed greatly to the recent industrial 
development of Germany. Productive soil, if not 



22 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

in the possession of an irremovable population, is also 
an asset eagerly sought, especially by a people which 
is multiplying rapidly. These considerations ac- 
count in large measure for Japan's desire to conquer 
Korea and thinly settled Manchuria, though strategic 
considerations of national defence were conspicuously 
present. 

The foregoing are the more concrete and material 
interests for which wars are fought. Nothing could 
well be more tangible or concrete than the territory 
which a people occupies, or the strong posts which in- 
sure its control. Independence of action is the very 
essence of national life, and commercial success the 
most obvious of material advantages. But real as 
these interests are, they are probably not the chief 
causes of war in our time. There is a growing sense 
that national frontiers are to be respected, and a deep- 
ening conviction that territories can not be assimilated 
if acquired. It is rare, too, that nations interfere 
with one another's commerce, or refuse to neighbour 
nations the use of their facilities. No disputes are so 
capable of amicable settlement as these. Seldom has 
a nation made so lame a defence as Germany in the 
present conflict, when she gives as her reason, that 
England was preparing to annihilate her ocean com- 
merce. Not only has England made no sign of such 
an intention, but she has given to German ships the 
same privileges as to her own in every port under 
the control of the British Parliament. She could do 
nothing else. The freedom and inviolability of com- 
merce may be accounted one of the substantial gains 
of modern times, while the sanctity of territorial 



THE TANGIBLE THINGS 23 

boundaries in civilised communities where justice is 
reasonably administered, is approaching the same rec- 
ognition. Germany may invade France, but she 
would hardly think of annexing any part of her ter- 
ritory. These causes of war are passing, as others 
have passed. What country would now go to war to 
enforce the claims of dynastic inheritance? What a 
gain it is that despite the close kinship between the 
ruling families of England and Germany, no member 
of either can ever claim the throne of the other ! 

But while these material considerations are less 
potent than formerly, and less potent than is pop- 
ularly supposed, there are other forces which have 
lost nothing of their potency, have perhaps become 
even more menacing. It is to these' more intangible 
ideal interests that we must now turn. 



CHAPTER II 

THE INTANGIBLE THINGS 

In the preceding chapter we have considered some 
of the more tangible interests that men fight for, in- 
dependence, territory and commerce. These inter- 
ests, just because they are more tangible, are wont 
to seem more real than others. We are very fond, 
in these days, of arguments drawn from statistics, and 
are wont to devote much attention to those factors 
in our problems which can be measured and enumer- 
ated. Hence the exaggeration of the importance 
of commerce as a cause of war, and the confident argu- 
ment of the peace advocate that war does not pay. 
Even the popular mind, which can neither use nor 
altogether follow the argument of statistics, is in- 
clined to emphasise " practical," i.e., material, consid- 
erations. When political accident raised our flag 
over the Philippines, there was forthwith much talk 
of the commercial and strategic value of our new pos- 
sessions. Probably not one in fifty of these enthu- 
siasts knew anything about either of these tangible 
interests, or was affected by them. He believed in 
the commercial future of the Philippines because he 
was enthusiastic. He was not enthusiastic because 
he believed in the commercial future of the Philip- 
pines. The enthusiasm came first and the belief aft- 

24 



THE INTANGIBLE THINGS 25 

erwards. And yet he expresses his enthusiasm in 
terms of commerce, or national defence, or mission- 
ary opportunity, or other familiar interest, because 
these things seemed more real to him and to others 
than did the things that were the real cause of his 
enthusiasm. We are all of us made that way. We 
use material interests as counters and signs of the 
real but elusive and intangible forces that shape our 
action. It isn't that we wish to deceive ourselves or 
others, but that we are quite unable to express or 
measure the subtler ideal forces that play into our 
lives. We are quite sure that there is some good rea- 
son for our enthusiasm over the Philippines, and be- 
ing unable to lay hands on the intangible forces that 
really influence us, we lay hold on commerce or other 
substantial interest, believing without proof, and un- 
convinced by counter argument. 

It is a very superficial judgment of mankind that 
takes all these disguises seriously, that assumes that 
because men talk in material terms they are therefore 
materialists. All men are idealists, though few men 
can give coherent expression to their own ideals, even 
to their own consciousness. Men do not make war 
because it pays, nor will they stop because it doesn't 
pay. They may talk about commercial advantage 
and the like, but they are fighting for something else. 
It is that something else which we have now to con- 
sider. 

Race unity is one of the ideals which exercise large 
influence over the minds of men. Though often over- 
borne by other considerations, it is never without its 
appeal, and across boundary lines or within them, it 



26 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

acts as a constant gravitation, drawing together men 
of the same race and sundering those of different 
races. It is rare, perhaps, that a war has been fought 
solely in the interest of race unity, but seldom is this 
cause wholly absent. Whatever the occasion of war, 
the appeal to " redeem our brothers from foreign des- 
potism " is pretty sure to come in somewhere, and is 
always effectual. The cry of the Italian " forward " 
party is Italia irridenta, unredeemed Italy, which be- 
ing interpreted is a plea for the annexation of certain 
Italian-speaking districts in neighbouring countries, 
notably in Austria. Undoubtedly the Italian states- 
men have other and more important purposes in the 
present conflict, but it can hardly be doubted that 
this is the popular purpose. It is necessary only to 
mention Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism and others to 
appreciate the role of this ideal in modern political up- 
heavals. Has Pan-Americanism any such dread pos- 
sibilities ? 

Looked at more closely, however, race unity is it- 
self a very variable and incoherent fact. What is the 
criterion of race unity? 

Blood relationship is the first suggestion, but in- 
quiry along this line soon gets us into difficulties. Ac- 
tual kinship of this kind can never be traced far, and 
when traced is apt to prove the opposite of what is 
assumed. There are no pure races, and those whose 
race unity is most apparent — like the ancient Greeks 
— have always been of very mixed origin. In Amer- 
ica we are forming another such race, compounded of 
almost every human element, but probably destined 
to become quite as much a unit as any race in history. 



THE INTANGIBLE THINGS 27 

Language is a more tangible and undoubtedly a 
more vital element in race unity. When we recall 
that the significance of race unity is purely psycho- 
logical, that it is not actual kinship, but the feeling of 
kinship that counts, it will be apparent that obscure 
ethnological data like the cranial index, and so forth, 
will have little effect on men's minds, while language, 
a characteristic emphasised by every act of social in- 
tercourse, must be all potent. The unredeemed Ital- 
ians who excite the popular fervour of Italian patriot- 
ism are largely Teutonic or Slavic in blood, but then, 
so are the Lombards of Milan, whose features still 
often recall their Germanic origin, and the same is 
true of large parts of the population in every part of 
Italy. After all, it is the Italian language that makes 
men Italians, far more than any fact of origin. 

Yet it must be remembered that community of lan- 
guage usually leads to a popular conviction of com- 
munity of origin, often with momentous consequences. 
The modern Greeks are certainly largely Slavic in >y 
origin — some have even claimed that they are wholly 
so — but they believe themselves to be descended 
from the glorious ancestry of ancient Greece, and are 
tenaciously attached to its traditions. Their only 
reason for this belief is the fact that they speak Greek 
and were born in Greek territory. Similarly the Ru- 
manians believe themselves to be descended from Ro- 
man colonists sent to the East by Trajan, and hence 
closely related to the Italians and French, the ground 
of their belief being that they speak a language de- 
rived from Latin. They doubtless have very little 
Roman blood, but that does not make their belief 



28 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

less potent. Both Greece and Rumania are largely 
influenced by this assumed ancestry. 

But while community of speech is pretty nearly 
equivalent to race unity, it will not always obscure 
outward and conspicuous evidences of race origin. 
The negroes of the United States speak the English 
language, but no mastery of that tongue will create 
in them or the whites the feeling of community of 
origin. Community of speech remains, in such cases, 
merely community of speech, unsupported by any of 
these pleasing fictions of brotherhood which weld the 
parts of remote but more similar races into a coherent 
people. Even so, the community of language as a 
cohesive force is enormous, but it is not race unity. 

It will occur to the thoughtful reader that commu- 
nity in other things than language may suggest the fact 
of kinship and so become a factor in race unity. It 
it related in Japanese legend that when the founder of 
the present dynasty carried his conquering arms into a 
distant province he was ultimately recognised as the 
kin of the reigning family because of the similarity 
of his weapons to those there in use. Similarity of 
any sort counts in the same way. One other factor 
is of sufficient importance to warrant brief consider- 
ation, namely, religion. 

Religion has undoubtedly lost much of its import- 
ance in recent times as a political factor. Its ancient 
role, however, was very important. This will be 
more apparent if we recall the fact that nations were 
once supposed to be of divine origin and essentially 
religious in character. All adherents of the national 
religion (and all religions were national) therefore 



THE INTANGIBLE THINGS 29 

logically belonged to the nation with which that re- 
ligion was identified. Membership in the one as in 
the other was normally a matter of birth, though 
adoption, a far more serious thing than its modern 
counterpart, might, by the aid of religion, establish 
a real relationship which, in its obligations, its senti- 
ments, and its all important recognition by the unseen 
powers, was identical with kinship of blood. 

It is easy to see how a religion which held men in 
awe, and which had not only the right to sanction 
but the power to create the closest bonds between 
men, constantly held the fate of peace or war in its 
hand. A disrupted people would still be united by 
the consciousness of a common faith. Conquered 
territories were never secure if they held the shrines 
of the conquered. Religious conflicts would make 
political union difficult or impossible. Witness the 
crusades, the sacred wars of Islam, the religious ob- 
stacles to a united Ireland. Fellowship in religion 
has too often resulted in fierce conflicts between those 
otherwise akin, and at times in strange unions of those 
otherwise dissimilar. 

It is a truism that the rallying power of religion 
in war has greatly diminished. No religion could 
to-day organise a crusade. More than once in our 
time the acknowledged head of the Moslem world 
has unfurled the prophet's banner in vain. Despite &/ 
the pleas of the Vatican, the Catholic world has not 
rebuked Italy for despoiling the Church. Bulgaria 
in alliance with Moslem Turkey is warring against 
Servia, a nation of the same faith as her own. 
Strangest of all, the great war witnesses Catholic and 



3 o THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Protestant allies lined up against their counterparts, 
and in defence of Greek orthodox Russia, who is at 
war with Greek orthodox Bulgaria, while Moham- 
medan Turks are opposed by Mohammedans from 
India and Algeria, and Orangemen and Nationalists 
fight side by side to keep Ireland British. There 
could hardly be a better illustration of the utter re- 
fusal of men to be swayed by religious considerations. 

Yet religion still counts, and under favouring condi- 
tions may turn the scale. The policy of the British 
Empire has been much influenced by the religious sen- 
sitiveness of Indian Mohammedans, and the religious 
animosities of Catholic and Protestant in Ireland not 
only brought that country to the verge of civil war, 
but were largely responsible for the confident expec- 
tation of British neutrality which led the Central Pow- 
ers to precipitate the present war. Decidedly, the 
power of religion as a war maker and political factor 
has waned, but he would be a careless statesman 
who should ignore it in his calculations. 

One great ideal interest remains, the recognition 
of which is vital to the success of our inquiry. It is 
complex and intangible, difficult to define or name, 
and in its present aspect it is comparatively modern. 
In default of a better name we may call it nationality. 
Under its influence men do not think of the nation as 
a means of advancing commerce or defending their 
possessions or even of uniting their race, but rather 
as a good in itself, a thing whose majesty and power 
they love to contemplate, even in so slight a matter 
as their particular colour on the map. Indeed, na- 
tionality will often brush commercial interests quite 



THE INTANGIBLE THINGS 31 

aside, will curtail independence, and will stride away 
over race boundaries under certain conditions quite 
without hesitation. It is futile to protest that na- 
tion building under these circumstances does not pay. 
Nationality itself is its own reward. Like the house- 
holder, we do not build the nation to make money; 
we make money to build the nation. 

If we try to analyse this object of our affection, we 
are as much embarrassed as we should be to explain 
our friendships or our tastes. Why do we think so 
much of our children? Hardly because of their su- 
perlative excellence. They can not all be exception- 
ally admirable. Yet no one thinks our fondness ab- 
surd or profitless. Likewise our love for the nation. 
It is not at all an abstraction. On the contrary, our 
affection attaches to a multitude of concrete things, 
the most of them utterly inconsequential, but the ag- 
gregate all compelling. 

The writer was once introduced by a vivacious 
young woman and former travel acquaintance as one 
who " has travelled all over the world and who ac- 
tually asserts that French coffee is fit to drink." He 
was moved to reply : " My dear young woman, do you 
know that is just what those soldiers are fighting about 
over on the banks of the Aisne? " This hyperbole 
was justified by an incident of trench life reported 
about that time. A German cook, missing his way in 
the dense fog, stumbled with his steaming coffee pot 
into a French trench, and the narrator concluded his 
story with the words : " We drank his vile juice and 
kicked him out." Other people's coffee is not like 
ours, but we never phrase it that way. Other people's 



32 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

coffee is " vile juice." Only our kind is " fit to drink." 
And what is true of coffee is true of thousands of other 
things, large and small, most of them quite as in- 
consequential as coffee, and preferred for reasons 
quite as arbitrary. But, taken all together, these mul- 
titudinous arbitrary things make up the substance of 
our lives, our bodies, so to speak, in which alone 
our spirits can be housed. Among people who make 
our kind of coffee and do all the other things in our 
way, we feel at home; we are in "God's country." 
We may recognise that these preferences are based 
on ignorance, that fuller knowledge, indeed, would 
quite revise our judgments, but the comfort of our 
wonted environment, and the extreme disagreeable- 
ness of readjustment are such that our feelings 
get little benefit from our intellectual concessions. 
" Their way may be all right, but, ugh ! none of it for 
me! " Something like that would be the average at- 
titude. If out of the heart are the issues of life, it 
is not difficult to see what that issue will be. 

All this is quite condemned by ordinary logic and 
quite justified by the deeper principles of race evo- 
lution. The sum of these items, small and large, 
make up a nation's character, just as the sum of a per- 
son's habits and traits make up his individuality. 
Looked at objectively, this is what we of the English 
speech call civilisation, and the Germans Kultur (a 
word not to be confounded with culture). No doubt 
there is a difference in civilisations, just as there is in 
biological organisms, some being better fitted to sur- 
vive than others, but with these differences our prefer- 
ences have nothing whatsoever to do. It is perfectly 



THE INTANGIBLE THINGS 33 

right for us to prefer our own civilisation, but that 
preference quite disqualifies us to sit on the jury that 
is to judge its merits. It is not for us to say whether 
French coffee is fit to drink, but we may say whether 
we care to drink it. There is only one arbiter. In 
the long run the superior civilisation will grow at 
the expense of the inferior. If the other kind of 
coffee comes out ahead, never mind. We shall not 
be here then, and those who are here will think it 
fit to drink. 

But while our preference is not due to the superi- 
ority of our civilisation, the superiority of our civil- 
isation is largely due to our preference. The most 
ideal civilisation would die if its devotees did not 
passionately prefer it, just as the most perfect species 
of animal would perish if it did not cherish and pro- 
tect its young with unreasoning devotion. Hence our 
unreasonable preferences as measured by the inherent 
quality of things, are justified as the only thing that 
can give our way of life a fighting chance in the great 
struggle for survival. Cosmopolitanism is a very ra- 
tional attitude, but it would take very little of it to 
unnerve a civilisation. And while most of the things 
that we thus jealously guard are as inconsequential 
as our coffee, and their superiority as doubtful, it must 
not be forgotten that within the sheltering fold of our 
national prejudice many an idea and principle of ac- 
tion of real value to the race survives through tender 
years till growth and achievement secure general rec- 
ognition. 

But nationality, it will be objected, is not the same 
thing as civilisation. It may even be claimed that 



34 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

they are not close counterparts, and that the one is. 
little else than an impostor, falsely claiming to be the 
guardian of the other. One writer goes so far as to 
claim that nationality is nothing but an administrative 
convenience, that it represents no matter of vital im- 
portance to men, and that we may well be indifferent 
to its divisions and frontiers. A Briton, it is argued, 
may legitimately desire the extension of British civili- 
sation, but the extension of the British Empire is a 
wholly different thing. But is it a wholly different 
thing? A different thing, no doubt, but not an un- 
related or independent thing. The nation is, in fact, 
an outward, concrete expression of the individual 
civilisation, by means of which that civilisation acts 
with tremendous additional efficiency. A national 
civilisation bears the same relation to a non-national 
civilisation that a modern army does to a horde of 
unorganised soldiers. The great fighting mechanism, 
in which individual units are scarcely more discernible 
than cells in our body tissue, sweeps the unorganised 
mass before it like so many sheep. Whether for 
purposes of peaceful achievement or militant asser- 
tion, the civilisation that has not acquired this organ 
of nationality is doomed, and that increasingly. Wit- 
ness the case of the Jews. They do not lack person- 
ality, and their civilisation has profoundly affected 
the world. Their personal power has not lessened. 
But their civilisation, deprived of national expression, 
has disappeared. There are German Jews, British 
Jews, French Jews, all sorts of hyphenated Jews, each 
ready to fight for the civilisation that is distinctively 
his own. There can be no doubt that the greatest 



THE INTANGIBLE THINGS 35 

civilisation in the world would suffer the same fate if 
deprived of this organ of national expression. That 
it would contribute greatly to surviving civilisations 
in the course of its elimination is a consolation but not 
a compensation. The lamb, under similar circum- 
stances, contributes undeniably to the substance and 
efficiency of the lion, but may reasonably prefer to 
remain a lamb. 

There is nothing new in this relation of nationality 
to civilisation, but it has clearly acquired new im- 
portance. No matter to what school of thought we 
turn or what political phenomenon we contemplate, 
the growing importance of nationality is apparent. 
It is a cardinal principle of socialism and near-social- 
ism, as of imperialism and all growing schools of 
thought. The old doctrine that that government is 
best which governs least nowhere finds a defender. 
Little governed states like China are developing the 
new much-governing mechanism with all haste. 
Everywhere we witness the steady transfer of func- 
tions from the individual to the state. Under such 
circumstances there is an ever lessening chance that a 
civilisation that is not equipped with the organ of na- 
tionality can preserve its distinctive characteristics, 
can survive as a civilisation. 

The newest thing of all in this connection is the 
fact that men have waked up to this fact of de- 
pendence. The last hundred years is in nothing so 
remarkable as in the revived consciousness of nation- 
ality. It is not so very long since Portugal seriously 
considered uniting with Spain, as territorial and racial 
considerations alike recommend. But although no 



36 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

war or other untoward incident has since estranged 
these peoples, the consciousness of nationality as an 
exponent of civilisation has completely reversed this 
tendency, and no suggestion could be now more of- 
fensive to the Portuguese than the surrender or com- 
promise of their nationality. In the same period 
Norway has severed her connection with Sweden, 
equally without special occasion, while suppressed na- 
tionalities like the Balkan states and the component 
elements of Austria-Hungary, even Egypt and India, 
have felt the intoxication of the new consciousness. 
It is folly to urge that there is no substantial good in 
this world passion; that nationality doesn't pay. 
None of us know enough to know whether it pays or 
not. And besides, our civilisation as incarnated in 
and energised by nationality is a final term. To ar- 
gue that it doesn't pay is like arguing that children do 
not pay. Our argument will not be refuted; it will 
only be laughed at and scorned. 

Recognising the great and unchallengeable posi- 
tion of nationality among the mental forces that shape 
men's conduct, it is easy to see its relation to war. In 
the first place, the conviction is easy and in a measure 
justified, that to extend the domain of our nationality 
is to extend the domain of our civilisation. The ex- 
tension is accompanied by something of deterioration, 
no doubt, but a real extension, none the less. India 
is not England, but India is British in something more 
than a political sense, and must become so increasingly 
as the relation continues. Does any one doubt that 
Roman civilisation in some very real sense was estab- 
lished in Gaul as the result of Caesar's conquest, and 



THE INTANGIBLE THINGS 37 

that it has profoundly influenced the subsequent his- 
tory of that country? The conquests of Alexander 
are a still more striking example of the influence of 
political arrangements on the course of civilisation. 
If it be said that in all these cases the civilisation in 
question would have made its conquests without the 
extension of political dominion, we need only to re- 
call the difference between Gallic and Germanic civili- 
sation in the days of Tacitus, the persistence of the 
German language and the disappearance of the Gal- 
lic before the Latin, etc. Or finally, we may ask 
ourselves whether there is any likelihood that India 
would have assimilated anything like so much of Brit- 
ish civilisation, if independent or under the rule of 
some other power. To ask these questions is to 
answer them, to the minds of all reasonable persons. 
Civilisation is not nationality, but the one follows 
close in the footsteps of the other, and devotion to 
our own civilisation must inevitably express itself in 
a tendency toward imperialism. Such a tendency 
may easily be indiscreet, but it is not ungenerous, not 
so ungenerous in fact as the stay-at-home conservatism 
which counsels us to mind our own business and not 
bother about the white man's burden. 

It is apparent that if nationality excites the strong 
to aggression, it must equally incite the weak to de- 
fence. Never a cause so hopeless, never a civilisa- 
tion so worthless, never a coffee so bad, that it will 
not find defenders who will accept martyrdom in its 
behalf. This being the case, it is clear that nation- 
ality must often be a cause of war, for it incites the 
one to attempt what it incites the other to resist. 



X 



3 8 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Never was this opposition more clearly manifest than 
in the present conflict. Germany-Austria-Hungary, 
convinced of the possibility and fascinated with the 
prospect of enlarged domain, Servia battling with the 
energy of desperation to preserve a national civilisa- 
tion still in its uncomely fledgling state, and Turkey 
in noisome decrepitude embracing its moribund civil- 
isation with the convulsive energy of despair, all for 
what? Just for the privilege of living, of being them- 
selves, and that in the full measure of the possible. 

One fact more should be noted in order to com- 
plete our inventory of these great forces. Men have 
become aware of late that civilisations are made and 
unmade mostly by the quieter forces of peace, and 
that war is often little more than a spectacular ratifi- 
cation of results already accomplished. On the face 
of it, it would seem that this should make for peace, 
but it does not always do so. A nation that finds 
itself gaining in the peaceful competition is likely to 
favour its continuance, but the nation that finds itself 
losing is quite apt to seek in war another chance. 
Thus, it is contended by Germany that England has 
fomented this war because she found herself losing 
to Germany in the field of commercial rivalry. On 
the other hand it is alleged that German commerce 
had been developed by government aid and bounties 
until that policy had reached the breaking point, and 
that Germany resorted to war to complete a conquest 
which she was not able to carry through by subsidy. 
Neither of these claims can be substantiated, but both 
suggest ways in which the forces of peace may drive 
nations to war. 



THE INTANGIBLE THINGS 39 

Far more significant than these, however, is the 
growing consciousness of growth as the insidious ally 
of certain nations against others. Why not be con- 
tent to live as you are, seeking prosperity by peaceful 
development, and avoiding the ghastly destruction of 
war, says the peace advocate? To which Germany 
may well reply: " We will if Russia will stop grow- 
ing." But let peace continue for a couple of cen- 
turies, and what will be the relative status of Ger- 
many, Russia, and Britain? Much the same as that 
of France and Belgium, or Germany and Denmark. 
Peace may still continue, nay, is likely to continue, 
as the hopelessness of war becomes more apparent. 
But the influence of the lesser power will wane, and 
its civilisation as embodied in the form of nationality, 
will cease to awe or inspire the minds of men in the 
measure that the greater nationalities do. Insensibly 
it will be undermined in its own habitat. Overshad- 
owed and cowed as the civilisation of a lesser people, 
it will be simply elbowed off the field, even by the 
most considerate of giant neighbours. 

The appreciation of the fact that our civilisation 
is endangered by the insidious forces of peace, by 
the mere protoplasmic push of forces that are of no 
man's willing, of no man's ill will, is revolutionary in 
its influence when it becomes the consciousness of a 
people, as it recently has of one people at least. To 
extend the domain of empire before it is too late, 
with its inevitable sequence of mother tongue and 
all our kind of things, becomes not wanton aggres- 
sion, as it might otherwise seem, but mere prudence 
and patriotic foresight. 



4 o THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

To what purpose all this, do you ask? To what 
purpose anything? It is our own country, our way 
of doing, and we love it, that's all. There is nothing 
beyond that. How could there be? 



CHAPTER III 

THE PROBLEM OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 

In the two preceding chapters we have tried to 
remind ourselves of what men in our day are like and 
of some of the more constant purposes which govern 
their action. We have now to turn from abstract 
principles to concrete problems and see how these 
principles work out in practice. We will not under- 
take to consider all the problems which burden the 
statesmen of our day. We are concerned after all 
with the general problem rather than with its local 
manifestations. It will be sufficient for our purpose 
to examine a few marked examples. 

The first thing that strikes us is that most of these 
problems have to do with the sea. There are ques- 
tions of land frontier like that between Germany and 
France, Italy and Austria, but they are of little con- 
sequence as compared with the problems of control 
of the sea. More closely considered, they usually 
prove to be sea problems in disguise, as notably in the 
second case above mentioned. Whether or not it be 
true, as claimed by Captain Mahan, that sea power 
has been the decisive factor in all the great wars of 
history, it is surely the decisive factor now, and its 
influence is rapidly increasing. And the sea is po- 
tent in war because it is potent in peace, as the great 

41 



42 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

burden bearer of the nations who are ever more re- 
quisitioning its services. Ocean borne commerce has 
steadily increased for centuries, and in the last half 
hundred years the increase has been prodigious. It 
is not too much to say that any nation, even Switzer- 
land, would suffer and perhaps perish if denied the 
freedom of the sea. 

Hence the great problems of the nations to-day are 
sea problems, problems of easier access to the sea, of 
more and better harbours, of larger docks and more 
commodious warehouses, of ampler and easier rail- 
road feeders, canals, etc. To entice the big steam- 
ship lines away from one port to another, to secure 
lower rates between this port and inland ports, or 
faster service which shall enable it to deliver letters or 
goods a few hours earlier than its rival, such are the 
great victories in the wars of peace. And concur- 
rently, the problem of war is primarily to keep open 
these ports, to protect these steamship lines and to 
prevent the strangulation of this life-giving commerce. 
And the sea is not only the great thing to be defended; 
it becomes in turn the great defender. Its great ships 
become the carriers of soldiers and munitions, and 
metamorphosed for their purpose, they are the most 
terrible engines of war ever devised by man. To 
provide for their construction and housing, to protect 
them from enemies and satisfy their insatiable de- 
mands for munitions and supplies, becomes in turn a 
chief concern of the modern state. 

This slow shifting of emphasis from the land to the 
sea has profoundly modified the science of strategic 
delimitation. The strategic unit was once a land 



PROBLEM OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 45 

unit; it is now a sea unit. The Italian peninsula, 
walled in to the north by mountains and elsewhere 
bounded by the sea, was an ideal old-time unit. To- 
day the Adriatic is the unit. There will be no as- 
sured peace as long as rivals dispute its control. 
After her first war with China, Britain sought to make 
her commerce in the East secure by acquiring the is- 
land of Hong Kong. She later found herself com- 
pelled to acquire territory upon the mainland opposite 
to protect the vitally important waters lying between. 
In so doing she assumed the unwelcome task of de- 
fending a long and artificial land frontier, but this was 
the lesser risk. After Japan's victory over Russia 
she demanded the southern part of the island of 
Saghalien, accepting the very artificial frontier of a 
parallel of latitude, her purpose being to secure con- 
trol of La Perouse Strait lying between. When 
Greece, in the Balkan Wars, extended her conquest 
into Epirus, the Powers absolutely refused to allow 
her to retain part of the territory conquered, because 
it would have given her control of the mountain-girt 
body of water lying between the coast and the Greek 
island of Corfu, a position too strategic to be lightly 
yielded to a power of unknown affinities. Such cases 
might be multiplied. They all point to the single con- 
clusion, that while we still live on the land, our destiny 
is determined on the sea. 

And perceiving this, we must assume that nations 
will struggle for the control of sea areas which are 
vital to their existence, that they will manoeuvre for 
position and that if conflicts of interest can not be ad- 
justed by compromise, wars will result. It is to cer- 



46 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

tain of these sea areas that we now turn our attention. 
We will begin with the Mediterranean. 

The importance of the Mediterranean in ancient 
times is too obvious for insistence, but it was of quite 
a different kind from that of the present day. It 
was practically the only known sea, and the known 
world bordered upon it. To this world it stood in 
much the same relation as the ocean at large holds 
to the nations of to-day. Its control was possible only 
with world dominion, and that dominion was attained 
primarily on land and thence transferred to the sea, 
maritime instincts and maritime science being both 
rudimentary. 

The discovery of America and other concurrent 
events led to the development of the larger modern 
world, built about the Atlantic much as the ancient 
world had been built about the Mediterranean. The 
latter now became a local issue, immensely important, 
no doubt, but no longer the goal of world dominion. 
Finally, the development of large interests in the East 
and the construction of the Suez Canal has again 
lifted the Mediterranean to honour, though its mod- 
ern importance is of a different kind from the old. It 
remains to be seen whether the new route via Panama, 
undoubtedly a rival, will again rob the Mediterranean 
of its brief importance and make the great highway 
again a mere line for local traffic. It seems certain, 
however, that among lesser bodies of water, the Med- 
iterranean must retain its place as an area of first 
importance. At present the most important prob- 
lems of statesmanship are directly or indirectly con- 
nected with this sea. We will consider here only the 



PROBLEM OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 47 

problem of through traffic, that is, traffic from or 
through this sea to the Atlantic on the one hand and 
the Indian and Pacific areas on the other, leaving for 
separate consideration the local problems of dwellers 
on its shores and in the areas of tributary seas. 

As thus defined, the problem of the Mediterranean 
is primarily a problem of its western and eastern en- 
trances, to which must be added the southern entrance 
to the Red Sea which latter is essentially a long vesti- 
bule to the Mediterranean. All these approaches are 
essentially in the control of a single power. The na- 
ture of that control and the problems that it involves 
invite attention. 

The western entrance, a narrow strait from eight 
to ten miles in width, is dominated by precipitous 
heights on both sides, constituting a natural fortress 
of great strength. On the north the height consists 
of a huge isolated rock, essentially an island, project- 
ing boldly into the strait, though not quite at its nar- 
rowest point, and connected with the mainland by a 
mere strip of sand scarcely above the level of the sea. 
This rock heavily fortified, together with the harbour 
laboriously constructed on its western side, is Gibral- 
tar, the most famous and in popular opinion the most 
impregnable of all fortresses. 

Whether popular faith in its impregnability is jus- 
tified or not we need not inquire. Certain it is that its 
nature and purpose are popularly misunderstood. It 
is commonly assumed that its function in war would 
be to prevent a hostile fleet from passing the straits. 
Its service in this connection would be but incidental. 
For such a purpose, the heights on the African side 



48 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

should be fortified and should co-operate. Unaided, 
it is doubtful if the guns of Gibraltar could stop the 
more powerful of modern fighting ships. But for 
such a purpose Britain relies, not on the fortress, but 
on her own fleet. What then is the use of Gibraltar? 
The question has been asked by writers of some pre- 
tension, and some have not hesitated to conclude that 
Gibraltar is useless, an expensive souvenir of an ear- 
lier day, and an example of the unconscious out-of- 
dateness of Britain's defences. 

These errors are due to popular ignorance of the 
nature of naval warfare. There is an unconscious as- 
sumption in the minds of all of us who are not of the 
craft, that warships once launched and manned are 
able to fight indefinitely in any waters to which they 
have access. The fact is that warships are very help- 
less if far or long away from their base of sup- 
plies on land. For one thing, they obviously need 
frequently to replenish their supply of fuel. An 
ocean liner coals every voyage, carrying little more 
than a week's supply. The provisioning of the ship 
with its large crew is another source of dependence in 
peace and war. In actual war this dependence is 
greatly increased. Suppose a warship in actual ac- 
tion, and victorious. What is its condition and its 
need? Its magazines would be empty, and perhaps 
its bunkers as well. Its hull and funnels would be rid- 
dled with shot, and its hold filled with wounded men. 
It must get to arsenals to replenish its munitions, to a 
hospital for the disposal of its wounded, to coal depots 
to fill its bunkers, to workshops to repair its hull and 
its machinery, and above all to a garrison post to fill 



PROBLEM OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 49 

the gaps in its fighting force. Failing this, it is 
quickly reduced to impotence. The distance at which 
a warship can successfully operate from its base 
(known as its radius of action) is far less than is usu- 
ally supposed, and is of course far less in war than in 
peace. The condition of a navy's successful opera- 
tion in distant waters is therefore the possession of 
suitably located naval bases, having all the requisites 
for repairing and equipping the ships of the fleet. 
The sea power of England consists not only in her 
ships but quite as much in her long line of naval sta- 
tions which dot all seas. 

Her control of the Mediterranean is essentially 
naval, and Gibraltar is the first of her naval stations. 
The visitor to the historic fortress is conducted 
through the rock-hewn galleries armed with obsolete 
cannon, and gets a glimpse of one or two big guns on 
the rocky summit, and is satisfied that he has seen 
Gibraltar. He should rather walk up the road which 
ascends behind the Alameda to a point where he can 
look down on the vast shops where the click of the 
riveter is never silent. He should note the huge cold 
storage plants, the hospitals, the fresh water reser- 
voirs, the ammunition stores, etc., for these are Gibral- 
tar. It goes without saying that such a base needs 
protection, and that this duty should, as far as pos- 
sible, be performed by other agencies than the fleet, 
whose freedom of action it is its purpose to assure. 
Hence the necessity of the fortress, which exists to 
protect the base, not to close the straits. This pur- 
pose it amply serves as against a hostile fleet. 

But while the inability of the fortress to close the 



50 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

straits is no indication of inadequacy, the developing 
science of war is gradually undermining its security. 
When Gibraltar was chosen as Britain's naval base, 
the utmost range of artillery was three miles, and from 
such artillery the isolated rock was perfectly safe. 
To-day the range is twenty-six miles. Far within this 
range rise heights on the Spanish mainland from 
which the fire of modern artillery could dominate both 
fortress and harbour and make the task of shop and 
storehouse impossible. The possibility that these 
heights may be seized and fortified by some powerful 
antagonist is the subject of unconcealed anxiety on the 
part of British strategists. Were Spain as isolated 
and impotent as China, there can be no doubt that 
England would long ago have assured Gibraltar by 
acquiring a considerable area on the adjacent main- 
land, even though this involved, as at Hong Kong, a 
difficult problem of frontier defence. Even now, 
should she descry the beginnings of fortifications on 
the heights above mentioned, there can be no doubt 
that, if protest were unavailing, the guns of the big 
fortress would be turned on the offending summits. 
A removal of the entire base to the east side of the 
rock has been contemplated, but not as yet effected. 

The defence of the Suez Canal is, if possible, even 
more vital to Britain than the defence of Gibraltar. 
Yet the canal itself is not fortified, and is under pledge 
to observe neutrality in war. Not till we reach Aden 
at the mouth of the Red Sea, thirteen hundred miles 
to the south, or Malta in the mid-Mediterranean, 
eleven hundred miles to the west, do we come upon the 
real defences of the Suez Canal. Obviously here 



PROBLEM OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 51 

again reliance is placed in the fleet, and the impreg- 
nable forts of " Steamer Point " and " Valetta " serve 
even more than at Gibraltar merely to protect the 
base and its activities. The character of these de- 
fences is further emphasised by the location of Aden 
a hundred miles from the narrow opening of the Red 
Sea, where alone its guns might hope to be efficacious 
in resisting a passing fleet. 

It is clear that if naval bases so located can serve 
the needs of the British navy, the shores of the Medi- 
terranean furnish other potential bases in abundance. 
The nations bordering on this sea have not failed to 
equip themselves with such adjuncts to their naval 
power. France has bases on both European and 
African coasts, and all other aspirants to sea power 
have bases appropriately located. 

What then, is the problem of the Mediterranean, 
and how may the situation thus outlined lead to war? 
Primarily it is a problem of more naval bases, and the 
possibility that other strong and aggressive nations 
may acquire a foothold in this region which might 
threaten the security of the Mediterranean powers 
and particularly of the through traffic between East 
and West by this great central route. It is irrelevant 
to inquire whether others have as good rights as pres- 
ent possessors. We are not here arbitrating claims, 
but are simply noting actual tendencies and possibili- 
ties. Present possessors do not wish rivals, especially 
powerful rivals, least of all rivals who have grievances 
or ambitions in other quarters which might give them 
more than local reasons for using the power thus 
acquired. In a word, neither Britain nor the local 



52 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Mediterranean powers want Germany admitted to 
their number. Free passage for her commerce is 
granted as a matter of course, nor is there any evi- 
dence that this privilege was grudged or liable to be 
withheld. But to have the freedom of the Mediter- 
ranean contested, or menaced as an incident to the 
pressing of outside claims is not to their liking. That 
Germany resents her exclusion from any part of the 
trade route of the Mediterranean is equally natural, 
and in view of her extensive commerce with the East, 
perhaps equally justified. We are concerned not with 
the merits of these opposed claims, but simply with the 
fact that they are opposed, and that the conflict is 
liable to make trouble. 

It has made trouble. Long ago, as the statesmen 
of Britain looked over the field, it became clear that 
the African shore was a source of danger. In 1827 
France had seized Algeria, and after a long and costly 
struggle had confirmed her possession about the mid- 
dle of the century. Thus a long stretch of coast in 
Africa was appropriated before the question became 
acute. Following the acquisition of the Suez Canal, 
Britain had occupied Egypt, and to appease the much 
aroused anger of France, had acquiesced in her occu- 
pation of Tunis, a most important strategic extension 
of her Algerian possessions. All this while Germany 
was struggling to become a nation. Slowly Germany 
became conscious of her remoter interests and pos- 
sessed of a new and mighty ambition. France with 
her old grievance and Britain with her new anxiety, 
rivals till now in this field, even bitter enemies in the 
eighties, now make common cause, and divide the 



PROBLEM OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 53 

keeping of the Mediterranean between them. Tripoli 
and Morocco remain as danger points. They must 
be permanently disposed of. 

The diplomatic records of this period will not be 
given to us until interest in these problems has largely 
ceased. Until then we have but circumstantial evi- 
dence as to what happened. Some things, however, 
are written large on the face of the situation. Tripoli 
was a nominal dependency of Turkey, and its seizure 
by Italy involved war with that country. Egypt, 
though under British control, was also in name a part 
of the Turkish Empire, and as such, pledged to sup- 
port the cause of its suzerain. The position of Bri- 
tain in Egypt was peculiarly calculated to show her 
hand. If she wished Tripoli to remain Turkish, she 
had but to permit Egypt to aid Turkish arms, or 
merely to open Egypt to the passage of Turkish 
troops, and Italian conquest would become impossible. 
Britain could have plausibly explained that she was 
merely permitting an unquestioned right, and refrain- 
ing from interference in a matter in which she had no 
concern. On the other hand, her actual control of 
Egypt enabled her to close that country to the passage 
of troops, under the equally plausible pretext of in- 
suring its tranquillity, and her own neutrality, thus 
assuring Italian success in turn. She chose the latter 
alternative, against strong pressure from both Tur- 
key and Egypt itself. Britain did not disapprove of 
the seizure. Indeed when we recall the fact that the 
masterful Lord Kitchener, whom the Egyptians were 
wont to obey, was sent by an unfriendly British cabinet 
to rule that country, and that the Italian expedition 



54 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

was launched immediately after his arrival, it is diffi- 
cult not to see in the move the masterly hand of Brit- 
ish diplomacy. Could the further rumour be substan- 
tiated that Germany was negotiating at the time for a 
long lease of one of the Tripolitan ports, and that 
these negotiations had come to the knowledge of the 
British government, surmise would give way to cer- 
tainty. 

It is easy to see the motive for such a policy. Tri- 
poli, undefended by its suzerain, was a standing temp- 
tation to any aggressive power. Its seizure by a 
responsible Mediterranean power was a substantial 
guarantee against seizure by an outsider. The fact 
that Italy was in nominal but precarious alliance with 
Germany made protest by Germany difficult, while the 
friendship of England, and in turn, the development 
of Italian oversea interests which could exist only by 
her suffrance, must tend to detach her from the central 
powers and draw her into closer relation to the powers 
of the West. It may further be noted that France 
and England are now friends and keenly alive to the 
importance of maintaining their friendship. We may 
have disputes with our next door neighbour, but sel- 
dom with our neighbour next beyond. Tripoli, lying 
between French Tunis and British Egypt, is a guaran- 
tee against boundary disputes and strain upon the 
friendship of the two great powers. Its value to 
Italy is a very different question. 

The annexation of Tripoli assures the coast from 
the Canal westward almost to the Straits. Only 
Morocco was needed to close the gap. Here again 
weakness invited aggression, and the interested powers 



PROBLEM OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 55 

had long been busy to avert the threatened danger. 
As the gap narrowed and the powers of the Mediter- 
ranean concert seemed about to draw their cordon of 
steel about the famous sea, excitement became intense. 
A tentative agreement of the Mediterranean powers 
for the disposal of the Moroccan question was chal- 
lenged by Germany, in the person of the Emperor 
himself, who landed at Tangiers, and in a speech to 
German sympathisers announced that no agreement 
from which Germany was excluded could be valid. A 
conference of European powers, called at the instance 
of Germany, met at Algeciras, the Spanish neighbour 
of Gibraltar, and after long debate reached an agree- 
ment with regard to the occupancy and administration 
of Morocco, from which Germany was excluded. 
Despite many face-saving concessions of other kinds 
or in other quarters, nothing could disguise the fact 
or remove the smart of this diplomatic defeat. 

Soon the world was startled by the appearance of a 
German warship in a Moroccan port. Questioned 
as to the meaning of this move, Germany frankly re- 
plied that she meant to reopen the Moroccan question. 
Again the long diplomatic battle in which, even more 
plainly than before, the mighty contestants showed 
their teeth. Again Germany was denied, though with 
face-saving concessions of more presentable charac- 
ter and possible value than before in remote and un- 
strategic areas. The possession of Morocco by the 
Mediterranean powers was confirmed, and the cordon 
of their undisputed control now stretched from the 
Egyptian frontier on the east to Gibraltar on the west, 
and round the north to Italy and the doubtful beyond, 



5 6 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

where local problems scarcely less important than that 
of the Mediterranean itself complicated the situation, 
and the rotten barrier of Turkey presented the last 
opportunity for the entrance of Germany into the 
coveted area. It was plain that peaceful entrance 
was and would be denied. Entrance by force was 
feasible only on Germany's element, the land. To 
this strenuous task Germany's mighty energies were 
henceforth to be directed. It is no exaggeration to 
say that the question of the Mediterranean was a 
principal cause, as these recent diplomatic defeats were 
the immediate occasion of the present war. At the 
close of the second struggle it was privately but openly 
announced by the German emperor that from that 
time he should adopt a new policy, and preparations, 
the extent of which the world has but begun to realise, 
were forthwith hurried to completion. 

The subject gives occasion to moralise on the un- 
reasonableness of national ambitions. Why not let 
Germany in? To which the only reply is that nations 
fear and suspect one another, and that a German naval 
station on Britain's line of communications with her 
great eastern empire might be used to her hurt. But 
would it be so used? Who can tell? Britain has not 
used the power she undoubtedly possesses to restrict 
in any degree the freedom of the seas she rules. Per- 
haps Germany would be equally considerate. But 
then why does Germany risk so much to gain that 
control? Were the Mediterranean in her keeping, 
nay, were all seas in her power, she would not enjoy 
a single privilege of peaceful use which is not now 
freely accorded to her. Why, then, this titanic strug- 



PROBLEM OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 57 

gle to assure rights that are not challenged? The 
suspicion is inevitable that more is intended, that Brit- 
ain's control of the sea is challenged as a prelude to 
contesting the possession of her colonies and the very 
existence of her empire. All with reason, it may be. 
No matter. Britain stands guard. Any people so 
challenged would stand guard. Criticise or sympa- 
thise as we will, the possessor must be expected to 
guard his possessions. And after all, does not the 
most altruistic of pacifists lock his door against the 
housebreaker? 

Meanwhile it is a matter of congratulation to the 
neutral world that the power now in control is one 
whose widely scattered and exposed interests compel 
her to be circumspect. Any attempt on her part to 
limit the freedom of the seas in time of peace, would 
arm the world against her, and against such a power 
she would be helpless. She is the world's mistress 
only by the world's suffrance. She has given hostages 
to humanity. 

But we are not concerned at present to decide who 
should rule the seas or the Mediterranean, but merely 
to note that the Mediterranean is necessarily a de- 
batable ground. So long as men are disposed to fight, 
so long as they can be induced to fight, the Mediter- 
ranean will be a thing to fight about. It is the world's 
oldest and well-nigh its greatest highway, a highway 
which has at once the shortest through route and the 
richest local traffic, and a highway withal which can be 
easily dominated from a few strategic points. A uni- 
fied control of the great highway is as inevitable as it 
is necessary to its proper commercial use. Let that 






5 8 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

control fall into irresponsible and inconsiderate hands, 
and we return, no matter under how genteel a form, 
to the days of the Barbary pirates. Other alterna- 
tives — the rule of a single power, conscious of the 
dangers of its supremacy, a balance of the powers, 
each watching jealously from its stronghold, a concert 
of the powers, an independent commission acting un- 
der international guarantees — each has its advocates 
and its opponents, its advantages and its dangers. 
But the Mediterranean remains one of the most vital 
of human interests, and its control is likely to be con- 
tested as long as there are rivalries and contests 
among the families of men. 



A. 



/ 



CHAPTER IV 

THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 

This great arm of the Mediterranean is about five 
hundred miles long and a hundred miles wide. Its 
detachment from the larger body is marked by a 
decided narrowing at the southern end, known as 
the Strait of Otranto, where its width is but forty-five 
miles. It is thus a spacious and easily entered com- 
mercial highway, giving convenient access to the east 
coast of Italy on the west, to the region of the eastern 
Alps on the north, and to the several countries on the 
east, to some of which, and those the most consider- 
able, it furnishes the only direct outlet to the sea. 

The western coast of the Adriatic is almost entirely 
low and unbroken. There are virtually no natural 
harbours, and such as have been laboriously created 
are much exposed. The great mountain chain of the 
Apennines, the backbone of Italy, barely comes within 
sight of the Adriatic near Ancona, and nowhere at- 
tempts to dominate it. To the north of Ancona, the 
great rivers which drain the Alps and the Apennines, 
have built and are still building the broad plain of 
northern Italy. When rivers build land against the 
sea, there is always a broad debatable margin of 
lagoon and swamp, and conspicuously so here. In 
this great swamp lies Venice with her ancient glories 
and her mouldering present, her toilsomely dredged 

59 






60 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

harbour feebly enlivened with a sluggish modern com- 
merce. 

The east coast is in all respects a startling contrast. 
Here mountains everywhere crowd against the sea, 
and as if not content with this dominating proximity, 
they have flung their outposts far out beyond the fron- 
tier in the shape of rocky islets that in long lines 
parallel with the coast form double and triple outpost 
defences. For hundreds of miles this wonderful 
archipelago runs in a strip some twenty miles wide 
along the mountainous coast, and when these lines of 
outposts cease, the coast becomes even more precipi- 
tous, rising into beetling crags thousands of feet high 
which open by the narrowest doorways into mountain- 
walled fjords of incomparable grandeur. In these 
fastnesses and behind the rocky islets lie harbours, 
numerous, commodious, natural and impregnable. 

To complete our inventory of Adriatic peculiarities, 
it must be noted that both within and without the 
Strait of Otranto lie superb natural defences, admira- 
bly suited to the purposes of a naval base. To the 
north, and barely inside the entrance, lies the splendid 
landlocked Bay of Avlona, the entrance to whose 
spacious waters is guarded by the island of Sasseno. 
To the south lies the beautiful island of Corfu whose 
crescent shaped eastern coast reaches out long moun- 
tainous tips which almost touch the mountains of the 
mainland and enclose a spacious bay of singular 
beauty. Here, as at Avlona, a navy of any size could 
find safe anchorage, perfectly protected from an 
enemy of any strength, and by means of modern craft, 
completely controlling the entrance to the Adriatic. 




\ mWtaO 

THE ADRIATIC 

SCALE Of MILES , 

o io 100 



Longitude East 15° ttom Greenwich 

6i 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 63 

To the north of Avlona and therefore well within the 
Adriatic, is Cattaro, at the end of a deep fjord much 
like Lake Lucerne in size, shape, and mountain envi- 
ronment. Connected with the sea by a narrow but 
perfectly practicable passage between huge cliffs, it is 
one of the best protected and most commodious naval 
bases in the world. It is noteworthy that in the pres- 
ent struggle, the Austrians have made it an object of 
chief importance to make sure of Cattaro, the Italians 
of Avlona, and the British and French of Corfu, the 
base best adapted in each case to their purpose. 

The commercial importance of the Adriatic, al- 
ways considerable, was at its maximum in the days of 
Venetian supremacy. In the Roman period it was 
little more than a route for local traffic, and that with 
one of the newer and less opulent parts of the empire, 
though the wealth of northern Italy contributed to the 
importance of its trade. But Rome was the western 
goal of Mediterranean trade, and the great trade 
routes lay to the south of the Adriatic. As the power 
and wealth of Rome declined, however, Italy ceased 
to be the purchaser of eastern goods. The empire, 
dead at the centre and living at the edge, saw the com- 
merce of the East diverted to Britain and France. 
What was the best trade route between the Levant 
and the North? 

From Constantinople across the Balkans and thence 
overland to the Rhine and beyond, was one way, a 
way having some advantages and no small local trade 
of its own. But it was a tedious and costly way, and 
there were robbers to be reckoned with, and toll-gates 
that were quite their kin. 



64 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Another way was to take ship by the old Roman 
route, passing the Straits of Messina with their dread 
Scylla and Charybdis, and thence on to the Riviera 
and the North. It was a cheap way, and there were 
no toll-gates, but the sea had its terrors and took a toll 
of its own. None the less the route was popular, and 
Amain", Pisa, and Genoa in succession, grew rich on 
the increasing commerce which passed their way. 

But clearly best of all was the intermediate route 
by ship under cover of the islands to the Adriatic and 
up its comparatively protected waters to Venice, 
whence easy routes led over the Alps to the great 
German cities, Nuremberg, Augsburg, etc., and on to 
the Rhine. In a word, the Adriatic was at that time 
what the Mediterranean is to-day, the great highway 
not only for local traffic, but for through traffic be- 
tween the ends of the earth. It must not be forgotten 
that in the thirteenth century when Venice was nearing 
her zenith, a single ruler controlled the earth from 
Kamchatka to Singapore, and from the Pacific to the 
Baltic. Trade routes were open and protected, and 
Chinese wares could find their way to Britain then as 
now, if not in the same volume or by the same routes. 
It is not an accident that a Venetian was secretary to 
Kublai Khan. The control of the Adriatic made 
Venice the greatest power in the West, conferring 
much the same power as does the control of the Medi- 
terranean to-day, and for the same reason. 

The mariner's compass, the greater mastery of the 
sea, and the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope 
destroyed this advantage, and the Adriatic again be- 
came merely a line for local traffic. Political changes 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 6$ 

in the East and West, accompanied by devastating 
wars, urged on the transition with disastrous precipi- 
tancy, and the Queen of the Adriatic became a pauper 
of gentility, who was made to dance in her faded 
finery for the amusement of a parvenu world. 

Slowly, with the development of the modern world, 
the commerce of the Adriatic has returned. It has 
not become again the thoroughfare of the nations, but 
with the development of the great hinterland of Aus- 
tria and Hungary, the local traffic which had been its 
modest portion, has grown to imperial proportions. 
Venice still moulders, but Trieste and Fiume, the rival 
ports of the dual empire, with all parts of which they 
are connected by railway, are among the busiest in 
the southern seas. They are by nature the outlets of 
a large territory, and this their natural importance 
has been largely increased by political conditions 
which have tended to focus upon these two neighbour 
cities the trade of an immense region, much of which, 
under different political conditions, would seek another 
outlet. So long as Austrian frontiers are where they 
now are, not a little trade will reach the Adriatic 
which nature intended for the iEgean. To a certain 
extent, however, this is offset in the southern Adriatic. 
Ports which are the natural outlet of Servia are with- 
held and committed to the keeping of the feeble Al- 
banian state whose only recommendation to its spon- 
sors is its feebleness, and Servia accommodates herself 
as she may with the Greek port of Salonica, which, 
however, is the natural outlet for most of her terri- 
tory. All these political factors are unstable and may 
change between the writing and the reading of this 



66 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

book, whether with gain or loss to the commerce of 
the Adriatic, it is hard to say. But in the long run, 
Servia, under whatever name or flag, must reach the 
Adriatic and augment its commerce. And if the con- 
solidation of the central powers should essentially 
efface frontier lines and bring the vast industrial might 
of Germany through to the Adriatic, something like 
the old conditions would be restored. The land de- 
tour from Bremen to the mid-Mediterranean might in 
part be spared, and the Adriatic again become a high- 
way between the great creative North and the limit- 
less East. This is more than a possibility. 

Having noted the physical peculiarities of the 
Adriatic and its commercial importance, we are in a 
position better to understand its problem, as this pre- 
sents itself to the modern statesman. That problem 
is, of course, one of conflicting interests on the part 
of the Adriatic states. These are threefold, commer- 
cial, racial, and strategic. 

It is clear, from what has been said, that the Adri- 
atic is very partial in its distribution of commercial 
facilities. On the west the ports that it offers are few 
and poor, while on the east they are numerous and 
excellent. There is a certain seeming equity in this, 
for the narrow peninsula on the west has other and 
better access to the sea on its western side, while the 
broad countries to the east of the Adriatic have hardly 
a second choice. But the difference is easily exagger- 
ated. The great mountain range which meanders 
through Italy, follows for the most part its western 
edge, and in the northern and broadest portion of the 






THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 67 

peninsula rises like a colossal barrier, its precipitous 
masses almost tumbling into the sea. These moun- 
tains constitute a watershed which sends the great 
trade currents like the great rivers, toward the Adri- 
atic. The mediocre facilities offered by the ungener- 
ous Adriatic are a real hardship, entailing a constant 
burden of expense. The great bulk of Italian com- 
merce is carried over the mountain barrier, and 
Genoa, the once humbled rival of Venice, now far 
outstrips her ancient conqueror. It is difficult to see 
how this situation can be remedied, but it is obviously- 
unsatisfactory and a source of discontent. The vague 
feeling that something ought to be done about it, ac- 
centuates any tendency which may arise from other 
quarters, toward a modification of the status quo. 
Such tendencies are not wanting. 

The racial situation is peculiar. The former poli- 
tical supremacy of Rome has left the Italian tongue 
as its legacy to the islands and border provinces of the 
northern and eastern Adriatic. Wave after wave of 
Slavic migration has come down to these historic 
shores, only to bow in turn to the memory of Rome, 
and learn its mellowed speech. Here, then, we have 
a constant appeal to the dwellers in the peninsula. 
Here are men speaking their language and occupying 
the splendid ports which to them are denied. The 
cry for their " redemption " goes up to heaven. The 
fact that these ports are not where Italy could use 
them is easily overlooked. The price which their 
present possessors set upon them is a sufficient proof 
of their value, while the speech of their citizens is 



68 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

prima facie evidence of their rightful ownership. It 
is easy to show the sophistry of this reasoning, but not 
to destroy its appeal. 

The force of this racial argument is greatly en- 
hanced by other distinct but contributing factors. 
The much talked of Trentino is a wedge of Italian 
speaking territory which Austria has driven right into 
the bulk of northern Italy. It has no seacoast, no 
indispensable commercial facility. It is not strategic 
unless for offence against Italy, for to the north rises 
the still higher barrier of the Tyrolese Alps, which, by 
virtue of their German speech, are confirmed in Aus- 
tria's possession. There are doubtless historic and 
recondite reasons for this territorial anomaly, but 
they are not such as are likely ever to appeal to the 
unsophisticated mind. As long as the anomaly con- 
tinues, the cause of " unredeemed Italy " will have a 
certain obvious justification, and the movement thus 
encouraged, will not stop where its justification stops. 
Doubtless voluntary cession in the interest of mere 
reasonableness, is unthinkable in the present condition 
of nationalist feeling, but if the fortunes of war should 
straighten this inexcusably dented frontier and assign 
the Trentino to its natural allegiance, it would be for 
Austria a beneficent calamity. 

The force of these considerations is further en- 
hanced by the repressive attitude of Austria toward 
the clearly perceived danger. Nowhere do men re- 
sent dictation more than in the matter of the language 
they shall speak. Left to itself, language is a matter 
of practical convenience, but persecuted, it quickly be- 



THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 69 

comes a martyr, and powerful sentiments and stub- 
born partisans rally to its defence. There has been 
much to provoke and perhaps enough to justify the 
policy of suppression, but that it has roused the oppo- 
sition of the Italian-speaking districts and has made 
unredeemed Italy sympathise with the efforts for her 
redemption, can hardly be doubted. 

But it is in the question of defence that we find the 
true problem of the Adriatic. This problem presents 
itself in two very different forms, and deals with in- 
terests that are distinct and almost incapable of recon- 
ciliation. We may call them the internal and the 
external problems. 

The external problem is the problem of defending 
the Adriatic against outside powers. This is a prob- 
lem in which all the dwellers upon its coasts have a 
common interest, but one which has not produced har- 
mony of action. It is primarily a question of con- 
trolling one or more of the naval stations already 
mentioned, Avlona, and Corfu, and Cattaro. Any 
one of these in the possession of a strong power, 
would completely dominate the Strait of Otranto, and 
thus control the entrance to the Adriatic. Curiously 
enough, none of these has hitherto been so occupied, 
and the united effort of the chief nations interested, 
has had for its aim to prevent such occupation. The 
reason is clear. Neither wishes an outside power, 
whose friendship can not be relied upon, thus to hold 
the key to their premises. Britain once held it by her 
possession of Corfu, but under the lead of Mr. Glad- 
stone's idealism she surrendered it to Greece, who can 



7 o THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

hardly utilise it without controlling the mainland op- 
posite, to which both Italy and Austria have positively 
refused their consent. 

But while united in their opposition to outside con- 
trol, these countries are unable to unite on any plan 
of control from within. Each covets this control for 
itself, and for that reason refuses it to the other, wait- 
ing for a favourable opportunity to realise its own 
ambition. For either to make the attempt would 
tumble down the whole card house of the European 
balance of power, a responsibility which each has hesi- 
tated to assume. Besides, there were other dwellers 
in the card house, who would object, perhaps with in- 
convenient vehemence. 

So the makeshift device has been adopted of keep- 
ing these strongholds in weak hands. For this pur- 
pose Turkey was admirably suited. Impotent and 
existing under suspended sentence, like a eunuch set 
to guard the harem, the sick man of the East has held 
the stakes for which the virile rivals strove. Hence 
the concern with which these rivals and their backers 
watched the collapse of Turkey in the Balkan war. 
The prize was in danger of falling into hands better 
able to hold and less willing to yield what they 
grasped. A new and reliable stakeholder must be 
found. Greece and Servia were uncomfortably asser- 
tive, and besides they might have, indeed were known 
to have, backers. Greece must not get both sides of 
the Gulf of Corfu. Servia must not have Avlona or 
any neighbouring Adriatic port. A new state must 
guard the entrance of the Adriatic, the most incoher- 
ent and powerless possible. The burlesque of Al- 






THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 71 

bania was not an unconscious joke, nor was there any 
intention that it should long endure. 

If we ask why Italy and Austria have not united 
to secure control of the Adriatic, the answer is to be 
found in the problem of internal defence. Their land 
frontier is fairly satisfactory and could be made alto- 
gether so, so far as mutual protection is concerned. 
But the Adriatic as a boundary can never offer mutual 
security. The problem of defence is here primarily 
one of naval warfare. For this purpose it would be 
difficult to find a greater disparity than that presented 
by the opposite sides of the Adriatic. On the Aus- 
trian side the islands stretch like long barrier reefs 
parallel with the shore. The entrances are few and 
narrow, easily closed by mines or submarines. Be- 
hind these barriers, in the labyrinth of islands, the 
secure retreat of pirates and sea rovers in Roman and 
Venetian days, all the navies in the world could lie 
secure. Conversely, all the navies in the world could 
not force these entrances if resolutely held by a few 
minor craft. This coast is impregnable. For of- 
fence, at least within the limits of the Adriatic, it is 
equally strong. A few submarines issuing from these 
fastnesses, could destroy any possible opposing force. 

These advantages appear still greater when we 
turn to the opposite coast. Here are no island bar- 
riers, no deep harbours of refuge. There is not a 
place on the Italian east coast where a ship could find 
secure shelter against an attack from the east, while 
the coast cities are all exposed to bombardment. In 
short, while the Adriatic is an ideal base for naval 
power, naval conflict between its opposite coasts is 



72 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

impossible. These two coasts are now at war, but 
although the western power has much the more power- 
ful navy, we hear of very little activity on its part. 
Austria is the only great power that hardly needs a 
navy to protect its coasts and its maritime interests. 

We are forced to the conclusion that there can be 
no balance of power in the Adriatic as such. A single 
people surrounding the entire sea would assure tran- 
quillity, but with the opposite coasts in the possession 
of different powers, no balance is possible, unless the 
overwhelming advantage of the eastern power in this 
area were offset by some counter check in another 
quarter. The formation of new Adriatic powers is 
no guarantee, for they can come in only on the eastern 
side where they are likely to be subservient to their 
more powerful northern neighbour. Possibly the 
recent Italian occupation of Avlona, giving her con- 
trol of the entrance of the Adriatic while Austria has 
control within, may create a balance of a sort, but it 
will be difficult to hold this detached territory, and if 
held, the resulting equilibrium will be precarious and 
uncertain. 

Again we are tempted to muse on the perversity of 
human nature and the futility of monopolistic ambi- 
tions. " If only men would — ," but that is another 
story and would lead us far from our quest. All 
honour to the efforts that may be put forth to persuade 
men to reasonableness and mutual concession. But 
so long as men are selfish and sensitive and suspicious 
— nay, just because they are so — it will be useful 
to note carefully the things about which they may 
quarrel. The great families of men who inhabit the 






THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 73 

opposite sides of the Adriatic are rather sharply di- 
vided in interests. They are also divided in language, 
but unfortunately, not quite at the same point. They 
are unequally situated as regards commerce, still more 
so as regards defence. Forbearance and circum- 
spection beyond the measure of most, are required to 
keep peace in the Adriatic. 



CHAPTER V 

THE PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINOPLE 

Constantinople is for us only a convenient name 
for the passage between the Mediterranean and the 
Black Sea. This passage begins with the Darda- 
nelles, a strait some fifty miles long and averaging 
three or four in width. From this strait we pass into 
the Sea of Marmora, a spacious body of water some 
fifty miles wide and a hundred and seventy miles long, 
and then again into another strait, the Bosporus, some 
twenty miles in length and even narrower than the 
Dardanelles. Constantinople stands at the inner or 
western end of the Bosporus. The two straits are 
essentially a mighty river with a considerable current, 
but they are deep and without dangerous headlands 
or sunken reefs. The water that flows through them 
has dropped all its silt in the Black Sea, and so forms 
no bars to obstruct navigation. The entrances to 
both straits are broad and plainly visible, the banks 
being high and distinctive. Navigation is easy for 
the largest ships. 

Constantinople with its tributary straits is the most 
strategic site in the world. It has been so for three 
thousand years, and will be so for three thousand 
years to come. When Napoleon and the Czar Alex- 
ander sat down at Tilsit to divide the world between 
them, Alexander is said to have pled with Napoleon : 

74 




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N 



C\ 



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A E A B^^ 

>S^7I ^"thE DOMAIN OF \ X perS iC 

" / CONSTANT. NOPUE ^ I 

. ' SCALEOF MILES 

'T | Vy / 



THE PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINOPLE 77 

" Give or take what you will, but give us Constan- 
tinople. For Constantinople my people are prepared 
to make any sacrifice." Napoleon bent long over the 
map, and then straightening up with sudden resolu- 
tion replied: "Constantinople? Never! That 
means the rule of the world." Nothing has happened 
since to discredit this judgment. Merchant and 
strategist alike still rank Constantinople as the most 
valuable of territorial possessions. It is now as it was 
a century ago, the centre of the world's strategy, and 
as such it must be accounted the chief issue in the pres- 
ent world war. And this is not the first war, nor will 
it be the last to be waged for its possession. 

The value of an entrance depends on certain obvi- 
ous considerations. To what is it an entrance? Is 
it the only entrance? Can the entrance be controlled? 
A thumb catch on a bank vault, or a combination lock 
on a woodshed would be equally worthless, the first 
because it secured nothing, and the second because 
there was nothing to secure. On the other hand the 
best of locks on the most valuable of treasure houses 
would be of little value to us, if there are side or rear 
doors unlocked or with keys in other hands. 

Judged by each and all of these criteria, Constan- 
tinople stands unapproachably first among the gate- 
ways of commerce and the strongholds of war. It is 
the only great highway that has no alternative. It 
leads to more than any other entrance open to com- 
merce. And it is the most impregnable of all en- 
trances. It is important that we consider somewhat 
carefully these three extraordinary facts. 

First of all, the gateway is unique. There is no 



7 8 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

other practicable entrance to the great region which 
it serves. It is true, as has been noted of late with 
somewhat exaggerated insistence, that railways may 
be built, and in part have been built, across the Balkan 
peninsula and across Asia Minor, roughly paralleling 
the great waterway, and connecting the Black Sea 
with the Mediterranean, but these can hardly serve 
more than local purposes. Rail transportation is at 
best far more expensive than water transportation, 
and the disadvantage is at its maximum when rail 
transportation is only a connecting link between two 
seas. Railroads may take freight from the lake 
steamers at Buffalo and deliver it to Atlantic steamers 
at New York, but never if there were a broad open 
waterway practicable for the largest steamers from 
Liverpool through to Chicago. Only in emergencies, 
when the waterway is closed, can railways serve as an 
alternate, and then only on the supposition, not yet 
realised, that they are controlled by a different power 
and affected by a contrary policy. No doubt such 
railways serve important purposes of local commerce, 
and that in the case of places approximately equidis- 
tant from the two seas, traffic may be diverted to 
Mediterranean ports, but to expect more than this 
from present or future railways is to overlook the in- 
herent limitations of railway transportation. 

So far from lessening the importance of the Dar- 
danelles, railway development in this part of the world 
must tend enormously to increase it. Present and 
prospective lines are all of the nature of tributaries 
rather than competitors. The Black Sea basin is an 
undeveloped country. Around a large part of its cir- 



THE PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINOPLE 79 

cumference the physical barriers are so great that only 
a narrow strip of coast land has access to the sea. 
Beyond this strip men are compelled to be self-suffic- 
ing, and their country lies fallow. With the advent 
of railways these inert lands will be astir with new 
life, and the unbroken line of steamships that now 
moves through the Bosporus will thicken into serried 
ranks. 

Excluding the possibility of railway competition, 
the Dardanelles can have no competition. Close that 
doorway, and there is no other entrance. The world 
must stay out. There is no other like case. New 
York has a commerce which is hardly rivalled by any 
other port. This commerce has piled up a wealth 
there such that if a conflagration should sweep over a 
certain small area of two square miles, we are told 
that it would bankrupt every insurance company on 
earth. Yet if some cataclysm of nature should 
destroy New York and close her harbour, the nation 
would suffer but temporary inconvenience. Boston 
and Baltimore and a dozen other ports would care for 
the traffic that formerly passed through the Hudson, 
and the commerce of the country would go on un- 
hindered. So with San Francisco, with New Orleans, 
with Rio or Buenos Ayres. So with Yokohama or 
Shanghai or Hong Kong. So with Calcutta or Bom- 
bay or Alexandria or Naples, with Liverpool or Lon- 
don or Hamburg. There is not one that has not its 
alternate, which could take over its task with but tem- 
porary inconvenience or local loss. Constantinople 
alone has no competitor, no probable or possible sub- 
stitute. 



80 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

In the second place, the territory tributary to Con- 
stantinople is the largest that is served by any single 
port. New York is undoubtedly its foremost com- 
petitor for this honour. The domain over which she 
extends some degree of commercial sway, includes the 
'Atlantic seaboard and the Mississippi valley, while 
even the Pacific coast is in a degree within her sphere 
of influence. But this domain she shares with many 
active competitors whose rivalry is felt up to her very 
suburbs, and whose influence, especially to the south, 
rapidly becomes paramount. We shall certainly be 
more than fair to New York if we assign her half of 
the territory east of the Rockies, say a million square 
miles, or a third of our domain of the States. 

The territory dependent on the Dardanelles in- 
cludes all that borders on the Black Sea back for an 
immense, though variable distance. It will be worth 
while to enumerate somewhat carefully. 

First to the left on entering (as the museum guide 
books say) , comes that southeastern portion of the 
Balkan peninsula which at the present writing is still 
called Turkey. A small area and mere back yard of 
Constantinople, it is commercially less dependent on 
the great gateway than districts lying beyond, for it 
has access to the i^gean with but moderate disadvan- 
tage. Still Constantinople is its natural outlet, and 
under all normal conditions can monopolise the trade 
of at least its larger portion, the more so as the great 
trunk line of railway for the whole Balkan peninsula 
runs through its central district direct to Constantino- 
ple. 

Next comes Bulgaria, recently enlarged and having 



THE PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINOPLE 81 

access, temporarily at least, to the iEgean, but all of 
whose lines of least resistance — rivers, valleys, rail- 
ways, etc. — lead and must always lead to the Black 
Sea. Of these lines two need especially to be con- 
sidered, the great international railway already men- 
tioned which traverses central Bulgaria on its way to 
Constantinople, a line not easily moved or duplicated, 
and the river Danube which forms Bulgaria's northern 
boundary and which offers a navigable waterway of 
the highest importance. 

Thanks to the Danube, our quest now leads us far 
from the Black Sea to the plains of Hungary and even 
Austria beyond. The dual empire, to be sure, has 
access to the Adriatic, but the mountain barriers on 
that side are a serious obstacle, even to railway trans- 
portation, and what is more serious, they quite prevent 
the possibility of canal and river transportation. 
Only certain kinds of merchandise can overcome the 
economic obstacles of this route, and the number 
rapidly diminishes as we go farther east into the broad 
plains that slope toward the great eastern sea. 
Meanwhile the broad Danube traverses the entire em- 
pire, everywhere navigable, and economical if slow. 
It is safe to count half of Austro-Hungary as tributary 
to the Black Sea. 

Rumania is wholly tributary and Russia for at 
least half of its European area, and that the more 
productive half. Indeed this understates the case, 
for though Russia has an outlet through the Baltic, 
that route is almost negligible as a competitor of the 
Black Sea and the Dardanelles. It has at present the 
advantage of prior development and the presence of 



82 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

the capital with its inevitable artificial attraction to 
population and trade. But the natural outlet of Rus- 
sia is to the south. All future growth can but con- 
firm that fact. 

In considering the relative advantages of the Black 
Sea and the Baltic, we must not be misled by mere con- 
siderations of distance. It is a question of ease and 
economy of transportation and continuous availabil- 
ity. In this connection two factors of supreme im- 
portance must be noted, both strongly favouring the 
south. First, the Baltic is a summer sea. Its east- 
ern, i.e., Russian, portion is frozen about one hundred 
and fifty days in the year, an interruption of traffic 
which icebreakers but imperfectly remove. Not 
merely navigation but harbour traffic and tributary 
transportation of all kinds suffers in a measure from 
the severe Russian winter. It is obvious that the 
commercial watershed between north and south will 
move far to the north of its normal during these five 
winter months. 

The second fact is the course of the great rivers 
which are more usable and more used for commercial 
purposes in Russia than in any other country. Unlike 
the Adriatic, the Black Sea is not walled in by moun- 
tains, but to the north stretches a vast plain from 
Odessa to the Arctic Ocean. The great rivers that 
drain this plain flow mainly to the south, those flowing 
to the Arctic being shorter and of course of little value 
for purposes of navigation. The Dniester, the 
Dnieper, the Don and the Volga, not rivers only, but 
vast river systems, navigable in both main stream and 
tributaries, all flow to the south. It is true that the 



THE PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINOPLE 83 

Volga, greatest of them all, does not flow into the 
Black Sea, but after having headed that way for al- 
most its entire length, it suddenly bends eastward and 
flows into the Caspian. But this eleventh hour change 
of purpose, like most such changes, does not wholly 
change the result. At the point of deflection, it had 
almost touched the headwaters of the Don, and a rail- 
road already bridges the narrow interval, while an- 
other and longer line avoids the shallow waters of 
the Sea of Azov and carries the cargoes of the Volga 
steamers direct to Novorossiisk, the superb new har- 
bour at the northeastern corner of the Black Sea. 
But this is not all. The Caspian itself is not an out- 
let, but a mere collecting basin for a vast region which 
finds its outlet mostly, and must always find it largely, 
through the Black Sea. It is now possible to take 
Caspian goods up the Volga and send them down the 
Don or across to Novorossiisk, as well as to send them 
across from Baku to Batoum, the Colchis of old where 
Jason went to get the golden fleece. And this brings 
us to a second area almost staggering in its immensity, 
which must own the sway of Constantinople. From 
the Caspian Sea a Russian railway already reaches 
nearly a thousand miles due east through the empire 
of Darius, of Alexander and of Tamerlane, and the 
end is not yet. 

To the south of the Caspian lies Persia, tributary 
to this same basin. It is true that there is an alterna- 
tive for Persia in part, and potentially for the whole 
Caspian basin, in the Persian Gulf which lies only a 
few hundred miles to the south and will doubtless 
ultimately be crossed by railways. But the Persian 



84 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Gulf is a long way from Europe, and the heavy toll of 
the Suez Canal adds its obstacle to the extra three 
thousand miles of distance which separates this outlet 
from European ports. When we remember that 
goods shipped at Batoum can be sent to London or 
New York without rehandling, the probabilities are 
very strong that the Dardanelles will continue to 
claim the largest share in the traffic of all this region. 

As we pass to the west into Asiatic Turkey, the 
dependence again becomes absolute until we near the 
Mediterranean and have the option of ports like 
Smyrna or Alexandretta. 

It is impossible to give any mathematical estimate 
of this area, the more so as the boundary is wholly 
vague, modified by each new railway, and even vary- 
ing with the season of the year. But when we remem- 
ber that a single one of these countries, Russia, is ap- 
proximately three times the area of the United States 
and almost wholly without other outlets, we are cer- 
tainly within bounds if we say that the area tributary 
to Constantinople and the Dardanelles is equal to the 
United States, or three times that tributary to New 
York. It is true that some of this territory is poor, 
but so is some of our own. The average is as good 
or better. 

Think what this means. Imagine, if we can, a 
single port handling all the foreign commerce of the 
United States. The conception is staggering, so much 
so in fact, as to arouse incredulity. How comes it, 
some one will ask, that Constantinople is after all 
only an inconsiderable city and the traffic of the Dar- 
danelles but an insignificant fraction of what our state- 



THE PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINOPLE 85 

ment presupposes? The obvious answer is that this 
country is undeveloped, incredibly so in parts. The 
newness of Russia is familiar, though the grain ships 
that feed England to-day start from much the same 
ports as those that fed Athens five hundred years be- 
fore Christ. But the southern shore of the Black 
Sea is one of the oldest habitats of civilised man, so 
old indeed that it has become new through centuries 
of abandonment and neglect. The land of Mithri- 
dates and Jason is virgin soil again, waiting for peace 
and protection and modern intelligence to bring it to 
fruitage. But while this easily accounts for the dis- 
parity between actual and potential production, the 
actual commerce of the Dardanelles is much greater 
than is ordinarily supposed. A dweller on the banks 
of the Bosporus told the writer that he had often 
counted fifteen grain ships at a time making their way 
toward Europe, while the smoke of others was seen 
in the distance, the ships concealed by a bend in the 
channel. Twelve thousand ships a year pass the Dar- 
danelles. That this commerce has maintained such 
large proportions under political conditions almost the 
worst possible, is certainly suggestive of what it may 
become under more favourable conditions. 

It does not follow, however, that Constantinople is 
destined to grow in proportion to the traffic which 
passes her gates. Cities grow, not by the traffic which 
passes them, but by the traffic which stops. Modern 
traffic is ever less inclined to stop en route. Constan- 
tinople is not the terminus of navigation, only a way 
station. Suppose a broad ocean highway free of all 
obstructions stretched from New York to the Great 



86 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Lakes, and once more, that the entire commerce of the 
United States was restricted to this outlet. Where 
would be the metropolis? Hardly at New York. 
Most of the ships would sail past her, scarcely taking 
time for port amenities. So with Constantinople. 
Always the centre of a considerable commerce, her 
measure will not be the measure of the commerce of 
the Dardanelles. She will stand as the name and 
symbol, yes, and as the administrative and protecting 
centre of this vast traffic which, converging from the 
ports of the wide world upon this narrow channel, 
radiates again to many ports in the great distributing 
basin of the Black Sea. 

We have finally to consider the defensibility of the 
famous passage, a question which has suddenly ac- 
quired new interest from current events. It is here 
that we shall be most impressed with the unique char- 
acter of Constantinople. 

The group of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Mar- 
mora and the Bosporus, form a sort of natural Dipy- 
lon gate, as the Greeks would have called it, a hollow 
enclosure with an entrance front and rear, which was 
a favourite trap in Greek devices for defence. Once 
past the outer entrance, the attacking party found 
itself surrounded, and retreat might become as diffi- 
cult as advance. Without insisting on this analogy, 
it is clear that the complete passage of the straits en- 
tails a double task, while access to Constantinople 
itself, whether from east or west, requires the forcing 
of one of the two straits. 

It is hardly necessary to say that both these straits 
can be made impassable by means of mines which can 



THE PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINOPLE 87 

be planted on very short notice. To force the strait, 
the enemy must remove this obstruction, and to pre- 
vent this, as well as to prevent the passage of the ships 
themselves, heavy ordnance have but to be properly 
located on the banks. For this purpose the banks are 
admirably adapted. Throughout almost their entire 
length the banks of both straits are high and broken 
into hills and bluffs which offer the military engineer 
every possible choice of site, while the various wind- 
ings of the channel offer every opportunity for an en- 
filading fire. No matter what guns an attacking fleet 
can bring to bear, there is no reason why equally heavy 
cannot be mounted for the defence, and with the 
greater accuracy of their fire and the greater protec- 
tion and concealment which land mounting permits, 
the odds are enormously in favour of the defence. 
To all this must be added the possibilities of the sub- 
marine which can be used against the fleet but not 
against the forts. It is doubtful whether the present 
defences of the Dardanelles are up to date, yet an 
attack by a powerful up-to-date fleet has just ended in 
disastrous failure. 

There remains the possibility of turning these posi- 
tions from the rear. Here again Nature seems to 
have completed her master work. From the Asiatic 
side, indeed, such a rear attack would seem to be pos- 
sible, though attended with all the difficulties of a 
major campaign in a rough country. But on the north 
the Dardanelles is bounded by a rocky peninsula run- 
ning the whole length of the strait and for some 
distance beyond. This narrow ridge of land, some- 
times not over five miles in width, is simply a moun- 



88 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

tain wall, as inaccessible on the back side as in front, 
and easily defended at the narrow neck at the eastern 
end. It would do no good for an enemy to hold the 
southern or Asiatic side of the strait as long as this 
rocky ridge was in the defender's hands. Needless 
to say, it is here that the principal defences have been 
located. And here again theoretic values have been 
put to the test. The Allies have endeavoured for 
many months to force this position with an enormous 
and well equipped army. These efforts have cost, to 
one of the Allies alone, a hundred thousand men, and 
have ended in disastrous failure. 

These defences once forced and the Sea of Mar- 
mora opened, Constantinople must fall, for it is fully 
exposed to bombardment from that side, and resist- 
ance would be futile. But it is not certain that this 
would involve the surrender of the great forts at the 
entrance to the Black Sea and the consequent opening 
of the Bosporus. It is primarily to guard against 
attack from the east, however, that these fortifications 
exist. Of their strength we have no means of judg- 
ing, but we may assume that they are adequate, and 
that a Russian attack upon the Bosporus would meet 
with the same result as a British attack upon the Dar- 
danelles. Nature has here done her part quite as 
well. The southeastern projection of the Balkan 
peninsula on which Constantinople stands is itself a 
comparatively narrow peninsula. As you approach 
Constantinople by rail from the northwest, you trav- 
erse for many miles the broad plains of Thrace, 
stretching from the Black Sea on the east to the Sea 
of Marmora on the south. But suddenly the two 



THE PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINOPLE 89 

seas seem to draw together, crumpling the plain be- 
tween them into ridges, and narrowing it to a neck 
only about twenty miles wide, through which for fifty 
miles or more the railway winds its sinuous way 
toward the minarets of Stamboul. Here are located 
the dread forts of Chatalja where the starved and 
half-armed soldiers of the Crescent stopped their rout 
and arrested the victorious Bulgars in their march on 
the capital. Here again nothing less than overwhelm- 
ing forces can turn the defences of the Bosporus from 
the rear. 

Is it any wonder that such a key to such an entrance 
is an object of supreme emulation on the part of inter- 
ested powers? The feeblest of powers, with such a 
key, can imprison the colossus among the nations, can 
stop the grain ships that feed fifty millions of people, 
can do all this and has done it three times within a 
decade. What wonder that, for Constantinople, 
the Czar and his people were prepared to make any 
sacrifice. But, in turn, imagine the key in the hands 
of the colossus. What preparations might not be 
made behind those barred gates, what thunderbolts 
hurled from behind this coign of vantage ! " Con- 
stantinople ! That means the rule of the world!" 



CHAPTER VI 

THE PROBLEM OF THE NORTH SEA 

Having considered the Mediterranean and the 
remoter seas to which it gives access, we may pass 
beyond the Pillars of Hercules on our further quest. 
To the south lies the great rounded solid continent of 
Africa, now almost wholly under foreign suzerainty, 
and divided among half a dozen nations in three or 
four times as many separate parcels. It is plain that 
the continent was made for the purpose. It has no 
inland seas, no strategic point where the door can be 
closed against the commerce of inner states. Its 
northern coast, as we have seen, shares in the danger- 
ous responsibilities of the Mediterranean, but else- 
where there is no especial problem, no vortex into 
which the inevitable currents of commerce and life 
are formed in perpetual maelstrom. 

If our voyage of exploration takes us to the north, 
as has more often been the case with explorers, we 
again find for a long distance nothing to complicate 
the relations of men. The Iberian peninsula which 
we first round, is an excellent illustration of the influ- 
ence of an uncongested coast line. It is quite artifi- 
cially divided between two kindred peoples who 
would long ago have been forced into one, or engaged 
in perpetual broils if they had been dependent upon a 

90 



PROBLEM OF THE NORTH SEA 93 

single outlet to the sea. But as they both have sea 
coast in abundance, they live contentedly side by side, 
the mere desire for more territory which is felt by all 
peoples being quite insufficient to disturb their peace- 
ful relations. When we consider that the two peo- 
ples are essentially one, thus minimising the difficul- 
ties of assimilation, and that the one has always been 
large enough to overwhelm the other, and exceedingly 
little hampered by scruples, it is significant that they 
live in easy tolerance and good will. The same is 
true of France and Spain as we go farther north. 
They do not fight because they do not have to fight. 
Their sea coast is open, and Nature has laid no trap 
for them. 

But as we round the long finger of Cape Finisterre, 
and follow the coast eastward, we steer straight into 
one of the most ingenious war traps which Nature has 
ever devised. Soon there is land upon our left, a 
long barrier-like peninsula at first, and then a broad 
land whose compact mass crowds closer and closer to 
the continent, until but a moderate channel is left 
through which we pass into a spacious inland sea. 
This sea has another and broader opening to the 
north, for the new land we have discovered is an 
island, or group of islands, spacious, fertile, and ex- 
ceedingly rich in natural resources. These are the 
elements of power, and as these islands are immune 
from land attack, their husbanded resources are po- 
tent to control the waters within. Thus the coast 
line of Europe which has hitherto moved along with 
a fair degree of directness, as though it were actually 
going somewhere, suddenly turns far inland, and then 



94 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

capriciously backs out again, forming a vast loop or 
pocket through whose entrance must pass the com- 
merce of some of the world's busiest peoples, with the 
inevitable jostling and conflict that such a congestion 
implies. And right at this natural toll-gate sits Eng- 
land, the pre-destined gate keeper, strong in her own 
protected people, and her rich island resources, and 
immeasurably strong in the resources which this 
strength and this position enable her to command. 

But this is not all. Continuing farther east, we 
find another gateway. This time the passage is long, 
narrow and tortuous, and leads us though several de- 
ceptive widenings before we at last enter another 
spacious inland sea, the highway to other and still 
larger lands, and even more susceptible of control. 
Here another vast volume of commerce is congested 
with its local frictions and dangers, and when released, 
it goes to swell the volume of the larger congestion 
outside. The Baltic is thus like the Black Sea, a 
double-locked area, controlled by inner and outer 
doors, the one at the Dardanelles and Gibraltar, the 
other at the Danish Straits and the English Channel. 
Curiously enough, it is the same great power in either 
case that is thus doubly locked in, and to complete the 
analogy, the same great power in each case holds the 
outer key. Is it possible to contemplate such a situa- 
tion and not see in it the possibility, almost the guaran- 
tee of trouble? In one respect there is an important 
difference. The inner door, though held in each case 
by comparatively weak powers, is really controlled 
in the north by the foremost of continental powers. 
Whoever would force the Danish Straits must reckon 



PROBLEM OF THE NORTH SEA 95 

with Germany, a power which, though not actually ad- 
jacent, is vitally interested and in a position of full 
control. In the south Turkey has long been isolated. 
It is partly for this reason that Russia has long con- 
centrated her effort on the southern entrance, the more 
so as it was the more serviceable of the two. Ger- 
many's recent determination, however, to make Con- 
stantinople her objective, completes the analogy be- 
tween the two situations. Russia, in either case, is 
locked behind double doors. In each case the inner 
door is held by a feeble power backed by Germany. 
In each case the outer door is held by Britain. That 
is the reason why Russia is fighting Germany now, and 
the reason why she will be fighting Britain later. 
When she gets powerful enough, as she almost cer- 
tainly will, to overpower a single doorkeeper, we 
shall find of necessity the two combining their forces 
against her. It is Germany's misfortune or Ger- 
many's madness that she has, for the moment, com- 
bined the two against herself. 

Once more is felt the impatient protest : " Why 
all this locking up and breaking out? Why not al- 
ways open these broad doors, through which the com- 
merce of a dozen continents might pass uncrowded? " 
Yes, undoubtedly, and for the most part they are 
open. But nothing can ever keep them so except the 
assurance of reasonableness and fairness among men. 
In such close pent quarters men have wonderful power 
to work one another's hurt, and corresponding occa- 
sion for vigilance and suspicion. The doorkeepers 
must ever be watchful till the bear becomes wholly a 
man. 



96 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Such, in the large, is the problem of the North Sea, 
but the whole circuit of its coast is studded with local 
difficulties which give to the problem, as thus enlarged, 
an almost unparalleled complexity. These local prob- 
lems it is important to notice in some detail. 

The supreme fact is the dominating position of 
Britain. It is interesting to note upon how many 
factors her pre-eminence depends. Were the area 
smaller, Britain could not have developed the force 
necessary to control the North Sea. Equally, if her 
soil had been barren or her climate unpropitious like 
that of similar latitudes on our side of the Atlantic, 
her population would have been scanty and scattered, 
and control, first of the Channel and then of the is- 
lands themselves, would have passed to the more 
favoured peoples on the continent. Nor is it possible 
to imagine Britain in her great role of to-day with- 
out her coal measures and her other mineral resources. 

But the point upon which we need especially to in- 
sist is that of location and the nature of the British 
coast. Britain is not only an island, but it is sepa- 
rated from the mainland by a comparatively broad ex- 
panse of water. The English Channel is not a river 
or even a Dardanelles, but a considerable sea, twenty- 
two miles wide at its narrowest point, and for the 
most part very much wider. During her period of 
incubation, while she was still small and self-sufficing, 
Britain found in this broad expanse of sea an admir- 
able protection against the invasions which ravaged 
the continent. Even in the early day Britain was 
seldom invaded, and since 1066 her shores have been 
inviolate. But as she developed her resources to the 



PROBLEM OF THE NORTH SEA 97 

point where contact with other countries was neces- 
sary, she could reach them only by crossing the sea. 
The continental countries, having no such narrow 
limitations, were slow to take to the sea, to which 
Britain was forced from the outset. She therefore 
easily outstripped them in the development of sea 
power. This result was the more predetermined by 
the fact that her coast furnishes many and excellent 
harbours, while those of the continent are few and in- 
ferior. 

This preponderance of maritime strength naturally 
determined British strategy in war. Her enemies 
might have more soldiers, but she had more ships. 
Hence it was obviously desirable to meet them on the 
sea if possible. At first this was difficult, except when 
the enemy attempted invasion, for the enemy ventured 
but little on the sea, and could not be greatly injured 
on that element. England's earlier wars were all 
fought on land, and under the great handicap of hav- 
ing to cross the Channel. This led to some curious 
results. Under the feudal regime each feudatory 
had to furnish his quota of troops and equip them at 
his own expense. This was possible in local wars, 
but when ships had to be furnished to take these troops 
across the Channel, it was embarrassing. Hence the 
custom grew up of commuting this feudal obligation 
for a money payment. With the revenues so secured, 
the monarch could maintain a force of professional 
soldiers which no extemporised militia could with- 
stand. It was with such troops that the battles of 
Crecy and Agincourt were won against odds that make 
the tale sound fabulous. This advantage, of course, 



98 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

was lost when military science developed on the con- 
tinent, though some shadow of it remains in the un- 
doubted efficiency of the small standing army of Bri- 
tain, the only professional army in Europe. 

But as we have seen, the great characteristic of 
civilisation is that it takes to the sea. As the nations 
of the continent developed maritime commerce and 
became more and more dependent upon it, the situa- 
tion played steadily into Britain's hands. All power- 
ful at sea and thus protected from the possibility of 
invasion, she began a full century earlier than her 
rivals the utilisation of the great resources which are 
the source of her present power and which have en- 
abled her to utilise the advantages of her unique posi- 
tion. 

The French coast offers no serious present-day 
problem. Earlier wars between the two countries 
were due to political causes which have quite passed 
away, and the bitter struggle with Napoleon may be 
attributed to the fact that France had temporarily 
pushed out into areas not naturally her own, and had 
incurred responsibilities in connections that vitally 
concerned Britain. If strained relations again de- 
velop between the two, it will be in connection with 
colonial interests. Eyen this now seems unlikely. 
In any case France has no North Sea problem, for 
the very good reason that she is outside the fatal gate- 
way. It is fortunate for the world that these two 
great powers have seemingly reached a delimitation 
of all their frontiers which involves no real hardship 
for either. Possibly each may have territories which 
the other would like to possess, but neither is locked 



PROBLEM OF THE NORTH SEA 99 

up or constrained by the other at any vital point. It 
is not too much to say that mere land hunger seldom 
leads to war. It is strategic sites, which are condi- 
tions of independence, that cause trouble. 

East of France the difficulties are at once appar- 
ent. The great power here is Germany, last formed 
and least settled of continental powers. We are con- 
cerned at present only with the problem of her sea 
coast. First of all be it noted that this frontage on 
the Baltic and the North Sea is her only sea coast. 
This coast is at best but indifferently suited to pur- 
poses of modern commerce. The coast waters are 
very shallow, and the harbours are all river mouths 
with their usual barriers of sand bar and silt. In- 
dustry, however, has made good the limitations of 
nature, and the immense importance of the commerce 
created by these industrious peoples has made these 
harbours among the busiest in the world. 

But viewed in their political aspect, these harbours 
present a curious anomaly. About midway in the nat- 
ural coast line of Germany projects the slender pen- 
insula of Denmark marking the boundary between the 
North Sea and the Baltic. The southern portion or 
neck of this peninsula was long ago prudently acquired 
by Germany, and by the construction of a canal across 
it, she has secured communication at all times for her 
merchant marine and navy, thus making it impossible 
to close the inner door against her, as it can be closed 
against Russia. It also enables her to mass her naval 
power on either side, an advantage which, in a war 
like the present, is incalculable. 

In the Baltic Germany has no grievance. Her 



ioo THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

coast line of over five hundred miles is the full front- 
age of her domain and considerably more, for a com- 
paratively narrow strip of German territory here pro- 
jects beyond the German hinterland and robs Russia 
of a part of her all too meagre frontage. Harbours 
are numerous, and as the shallow Baltic goes, excel- 
lent, while the Kiel Canal gives them much of the 
advantage of North Sea ports. But in the North Sea 
the German coast line is curiously curtailed by two 
small coast countries, maintained in artificial inde- 
pendence, which intercept three-fourths of the natural 
frontage of the German hinterland. This is Ger- 
many's standing grievance, and one which it is impos- 
sible to contemplate from a natural or geographical 
standpoint without recognising its justness. Not only 
is the territory behind these countries German, but it 
is the chief industrial centre of Germany, the one in 
which most of her foreign commerce originates. 
When we add that the population of both countries 
is essentially Germanic, the anomaly of their political 
independence becomes strikingly apparent. Yet 
there is no anomaly in the modern political world 
which it will be more difficult to eliminate so long as 
anything like the present balance of power is main- 
tained. Holland and Belgium owe their existence to 
no far seeing sagacity of European statesmanship. 
They came into existence as petty principalities long 
ago, when there was no Germany, and the territory 
now united in the German Empire, was itself divided 
into units no larger than themselves. As these units 
have become consolidated and highly organised for 
war, these unabsorbed independencies have acquired 



PROBLEM OF THE NORTH SEA 101 

sudden value in French and British eyes. Belgium 
offers the one feasible route for invasion between 
France and Germany, while the two countries offer a 
base of possible offence against Britain which must 
not on any account be allowed to pass into German 
hands. When, sometime since, a Dutch port was 
about to be fortified and converted into a naval base, 
Britain peremptorily forbade the project under the 
threat of war. The seeming effrontery of this inter- 
ference with the plans of an independent power is 
suggestive of the extreme tension which has long ex- 
isted between these great North Sea powers. Ever 
since the expansionist policy of the German Empire 
began, Britain has realised that that expansion could 
only be in a direction inimical to her own interests. 
Germany must get her colonies from Britain or get 
them in localities which controlled Britain's lines of 
communication, simply because there were no other 
colonies or locations to be had. Not being prepared 
to surrender either colonies or control, Great Britain 
has realised that war might be the alternative. When 
Germany began to challenge her naval supremacy, the 
possibility became almost a certainty. The intentions 
of Holland may have been most innocent, but the re- 
sult to Britain would have been not the less disastrous 
if a power that Holland was unable to resist should 
seize the base so fortified and use it in a way not in- 
tended. It is no criticism of Britain to say that her 
defence of Belgium was not motived exclusively by 
altruism or by regard for treaty obligations. 

Of all the northern powers, Russia is the least satis- 
factorily situated. It is true that she has summer 



102 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

access through the White Sea to the Arctic Ocean, and 
hence around the northern end of the Scandinavian 
peninsula to the Atlantic. It is even reported that a 
railroad, pushed to completion since the war began, 
now gives Russia a far northern outlet which, by a 
caprice of the Gulf Stream, is free from ice the year 
round. But valuable as this northern route may be 
at a time like this, its economic value can never be 
considerable. Even an ice-free port does not wholly 
overcome the barrier of the long rail haul over the 
frozen arctic wastes, or the long voyage through a 
stormy ocean. For commercial purposes, the Baltic 
is Russia's only outlet to the north. Even within the 
Baltic her situation can hardly be called satisfactory. 
The unnatural extension of East Prussia beyond the 
natural frontier of Germany, thus intercepting the 
ports which are the natural outlet of the provinces to 
the rear, is a standing grievance to Russia as Belgium 
and Holland are to Germany, but without any such 
plea of necessity. Dull indeed would be the Russian 
patriot who would not see in the Vistula a more nat- 
ural and equitable frontier. 

But the greater hardship is obviously to be found 
in the dependence of Russia upon the powers who con- 
trol the Danish Straits and the English Channel. 
Russia has made no overt move as yet to secure con- 
trol of even the inner gateway, for she knows how to 
concentrate upon one thing at a time. But the same 
logic which impels her to seek control of the Darda- 
nelles, will in turn dictate her advance to the Danish 
Straits. The annexation of Finland and its subse- 
quent rather violent assimilation by the great empire 



PROBLEM OF THE NORTH SEA 103 

can hardly be construed otherwise than as a stepping 
stone to the control of the Scandinavian peninsula. 
This next step once taken, Russia would have not only 
one side of the Danish Straits, insuring her at least 
defensive control, but she would have in the fjords 
of Norway unlimited access to the Atlantic for emer- 
gency purposes. Economy, however, would still give 
precedence to the Baltic and justify to Russian minds 
all measures necessary to secure its complete control. 
This could mean nothing less than moving the Rus- 
sian frontier from the Vistula still further west to the 
Elbe and the control of the Danish peninsula. This 
would, of course, affront the principles of race unity, 
balance of power, and much else, but hardly more 
than the Russian plan to encircle the Black Sea and 
control the Dardanelles. It is needless to say that 
long before this was accomplished, long before even 
the Scandinavian peninsula was acquired, Russia 
would meet all the resistance that Germany could put 
up, and that with her could probably be aligned all the 
western powers. For with Russia in Norway and 
Denmark, their independence would be but nominal. 
It is this certainty that has thus far prevented an ad- 
vance. But that such an advance has been considered 
and is kept constantly in mind by Russian imperialists 
can hardly be doubted. The fear of it is the constant 
spectre of the Scandinavian countries, a spectre which 
drives them visibly toward an alliance with the other- 
wise most unwelcome Germany. It is difficult to im- 
agine a time when Russia will not feel the temptation 
to turn the Baltic into a Russian lake, a temptation to 
which we may expect her to yield if circumstances fa- 



104 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

vour. It is impossible to imagine a time when such 
an effort will not encounter strenuous resistance. In 
this, as in the relation between Britain and Germany, 
we see the permanent problem of the North Sea. 

The commerce of the North Sea and its tributaries 
is incomparably superior to that of the Dardanelles, 
yet its natural domain is smaller and inferior in re- 
sources. But it is a developed area, while the other 
is still crude. Belgium, Holland and Germany, its 
chief contributors, are among the most advanced na- 
tions in the world in the exploitation of their natural 
resources, and though their development is destined 
to go much further, no such increase can be expected 
here as in the domain of the Black Sea. Russia, to 
be sure, is young, in the north as in the south, though 
the location of her capital in the north by the fiat of 
her great Czar, and the continued dependence of the 
south upon the caprice of Turkey, has forced the de- 
velopment of the Baltic region beyond its due. The 
future inclines toward the south. Taken all in all, 
the North Sea is the home of the present, while Con- 
stantinople belongs to the past and to the future. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE PROBLEM OF THE FAR EAST 

It is significant of recent developments that we can 
no longer consider the problems of the West by them- 
selves. The East has its situations and problems 
quite like those of the West, and increasingly shows 
a certain imitative tendency to treat them in the same 
manner, in itself a fact to suggest the new conscious- 
ness in the Orient of western doings and an uncon- 
scious recognition of western leadership. But more 
than this, there has grown up between East and West 
a vital connection, commercial and political, which 
makes the eastern situation a part of the great world 
equilibrium. A disturbance of this equilibrium in the 
West has its repercussion in the East, as recent events 
have demonstrated, and in turn a disturbance in the 
East subjects to increasing strain the always unstable 
equilibrium of the western world. The East must be 
heard, therefore, in any serious study of European 
problems. 

The problem of the East has many phases, but 
interest chiefly centres in the struggle for the control 
of a single outlet to the Pacific, the so-called Yellow 
Sea. The southern part of the east coast of Asia 
presents few special difficulties. This coast, with 
trifling exceptions, is in the undisputed possession of 

105 



106 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

China, a populous if not a powerful country, and for 
the present at least the policy of the nations is to de- 
mand only commercial privileges and those on a basis 
of equality. The granting of these privileges in- 
volves economic problems for China of the gravest 
possible character, problems which may exert a pro- 
found influence upon domestic politics, but it does not 
seem to threaten international complications, save in 
the ever more improbable event of the parcelling out 
of China among the Powers. Moreover this coast is 
much indented and the numerous harbours thus af- 
forded are sufficiently equivalent to make it but little 
object to any power to monopolise any particular loca- 
tion. All these ports furnish direct access into the 
broadest of all oceans. 

But north of Shanghai, which is about in the lati- 
tude of Savannah, all this changes, and geography 
seems to predestine men to strife. For another hun- 
dred miles or more the coast line runs to the north, 
but affords no harbour. The inhospitable shore wards 
off the trader, driving his ships northward and along 
round the mountainous peninsula of Shantung, to the 
few secluded harbours that nestle in the innermost re- 
cesses of the Gulf of Pechili. Meanwhile to the 
north, all unnoticed, the continent has swept far to the 
east, then south in the peninsula of Korea, closing in 
on the trader's rear almost from the moment he left 
Shanghai. As he passed this port he entered the outer 
circuit of the great Asian stronghold, and as he passed 
the rocky heights of Shantung he might have seen on 
the other side the downthrust mountain peninsula of 
Liaotung, tipped with the redoubtable Port Arthur, 



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.-BONIS IS. 



- THE FAR EAS' 
SCALEOF MILES 

100 400 

PFTEffB v Erc'ffB9.. f OTgTaM | 



Xongitude East 



140° 



from Greenwich 



107 



THE PROBLEM OF THE FAR EAST 109 

companion guardian to the stronghold's inner donjon. 
And lest wary commerce should slip around the outer 
defences and sailing up the east coast of Korea, ap- 
proach the continent further north, the icy barriers 
of climate have been supplemented by the long bul- 
wark of Japan. Nature has simply corralled the com- 
merce of the most active latitudes, and driven all into 
a single little pen. The creative industry and active 
commerce of the world lies mostly between the thir- 
tieth and fiftieth parallels of latitude, and in Asia 
there is not a single really free port, and but one really 
good approach to the vast continent, within these 
limits. 

It should hardly be necessary to recall, though it is 
all important to remember, that between these two 
parallels, the largest of European countries touches 
the Pacific. It is noteworthy, too, that the neigh- 
bouring portions of the Chinese empire, Manchuria 
and inner Mongolia, are at once rich and undeveloped, 
and that the best harbours and the strongest natural 
defences are on their coasts. Finally, as the last 
requisite to insure trouble, the long barrier reef of 
Japan is densely populated, highly organised, and 
keenly alive to all the possibilities of the situation. 
Let us note more in detail these possibilities. 

The Russian empire extends clear through to the 
northeastern extremity of Asia, and thus has ample 
access to the Pacific. But this access is worthless be- 
cause of adverse climatic conditions. The latitude is 
about the same as that of Hudson's Bay, and the con- 
ditions of navigation much the same. Russia has no 
railroads running to this frozen north, and if she ever 



no THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

has them, her great commerce will never go that way. 
Much the same is true of the long frontage on the sea 
of Okhotsk. This, to be sure, is no further north 
than the North Sea, but the Gulf Stream of the 
Pacific is shunted off by the Japan islands, leaving this 
great sea and its hinterland the domain of ice and fog. 
There are no good ports and no cities, and such as it 
may develop can never be an outlet for the great 
plains of Siberia lying to the west. 

Dropping to the latitude of Liverpool, we come to 
the mouth of the Amur River, the great waterway of 
the region, and the seemingly predestined seat of a 
great port. But here again nature is chary. The 
sea is still ice-bound, and available for scarce half the 
year. But now comes a new indignity. Just at this 
point — the first which commerce might consider — 
begins the great island barrier, thrown like a huge 
wall around the coast clear to the tip of Korea. The 
beginning is the long island of Saghalien, more than 
six hundred miles in length, which starts so near the 
mainland that it leaves virtually no channel fit for 
commerce, even if commerce were disposed to look in 
this untoward direction. If we turn southward in 
search of an exit, we shall find the first opening in the 
barrier to the south of Saghalien in La Perouse 
Strait, less than thirty miles wide, both sides of which 
are now in the possession of Japan, who thus can con- 
trol the strait by a moderate exercise of naval power. 
But even this entrance only admits to the Sea of 
Okhotsk, which is closed by the long line of the Kurile 
islands, also Japanese, whose many gaps are all nar- 
rower than La Perouse. If this exit seems unsatis- 



THE PROBLEM OF THE FAR EAST in 

factory, we shall go farther and fare worse. The 
next break in the barrier is the Tsugaru Strait, only 
a quarter as wide as the other, long and winding, and 
guarded by the great Japanese islands of Yezo and 
Hondo on either side. And besides, in this case as in 
the other, the passage doesn't take us where we chiefly 
want to go. 

The next opening, the Strait of Shimonoseki, is 
scarcely an opening at all. It is only a fraction of a 
mile wide, long and devious, and it opens, not into the 
Pacific, but into the marvellous Inland Sea of Japan. 
It is true that this sea gives access to the Pacific by a 
like narrow passage at the other end, but the whole 
affair was obviously intended for private use. Like 
a private premises whose front and rear gates furnish 
a convenient passageway from street to street, its use 
for that purpose must depend on the indulgence of the 
owner. We can hardly complain if at any time he 
puts up the sign: " No thoroughfare! " 

We have moved on like a fly looking for a larger 
mesh in the screen of his trap. Now is our last and 
best chance. Between Japan and Korea is a channel 
over a hundred miles in width. It is not only ample 
for all possible purposes, but is in the direction which 
world commerce must always chiefly take. But even 
here we shall hardly pass without a permit. At in- 
tervals in this channel lie several large islands like 
stepping-stones between Japan and the continent. 
These islands, which from time immemorial have been 
in the possession of Japan, break up the larger chan- 
nel into lesser channels nowhere much more than 
twenty miles wide. The closing of such channels is 



ii2 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

an easy task for modern naval power. It was here 
that Togo awaited and annihilated the great Russian 
fleet in 1905. 

Having explored the island barrier, let us go back 
to the mouth of the Amur and follow the coast of the 
mainland south. The coast is Russian for nearly a 
thousand miles until we reach Vladivostok in the lati- 
tude of Boston. But latitude is a deceptive criterion, 
and is here no guarantee of an open sea like that off 
our New England coast. For five months in every 
year Vladivostok is icebound. Worse than this, Vla- 
divostok and every other port that Russia may create 
on this, her whole eastern frontier, is Japan-bound. 
It may be that some day Russia can ignore that fetter, 
but for the present — for a long time to come — that 
fetter holds her with a grip of steel. 

It may seem depressing thus to think of neighbour 
peoples as constantly concerned to control individually 
these broad common thoroughfares that are ample for 
the convenience of all. To such an objection the an- 
swer for the present must be that peoples are so con- 
cerned, and that any nation which should cease so to 
concern itself would soon exist on suffrance only. 
And after all, this concern is not unlike the instinct 
which governs individual action and which passes as 
not unneighbourly. As has been said before, no pru- 
dent man would be dependent on his neighbours for 
access to his premises, and that not because he was not 
neighbourly, but rather because he wished to remain 
so. If it be objected that the problem of access and 
of common highways is not so simple for nations as 
for individuals, it is conceded. Moreover, that is 



THE PROBLEM OF THE FAR EAST 113 

the very point of argument. But with all their striv- 
ing and all their concern, the peoples are usually neigh- 
bourly enough. It is neither bad blood nor unrea- 
sonable ambition that leads them to seek an outfit of 
commercial facilities which shall make them inde- 
pendent of their neighbours' activities, and minimise 
the occasions of friction which collisions of commerce 
might entail. It is certain that nations will not will- 
ingly stop short of this goal. It is demonstrable that 
nature hasn't enough harbours, etc., to go round. 
Hence the problem of problems — difficult beyond all 
estimate, but not necessarily insoluble. 

The earlier programme of Russia undoubtedly in- 
cluded the extension of her sway over Korea, thus 
giving her the entire western side of the Japan Sea, 
and making it impossible for Japan to close the south- 
ern entrance to her navy or her commerce. This was 
thwarted by Japan in her great struggle with Russia, 
and her annexation of Korea has assured her absolute 
control of this important access to her own and the 
Asiatic coast. But long before this consummation it 
was apparent that this was to Russia only a side issue. 
The control of the Japan Sea was vital to Japan, for 
it insured not only commercial advantage, but defence, 
and so, her very existence. But to Russia, however 
important, it was not sufficient. Vladivostok was too 
far away from commercial Siberia, and the long rail 
haul must be shortened if possible. Above all, an 
outlet into warmer waters unencumbered by ice, was 
well-nigh indispensable. For both these purposes, the 
concentration area already described behind the Shan- 
tung and Liaotung peninsulas was ideally adapted. 



ii 4 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Transferring Russia's problem to our own territory, 
we may put it this way. She already controlled the 
St. Lawrence River. What she now wanted was New 
York. What would we want under such circum- 
stances? Nay, put the case stronger. Suppose a 
barrier reef, an island empire under the Kaiser's rule, 
stretched from Nova Scotia to Long Island, its nar- 
row gate always open to us during good behaviour. 
What would we think about it? What would we do 
about it? To secure real independence for our St. 
Lawrence outlet would be important. To secure New 
York would be imperative. In reality Russia's case 
was much stronger than this, for she had no ports, no 
coast line, farther south. 

Hence the great struggle, the scheming, the bully- 
ing, the aggression upon helpless China, Japan's 
deepening suspicion, her silent preparation, her swift 
and terrible onset, and her victory. Korea is first 
" protected " and then annexed. Port Arthur, won 
once before, and lost to the great rival, is won again, 
and Dairen, its commercial adjunct and the railroad 
far back into coveted Manchuria. Russia is forced 
back into her remote hinterland. Her crestfallen 
cruisers and merchantmen follow the icebreaker 
through frozen seas into cheerless Vladivostok. The 
Kaiser's flag waves from Long Island to Nova Scotia, 
and from New York up the railway to the north, 
while we go in and out at the frozen St. Lawrence at 
his gracious pleasure. This is no criticism, no plea. 
Japan played the game fairly enough, rather more 
fairly than it is usually played. She played for the 
greatest stakes that a nation can play for — inde- 



THE PROBLEM OF THE FAR EAST 115 

pendence and existence itself — for Russia's victory 
would have meant for her a subjection which no vic- 
tory of hers could ever impose upon Russia. But be 
the equities of the case what they may — our sympa- 
thies what we will — the great fact remains that in- 
terests were opposed, and that conflict was fore- 
doomed. And it is farther clear that the result of 
the conflict to date offers no permanent settlement of 
the difficulty. The problem remains, must remain 
under any possible condition short of general occu- 
pancy by a single power. Present policy, and plenti- 
ful trouble in other quarters, may induce Russia to 
submit with good grace for a time to the present situ- 
ation, but she will not, cannot, should not, accept it as 
a permanent arrangement, any more than we would 
accept the analogous arrangement mentioned above. 
On the other hand Japan can never safely accept less, 
and each year of possession increases her ability to 
keep what she has won. 

Concurrently with Russia's seizure of the Liaotung 
peninsula and the entrenchment of her navy and her 
commerce at the twin ports of Dairen and Port Ar- 
thur, Germany seized a commanding site on the oppo- 
site peninsula of Shantung. There was at the time a 
concert between the two powers, a concert which failed 
them in the hour of their need. These two positions 
controlled absolutely the broad gulfs of Pechili and 
Liaotung lying behind, and with them all access to 
Manchuria and North China, including the com- 
mercial metropolis of Tientsin and the capital of 
China itself, Peking. The danger to China was enor- 
mous, but she could not resist it, perhaps did not see 



n6 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

it. The danger to Japan was chiefly from Russia, the 
trend of German ambitions being obviously in an- 
other direction. But the Russian danger once dis- 
posed of, Japan could hardly fail to regard the pres- 
ence of a powerful naval base so near her shores in the 
hands of an aggressive western power as a menace to 
her safety. Hence in accordance with the coolest cal- 
culations of self-interest, she has taken advantage of 
Germany's embarrassment to expel her forces from 
Shantung. This gives her the two peninsulas, and 
with them the complete control of this gateway to the 
East. Whether the holding of this detached outpost 
will be a source of strength or weakness remains to be 
seen. The alleged intention is to restore it to China. 
Whether that intention is carried out will depend 
largely on her future relations with that great oriental 
power. 

In conclusion it is well again to remind ourselves 
that the problem inheres rather in the geographical 
situation than in the character of the peoples involved. 
Russia and Japan are no more quarrelsome, no more 
ambitious than other peoples. Their most doubtful 
aggressions compare favourably with our former de- 
spoiling of Mexico and our acquisition of Panama. 
They have had trouble, because there was trouble in- 
herent in their environment. It is the same every- 
where. France and Spain live peaceably enough, 
though neighbours, because each has her own harbours 
and other commercial outfit, free and unmenaced by 
the other. Who ever saw a problem in the Bay of 
Biscay? The same is true of England and France in 
eastern Asia, though Tonkin and Hong Kong are 



THE PROBLEM OF THE FAR EAST 117 

close together. Each has harbours enough, and all 
else that it needs, with no danger to or from the other. 
So everywhere under like conditions. 

But wherever Nature has so arranged the land and 
sea as to congest the commerce of large areas, and no 
parcelling out of territory becomes possible without 
denying necessary facilities to one or exposing an- 
other to a neighbour's domination, any arrangement 
that can be made must involve hardship and inequality, 
and so invite if not insure conflict. It is in such areas 
that wars have their usual origin. Such wars are not 
for nothing, however ill advised, nor are they neces- 
sarily marked by great bitterness. The war between 
Russia and Japan was a conspicuous example of a cold 
blooded war, fought between powers that perfectly 
understood the situation, knowing that neither could 
yield the point claimed without serious if not fatal 
sacrifice to the growth of its people and the triumph of 
its ideals. Each respected the other and itself for its 
insistence. There was nothing to do but try it out. 
The matter is not settled. The contestants are taking 
breath. And as here, so elsewhere. Is there any al- 
ternative ? Not as yet. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE CASE OF TURKEY 

In the foregoing chapters we have considered some 
of the physical peculiarities of the eastern hemisphere, 
areas so located and so shaped that they tend to con- 
gest the commercial and other interests of the different 
nations and so to bring them into conflict. Other 
problems might have been considered, such as that of 
the Persian Gulf, hardly less important than those 
chosen, but it would have been only one more illustra- 
tion of principles already much illustrated. There 
are also problems of defensive land frontiers, of rail- 
way and mining concessi3ns, and many others, but they 
are one and all less important than the great examples 
chosen, and such notice as we need to give them may 
well be included under the subjects to which we now 
turn. Thus far we have considered individual prob- 
lems as related to many peoples. We shall now find 
it useful to consider individual peoples as related to 
many problems. This will necessarily involve some 
repetition, but repetition of things of which we need 
to be often reminded. 

Turkey is somewhat of an anomaly among the na- 
tions of Europe. Its counterpart is to be sought, if 
anywhere, in Asia, to which part of the world it 
strictly belongs. In some ways it finds its grotesque 

118 



THE CASE OF TURKEY 121 

analogue in the now defunct Papal States, for its ruler 
is quite as much a pope as an emperor. But unlike the 
Papal States, it has made a serious business of war 
and empire building, and its military establishment 
was long the most efficient in Europe. The sub- 
stantial reality of its temporal power not only made it 
a force to be reckoned with, but saved it from the 
worst vice of a really religious state. For it is a well 
attested fact that practical empire builders of the 
purely mundane stamp, set a value upon subjects of 
productive or fighting capacity, even though heretical, 
who under a merely religious jurisdiction, would be 
cast as rubbish to the void. Practicality has ever been 
more humane than fanaticism. 

Contrary to received tradition, this principle has 
been constantly illustrated in the rise of the Moslem 
power. No grosser calumny has ever been perpe- 
trated than that which pictures the Moslem conqueror 
as everywhere offering the conquered the choice of the 
Koran or the sword. The disproof of the story in- 
deed is found in the existence in every Moslem country 
of large bodies of followers of the earlier faith. In 
Egypt, where fanaticism seems to have flourished un- 
der every religion, the ancient Coptic church still 
thrives and whole communities still own allegiance to 
it as before the days of Omar. The Gregorian and 
Armenian churches have never been suppressed in 
Asia, while the religious establishments of the Balkan 
states have been freely tolerated. Nay, more than 
this. The history of Moslem conquest contains in- 
stances of altogether extraordinary consideration for 
conquered faiths. In the centre of the city of Damas- 



122 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

cus stands a vast mosque which was once a Christian 
church. Like all such religious establishments in the 
East, it is built, cloister like, around a hollow square, 
the main sanctuary stretching at great length along 
one of the long sides. When the Moslems captured 
Christian Damascus in 635, the days of their fiercest 
enthusiasm, a traitor admitted them by one of the 
gates. The commander, seeing that all was lost, has- 
tened to surrender the city to the Moslem commander 
on the opposite side who had not yet heard of his ad- 
vantage. Capture then meant pillage, but capitula- 
tion entitled the conquered to immunity. The two 
Moslem forces, entering from opposite sides, ad- 
vanced, the one pillaging and the other refraining, 
and met in the church at the centre. The stratagem 
of capitulation was of course discovered, but its guar- 
antees were respected. The line was drawn through 
the middle of the church, one-half of which remained a 
church while the other became a mosque, and Moslem 
and Christian, entering by the same door, worshipped 
under the same roof. When some years later this 
trouble-inviting arrangement was terminated and the 
whole became a mosque, the Christians were indemni- 
fied by a grant of other property for the part they 
were obliged to surrender. 

When the Crusaders captured Jerusalem in 1099, 
their horses are said to' have waded knee-deep in the 
blood of unresisting Moslems while the Jews were 
burnt alive in their synagogue. The day closed with 
a white robed service of thankfulness in the Church of 
the Holy Sepulchre, spared, be it noted, for five cen- 
turies by the Moslems. Next day the slaughter began 



THE CASE OF TURKEY 123 

again with careful deliberation. Tancred had ac- 
cepted the surrender of three hundred prisoners with 
a guarantee that their lives should be spared, but he 
was overruled and his proteges slaughtered on the 
ground that promises made to the infidel were not 
binding. 

"HSFo one now feels it necessary to defend the Cru- 
saders or to exonerate Christianity of all responsibility 
for their excesses. Equally, we may concede that such 
exceptional tolerance as that shown in Damascus is 
not representative of Mohammedanism. But the con- 
trast is not therefore without significance. Christi- 
anity has usually been intolerant of other faiths, hu- 
manely so, for the most part, often — it may be — 
beneficently so, but none the less intolerant, strongly 
convinced of its superiority, its sole validity, as a re- 
ligious system, and determined to assure its dominion 
" where'er the sun doth his successive journeys run." 
Mohammedanism has been quite as assured and quite 
as determined to assert its claim, but less anxious, ap- 
parently, that all creatures should share its benefits. 
May we perhaps say that Christianity has been the 
more democratic and Mohammedanism the more aris- 
tocratic faith? 

Be that as it may, the whole structure of Moslem 
power seems to have been built on a foundation of in- 
different, not to say contemptuous, tolerance. The 
Moslem seems seldom to have been actuated by 
motives of ferocious intolerance toward unbelievers, 
and when he has seemed to be thus animated, as in the 
case of the Armenians, there have always been other 
grounds for his feeling. On the other hand, he has 



i2 4 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

never felt under any very serious obligation toward 
them. They were inferiors and legitimate subjects of 
exploitation. Moslem policy toward non-Moslem 
subjects has always been to leave them to shift pretty 
much for themselves, guaranteeing them only the most 
elemental rights, and good-naturedly exploiting or 
plundering them as a superior and governing race 
might reasonably be expected to do. The organisa- 
tion of the state being religious, none but followers of 
the prophet could be expected or trusted to perform 
military service. The picture has its sunshine as well 
as its shadow. The writer recently found the Jews 
of Salonica, a very numerous community, bewailing 
the transfer of that city to Greek rule. Their condi- 
tion was nothing like so favourable, they declared, in 
Christian as in Mohammedan countries. Yet they are 
infidels to the Moslem quite as much as to the Chris- 
tian. But the Jew thrives on liberty and unrestricted 
opportunity. 

The Turk is by no means the original Moslem. 
He has not the remotest kinship of race to the con- 
queror of Damascus. The Moslem faith has been 
committed in succession to a number of peoples, the 
earlier ones Semitic, the later Tartar in origin. Like 
ourselves, they have waged their fiercest wars with 
their co-religionists. This has destroyed the unity of 
the Moslem world and paralysed its influence, but it 
has not changed this, its original character. Of all 
Moslem hegemonies, that of the Turk has been most 
indolently good-natured and indifferent. The Mos- 
lem fanatic of to-day is the Arab. It has always been 
the Arab or his kin. The Turk is seldom fanatical. 



THE CASE OF TURKEY 125 

Indeed, it is his easy-going temperament that is the 
great source of his weakness and the root of all his 
woes. It enables the subject peoples whom he de- 
spises and plunders, to recoup themselves many fold at 
his expense, until, vaguely conscious of their depreda- 
tions, he loses patience and indulges in an orgy of 
brutal retaliation. It is with no intent to justify these 
excesses that resident observers of the daily tussle of 
Turk with Jew, Armenian, and Greek, usually give 
their sympathy to the Turk. 

To this characteristic of the Turk was due one of 
the most remarkable, and in later history, one of the 
most important institutions of the Empire, the Capit- 
ulations. These were a series of agreements by 
which foreigners resident in Turkey were placed under 
the jurisdiction of their own laws and their own of- 
ficials. As it has worked out, this has become a 
valued privilege, securing to the foreigner immunity 
from the vexations of Turkish maladministration and 
even from the legitimate duties of citizenship. As 
such, we have come to think of the Capitulations as 
concessions extorted from decadent Turkey by the 
powerful nations of the West. Such they were when, 
in the later day, the system was imposed on China and 
Japan, and such they eventually became in Turkey. 
But nothing could be further from the truth as re- 
gards their origin. They date from a time when — 
can our imaginations picture it — the two supreme 
powers in Europe were Portugal and Turkey. The 
first of these agreements was made between the most 
powerful of Turkish monarchs and a defeated Chris- 
tian sovereign. Their real purport was this. The 



126 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

alien and the unbeliever had no standing in Moslem 
law. Its blessings were only for the faithful. Yet 
as Turkey possessed the shrines of the Christians and 
the most important highways of the world's commerce, 
thousands of aliens were at all times within the em- 
pire. These aliens were long outlaws, and got along 
only by the suffrance of their Turkish neighbours, but 
the need of regulating their status and conduct ulti- 
mately became manifest. Rome had had the same 
problem in her early history, and had just as unhesi- 
tatingly refused to aliens the benefit of her sacred law. 
She met their needs, however, by developing alongside 
her own code, a second code called the law of nature, 
or law of nations, a sort of codification of common 
sense and the supposed general practice, which, be- 
cause of its less sacred character, proved infinitely 
more flexible and opened the door to that wonderful 
development of Roman law which is the glory of that 
great people. The Turk, not being a lawgiver, and 
having an easier alternative, merely refused to bother 
with these outsiders, and said to the Christian powers 
in effect: " Here, take care of your own people and 
see that they behave, and I won't interfere." He was 
totally unconscious at the time that the task thus laid 
upon them might later be used to impair his authority. 
It was in pursuance of this same policy that he al- 
lowed the church, in the various countries which he 
conquered, to persist, and recognised its patriarchs as 
responsible leaders and administrators. It was out 
of the question to continue the temporal sovereigns of 
these countries. Moreover, it was perfectly congenial 
to Mohammedan ideas, that a religious functionary 



THE CASE OF TURKEY 127 

should administer law, for their own law is founded 
on the Koran and has been largely administered by- 
religious authorities. So each country got its patri- 
arch, and thus was laid the foundation of that 
tenacious sectarianism which to-day is one of the chief 
obstacles to the unification and tranquillisation of the 
Balkans. 

The Turk has never been an administrator. The 
countries that he conquered were all possessed of a 
better organisation than he was able to devise, so he 
quite naturally left them much as he found them. 
His conception of empire at the best was the primitive 
one which Rome had long ago outgrown, a group of 
subject states whose duty was to pay tribute to the 
ruler, and his duty to them to prevent any other ruler 
from putting them under tribute. To go out into 
these subject provinces and guide them in the develop- 
ment of their resources, to help them build roads and 
harbours, to plan their cities and teach them the art 
of organisation, to take up the white man's burden, in 
short, all this had had no place in his traditions, and if 
it had had such a place, his inferiority to the peoples 
he subdued would have prevented its continuance. In 
such works as were undertaken by the greater Sultans, 
it was necessary to depend entirely on Christian sub- 
jects for guidance. There is not a single great 
mosque in Constantinople which was not planned by a 
Christian architect and motived by the Christian 
church of Santa Sophia. 

The history of an empire so formed and so ad- 
ministered can hardly be other than a record of deca- 
dence, once the limit of conquest has been reached. 



128 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Territories administered by men who have neither the 
genius nor the inclination for organisation and who 
are intent merely on the collection of tribute, are not 
likely to be vigilant in the repairing of roads or enter- 
prising in the building of new ones. Irrigation works, 
harbours, and public works of every kind are used till 
they need patching, and then patched till they need re- 
newing, and then abandoned. Industry thus crippled 
becomes less productive, and its lessened product 
meets the exactions of the tax gatherer with increasing 
difficulty. Vineyards become fields, and fields become 
pasture where goats browse on the untended vegeta- 
tion. The traveller in Turkey who comes upon a 
rock-hewn winepress in a pasture choked with weeds, 
or a Roman bridge crossed by a meandering camel- 
trail, or the tumbled columns of a Herodian city, or a 
stable in the sanctuary of a Greek temple, certainly has 
food for thought. The Turk hasn't done it all, but 
he at least hasn't undone it. Nor can he. He is 
much more deserving of our sympathy than of our 
execration. " The incapable Turk " sounds much 
less dramatic than " the unspeakable Turk," but it is 
far more just. 

The empire reached its zenith in the sixteenth and 
seventeen centuries, just as the assertive tendencies 
of Europe were breaking bounds. The fabric of the 
Turkish Empire looked imposing, but it had been built 
with flimsier and flimsier workmanship as time went 
on. The Balkan kingdoms had been added without 
assimilation, and with a minimum of actual sover- 
eignty. The Barbary States had accepted a nominal 
suzerainty on their own initiative, merely as a matter 



THE CASE OF TURKEY 129 

of policy. The sultan had arrogated to himself the 
solemn role of the caliphate without a shadow of claim 
to that kinship to the prophet which the role implied, 
and Mecca gave him but lukewarm support. It was 
in this state of pompous senility that Turkey was 
called upon to meet the encroachments of expanding 
Europe. 

Not at once was this weakness apparent. The 
struggle under the walls of Vienna was a dearly won 
victory for Europe; the war with Venice a defeat. 
But the force of the empire, no longer recruited by 
conquest, rapidly declined. The defeat of Venice 
was a Pyrrhic victory. From then till now the story 
has been one of loss and disaster. The Barbary 
States have shed their allegiance only to be absorbed 
by western powers. Greece slipped the leash, then 
Egypt, then the northern Balkan states, then Crete 
and the islands, then Albania, Macedonia and Thrace; 
and now the Greek headlands of Asia Minor are 
threatened, the Dardanelles, even Constantinople it- 
self. Everything seems about to go. The world 
waits in suspense. 

Quite as significant as this crumbling of the terri- 
torial fabric is the growing paralysis within. A gov- 
ernment may be very oppressive without exercising 
much control. If " that government is best which 
governs least," then China and Turkey are among 
the best governed states, for the citizens of both, 
though often oppressed, are very little governed. 
So long as they pay their taxes, they are allowed to do 
pretty much as they please, the government being quite 
without the machinery for the detailed direction of 



i 3 o THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

their actions. As western enterprise has pushed its 
way into their primitive land, the Turkish patriarchal 
system has proved wholly inadequate to the task of 
regulating the new relations involved. This palsied 
grasp of Turkish administration is incomprehensible 
to Europeans, and leads to frequent misunderstand- 
ings. The difficulty will be best understood by an 
illustration. 

It is well known that the most important sites in 
the field of classical archaeology which remain to be 
explored are within the limits of the Turkish Empire. 
Yet the Turk will neither explore these sites himself 
nor permit outsiders to do so. Meanwhile the in- 
valuable remains of Chaldean, Assyrian, Hittite, 
Greek and Roman cities are utterly unprotected. 
Any peasant who wants a stone for a doorsill, is free 
to pry out a block from a Greek temple. The writer 
has himself seen a Turkish road gang prying out 
blocks from a magnificent Roman structure to break 
up into dressing for a macadam road. Statues, in- 
scriptions, and the like, discovered by chance, become 
the plaything of their discoverer, or are disposed of 
for a song to irresponsible collectors through whom 
they are scattered and their origin and significance lost 
sight of. How exasperating this dog-in-the-manger 
policy, this wanton, wasteful neglect! 

But an archaeologist familiar with the situation, 
shows us another side to the picture. The Turk has 
had experience in these matters and has found 
archaeology a dangerous pastime. Dig he cannot, for 
he lacks the means, though his admirable Museum in 
Constantinople goes far to refute the charge of indif- 



THE CASE OF TURKEY 131 

ference. On the other hand, to permit a foreign ex- 
pedition to explore, quite naturally implies to the for- 
eign mind a guaranty of protection, and this the Turk 
cannot furnish. An expedition starts to excavate 
some out-of-the-way site. Its advent arouses the 
curiosity, possibly the suspicion, of the peasantry, and 
its equipment excites their cupidity. Soon implements 
or animals are missing; possibly explorers are robbed, 
even killed. Then comes the inevitable demand for 
redress and indemnity, the tedious negotiation with 
some foreign power, and finally, the inevitable ad- 
verse verdict obtained by threat to bombard some 
Turkish port or seize its custom house until the in- 
demnity is collected. Missionary, commercial, and 
other foreign enterprises present similar problems. 
When we add to this the fact that foreigners and for- 
eign powers are in a mood of continual exasperation 
at Turkish inefficiency, that foreign activities are often 
predatory, and finally, that under the Capitulations 
foreigners were practically exempt from the opera- 
tion of Turkish law, with immunity from taxes, in- 
violability of domicile, and vigorous support from 
powerful governments, whatever their undertakings, 
Turkish antipathy toward the foreigner is not difficult 
to understand. 

This administrative feebleness quite naturally mani- 
fests itself toward the larger alien groups within the 
empire, as well as toward individuals. During the 
nineteenth century the Greeks, Servians, Bulgarians, 
and other peoples slowly recovered the autonomy 
which they had lost in war. The independence of 
some of these powers is usually dated from 1878, 



132 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

when their status was formally recognised by Eu- 
rope, but in fact it is of earlier date. Servia, for 
instance, exercised practically complete sovereignty 
for years before she was recognised as independent, 
even the Capitulations, the binding agreement between 
Turkey and foreign powers, being practically abro- 
gated in her territory. As there were few Turks 
there to claim the benefit of Turkish law, a Turkish 
governor had nothing to do but collect taxes, and as 
long as Servia paid her tribute, it was as well not to 
irritate her by the presence of a useless functionary. 
Nearer Constantinople where there were more Turks, 
the case was different, but the rein was still a loose 
one. Few people are aware to how large an extent 
the Turkish Empire had resolved itself into quasi- 
independent kingdoms before the Balkan wars an- 
nounced its imminent dissolution. The island of 
Samos, for example, was entirely autonomous, being 
ruled by a " prince " appointed by the sultan; but this 
appointment was made from an eligible list nominated 
by the Samians, who retained the practical power of 
dismissal. 

Now comes the great paradox of Turkish history. 
Turkey has survived because of her weakness. She 
has been left in possession, even confirmed in pos- 
session of her territories, because of her relative impo- 
tence. The striking example of this is Constanti- 
nople. The value of this possession was recognised, 
as we have seen, by Napoleon a century ago. In 
point of fact it was no discovery of his, but a tradition, 
based on no theoretical considerations, but on two 
thousand years of experience. His rebuff to the Czar 



THE CASE OF TURKEY 133 

only delayed the assertion of Russia's claim. Half a 
century later the time seemed ripe, and the Czar de- 
liberately proposed the partition of Turkey among the 
powers interested, a procedure for which the partition 
of Poland furnished a precedent. But with that pe- 
culiar mixture of shrewdness and conscience which has 
proved so effective a combination in the English char- 
acter, Britain rejected this proposal, and leagued with 
France and Italy, fought one of the most terrible of 
wars to confirm Turkey in her possession of Constan- 
tinople and her control of the entrance to the Black 
Sea. English sagacity saw a menace to her own con- 
trol of the Mediterranean in the force which might 
issue from these inner recesses of Russian power. 
The wisdom of her policy may be questioned, but at 
any rate, it insured Turkish control for another sixty 
years. The attempt of Russia in 1878 was similarly 
foiled, though this time by a bloodless battle. Now 
that British fear of Russia has been lessened, a new 
protagonist arises for Turkey, a power having more 
than negative interest in Constantinople, but for the 
moment still championing the cause of Turkey. The 
lists are not yet closed. It is by no means certain that 
the issue of the present war will put an immediate end 
to Turkish control. A German victory would cer- 
tainly mean the reinstatement of Turkey, though un- 
der virtual German suzerainty, which would perhaps 
be only a temporary disguise for annexation, while a 
victory for the Allies, though probably assuring Rus- 
sia's eventual possession, might not at once open the 
way for a probate of the Turkish estate. 

A less familiar though equally certain case of ad- 



i 3 4 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

vantageous weakness is found in the Balkan peninsula. 
The slow recovery of independence by these unassimi- 
lated parts of the empire has been noted. As certain 
of these powers acquired national recognition in 1878, 
there began an active rivalry for ascendency in the af- 
fairs of the peninsula. It was evident to all that the 
arrangement was not final, that populations were 
much intermingled and frontiers correspondingly arbi- 
trary, and above all that these new states must some- 
time be enlarged by the inclusion of territory still 
loosely held under Turkish rule. Competition for 
this territory, notably the much discussed Macedonia, 
became virulent, especially between Greece and Bul- 
garia. Strangely enough, the competition was pushed 
mostly by means of schools, the point being to teach 
the Greek and Bulgarian languages respectively and 
so assimilate the population to one or the other race 
in preparation for the time when this might be the de- 
ciding factor in an international settlement. Seldom 
has a country been so overschooled as Macedonia, and 
seldom has schooling been so doubtful a blessing. 
Violence and intrigue of course complicated the situa- 
tion. 

Strangely enough, these little states, like the great 
western powers, while disagreeing on almost every- 
thing else, were agreed on the present policy of main- 
taining Turkish sovereignty. Each hoped to destroy 
that sovereignty, but not until it could be quite sure 
that the territory thus liberated would be added to its 
own. Meanwhile only the indifference and weakness 
of Turkey could make their propaganda possible. 
The Turk having no schools, cared nothing how many 



THE CASE OF TURKEY 135 

the neighbouring powers established, especially as they 
seemed pretty thoroughly to checkmate each other. 
If he repressed violence at times with great brutality, 
this too had its advantage for the rivals, for it was 
needful to foster dislike for the Turk against the day 
of reckoning. Thus for reasons quite comparable to 
those urged in the councils of Berlin and London, 
these fledglings among the nations voted suspension of 
sentence for the condemned miscreant. Obviously, if 
Turkey were a power capable of measuring her- 
self with Germany or England, she would at once be- 
come the object of their jealousy or fear, and their 
motive for keeping Constantinople and the Darda- 
nelles in her control would disappear. Equally if 
her grip upon Macedonia had been firm and secure, 
not only would this rival propaganda have been im- 
possible, but their energies would necessarily have 
been directed against her, rather than against each 
other. 

Such was the situation when in 1908, under the 
leadership of foreign educated " Young Turks," 
Turkey suddenly undertook to be something real in 
the national line. A constitution was proclaimed and 
the machinery of representative government estab- 
lished, the army was reorganised to include all Otto- 
man nationalities, religious freedom was decreed, 
schools were established, espionage and other odious 
features of the old regime were abolished; in short, 
the entire national system was revised along lines else- 
where associated with efficiency and power. The 
world was stunned by the suddenness and seeming 
completeness of the transformation. There was a 



i 3 6 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

brief period of watchful waiting, to see if the move- 
ment would miscarry, but as its sponsors seemed pos- 
sessed of extraordinary prudence and moderation, in- 
credulity gave way to a belief — or a fear — that a 
real rehabilitation of Turkey might result. Conster- 
nation was manifest in the councils of those govern- 
ments whose policy for generations had been based on 
the assumed helplessness of Turkey. It was like the 
case of rival heirs who have been watching with zeal- 
ous solicitude round the deathbed of a wealthy rela- 
tive, and who suddenly learn that he is on the road to 
recovery. 

When it became apparent that the passive agent 
whom all had agreed upon to hold the stakes of in- 
ternational rivalries, small and great, was about to 
decamp with the stakes, there was a hurried scramble 
and much confusion of plan. Austria promptly an- 
nexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, two large Slavic 
provinces which, since 1878, she had been commis- 
sioned to administer " for Turkey." Servia stormed 
and Russia threatened, but both were cowed when 
Germany laid hand upon the sword hilt. The whole 
European conflagration was foreshadowed. The 
Cretans asked admission to the Greek Parliament and 
were briefly restrained only by the prospect of having 
to face the undivided power of Turkey. The Balkan 
States began the difficult task of combining against 
their new danger, and Italy snatched Tripoli before 
suzerainty could become sovereignty, adding a dozen 
islands when Turkish obduracy prolonged the strug- 
gle. Like the drug fiend who gets along fairly com- 
fortably until he tries to reform, only to suffer the full 



THE CASE OF TURKEY 137 

penalty of his vice in the moment of his moral self- 
assertion, so Turkey, secure in her degeneracy, found 
in the path of rectitude only a long arrears of retribu- 
tion. The Balkan wars capped the climax of her dis- 
aster, depriving her of all her islands and all her terri- 
tories in Europe save a fragment dropped by the dis- 
sensions of her enemies. 

It is difficult for those who are privileged to belong 
to a healthy and vigorous nation to appreciate the re- 
action of such disasters upon a people. Under the 
most favourable conditions the reform movement 
would probably have failed. Turkish tradition was 
wholly against it. The new institutions were wholly 
unfamiliar and corresponded to no clearly defined as- 
piration of the people. The new parliament is said 
to have debated all winter without enacting a single 
measure. It seemed unable to grasp the fact that it 
actually had the power to enact statutes. Religious 
liberty was hailed as a boon, a bond of brotherhood 
between all races, but when it was found that it de- 
stroyed the old immunities and entailed the obligation 
of military service and all the burdens of citizenship 
in a new and more burdensome government, it wore a 
different aspect to the Christians now admitted to the 
pale. Christian and Turk alike were psychologically 
unprepared for a state in which all elements should 
meet on an equal footing. Said a Greek in Constan- 
tinople when the logical consequences of the new 
equality began to be apparent: "They are talking 
of assimilating us all to an Ottoman unity. There 
are six million Greeks in the Turkish empire and 
(here his eyes flashed and his voice trembled with pas- 



138 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

sion) do you imagine that men born with the heritage 
of the Greek will ever allow themselves to be assimi- 
lated into an Ottoman unity? " 

The Turk's attitude was different but no more pro- 
pitious. The writer recalls a conversation with a 
railway official in Turkey, one of the fairest and most 
dispassionate observers whom it has been his fortune 
to meet. Asked what would be the outcome of the 
new constitution, then recently promulgated, he ex- 
pressed his misgivings. " The Turk is a man of 
many virtues, a better man than any other hereabouts. 
As a family head, a neighbour, a friend, I ask no bet- 
ter man. He will share his last crust with the needy. 
He will keep faith with his fellow. He will die for 
his faith. He will respond to every sentiment that 
we honour, except one. Speak to him of patriotism, 
the nation, the state, and he will gaze stupidly at you, 
utterly unable to comprehend your meaning. He 
cannot conceive of a bond which shall bind together 
races who do not worship the same god. He is not 
averse to the new Ottoman unity. He simply cannot 
conceive it. There is no psychological basis upon 
which to build the new state." This estimate of the 
Turk has received abundant confirmation. 

Other elements were equally unassimilable. The 
Armenians have from time immemorial been a prob- 
lem to the Turk. Unlovely in their race personality, 
they share with the Jew and the Greek the business 
shrewdness, not always tempered by humanity, which 
the Turk conspicuously lacks. Numerous, and in- 
habiting a considerable territory of strategic impor- 
tance on the Russian frontier, their tradition of past 



THE CASE OF TURKEY 139 

independence and their dream of its recovery have 
kept the Turk uneasy. They have prospered in spite 
of intolerable handicaps, their pitiless shrewdness be- 
ing pitted against the dull witted supremacy of the 
Turk. With abundant provocation, each side has re- 
sorted to criminal outrage. When a powerful Ar- 
menian conspiracy some years ago seized the Otto- 
man Bank, the treasury of the empire, the Turks re- 
taliated by a general massacre. The nerve-shattered 
Abdul Hamid, obsessed with fear of assassination by 
Armenians, incited wide-spread massacres of Arme- 
nians by their traditional enemies, the lawless Kurds, 
thus justifying the attempt which they afterwards 
made. It is a sorry story of sordidness and crime, in 
which neither side can escape condemnation. But 
whatever the blame, the fact relevant to our immedi- 
ate purpose is the present unassimilability of the Ar- 
menian race to an Ottoman unity. 

And now upon this fragile structure of the new 
built Turkish state fell blow upon blow with sledge- 
hammer violence, breaking off one fragment after 
another till it seemed nothing would remain, Egypt, 
Herzegovina and Bosnia, Bulgaria, Crete, Tripoli, 
the Dodecanese, Albania, Macedonia, Thrace, the 
rest of the iEgean islands, Samos, Chios — where 
would it end? Depression became desperation, mur- 
der inaugurated revolution, and the government fell 
into the hands of the more daring instead of the 
more prudent spirits. That the personal sympathies 
of these leaders were with Germany counts for little 
in the final plunge. It is difficult to see aught but dis- 
aster in prospect for the doomed empire. Partition 



i 4 o THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

among the Allies — if indeed they are yet ready to go 
that far — or continuance under German protection, 
alike mean extinction, unless unforeseen forces inter- 
vene in her behalf. But it may be said in excuse of 
the desperate venture, that she had no choice. When 
the two German warships were welcomed by the un- 
witting defenders of the Dardanelles, they passed 
within sight of the city whose defenders with like ac- 
claim drew the wooden horse inside their walls. 
There must have been those on board who smiled 
grimly to think of the great drama which they were 
privileged to re-enact. Theirs was the first hostile 
act. With their guns trained on the Sultan's pal- 
ace, distracted Turkey could neither disarm nor dis- 
own them. The Crescent wanes and passes. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 

Nowhere else can the difficulties with which the 
state builder has to contend be studied to such advan- 
tage as in the Balkan Peninsula. All the forces which 
contribute to the formation of the state are here 
manifest, but in violently dynamic rather than in static 
form. All factors seem to be working at cross pur- 
poses, so that concession to the one means rebuff to the 
rest. There seems to be no possibility of equilibrium 
short of a complete rearrangement, possibly a com- 
plete synthesis and union, a condition in itself hope- 
lessly remote. 

The peninsula includes, wholly or in part, the states 
of Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, Servia, Mon- 
tenegro, and nominally at least Albania, to which must 
be added as very essential component parts the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian dependencies of Croatia, Slavonia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the last two essentially a 
unit. Other dependencies of Austria and even cer- 
tain territories of Russia enter into every comprehen- 
sive plan for regulating the Balkan problem, while 
these two great powers themselves loom large as an 
overshadowing background, and even remoter states, 
as recent events have shown, regard themselves as in- 
terested parties in all Balkan arrangements. Not 

141 



i 4 2 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

one of these states has a natural boundary; not one of 
them rules over a single race; not one of them rules 
over the whole of its own race; not one of them that 
has a past, has recovered its past possessions; not one 
of them is large enough to have any real independ- 
ence; only one of them has reasonable access to the 
sea or adequate commercial facilities. Worse still, 
there is not one that can hope to have these things 
without destructive encroachment on others. It is 
clear at a glance that present arrangements are not 
final, and that very consciousness tends toward insta- 
bility. 

All of the territories above mentioned have at one 
time been included in the Turkish empire. Turkish 
rule has varied in length and degree about in propor- 
tion to nearness to Constantinople. The territory 
near that city has been theirs almost from the begin- 
ning of their empire, and is theirs still. Its as- 
similation is naturally comparatively thorough. 
Turks form the largest element in the population, and 
the administration has been consistently in their hands. 
Adrianople was their capital for almost a century be- 
fore the capture of Constantinople and has acquired 
for them a semi-sacred character. 

On the other hand, the districts in the outer zone 
where Turkish influence fades into that of Russia and 
Austria, were not brought under Turkish rule until 
much later, and then but imperfectly and fitfully. 
Some of them never knew Moslem rule, their gov- 
ernors being either princes of their own blood or 
Greeks who purchased their posts in Constantinople. 
Though plundered by these adventurers and sorely 




Longitude East 



PETERS EMGBS., BOSTON 



143 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 145 

pressed by their fiscal exactions, their race character 
remained unmodified, and they early acquired virtual 
independence. To all, however, Turkey has left her 
legacy which we shall have occasion to note. 

It must further be remembered that these countries 
have been from the first the subject of active rivalry 
on the part of Austria and Russia, with the other pow- 
ers of Europe as their allies and backers. All Balkan 
happenings therefore have a double character. Each 
state acts as any other state would do, in its own in- 
terest, but it also acts as the protege of one of the 
greater powers. These powerful backers are often 
the chief actors, and their several proteges little more 
than puppets, sometimes playing a role quite other 
than that which they would have chosen. This double 
character of Balkan activities is inevitable in view of 
the relation of these states to the all important prob- 
lem of Constantinople. 

RUMANIA 

This, the largest and remotest of the Balkan states, 
is a modern combination of several principalities, or 
parts of principalities, founded in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries by migration from Hungary. 
These principalities, lying as buffer states between 
Turkey and the greater powers to the north, were 
alternately courted and oppressed by both before their 
union with the Turkish empire in the sixteenth cen- 
tury. This union, one of the last of Turkey's an- 
nexations, was not effected by conquest, but was a 
voluntary choice between evils, the harassed prin- 
cipalities seeking in a Turkish protectorate immunity 



i 4 6 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

from Hungarian and Austrian oppression. Coming 
thus voluntarily, they never knew Turkish sovereignty 
and Moslem administration, but only suzerainty, be- 
ing ruled often by princes of their own race or by 
Greeks who had at least the advantage of respecting 
their religion and their civilisation. This did not save 
them from oppression, especially under the Greek 
governors who bought their office for large sums from 
the impecunious Sultan, and must needs recoup them- 
selves, but it saved them from Turkish colonisation 
and preserved their language and their culture. 
Whatever the intrinsic value of these much treasured 
possessions, they had the advantage of being essen- 
tially identical in the different principalities and so a 
bond of union which, strangely enough for this dis- 
tracted region, was able later to triumph over all divi- 
sive forces and produce voluntary union. 

As these principalities were among the latest and 
loosest additions to the Turkish empire, so they were 
among the first to leave it. From the end of the 
seventeenth century the power of the empire rapidly 
declined. This decline brought little relief from fis- 
cal oppression, but it brought a large measure of prac- 
tical independence and a constant incentive to increase 
it. Moreover it suited the purpose of the big neigh- 
bours to espouse the cause of Rumanian independence, 
from mixed motives, no doubt, but not the less ef- 
fectively. By the beginning of the nineteenth cen- 
tury Turkish suzerainty was reduced to a shadow. 
Successive treaties between Turkey and the European 
powers confirmed the autonomy of Rumania, and fi- 
nally the principalities, already voluntarily united 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 147 

against the express wish of their new sponsors, de- 
clared their complete independence in 1877, and this 
was confirmed by the Congress of Berlin in the follow- 
ing year. 

The origin of the Rumanian people is a matter of 
dispute, but fortunately, the Rumanians themselves 
are not troubled by the doubts of scholars. They be- 
lieve themselves descended from the inhabitants of the 
Roman colony of Dacia, established by Trajan in the 
second century of our era and peopled by emigrants 
from Italy. It is difficult to reconcile this belief with 
the known facts of later history, when a series of mi- 
grations swept over this region, ultimately filling the 
entire peninsula with a Slavic population, as also with 
their own tradition of migration from the West, but 
over against these obstacles are the undoubted facts 
that Roman Dacia was located here, and that their 
language is clearly of Latin origin, the only Latin 
tongue in this part of the world. We may leave to 
philologists and ethnologists the problem of language 
persistence along with racial change. It is sufficient 
for us that the Rumanians believe themselves to be 
of Roman descent, and as such, related to the Italians 
and French. They are very proud of this ancestry, 
and their supposed kinship with the enlightened na- 
tions of western Europe exercises a powerful influ- 
ence over their political affiliations. The chief result 
of this assumed affinity, however, is to isolate them 
from their Slavic neighbours and give them an ex- 
treme sense of race solidarity. The union of all Ru- 
manians under a single government is a national ideal 
of exceptional power. Unfortunately the domain of 



i 4 8 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

the Rumanian language, the chief bond of union 
among these people, is somewhat patchy. The pres- 
ent kingdom of Rumania includes only about half the 
Rumanian area. Nearly a third of the kingdom of 
Hungary is peopled by Rumanians, while on the east, 
the area extends to the Dniester River and even be- 
yond in irregular patches sandwiched in between areas 
of Russian population. To push their frontier on the 
east to the Dniester River and make that their fron- 
tier to the sea, and on the west to include the broad 
territory of Transylvania, is the irreducible minimum 
of Rumanian ambition. The ethnic argument is the 
paramount one, because, forsooth, it is the one that 
favours their contention. Rumania, as thus enlarged, 
would have a compact oval outline and would look 
exceedingly well on the map. 

Unfortunately, the Rumanians are not very con- 
sistent in their insistence on the principle of race sol- 
idarity, nor can they very well be so, for race migra- 
tions have introduced an almost malicious complexity 
into the ethnic problem. Thus, Bessarabia, the Rus- 
sian province lying to the west of the Dniester, is 
peopled for the most part with Rumanians, but there 
is a narrow strip along the coast whose population is 
wholly Russian, while just behind this coastal strip are 
considerable settlements of Bulgars and Germans. 
Certainly no one would think of carrying the frontier 
to the Dniester without at the same time extending it 
to the sea. About two thirds of this area would be 
Rumanian and one-third alien, an approach to equity, 
perhaps, but not so clear a case but that the ethnic 
claim might conceivably be outweighed by other con- 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 149 

siderations. On the west the case is equally difficult. 
Transylvania, an area half as large as Rumania it- 
self, is mostly Rumanian in language, but the east- 
ern portion, lying right in the elbow of Rumania and 
almost exactly in the centre of the larger Rumanian 
area, is peopled by Hungarians and Germans. These 
are quite separated from their kinsmen farther west. 
If Rumania could annex Transylvania she would unite 
the Rumanians, but she would divide the Hungarians, 
while Hungary, by retaining Transylvania, unites the 
Hungarians but divides the Rumanians. As regards 
numbers and area, the odds are considerably in favour 
of the Rumanian arrangement, but again these odds 
may easily be overcome by other considerations. In- 
deed, to have a Hungarian province the size of Mon- 
tenegro exactly in the middle of an enormously more 
numerous Rumanian population, would be a peculiarly 
vexatious administrative problem and would almost 
certainly result in oppression of this small but com- 
pact minority. 

Turning now to the southeast, we find a wedge of 
territory lying between the erratic Danube and the 
sea, the oft mentioned Dobrudja. This, which has 
belonged to Rumania ever since its recognised inde- 
pendence, is Rumanian only in its northern tip. The 
most of it is occupied by a Turkish settlement, the 
only unmixed Turkish population, strange to say, in 
all Europe. No possible ethnic argument could pre- 
vail upon Rumania to part with this valuable terri- 
tory which affords her only access to the sea. For 
it was a weakness of the progenitors of this people, 
as still more of the Hungarians, that they did not take 



ISO THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

to commerce or appreciate the advantage to their pos- 
terity of tenaciously holding the sea coast. At the 
close of the recent Balkan wars, Rumania still fur- 
ther extended her coastal possessions by annexing a 
Bulgarian province, Silistria, which contains no Ru- 
manian population whatever. She thus ignored, for 
the time being, as all nations will do, her favourite 
argument of race solidarity, in deference to other in- 
terests quite as tangible but conflicting. 

There are other considerations quite as pertinent 
which it suits her purpose to ignore. Her western 
frontier, as we have seen, is not an ethnic boundary. 
But it is a natural frontier, a well marked mountain 
range, while the ethnic boundary farther west is little 
more than an arbitrary line running through open 
country. So, even if there were no island of Hun- 
garians to be surrounded by this Rumanian sea, the 
formation of the greater Rumania would have decided 
disadvantages. Suppose Rumania should realise her 
ambitions as a result of the present war, and by an- 
nexing Bessarabia and Transylvania should double 
her territory and unite the Rumanians. The ethnol- 
ogist would now be satisfied. But we may be per- 
fectly sure that before long the strategist would begin 
to agitate for a more strategic frontier, to be obtained, 
of course, by farther annexation. The favourite Ru- 
manian argument would no longer be race unity but 
national security. The natural boundary on the 
south, for instance, would be the Balkans. The popu- 
lation thus annexed would be Bulgarian, but so is the 
population of Silistria, already annexed and seemingly 
contented. The plea of the strategist is perfectly 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 151 

sound, and under favouring conditions, the annexation 
would certainly be made. And this accomplished, 
with half the Bulgars under Rumanian rule, the eth- 
nologist would again have his innings, and the slogan 
of " unredeemed Bulgaria " would urge them on to 
the iEgean. The plea of commercial interest would 
of course powerfully second each argument for ad- 
vance, and nationality, the great blind idealism of em- 
pire and race, which knows no boundaries and recks 
not of our reasoning, would become ever more in- 
satiate. Can we not anticipate the exhortation of the 
latter day patriot orator: " In Rumania triumphant 
behold Rome come again to rule the world. On Ro- 
mans, to the fulfilment of your high destiny." 

In brief, Rumania is so situated that her most tangi- 
ble argument for expansion is race unity, though in the 
East, where it suits her purpose, she ignores this argu- 
ment in the interest of access to the sea. Hungary is 
so situated, especially in other quarters, that the less 
she says about race unity the better, though in this 
quarter she has something of a case. On the other 
hand she can urge strategic considerations with much 
force in favour of the maintenance of the status quo. 
And perhaps we may add that tenacious as is a peo- 
ple's attachment to its language and customs, these 
are not quite immutable like mountain and sea. If 
there must be divisions, it is convenient and prudent 
to have them marked by natural barriers. It is of 
course futile to urge such prudential considerations 
upon the parties to such a contest, but we may per- 
haps see in them some reason to conclude that natural 
boundaries will slowly win the day. Moreover the 



152 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

prudential consideration would not be without weight 
with a council of outside powers, so far as their action 
was free to regard it. In any case, ethnic interests 
can never receive exclusive consideration. 

THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 

Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, 
Servia and Montenegro, taken together coincide 
roughly with the habitat of the Southern Slavs, a 
branch of the great Slavic family which is entirely 
separated from all its kin. The political boundaries 
are necessarily somewhat artificial. The Slavic popu- 
lation really extends somewhat to the north of these 
limits into Carniola and Istria, thus reaching around 
the northern end of the Adriatic where they mingle 
with the Italians and succumb to the seductiveness of 
the Italian tongue. On the other hand, northeastern 
Servia cuts a big notch out of Rumanian territory, 
while the recent enlargement of Servia is almost 
wholly at the expense of Albanian and Bulgarian 
populations. But while not very well represented by 
present political boundaries, the Southern Slavs oc- 
cupy a singularly compact territory, and were it not 
for the exigencies of their great neighbours, nothing 
would be more natural than to form them into a united 
nation. 

This territory, by virtue of its location and its nat- 
ural character, has been debatable ground for two 
thousand years. The Romans conquered and orga- 
nised it about the beginning of our era, and for five 
hundred years it remained under their control. Then 
the barbarians overran and ruined it, a whole series 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 153 

of them, and finally, after a century and a half of 
anarchy, the Slavs, ancestors of the present inhabit- 
ants, took possession of the wasted land. They 
either destroyed or absorbed the older population 
except on the sea coast where the great Roman cities, 
built by the commerce of the Adriatic and always 
in touch with Italy, offered a refuge, if not to the 
population, at least to the civilisation of Rome, and 
kept, as they still keep, their Roman speech. 

These Slavs seem to have brought with them only 
the most rudimentary political organisation. They 
had every opportunity to build a powerful Slavic state, 
but never having known or imagined anything more 
than a tribal organisation, the opportunity passed un- 
improved. Slowly they learned to form dukedoms 
and principalities, but meantime their neighbours got 
ahead of them, and their history has been one of con- 
stant subjection and shifting allegiance according as 
the great neighbours waxed or waned in influence. 

The northern part of this Slavic area, Croatia and 
Slavonia (ignoring for the moment the fragments in 
Carinthia, etc.) is essentially a part of the great plain 
of Hungary. Its present annexation to that country 
is in accordance with the plain intent of nature, though 
man has done much to make the realisation of na- 
ture's purpose difficult. Here in this large plain was 
formed the petty kingdom of Croatia which lasted 
for nearly two hundred years. Then quite naturally, 
the Hungarians, more numerous dwellers in the same 
great plain, conquered the country in order to get 
down to the sea, and held it for over four centuries, 
until in 1526 the Turks destroyed the power of Hun- 



i 5 4 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

gary and took bit by bit these fair plain lands for 
themselves. But though they kept encroaching for 
eighty years they never quite got through to the sea 
where they would have encountered the redoubtable 
power of Venice, and their conquests were loosely 
held. They sent no colonists and no pashas, but like 
absentee landlords, farmed the country for tribute. 
When toward the end of the seventeenth century the 
tide turned and the country returned to its former un- 
certain status, there were no mosques to pull down 
and no Moslem institutions to eradicate, only the de- 
moralisation resulting from unintelligent exploitation. 
Then, with a part of Hungary which had shared its 
fate of Turkish rule, it passed to Austria where it 
remained for a century save for a brief interval of 
Napoleon's supremacy. Finally, when in 1814 the 
Congress of Vienna sought to settle all these trouble- 
some questions forever, Croatia and Slavonia were 
given to Hungary, in whose keeping they have since 
led a restless and uncomfortable existence. Toward 
the middle of the nineteenth century, Croatia and 
Slavonia were deeply stirred by the almost world-wide 
agitation in favour of nationalism, or as we may per- 
haps better term it, race integrity. Born out of due 
season, there came the concept of a united Southern 
Slavic people. Being an appanage of Hungary 
rather than an equal partner, the seed of the new agi- 
tation fell in fertile soil, and the fruit is not all gath- 
ered yet. 

South of the great plain lie Dalmatia, Bosnia and 
Servia, stretching from west to east, with little 
Herzegovina and Montenegro tucked in beneath. 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 155 

Here all is mountainous, and separate principalities 
were quite inevitable. Smallest and most interesting 
of all is Dalmatia, a spike shaped strip of coastland 
separated from Bosnia by a well defined mountain 
ridge, and supplemented by the wonderful islands 
mentioned in an earlier chapter. Here Rome ruled 
for the first eleven centuries of our era, first from 
Rome and then from Constantinople, and here were 
the great Roman cities, the strongholds where Roman 
civilisation and Roman speech stood at bay, conquer- 
ing even when conquered. Its history is much the 
same as that above narrated save for the participa- 
tion of another power not concerned with the fate of 
the great plain. From 1100 for more than three 
hundred years, while Hungary ruled the Slavs of the 
plain, she was contesting with Venice the control of 
the islands and the Dalmatian coast. Finally, as the 
Turks shattered Hungary, Venice won but only to 
find herself doomed to another three centuries of 
struggle, this time with Turkey. When the struggle 
finally ended in her favour, Venice was in the sere and 
yellow leaf, and her eighty years of tranquil posses- 
sion ended with the extinction of the republic. After 
a few years' subjection to Napoleon, Dalmatia passed 
to Austria, in whose possession it has since remained. 
It was therefore the least Turkish, but also the least 
Slavic of these regions. It is vital to the scheme of 
a united Slav state, but equally so to Austrian de- 
fence and to the far-reaching scheme of Italian ex- 
pansion, with which country it has extensive commer- 
cial relations and natural linguistic affinities. What 
its sympathies are it would be difficult to ascertain, but 



156 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

there is no likelihood that any of the contestants will 
concern themselves with the question. Its fate will 
be decided, as it always has been, outside its borders, 
and it has acquired the habit of acquiescence. 

The mountain ridge that separates Dalmatia from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Servia farther in- 
land, assigned to these territories a very different fate. 
They had neither sea coast nor natural highways join- 
ing populous and productive regions, and were thus 
without incentive to commerce or specialised indus- 
try. Lying nearer the centre of Turkish power, they 
naturally felt its impact more heavily. 

Here as in the north, there slowly developed some- 
thing of organisation. Bosnia and Servia became 
principalities and then petty kingdoms. For brief 
periods they overreached their boundaries, Bosnia 
controlling Damatia and developing commercial and 
naval power, and Servia extending her conquests east 
and south into a so-called empire. For about a hun- 
dred years — the hundred years immediately preced- 
ing the fall of Constantinople — both were consid- 
erable powers, but during the next century the long 
struggle with Turkey ended in their subjection and 
incorporation in the Turkish empire. 

Meanwhile a new complication had appeared 
which, especially in Bosnia, was destined to com- 
pletely change her fate. This was a religious con- 
troversy. This whole region had already been 
divided between the Catholic and Greek churches, 
Dalmatia and Croatia going to the former, Servia 
to the latter, and Bosnia part to each. As if this 
were not enough, however, a new doctrine, known of 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 157 

course as a heresy, made its way from Asia across \ 
Bulgaria to these Southern Slavs. This Bogomil I 
heresy, as it was called, seems to have been similar to I 
certain creeds known in our day. It denied the divin- 
ity of Christ, gave natural or figurative interpreta- 
tions of the miracles, and in particular, denied the 
utility of images, forms, priests, and ecclesiasticism 
generally. It won a certain number of adherents and 
finally was adopted by one of the ablest Bosnian rul- 
ers partly for political reasons, and through his in- 
fluence became the religion of the court and aristoc- 
racy. It will be readily understood that the common 
people remained faithful to their images, their forms, 
and their priests, and that both Catholic and Greek 
churches anathematised and persecuted the new re- 
ligion. 

It was in the fierce heat of this controversy that 
Bosnia fell under Turkish sway. Turk and Bogomil 
alike had a fierce contempt for the image-worshipping 
Christian. Moreover there was not a little in com- 
mon between their creeds. In short, the Bosnian 
aristocracy became Moslems and were of course con- 
firmed in their prerogatives to the great detriment of , 
the Christian peasantry who were ground down under 
more than Turkish oppression. Here, therefore, iso- 
lated among Christian domains, we have a Moslem, 
though not a Turkish state. The complications thus 
introduced into the perplexing Balkan situation will be 
at once apparent. 

Bosnia contributed her share toward the disorders 
of the nineteenth century, revolting repeatedly against 
Turkish rule. But the reason was just the opposite 



1 58 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

of that which actuated her neighbours. The Moslem 
aristocracy resented the reforms which enlightened 
sultans from time to time attempted to introduce, look- 
ing toward the modernisation of the country and the 
ultimate decline of their own prestige. For thirty 
years, from 1821 to 1851, Bosnia was constantly at 
war with the sultan, the ultimate result being the de- 
struction of her aristocracy, but of course the confir- 
mation of Islam, which had now become the religion 
of a large part of the people. So while the collapse 
of Turkey in 1878 brought emancipation to other 
principalities in the peninsula, it brought a new sub- 
jection to Bosnia. Independence for this strategic 
province was no part of the plans of Austria, and the 
sop thrown to her in the Congress of Berlin was the 
privilege of " administering " these territories, the 
consent of Turkey being secured by the solemn prom- 
ise that they would be restored to her sovereignty. 
But the consent of Bosnia was not so easily won. It 
took an army of 200,000 men and a war of three 
years to restore order and assure Austrian control. 
An admirable administration, followed by greatly in- 
creased prosperity, may be appealed to to condone if 
not to justify the violation of her pledge in their an- 
nexation in 1908. 

The present mood of Bosnia can only be surmised. 
Austrian occupation has brought prosperity and pre- 
sumably has won certain interests to its cause. But 
patriotism is not mercenary, and material benefits sel- 
dom purchase the sympathy of a people. The decay 
of Islam and the growing prestige of Christianity un- 
der present political conditions, contributes to the 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 159 

Christian element of the population, and so to the 
removal of the barrier which has separated the Bos- 
nians from their Slavic kin. Meanwhile the spirit 
of the age powerfully favours the spirit of race unity. 
Independent Servia is its visible beginning. The Aus- 
trian suggestion that this ideal should be realised by 
a union under Austrian suzerainty seems in reality 
the negation of this ideal, and the treatment of Cro- 
atia and Slavonia is a further deterrent. Ii^^ a^ a 
Bosnian who killed the Archduke Ferdinand. 

Ine history or bervia up to the time or the lurk- 
ish conquest is not unlike that of Bosnia. But its 
leaders were not Bogomils and did not become Mos- 
lems. It therefore had the semi-autonomous govern- 
ment and the tribute-burdened existence with which 
we are already familiar in the case of Rumania. 
Without bonds of sympathy toward her suzerain and 
with the memory of very considerable achievements 
in the past, Servia was prepared to take advantage of 
the first opportunity to assert her independence. This 
came as early as 1804, when through the intervention 
of Russia, Servia completely shook off Turkish rule. 
The Turk soon came back again, but not to stay, and 
after a period of doubtful struggle, recognised the 
complete autonomy of Servia in 1830. Autonomy, 
of course, does not mean independence. Servia was 
still counted a part of the Turkish empire, and theo- 
retically at least, was subject to tribute and could have 
relations with foreign powers only through her suze- 
rain. But she had her own princes and managed her 
home affairs in her own way. Moreover, in reality 
she never paid tribute nor recognised the Capitula- 



160 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

tions, Turkey's agreements with foreign powers. 
Her recent history with its surprising assertion and 
large ambitions, is better understood when we real- 
ise that she has really been an independent nation al- 
most as long as ourselves. 

One new factor which has unobtrusively entered, 
deserves our careful attention, namely, the interven- 
tion of Russia. Since 1804 when she makes her first 
significant appearance, she has been the more or less 
constant sponsor for Servia. This strikes us as pe- 
culiar, for Servia is not adjacent to her territory. 
The reason for this tutelage will be apparent when 
we come to consider the case of Russia and her great 
rivals. For the present we have only to notice that 
this relationship is of paramount importance in Ser- 
vian history. The course of true love has not run 
smooth, and there have been periods of estrangement, 
but the whole trend of political forces has driven them 
back into each other's arms. 

The Congress of Berlin in 1878 recognised the in- 
dependence of Servia. This had been substantially 
a fact for three quarters of a century. It also handed 
Bosnia and Herzegovina over to Austria to adminis- 
ter for a limited but indefinite period. Possibly the 
statesmen of Europe hardly realised that Servia in 
this period had grown a full set of national ideals and 
ambitions. She had taken note that her language 
was spoken from Uskub to Trieste. She had realised 
that a nation to be independent must have access to 
the sea, and had noted that the harbours of the 
Adriatic were in the possession of her kinsfolk. The 
dream of a greater Servia was already a heritage of 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 161 

her patriots. An independent Bosnia would have 
made the realisation of that dream easy; an Austrian 
Bosnia made it impossible. And Servia was not re- 
assured by the promise of restitution. Hence the 
policy of agitation, whose aim was to rouse in unpro- 
gressive Bosnia the consciousness of Slavic origin and 
of Servian kinship, a propaganda which the very bene- 
fits conferred by Austria could not fail to promote. 
In this effort to detach Bosnia from Austria, Turkey 
was sure to aid in the hope of restitution, but Servia 
felt sure that she could intercept the gift on the way. 
Russia would aid Servia in her efforts at both detach- 
ment and annexation. 

To this persistent effort Austria opposed alternate 
coaxing and coercion, each in vain. Coaxing meant 
surrender, and coercion only emphasised Servia's help- 
lessness. Among the latter measures adopted were 
differential tariffs on Austrian railroads by which alone 
Servian products could reach their markets. This 
gave precedence to Austrian and Hungarian competi- 
tors and showed Servian producers that they were the 
vassals of the powerful neighbour who held Servia 
prisoner with her own kinsmen for a jailor. It is not 
strange that Servia was not reconciled; it is perhaps 
strange that she was not cowed. 

Such was the situation when in 1908 Austria served 
notice to all parties of her intentions, by ^JJjgxjng 
Bpjinia and Herz.eg.o,vjna. There was nothing unex- 
pected in this, but Servia had hoped against hope. In 
the first moment of blind fury she was tempted to 
risk the chance of war, but finding that Austria was 
backed by Germany, and that Russia, however de- 



1 62 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

sirous, could not help her, she resigned herself, with 
what feelings we may imagine, to the indefinite post- 
ponement of all dreams of Slavic unity, and began to 
look elsewhere for escape from economic bondage. 
She must get to the sea. If this could not be accom- 
plished through union with her own kinsfolk, she 
must strike farther south, through the wild moun- 
tainous region of Albania, inhabited by an uncouth 
and alien people. It was a longer way, a harder path, 
a more inhospitable neighbourhood. The harbours 
were fewer and less suited to her purpose. The route 
was decidedly a second choice, but a possibility, though 
Europe did not think so. But the co-operation of 
other powers and the unexpected energy of Servia 
confounded European calculations, Turkey was driven 
back to the walls of Constantinople, and a Servian 
army occupied Durazzo on the Adriatic. Servia had 
gotten to the sea. 

But Servia had yet to drain the cup of humilia- 
tion. Europe forbade her to occupy any point on 
the Adriatic. The Albanians must become a nation, 
though unprepared for the task, unwonted even to 
the thought. This was the will of Austria; this was 
the verdict of Europe; war with the great powers of 
Europe was the alternative. 

It is unnecessary to comment on the sentiments 
resulting from such an experience, beyond noting their 
importance as a further political force. Servia was 
enlarged at the expense of an alien race and at the 
cost of a new and dangerous enmity. But she got no 
outlet, no independence, no union with her kinsmen. 
It would be difficult to imagine a better guarantee of 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 163 

future trouble. The net result was to drive Servia 
back to her former programme, to renew and inten- 
sify her agitation for a greater Servia and for the 
union and independence of the Southern Slavs, with 
results the beginning of which we know. 

Montenegro is simply the southern tip of this Slavic 
domain, the only portion which, on account of its al- 
most inaccessible mountain fastnesses, the Turks were 
never able to subdue. It has the advantages and 
the defects of littleness and isolation. Its access to 
the sea early alarmed Austria, who hedged it about 
with restrictions, military, commercial and fiscal, 
which limit its real independence to harmless internal 
affairs. As a factor in the military situation it is 
hardly more than an annoyance. In commerce and 
other connections it is less. As a part of a large Slavic 
state, it would be of immense strategic importance, 
commanding the magnificent harbour of Cattaro, 
which would make an ideal naval base, to say nothing 
of its commercial possibilities and its marvellous scenic 
attractions. Its great potential importance is not lost 
sight of by parties to the great struggle, but as an 
independent power it is insignificant, a suggestion of 
the impotence of this naturally powerful country, in 
its present divided condition which certain European 
powers are interested to maintain. 

BULGARIA 

Bulgaria is the descendant, or perhaps we should 
say, merely the namesake, of a once powerful people 
who at two different periods and in somewhat dif- 
ferent territories, rose to prominence. The people 



1 64 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

are a composite. The basic stock is probably the 
same Slavic element which in the seventh century in- 
undated the whole peninsula except for a small region 
in the southwest, too inaccessible for them to pene- 
trate. These Slavs we find quite unadulterated in 
the large territory just considered. We also suspect 
that they are the real substance of the Rumanian 
race, though disguised by a Latin speech. Perhaps 
even Greece is in like case, at least in parts. 

But the Bulgars, like the Rumanians and the Greeks, 
recognise their ancestry in another race, this time a 
Tartar or Mongolian people who invaded the penin- 
sula in the seventh century, not long after the Slavs 
had settled there. They were not numerous, but had 
developed a military organisation superior to that of 
the Slavs and so easily established their supremacy. 
In other respects, however, the Slavs were their su- 
periors. The result was that they soon adopted the 
Slavic customs and language, and merged their race 
entirely in that of the race they had conquered, just 
as the Slavs had done in Rumania and Greece. So in 
the most important sense, we have in the Bulgars a 
Slavic people. Their language differs from that of 
Servia hardly more than the language of Naples dif- 
fers from that of Florence. It would seem, there- 
fore, that the Slavic unionists might look in this di- 
rection for the realisation of their ideals. But all 
accounts agree that the Tartar Bulgars, while leav- 
ing the speech of the conquered Slavs almost unmodi- 
fied, have greatly modified their temperament and 
character. Perhaps that is because the Tartar blood 
is so different from that of the Aryan races. In any 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 165 

case there is little natural sympathy between the Bul- 
gars and their Slavic neighbours. 

This natural antipathy is accentuated by their his- 
tory. The Bulgars formed a powerful state which 
lasted with one considerable interruption, for over 
seven hundred years. Twice it was extended to con- 
trol nearly the whole peninsula. At last it was over- 
whelmed by Servia in her brief period of imperial 
greatness and was obliged to continue as a tribute 
paying state. This humiliation was speedily avenged 
by the fall of Servia, but not to the advantage of 
Bulgaria, for both passed under the dominion of 
Turkey, Bulgaria suffering first and worst from the 
conqueror's oppression. 

In arriving at our estimate of the Balkan situation, 
one more important fact must be noted, namely, the 
proximity of Bulgaria to Constantinople. It must 
never be forgotten that up to the thirteenth century 
Constantinople was the headquarters of art, wealth 
and civilisation, not only for this region but for the 
entire world. Proximity and easy access to this great 
centre of wealth and culture could not fail to exercise 
a profound influence upon the Bulgarians, an influ- 
ence which was little felt in the remoter mountain dis- 
tricts of Servia. History fully justifies this assump- 
tion, and here we find another reason for the aliena- 
tion between these two neighbouring peoples. The 
Bulgars do not recognise the Servians as their equals. 

But after the Turkish conquest, proximity to Con- 
stantinople became a curse. Almost the first con- 
quests which the Turks made in Europe were made at 
the expense of Bulgaria, and by 1396 it was com- 



166 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

pletely under their sway, more than sixty years before 
the conquest of Servia and a century and a half be- 
fore the subjection of the northernmost provinces. 
And this subjection not only began early, but it con- 
tinued late. The revolt which essentially liberated 
Servia in 1804 was not possible in Bulgaria until 

1876, and full independence was not acquired until 
1908. Worse than this, however, Bulgaria's near- 
ness to the Turkish capital resulted in extensive coloni- 
sation by Turks. The eastern portion, nearly half, 
of the one-time Bulgarian empire has in consequence 
a mixed population which adds complexity to an al- 
ready complicated situation. 

It is interesting to note that it was a literary re- 
vival which roused this almost forgotten people to 
assert their independence. This revival taught them 
their history over again and so drew them together. 
But it taught them also to dislike and despise Servia, 
their conqueror and their inferior, and so acted as a 
centrifugal quite as much as a centripetal force. 
Their opportunity came in the Russian invasion of 

1877, precipitated by a Bulgarian revolt and its usual 
accompaniment of Turkish atrocities which earned for 
their author at the time the title of " the unspeakable 
Turk." The peace dictated to Turkey under the 
walls of Constantinople aimed not only to free Bul- 
garia but to give her virtually the whole peninsula 
between Servia and Rumania on the north and Greece 
on the south. 

It must be remembered that this magnificent scheme 
had its historic background and that Bulgarian am- 
bition had been quite prepared for it by the literary 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 167 

and historic revival. But so sudden an access of 
good fortune was too good to last. The powers of 
Europe knew that the great power that had made the 
new Bulgaria would also control it, and much as they 
might approve the emancipation of the peninsula from 
Turkish rule and its virtual unification, they were not 
ready to see it accomplished on those terms. So the 
greater Bulgaria was divided into three parts. The 
southern third went back to Turkey where it remained 
for a generation. The middle third was called Ru- 
melia, and was to be autonomous like Bulgaria, the 
northern third, under the suzerainty of the Porte. 
Bulgaria, made and unmade by outside powers, ac- 
quiesced of necessity, but the making had of itself de- 
fined her manifest destiny. All subsequent effort has 
been directed toward the attainment of the Russian 
programme of 1878. 

But there is one essential feature of that programme 
which Bulgaria has quite ignored, namely, subordina- 
tion to Russian influence. Neither the people nor 
their monarch have proved docile, and Russia has had 
reason to be thankful that her plan for a greater Bul- 
garia was thwarted. Of late the peculiar relation has 
grown up of dependence of Servia upon Russia and 
of Bulgaria upon Austria. The reason is perfectly 
obvious. Russia and Austria are rivals ; so are Servia 
and Bulgaria. If the little country in each case would 
be subservient to its big northern neighbour, the 
neighbour would be well pleased to be its friend and 
backer. But if instead of furthering the ends of its 
great neighbour, it insists upon blocking its way, then 
the neighbour will not befriend it but will help its 



1 68 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

rival. It is the bitter feud between Servia and Aus- 
tria which insures Russia's friendship, for she sees 
in Servia, thus minded, a barrier to the advance of 
Austria toward the iEgean and the outposts which 
she herself hopes to occupy. Conversely, it is Bul- 
garia's hatred of Servia which has earned Austria's 
friendship. 

GREECE 

Unlike Servia and Bulgaria, Greece can point back 
to no empire, for the territories which she calls hers 
were never united under a single Hellenic rule. Yet 
her historic background is far greater than theirs and 
more compelling. Despite her political incoherence, 
her name is above every name, and the Greek, though 
half Slav in blood, sees in that name the promise of a 
limitless destiny. No definite necessity, political or 
strategic, impels the Greek to a definite advance, like 
Servia's striving for the sea. Yet equally, there is 
no compelling reason for stopping where he is. 

A farther incentive to this unmeasured ambition of 
the Greek, is found in the character of the people. 
They are the merchants of the eastern world, and in 
all the seaports and commercial centres of the Levant, 
they sit in the seats of the mighty. They are almost 
nowhere in the majority, but are everywhere numer- 
ous, and influential out of proportion to their numbers. 
This population would furnish a plausible pretext for 
annexing almost any port of the littoral of the east- 
ern Mediterranean if the occasion should arise. And 
inasmuch as it is impossible to take the littoral with- 
out taking some country with it, the pretext could be 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 169 

stretched to cover the requirements. Greeks, too, 
have always governed Constantinople. Even after 
the Turkish conquest they continued to plan its build- 
ings, to control its commerce, and to monopolise its 
wealth. They do so to-day. When the vicious sys- 
tem prevailed of selling the governorships of the prov- 
inces to the highest bidder, it was always Greeks who 
secured the prize. What an argument for solving the 
insoluble problem of Constantinople by adding it to 
the kingdom of Greece ! There is not a Greek alive 
who has not had the thought. And if Constantinople, 
then assuredly the country in between, Macedonia, 
Thrace and Gallipoli, and of course whatever is nec- 
essary beyond the Dardanelles to assure control of 
the great waterway of which Greece would thus be- 
come the trustee. Only such an ambition can explain 
the completely unstrategic extension of Greek terri- 
tory to the east following the second Bakan war. 

Like all the countries we have been considering, 
Greece has belonged to Turkey, but she came later 
and left earlier than any of the rest. In this quarter 
Turkey found herself pitted against the redoubtable 
power of Venice, and it was only after a prolonged 
and bitter struggle that her ascendency was estab- 
lished. But conquest in this case was even more dis- 
astrous than possession. The ruins of the Parthenon, 
wrecked by a Venetian bombardment in the course of 
the struggle, are its tragic reminder. 

Despite the demoralisation of Turkish rule which 
was here at its worst, Greece was prompt to revolt at 
the first opportunity, and after a romantic struggle 
lasting for eight years, Greece became, with the aid 



i 7 o THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

of the Powers, an independent kingdom in 1829. 
Her insufficient territories were later extended by the 
same outside agency, but an attempt at further forcible 
extension in 1895 ended disastrously, and the newly 
made kingdom was obliged to fall back upon its Eu- 
ropean sponsors for protection against the Turkish 
attack which it had provoked. 

Greece seemingly owes her existence and also her 
later growth largely to sentimental considerations. 
The romance of her history, her literature and her art, 
the much prized heritage of the western world, were 
mainly responsible for the sympathy and ultimate in- 
tervention of the western powers a century ago, with- 
out which she could not have achieved her independ- 
ence. The same influence operated to secure her later 
extension of territory and to protect her from the 
wrath of Turkey which she had recklessly incurred. 
But if sentiment has wrought powerfully without, it 
has wrought still more powerfully within. It was 
this same sentiment that induced the Ionian islands to 
join the new and precarious kingdom instead of con- 
tinuing under the prosperous rule of Britain, and it 
was again this sentiment that induced Britain to re- 
lease them when they had expressed their preference 
by a plebiscite. Above all it was this sentiment which 
impelled the large island of Crete to hazard war with 
Turkey, and disaster for Greece herself, to secure ad- 
mission to the Kingdom of the Hellenes. 

It was the Cretan question more than any other 
which induced the Greeks to join with the other Bal- 
kan states in attacking Turkey. There were other 
islands to be had for the taking, and an extension of 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 171 

territory north and east was of course contemplated. 
The risks of the undertaking were immense, but Greek 
fortunes were in the hands of a statesman both dar- 
ing and resourceful, and she boldly entered the arena, 
to win new territories and create new problems be- 
yond her hopes and fears. 

THE BALKAN WARS 

The hope of the Balkan allies to overcome Turkey 
was not unreasonable, and was better justified by the 
result than they or their friends expected. They ex- 
pected to secure Albania and Macedonia, that is, the 
western part of European Turkey as far east as the 
present confines of Greece, besides Crete and other 
islands. They do not seem to have expected to ac- 
quire Thrace, the large eastern plain dominated by 
Adrianople, and perhaps in view of its large Turkish 
population and its command of the Dardanelles which 
would be sure to involve the intervention of Europe, 
they were at first prudent enough not to desire it. 
The territory once acquired, they had their several 
ideas about dividing it, but save in one case, they seem 
not to have arrived at an understanding in advance. 
Greece would have Southern Albania, the ancient 
Epirus, perhaps as far north as Corfu, thus consoli- 
dating her possessions, and Servia would have the 
northern portion with its much needed seaports. 
The division here would hardly make trouble. Servia 
in turn secretly agreed with Bulgaria on a line which 
would leave the latter a free hand in Macedonia. 
That is, she would not try to get a port on the iEgean. 
There remained only the question of questions, the 



172 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

division of Macedonia between Bulgaria and Greece. 
The long continued struggle between these two pow- 
ers to establish their claims here has been referred to. 
The struggle was carried on by every device available 
to either contestant. Each had large ambitions to 
which the possession of Macedonia was essential. 
Bulgaria sought to regain her olden empire so lately 
promised by Russia, and also by acquiring ports on 
the iEgean, to free her commerce from dependence 
on the Dardanelles. Greece sought to open a path- 
way to Constantinople. 

They got all they expected, and Thrace in addition. 
But while fortune added Thrace in the East, the Pow- 
ers clipped off Albania in the West. Servia was the 
loser, Bulgaria the gainer, as agreements stood. Ser- 
via made the reasonable suggestion: " Let us all 
move on a step." Bulgaria demurred. Servia's loss 
was no fault of hers, her gain no merit of Servia's. 
An agreement was an agreement. By way of com- 
promise the dispute was referred to the arbitration 
of the Czar of Russia, and while his decision was 
pending, Bulgaria sought to force the issue by a sur- 
prise attack. Hence the second Balkan war, the dis- 
comfiture of Bulgaria, the extension of Greece over 
all the littoral of Macedonia, the extension of Ser- 
via south into territory occupied solely by Bulgars, 
the separation of the iEgean hinterland from its nat- 
ural outlets, the creation of long and indefensible fron- 
tiers and a new harvest of grudge and hate. Prob- 
ably not one of the powers involved accepted the so- 
lution as even measurably satisfactory or permanent. 
Bulgaria's attempt to surprise the allies angered the 



THE CASE OF THE BALKANS 173 

Czar, the chosen referee, and her subsequent defeat 
disappointed Austria at whose instigation she had 
probably acted. The great war was already fore- 
shadowed. 

ALBANIA 

This burlesque product of embarrassed diplomacy, 
it is hardly necessary to add, was formed in no spirit 
of deference to the Albanian people. They are not 
a unit in race, language, religion or any other vital 
interest. They have refused to accept the political 
unity of the state, and have not progressed in thought 
beyond the stage of clan organisation. But they are 
a unit in not being related to any one else in the 
peninsula. When the invading swarms of Slavs, Bul- 
gars and the like swept over the peninsula, they swept 
the earlier inhabitants before them and in the almost 
inaccessible mountain fastnesses of the extreme South- 
west, those who refused to be conquered or absorbed 
found a refuge. So in the Pyrenees and the Cau- 
casus we find remnants of earlier races which the im- 
migrant hosts have crowded out of their path and left 
as a glacier leaves its terminal or lateral morains. 

It was with this human remnant that Austria, sec- 
onded by Italy, proposed to construct a state, whose 
sole reason for existence should be to hold the key to 
the Adriatic, as the Turk has so long held the key to 
the Black Sea. Servia might have served the pur- 
pose, but Servia was unfriendly, and besides, Russia 
was her backer. To give the key into her keeping 
was too much like giving it to Russia. The custodian 
must be a power without friends, a weak power, no 



i 7 4 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

matter how weak, only so that it could maintain a 
semblance of existence and hold the key until Aus- 
tria got ready to take it. The time would be short; 
the world did not then know how short. Italy rea- 
soned similarly, knowing that the upheaval was near. 
The kingdom of Albania has had an inglorious exist- 
ence, but it has lived out its appointed time and has 
finished the work that was given it to do. To Italy 
or to Austria, it would seem, must now pass the cus- 
tody of the Adriatic. 



CHAPTER X 

THE CASE OF AUSTRIA 

Under this name popular usage, is wont to desig- 
nate the great dual empire of Southern Europe, 
though the susceptibilities of the Hungarian people 
demand with much insistence the fuller name, Aus- 
tria-Hungary, or the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It 
will be convenient to follow popular usage, the more 
so as we have to deal with a historic people of very 
varying extent who have but recently organised the 
partnership designated by the longer name. The 
state which we are considering is one of the oldest in 
Europe, while the Austro-Hungarian Empire is but 
fifty years old. 

Austria began not as an empire, not even as a 
duchy, but as a mark, the pettiest of principalities, 
with a territory about as large as the state of Rhode 
Island. It was founded about eleven centuries ago 
by the ruler of the Franks, the great Charlemagne, in 
an effort to protect the empire which he had built 
against the Slavs whose migrations had already inun- 
dated the whole Balkan peninsula, and now threat- 
ened to overwhelm all Europe. It may perhaps be 
said that this has been the historic mission of Austria 
from first to last, that it is still the cornerstone of her 
policy, and that fear of the Slav is still the ground 

i75 



176 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

of the pro-Austrian policy of certain nations of Eu- 
rope. 

The mark grew into a duchy, and ultimately into 
a kingdom, moving its capital eastward as it pushed 
its campaign against the Slav, until it settled it in 
Vienna, where it has remained for nearly eight hun- 
dred years. Other marks and duchies were of course 
established about the same time and for the same 
purpose, and it was long before it became clear which 
would outgrow the rest, but at last the advantage was 
with Austria, as indeed was inevitable, for Austria 
was planted on the Danube, the great commercial 
highway of this vast region, and trade brought wealth, 
population and power. There were numerous an- 
nexations and consolidations, sometimes through con- 
quest, oftener through marriage, and almost as many 
divisions among the monarch's too numerous sons, for 
rulers then regarded their territories as private es- 
tates to be transferred as dowries or legacies according 
to family exigencies. But slowly consolidation gained 
on disintegration, and Austria became a great domain. 
She was not without rivals, however, for Bohemia 
and Hungary, kingdoms built largely with non-Ger- 
man peoples, had passed through much the same ex- 
periences. These in turn, however, passed under 
Austrian sway, and gradually other territories were 
added, large parts of Italy, the Belgian provinces, a 
part of Poland, then Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia and, 
finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Concurrently some 
of these possessions were lost, notably Belgium and 
Italy, neither of which were appropriately included. 

This process of growth and consolidation was much 



THE CASE OF AUSTRIA 179 

influenced by two great forces from without. The 
first of these was the Holy Roman Empire. This 
was, in the minds of men, a continuation of the em- 
pire of the Caesars, an empire which had suffered 
eclipse during the Barbarian invasions, but which 
could not pass out of existence, to the minds of men 
inheriting the traditions of the long world rule of 
Rome. Under Charlemagne that empire had again 
assumed tangible form and become a real power. It 
rapidly lost power, to be sure, but its prestige re- 
mained considerable down to the time when, with so 
many other time-honoured relics of the past, it was 
destroyed by Napoleon. The choice of Charlemagne 
as emperor had this important result, that it perma- 
nently removed the seat of that empire to Central 
Europe, where certain princes of that much divided 
land gradually acquired the prerogative of electing 
the emperor. Their choice, limited by a Frank tra-^ 
dition to a German prince, soon fell upon the Aus- 
trian monarch, and ultimately became a prerogative 
of the dynasty, the famous house of Hapsburg. Not 
till 1804, when it became apparent that Napoleon, as 
dictator of Europe, would either abolish the title or 
compel its bestowal upon himself, did the Austrian 
monarch decide to forestall possible humiliation by 
substituting the title, Emperor of Austria, by which 
he has since been known. 

It will be apparent that this long recognition as 
titular head of Europe and of the German states in 
particular, at a time when these states were num- 
erous and weak, could not fail to be of advantage to 
Austria. The tradition of the Holy Roman Em- 



180 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

peror as the ruler of all Europe disappeared with 
Napoleon, but the tradition of Austria as the head of 
the German states continued until Bismarck, by a 
crushing defeat, demonstrated the supremacy of Prus- 
sia, and relegated Austria to the position of a non- 
German state. But while this double leadership con- 
tinued, it was used, not always scrupulously, to ag- 
grandise the Austrian state. 

The second fact was the rise of Turkey, whose 
steady advance northward in the Balkan peninsula 
ultimately brought her arms to the walls of Vienna. 
Here the advance was stayed, not however by the 
Austrian arms, but by the prowess of Poland, at that 
time a powerful neighbour, whose interests were 
menaced by this advance. Generally speaking, how- 
ever, Austria was too far away from Turkey to be in 
much danger of attack, and the fact that the attack 
did not come until 1683, nearly two centuries after 
the absorption of the Rumanian and Southern Slavic 
principalities, shows how strong were the buffer states 
across which the Turk must advance to the attack of 
Austria. As a matter of fact, these two centuries 
witnessed the decline of the Turkish power and in- 
sured the triumph of her remoter enemies. 

But while Turkey harmed Austria little, she ren- 
dered her the great service of exhausting and subdu- 
ing her eastern and southern rivals, especially Hun- 
gary. But for the appearance of the Turks in the 
peninsula, there can be little doubt that this vigorous 
people, the descendants of Attila's Huns, would have 
forced their way east to the Black Sea, and perhaps 
south to the iEgean, becoming in turn a menace to 



THE CASE OF AUSTRIA 181 

Austria on the west. But Turkey broke their power 
in a great battle in 1526, and thus set permanent lim- 
its to their expansion. Fear of the Turk impelled 
them to make common cause with Austria and ulti- 
mately merged their kingdom in the Austrian empire. 
It was this large and reinforced empire which the 
Turks attacked in 1683, only to suffer the great de- 
feat which was the prelude to their slow retirement 
from the peninsula. 

Austria suffered severely from the onslaughts of 
Napoleon, but in turn was chiefly responsible for his 
overthrow. This fact, coupled with the great ability 
of her representative, left her in a very strong posi- 
tion at the resettlement of Europe. But as so often 
happens, relief from outside pressure only released 
disruptive forces within, and these were abundantly 
present in her heterogeneous population. Formed 
as a German bulwark against the Slavs, the Germans 
at this time constituted hardly a fourth of her popu- 
lation, while the Hungarians, an utterly alien people, 
were about as numerous, and the Slavs within the em- 
pire outnumbered either. There were also at that 
time almost as many Italians as Germans, and alto- 
gether the empire could count ten fairly distinct na- 
tionalities. Necessity had driven them together, and 
with its disappearance they drifted apart. 

Now appeared upon the stage another influence, all 
unobtrusive and quite innocent to the minds of the 
very suspicious statesmen of that day, namely, the re- 
vival of interest in literature and history. This in- 
terest was even encouraged by the government as a 
vent for the energies which were beginning to assert 



182 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

themselves in dangerous political agitation. Nothing 
better could have been devised to increase this agi- 
tation. The different peoples in the empire, Galicians, 
Bohemians, Hungarians, Southern Slavs, etc., began 
to clamour for larger recognition as against the over- 
weening German leadership which Austria had known 
for a thousand years. There was a revolution in 
1848, that year of revolutions all over Europe. 
This was put down in a way which virtually played 
off one race against another, leaving the Germans in 
control as before. But when in 1866 Prussia vir- 
tually expelled Austria from the family of German 
nations, the German prestige in Austria was shat- 
tered and recognition of the equality of other races 
became inevitable. The result was not a dissolution 
but a partnership. Curiously enough, only one peo- 
ple, the Hungarians, secured the desired recognition. 
The Slavs were more numerous, but they were sepa- 
rated by broad intervening territories into southern 
and northern groups, and these again by long stand- 
ing political or religious barriers, into lesser groups 
very little inclined to unite for any purpose. Mean- 
while Germans and Hungarians not being thus handi- 
capped, quite naturally preferred to monopolise the 
advantages of supremacy, and so formed a dual em- 
pire. Austria and Hungary form two distinct na- 
tions, each having its own parliament, laws and ad- 
ministration, but having a common sovereign. The 
most ingenious precautions have been devised to pre- 
vent the possibility of a closer union. But it was re- 
luctantly concluded that a united army, a united cus- 
toms service and a united foreign representation were 



THE CASE OF AUSTRIA 183 

necessary for national efficiency. The Slavic prov- 
inces were divided between the two self-chosen part- 
ners. Austria got all the northern Slavs, Bohemia, 
Moravia, Galicia and Bukovina, the whole constitut- 
ing a long irregular strip of territory which wraps 
itself like a tentacle half round the compact oval of 
Hungary. She also got the southern Slavs in Carin- 
thia and Carniola, territories partly German which 
she had ruled for centuries. Even Dalmatia, the 
long strip of island and coast stretching far to the 
south and henceforth quite detached from the rest of 
her territories, she was able to retain. But Croatia 
and Slavonia went to Hungary for two reasons. 
First, because Hungary must get to the sea, and all 
her true Hungarian frontiers lay far inland. Sec- 
ond, because it was necessary to keep the Slavs di- 
vided. If all had gone to either partner, they could, 
by combining, have outnumbered the other race, a 
result which Germans and Hungarians were alike 
minded to prevent. Even this carefully guarded 
partnership scarcely stayed the divisive tendencies. 
For years it was generally believed that the death of 
the present sovereign would witness the dissolution 
of the dual monarchy, the more so as there was con- 
stant difficulty in apportioning the expense of the 
common services already referred to, between the two 
partners. Of late, however, the tide seems to have 
turned, and a dissolution is now no longer expected. 
Less trouble is experienced in making the necessary 
adjustments, and meanwhile a new interest has de- 
veloped to hold the two together. This is the an- 
nexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This vast ter- 



1 84 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

ritory, with its Slavic population, it should be noted, 
has not been assigned to either partner, but is jointly 
administered by a special bureau under the direction 
of the finance minister who presides over the joint af- 
fairs of the empire, i. e., customs, army and navy, and 
foreign representation. In this way the new Slav 
provinces have no representation in either the Aus- 
trian or the Hungarian parliaments. Again it is easy 
to surmise the reason. Such an addition would in- 
crease the Slav vote and so the ultimate danger of 
Slav ascendency. 

It is needless to say that the Slav provinces have 
not taken kindly to this arrangement. Especially is 
this true of Bohemia, a populous and compact terri- 
tory conscious of a great and independent past. The 
demand for partnership rights has been insistent and 
bitter. But this demand is made for Bohemia alone, 
and a glance at the map will make it clear that a 
united demand on the part of all the Slavs, or even on 
the part of all the northern Slavs, is well-nigh im- 
possible. To make Bohemia a third partner would 
still leave half the northern Slavs and all the south- 
ern Slavs to be distributed among the partners, with 
the certainty that the agitation for further partners 
would continue. Against such an extension of the 
partnership there are the weightiest reasons. It 
would increase the cost of government and decrease 
its efficiency. In particular, it would render dilatory 
and uncertain all concerted action which would always 
halt waiting for some partner's consent, for it must 
be remembered that there is no federal government 
to impose concerted action on all the states, as there 



THE CASE OF AUSTRIA 185 

is with us. This is precisely what the Hungarians 
have refused to tolerate. 

To these sound reasons of general policy, there are 
others less admirable but even more influential. To 
admit the Slavs to full partnership would give the 
Hungarians no access to the sea. Worse still, it 
would reduce Austria to comparative insignificance. 
The Germans are a minor part of the entire popula- 
tion, and their territory a still smaller part. The 
Hungarians would outnumber them and that increas- 
ingly, for their territory is vastly greater. That the 
people who have so long ruled the whole empire and 
even stood at the head of all Teutonic Europe should 
voluntarily accept a minor place in the partnership 
is not to be expected. So both countries stand pat, 
and will doubtless continue to do so until a revolution 
or some other extraordinary event, perhaps the pres- 
ent war, compels them to yield. 

There are not wanting, however, in high places, 
those who anticipate the inevitable decision. They 
are advocates of what is known as trialism; that is, 
a threefold instead of a twofold partnership. The 
late Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the throne, was said 
to be a trialist. What action he would have taken 
had he become emperor, or how he would have over- 
come the geographical and other obstacles, to the par- 
ticipation of the Slavs as a unit, we can only guess. 

The discontent of the Slavs has manifested itself in 
very different forms in different districts. Bohemia 
wishes to become a distinct kingdom, co-operating 
with Austria and Hungary on even terms. Galicia, 
once a part of Poland, would perhaps prefer to with- 



/ 



1 86 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

draw from the empire altogether and be reunited with 
German and Russian Poland to form an independent 
state, though this is not so certain. Croatia, Slavo- 
nia and Bosnia see in a union with Servia a prospect 
far more attractive than union with the northern 
Slavs or subjection to Hungary. How harmonise 
these discordant ambitions? 

A plan attributed to the Archduke Ferdinand is at 
least interesting. It was to permit the realignment of 
the Balkan powers on racial lines, but under the su- 
zerainty of the Austrian crown. Servia, Bosnia, 
Croatia and Slavonia, with Dalmatia or Albania or 
both, would thus be united with Hungary, Austria, 
Bohemia and Poland in a vast federated empire, to 
which it was his hope that Rumania and Bulgaria 
would be added, each with enlarged boundaries. 
Each would retain its own king and its independence 
in matters of internal administration, while resigning 
to the central government the control of all matters 
affecting the empire in its relation to other powers. 
The plan appeals strongly to the unbiased imagina- 
tion, but it does not seem to have been welcomed by 
the present partners, who are perhaps less concerned 
with the development of the empire than with the 
maintenance of their present advantage. Nor was it 
satisfactory to the southern Slavs, who feared that 
this concession to the Slavs would defeat their plans 
for independence. 

The first step in the way of realising this plan, or 
any plan, is necessarily the control of Servia. The 
greater Servia is not to be thought of as an outsider 
and possible enemy. If the Slavs are to be united it 



THE CASE OF AUSTRIA 187 

must be by bringing Servia in, not by letting the others 
out. Hence the attempts at alternate conciliation 
and coercion to which Servia has been exposed. We 
have already seen how all these efforts have failed 
and how the stand which Austria has believed it nec- 
essary to take to assure the freedom of the Adriatic 
and the loyalty of her Slavic subjects, has aroused a 
resentment in the Servian mind which probably has no 
parallel in the existing family of nations. This re- 
sentment has manifested itself, not in epithets and 
insults only, but in carefully laid plans to detach the 
southern Slavs from their allegiance, and to unite 
them to Servia to form an independent state. It has 
been charged that secret societies have been formed 
which included not only Servian citizens, but large 
numbers of Servian officials, with a programme defi- 
nitely hostile to Austria. We can hardly expect, as 
things now stand, ever to know the truth of these as- 
sertions, but they probably contained a large element 
of truth. It would be strange if the Servians, twice 
baffled in their efforts to attain their most elemental 
requirements, should not risk much in a final and des- 
perate attempt. It would be strange in turn if Aus- 
tria, threatened with the loss of everything, should 
not stake all in an effort at self-preservation. 

For let us not overlook the fact that Austria must 
lose all if she lost here. The loss of the southern 
Slavs would have meant the loss of the northern 
Slavs, for nothing would have withstood their claims, 
if similar claims had been conceded elsewhere. 
Worse still, the loss of the southern Slavs would com- 
pletely shut off both Austria and Hungary from the 



1 88 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

sea. We have seen that even within the confines of 
the empire, where no customs barriers are permitted, 
it is still deemed important in the interest of harmony, 
that each of these countries should have its own sea- 
ports, and that Croatia and Slavonia had to be ceded 
to Hungary by Austria on that account. How much 
more important, therefore, if the alternative is to 
have all ports in the hands of a completely separate 
power, able not only to erect customs barriers, but 
even to strangle traffic by differential railway tariffs 
or refusal of adequate railway facilities, as we have 
seen done to Servia. Even were the Slavs to be mod- 
erate, and take only Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and 
Bosnia, leaving Carinthia and Istria, the less Slavic 
states, in Austrian possession, and giving them Trieste 
as an outlet to the sea, the loss would still be fatal. 
The great archipelago of Dalmatia, now the incom- 
parable defence of Austria from naval attack, would 
be lost, and with it the tiny sea outlet would be wholly 
in the power of the new Slav state. Moreover, an 
Austria so weakened would at once become the prey 
of Italy, whose designs on the Istrian peninsula with 
its Italian population are loudly proclaimed. It is 
perfectly certain that any government which has the 
weakness, or even the misfortune, to lose territory so 
vital to the life of the empire would be overthrown, 
that the disruptive forces within the empire would be 
no longer restrainable, and that the empire would fall 
asunder. 

No government can be expected knowingly to com- 
mit suicide. It may have the scantiest possible claim 
upon our sympathy, the most doubtful right to exist, 



THE CASE OF AUSTRIA 189 

but these facts do not lessen its instincts of self-preser- 
vation or invalidate its right to act in self-defence. 
The statesmen charged with its defence cannot be ex- 
pected to question its right to exist. Its action must 
be measured not by its merits, but by its needs. 

But Austria needs no apologist for its existence. 
No government in Europe is so constrained, so arti- 
ficial, yet none is so indispensable. It will hardly be 
claimed that the two great partners have treated con- 
siderately the other great incoherent race that is in 
their keeping, but they have kept the peace over a 
large area in the most chaotic part of Europe. It is 
not the faults of government that create the disso- 
nance in this sore troubled realm; it is the dissonance 
that creates the faults of government. And this dis- 
sonance inheres in the situation, in the shape of the 
land which it is here given to men to inherit and to fit 
to the needs of harmonious national life, in the nar- 
row sea front which accident has given into one peo- 
ple's keeping, in the medley of races which the cross 
currents of race migration have here piled in sorry 
confusion, in the raw material which nature has fur- 
nished the builder, and not in the builder's mistake. 
Unhappy Austria, with her family jars, and her babel 
of tongues! Yes, no doubt, as compared with Eng- 
land and France with their united purpose and their 
common tongue. But happy, yes, thrice happy, as 
compared with the Balkan states, with their chaos of 
purpose, their carnage, and their smouldering hate ! 
And that is the alternative. It is a hazardous ven- 
ture to dissolve even the imperfect cohesions among 
men. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE CASE OF RUSSIA 

The Russian Empire is the largest body of con- 
tiguous territory in the world. It is approximately 
three times the size of the United States. The Brit- 
ish Empire is larger, but its parts are widely sepa- 
rated, the largest single area, Canada, being consid- 
erably less than half the size of Russia. The Chi- 
nese Empire, even counting such shadowy dependen- 
cies as Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet and Turkestan, 
is less than half the size of Russia, while China 
proper, the so-called eighteen provinces, is less than 
one-fifth the size of Russia. Superimpose the map 
of the United States on that of Russia, placing San 
Francisco at Warsaw, and then start eastward for 
New York. When you have reached your destina- 
tion, you are just about in the middle of the Russian 
Empire, half way to the Pacific. 1 A young man 
boarded our train at Irkutsk. The sound of English 
speech aroused his visible interest. " Do you speak 
English?" we asked. "Sure." "An American, 
then." " Yes, from Pennsylvania." " What are 
you doing out here?" "Oh, working in a mine." 

1 The United States (excluding outlying possessions) extends over 
57 degrees of longitude, the Russian Empire over 174 degrees. The 
distance from San Francisco to New York by rail is 3180 miles, from 
Warsaw to Vladivostok 6221 miles. 

190 



THE CASE OF RUSSIA 193 

" Where?" " Up north a ways." "How far 
north?" "About two thousand miles." " How 
long does it take you to get here?" "About a 
month." 

Two thousand miles north of Irkutsk, i.e., north 
of London or Labrador ! And farther west he could 
have gone twelve hundred miles south of the same 
parallel without leaving Russian territory. Extend 
our country northward to the Arctic Ocean, trimming 
off the Gulf states, and then stretch it northeast to 
Liverpool, and you have the Russian Empire. It 
would hold our country dropped in cross wise, and 
then the empire of Caesar on one side and that of 
Alexander on the other, and still there would be room 
for all the states of western Europe. 

But this is not all. The traveller from San Fran- 
cisco to New York crosses hundreds of miles of coun- 
try which no conceivable effort can make largely pro- 
ductive. The long journey from Warsaw to Vladi- 
vostok crosses scarcely a mile of untillable soil. Even 
the Urals, the alleged mountain barrier between Eu- 
rope and Asia, are hardly mountains at all, but merely 
wooded hills which the railway crosses without a sin- 
gle tunnel. Even allowing for the Arctic wastes, 
which are less extensive than is commonly supposed, 
the Russian empire probably has a larger percentage 
of tillable land than the United States. For more 
than five thousand miles the railway traverses a coun- 
try like Iowa and Nebraska. 

This vast domain has a population of about one 
hundred and seventy-five millions, mostly crowded 
into the southwestern corner. Siberia, with more 



i 9 4 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

than half the territory of the empire, has a population 
of less than ten millions. Most of this vast popula- 
tion, say a hundred and fifty millions, consists of white 
men, having all the potentialities of the white race. 
This is the largest body of white men living under one 
government in the world. Yet it is but the beginning 
of what seemingly must be. China has but a fifth 
the area, and more than half of that is mountainous 
and refractory. Yet with resources but partially de- 
veloped she supports a population of four hundred 
millions. Japan has one-sixtieth the area of Russia, 
and only one-sixth of her soil is or can be cultivated, 
yet she supports a population of fifty millions. At 
the same rate as China Russia would support a popu- 
lation of two thousand millions; at the rate of Japan, 
three thousand millions. Neither is impossible. The 
Russian people seem conscious of this possibility, for 
they are expanding at the most rapid rate anywhere 
recorded. At the rate of increase of the last hundred 
years, the total of two thousand millions would be 
reached about the year 2000. Only one other white 
population can, under present conditions, increase to 
any such extent, and that population is not politically 
united. 

It would seem certain, from the foregoing consid- 
erations, that Russia, with reasonable development 
and organisation, was assured an easy supremacy 
among the white races of the world. No one of them 
can possibly withstand her, and a combination which 
should long thwart her purposes would seem to be 
most unlikely. Not altogether presumptuous was the 
prophetic utterance of the great spokesman of the 



THE CASE OF RUSSIA 195 

Russian people : " We have come to take up the bur- 
den of civilisation. We have come to relieve the 
tired men." 

Yet we have here to note the great paradox of mod- \ 
ern political geography. Russia has the largest white 
man's land, the most productive of empires, the larg- 
est white population, the most prolific white popula- 
tion, the most room to grow in, and the best assurance 
that she can never be outgrown by any rival — and 
yet, there is no country in the world to-day that needs 
more territory as badly as Russia. 

The reason is plain to those who have followed the 
reasoning of the earlier chapters. Territorial suffi- 
ciency is not a question of area, but of organic com- 
pleteness. Spain is a little country, yet her territory 
is admirably complete. Union with Portugal would 
leave her territorially almost perfect. On all sides 
but one, the sea coast, and on the other, a mountain 
frontier easily delimited and defended. But a king- 
dom of Dakota the same size would be one of the 
most helpless and unstable political units imaginable. 
It would live in constant danger and would end by ab- 
sorbing adjacent territories or being absorbed by 
them. Nature has, indeed, set no absolute limits to 
states, as the British Empire now demonstrates, but 
there are enormous differences of convenience and sta- 
bility among the possible boundaries that she offers. 
Reasonable facilities for defence, and, above all, for 
trade, are indispensable to satisfactory territorial 
equipment. To stop short of this is to forego true 
independence and to invite trouble. These requisites 
Russia does not possess. Her constant expansion, 



i 9 6 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

much of it unwilling, despite common opinion to the 
contrary, is no insatiable land hunger, but the effort 
of a smothered people to get out to the air and light. 

It is easy for us, almost ideally situated in these re- 
spects, to discount Russia's need, to advise co-opera- 
tion in the use of facilities, and reliance upon neigh- 
bourly offices. But it is doubtful whether we, in like 
situation, would find our own advice palatable. We 
are hardly able, perhaps, to imagine ourselves trans- 
ferred to Russia and confronted with her problems. 
Let us try the easier task of reproducing, as nearly as 
we can, the Russian situation here. 

We have imagined in a former connection a chain 
of large islands stretching from Newfoundland to 
Long Island, and completely controlling access to the 
mainland — these all under German rule. Next, we 
will assume that all the Atlantic seaboard south from 
Maine to Georgia, and back to the Mississippi, with 
the Gulf States, is an independent and not too friendly 
country, far more populous than our own territory to 
the north and west, while Florida and Cuba belong 
to France. Mexico and the Pacific coast states are 
all in the hands of Japan, while Alaska, with its long 
" panhandle " extended much farther south and in- 
land, is also under foreign control. In compensation 
for all these losses, we will imagine that political acci- 
dent has given us Canada, with its narrowed western 
exit at Puget Sound, and the freedom of Hudson's 
Bay. We should have an ample territory stretching 
from Ohio through Montana, and from Oklahoma to 
the Arctic Ocean, but the very extent of this territory 
would be an embarrassment. The only exit to the 



THE CASE OF RUSSIA 197 

eastern sea actually ours would be the semi-frozen St. 
Lawrence, and this an exit to a sea under German con- 
trol. On the west our sole contact with the sea would 
be at the back end of Puget Sound, from which 
we could issue only between the pincers of foreign 
forts. Actual commerce would have to be bonded 
across foreign territory to New York, to New Or- 
leans, to San Francisco. 

Imagine such a situation. The very thought is suf- 
focating. No doubt we should accommodate our- 
selves to the necessities of the situation while we were 
too weak to change it. No doubt we should get used 
to it, and some among us would come to think it highly 
satisfactory, heaven-ordained, and would denounce as 
insatiate greed and unholy ambition all attempts at 
imperialistic or jingo policy. But can any one imag- 
ine that such an arrangement would be satisfactory to 
the American people? To a nation so hampered, 
peace could be but a truce; diplomacy could be but 
duplicity. Any number of wars would be fought to 
win New York, our Port Arthur. We should cherish 
every acre of the Nevada desert that brought us 
nearer to the Gulf of California, our Persian Gulf. 
No statesman would retain our confidence who did not 
seek control of the headlands that guard Puget Sound, 
our Baltic; while expansion toward the Gulf would 
become the cornerstone of our national policy. To a 
United States thus gripped by the steel shackles of 
militant Germany and Japan, how silly would sound 
arguments for arbitration and international brother- 
hood. How universal would be the gospel of our 
manifest destiny ! How easy the conviction that na- 



198 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

tions are not sentient beings whose existence is sacro- 
sanct, but mere arrangements for administrative con- 
venience, to be discontinued when they defeat rather 
than promote that end. If we have other policies 
and other convictions, it is because we know nothing 
of Russia's needs. Put us in her position and we will 
soon learn to think her thoughts and do as she does. 
The same land hunger and insatiate imperialism, the 
same bureaucratic management, the same shameless 
subterfuge and diplomatic intrigue, above all the same 
military organisation and intermittent warfare, would 
be our portion until one writ ran from coast to coast, 
and through the open windows of the world we 
breathed unhindered the breeze from the outer sea. 

It is Russia's doom to be big. She has no choice, 
no nearer stopping place. To escape from her inland 
prison, the common aim and need of all peoples, she 
is compelled to stretch nearly half way round the 
world. Even so she is but meagrely supplied with 
outlets for her commerce. The immense stretch of 
her Arctic coast line is negligible as an outlet. 
Archangel, at the southern end of the White Sea, 
serves minor purposes during the summer months, 
and it is rumoured that the exigencies of war have cre- 
ated another outlet, this one ice-free for all the year, 
though within the Arctic Circle. But such an outlet 
can hardly serve the purposes of commerce in normal 
times. It is too remote from the destinations of com- 
merce, and involves for all ordinary purposes too vast 
a detour. 

The Baltic is a natural and valuable outlet, both be- 
cause it penetrates through the great barrier of west- 



THE CASE OF RUSSIA 199 

ern Europe far into the interior of Russia, and be- 
cause it gives immediate access to the great markets of 
Europe. The first great move of Russian statesman- 
ship was the decision of Peter the Great to move the 
capital and business centre of Russia from inland 
Moscow to the shores of the Baltic. That was the 
keynote to the policy which Russia has pursued ever 
since. 

But the Baltic is a grudging outlet at the best. Na- 
ture is churlish during the dark winter months, and 
the icebreaker but poorly compensates for her with- 
held favour. Above all, the Baltic is doubly bound 
by outlying territories, first by the Scandinavian coun- 
tries whose grip is a very close one, and then by the 
looser but mightier grip of Britain beyond, while Ger- 
many is in a position to exercise her powerful pressure 
in either sea. For this naval grip of Britain and Ger- 
many there seems to be no remedy, except to match it 
in kind, which Russia may not unreasonably hope 
sometime to do. But the Scandinavian grip is of a 
different character. Here no naval power is neces- 
sary for her enemies, and no naval development will 
avail for her defence. The one solution is to control 
the shores of the Danish straits, both sides if she is to 
control the straits, and one side if she is to prevent 
others from controlling them. This can mean but 
one thing, the control of the great Scandinavian penin- 
sula, and that this extension of Russian dominion is 
in the background of Russian state consciousness few 
will doubt. Certainly it is the constant spectre of 
Scandinavian statesmanship. The annexation of Fin- 
land, a country harmless and useless in itself, and the 



200 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

suppression of liberties liable to impede farther Rus- 
sian advance by this route, can have no other rational 
interpretation. The long halt at present confines 
means simply the necessity of husbanding national re- 
sources, for when the attempt is made it can hardly 
be expected that neighbouring powers will be indiffer- 
ent. Then, too, there are more urgent if not more 
important tasks on hand. Obviously the full pro- 
gramme would require the annexation of East Prus- 
sia, Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark, which would 
convert the Baltic into a Russian lake and put the 
great empire, as regards this part of the world, into 
the strongest position of any of the great powers, 
whereas her position there now is probably the weak- 
est. When we recall the fact that Russia already 
rules in her Baltic provinces a large German popula- 
tion, and that East Prussia is a somewhat unnatural 
coast extension overhanging Russian Poland and itself 
containing large elements of Slavic population, the 
proposition ceases to seem preposterous. But it is a 
large proposition, and one to which Germany will in- 
evitably oppose the most strenuous resistance. It is 
an ambition, therefore, which the Russian can hope to 
see realised only in a remote future, when growth of 
population and development of internal resources 
shall have greatly modified the relative strength of 
the rival powers. But Russia is accustomed to far 
projects and distant hopes. That this is one which 
she is cherishing, no one familiar with her ideals will 
question. And in fact it is the first measurably stra- 
tegic frontier. 

Russia's Far Eastern problem is simpler if not eas- 



THE CASE OF RUSSIA 201 

ier. Here there can be no question as to the need 
and the natural goal of her ambitions. Commerce 
requires imperatively that the vast resources of Si- 
beria and Manchuria should find unhindered access to 
the markets of the world through a port whose wa- 
ters never freeze, and this can not be found north of 
Korea. It has been shown already that nature has 
contrived with peculiar thoroughness to concentrate 
the commerce of all the northern half of Asia in the 
small waters of the gulf behind the Korean peninsula. 
Any power having interests in this region must there- 
fore make this gulf its objective. The only question 
can be as to the way of reaching it. In this, the near- 
by districts like Manchuria and Pechili have no 
choice. They border on the gulf and of course reach 
the gulf at their borders. It should be noted, how- 
ever, that their access is quite unequally favourable. 
Manchuria has the north shore of the gulf. At each 
end of this littoral a large river enters, the Yalu at 
the east and the Liao at the west, offering fairly good 
harbours, Antung and Newchwang, while between 
them the long peninsula of Liaotung projects far to 
the south with its great harbours of Port Arthur and 
Dairen. Railroads now run to all these ports. 
Moreover, by a curious caprice of the ocean currents, 
these harbours never freeze. To the west, however, 
where the gulf bends far inland in the rich province 
of Pechili, there is but one access, that offered by the 
sluggish Pei-Ho river, with the river port of Tien- 
tsin some miles up stream and the gulf port of Taku 
at its mouth. Both of these leave much to be de- 
sired, and that increasingly as the size of ocean car- 



202 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

riers increases. Moreover, they are somewhat en- 
cumbered by ice. 

As Russia faced the problem of an outlet to the 
Pacific, she had her choice of three routes. The first 
and longest lay through her own possessions to Vladi- 
vostok. This was unsatisfactory because the port is 
available only seven months in the year, and is com- 
pletely in the power of Japan. Moreover, the route 
was long, and if kept within Russian territory, a con- 
necting railroad would derive but little revenue from 
local traffic. But as an alternative route this was not 
to be neglected, and from the first, as the great Trans- 
Siberian Railway was pushed eastward, a terminus at 
this Russian port was contemplated. 

The second route lay through Manchuria with a 
terminus at Port Arthur and Dairen. Merely as a 
terminus this was incomparably superior. Not only 
did it offer an outlet to ice-free waters, and a pro- 
tected harbour, but it offered a second and highly de- 
fensible harbour suitable for the naval base which was 
indispensable for the protection of Russian commerce 
in these distant seas. Finally, it was a more direct 
route than that to Vladivostok and, above all, the re- 
quired railway would traverse one of the richest agri- 
cultural districts in the world with corresponding ad- 
vantage to its revenue. 

The third route was from the southern end of Lake 
Baikal, the most southernly point on the Trans-Siber- 
ian, southeast across Mongolia to Peking, Tientsin 
and Taku. This route had the single advantage of 
being short — much shorter, in fact, than either of 
the others. There were advantages and disadvan- 



THE CASE OF RUSSIA 203 

tages in the farther fact that it ran through the popu- 
lous province of Pechili and the capital of the empire 
as well as the commercial metropolis of the North, 
the great city of Tientsin. But harbour facilities 
were inferior and Mongolia was largely a desert. 
The all-important consideration, however, was that 
this route offered no opportunity for Russian control. 
The railroad from Peking to the gulf was already 
built, and was under thinly veiled British control. 
Tientsin represented immense foreign interests, 
mostly non-Russian. Above all Peking, the capital 
and symbol of Chinese sovereignty, interposed a bar- 
rier which nothing short of the partition of the empire 
could remove. 

The reader whose thought is attuned to the piping 
times of peace may find depressing this constant allu- 
sion to the necessity of political control. It would 
quite suffice our purpose to remind such objectors that 
we are dealing with men as they are, and that nations 
in fact do feel that political control of commercial ne- 
cessities is indispensable to the security of their com- 
merce. But it is also pertinent to recall the fact that 
this belief is specially justified in this part of the 
world. In the case of China, political organisation is 
defective, and with the best of intentions (which are 
not quite assured) she has neither the power nor the 
intelligence to provide such facilities as modern com- 
merce requires. Japan is not lacking in these requi- 
sites, but her desperate need of strengthening her 
position is likely to give, as we shall see, a peculiar 
virulence to her self-interest and to make her an un- 
safe custodian of the interests of commercial rivals. 



2o 4 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

In view of these facts, there could be no hesitation 
in seeking the main terminus of the Trans-Siberian 
Railway in the Liaotung peninsula. Long before the 
completion of the all-Russian route to Vladivostok, 
this was decided upon, the necessary concessions were 
secured from China, the Vladivostok line was carried 
straight across the great northern projection of Man- 
churia, and a branch line — the real main line — was 
built to Port Arthur, from which Japan, the recent 
tenant, had been somewhat unceremoniously evicted. 
Russia's scarcely concealed intention of annexing both 
Manchuria and Korea, a strategic necessity if her 
new outlet was to be secured, resulted in the war with 
Japan and the loss of both, in which Russia was now 
compelled to see entrenched, not impotent China, but 
militant Japan. 

We are here interested, not in recording the result 
of this war, but in noting its possible relation to future 
wars. There can be no blinking the fact that this 
war left Russia with a maximum incentive to again try 
conclusions with Japan at a convenient season. Aside 
from the wound to her pride and her national pres- 
tige, her concrete loss is incalculable. The outlet 
thus lost has no satisfactory alternate, and it has 
passed into the control of a rival of maximum effi- 
ciency, skilled in the art of formally permitting, while 
effectively preventing, all real competition with her 
commerce, and constrained to this egoistic policy by a 
desperate need. Russian statesmanship would be im- 
becile if it renounced the ambition to retrieve this dis- 
aster. 



THE CASE OF RUSSIA 205 

For the present, however, no move is contemplated, 
or can be. There are other things to do. But while 
the modus vivendi with Japan is accepted, the Trans- 
Siberian has been double-tracked, a sufficiently omi- 
nous portent which Japan must perfectly understand. 
In the meantime attention is turned to the third route 
as an alternative, useful in itself, and likely to prevent 
Japan from becoming too exacting. A railway from 
Lake Baikal to Peking is a thing of the near future, a 
considerable part being already in operation. In this 
connection mention should be made of another project 
which, all unnoticed, is being advanced toward com- 
pletion. Mention has already been made of the rail- 
road which Russia has built from the Caspian Sea 
eastward through Samarcand to Tashkend. The pri- 
mary purpose of this railroad, like that of most Rus- 
sian railroads, was undoubtedly strategic and military, 
but its commercial possibilities are not the less impor- 
tant. There can be little doubt that its extension 
eastward across China, either as a Russian extension 
or in co-operation with some friendly interest, is con- 
templated. Meanwhile one cross line has already 
been built from the Siberian line lying far to the north 
and others are sure to follow. Such a railroad would 
assure an outlet to the Pacific in southern Chinese wa- 
ters, far from the contested waters of Pechili. But 
the length of the haul and the nature of the country 
to be crossed render it doubtful whether such a route 
can advantageously compete with the more northern 
route as an outlet for Siberian produce. On the 
other hand, its influence in opening up an undeveloped 



206 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

country must be enormous. Incidentally, be it noted, 
it creates new problems which may reject all arbitra- 
ment save that of the sword. 

As we pass westward from the Pacific round the 
huge peninsulas which project from southern Asia, 
Russia seems to retire into a remote background. 
Trackless deserts, stupendous mountain barriers and 
overwhelming masses of humanity, dwelling in areas 
scarcely less extensive than her own, interpose their 
vast bulk between Russia and the sea. For sixty de- 
grees of longitude — one-sixth of the circumference 
of the globe — there is not the faintest prospect of an 
outlet. But at last comes the deep indentation of the 
Persian Gulf. From the head of this convenient 
waterway it is less than five hundred miles as the crow 
flies to the Caspian Sea. When it is remembered 
that the Caspian gives access to the mighty Volga 
which is navigable almost to Moscow and Petrograd, 
and that it is easily accessible from the Black Sea and 
all its tributaries and is the only outlet at present for 
the whole region of central Asia which is tapped by 
the railroad last described, the importance of the Per- 
sian Gulf as a possible outlet will be apparent. 
Moreover, the railroad required across Persia would 
traverse a region rich in mineral resources and re- 
munerative in local traffic. 

It is hardly necessary to add that Russia has long 
had her eye on this outlet, and that her policy has been 
shaped toward this end. That it has not been given 
more prominence in her programme is due to several 
facts. First, the outlet, though practicable and ulti- 
mately indispensable, points just now in the wrong 



THE CASE OF RUSSIA 207 

direction. What is desired in this quarter is an outlet 
toward Europe. From the Persian Gulf Europe can 
be reached only by circumnavigating Arabia and pass- 
ing the Suez Canal, a long and expensive route, as 
compared with that of the North Sea or the Darda- 
nelles. When trade with Asia assumes larger pro- 
portions, this outlet will be more valuable, and Russia 
has no mind to see it pass hopelessly under other con- 
trol. But for the present other facilities are more 
desired. 

A second reason is the present difficulty of securing 
it. This would involve at the outset the control of 
Persia, a serious undertaking in itself, and far more 
important, an inevitable clash with Great Britain, who 
sees in the establishment of a strong power in the 
Persian Gulf a serious menace to the security of India. 
So emphatic has been her objection to this move that 
it was long the accepted belief in all quarters that Rus- 
sia, insisting upon the occupation of the Persian Gulf 
and knowing that Britain would never consent, would 
seek to realise her ambition by an attack on India. 
British distrust of this period is accurately expressed 
in Kipling's remarkable poem, " The Truce of the 
Bear." For a generation the two empires manoeu- 
vred for position and glared at each other across the 
Himalayas until the appearance of new actors on the 
stage made them allies, and for a time held Russian 
ambitions in abeyance. These new actors were Japan 
and Germany, the former cleverly used by Britain to 
distract Russia's attention and make her amenable to 
reason; the latter looming suddenly as the rival and 
the enemy of both. Of these more in their place. 



208 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

The present result is an agreement upon " spheres of 
influence " in Persia ; that is, a virtual partition of the 
country as regards its relation to international prob- 
lems and foreign trade, an arrangement which leaves 
Britain in undisputed possession of the Persian Gulf. 
But Russia's renunciation undoubtedly has its mental 
reservations. The end is not yet. 

We come now to the question of Russia's access to 
the Mediterranean, a problem which so far exceeds 
the others in importance, that it has held for a century 
or more the first place in Russian policy. The signifi- 
cance of Constantinople and the Dardanelles has al- 
ready been dwelt upon at length. It remains to be 
noted that Russia is chiefly interested in this gateway 
to the inner continent. It is true that other countries 
like Rumania, and to a less degree Bulgaria, are de- 
pendent upon this outlet, but it is difficult to believe 
that their present isolation or even their existence is 
permanently assured. Without altogether subscrib- 
ing to the brutal dictum that " the day of small nations 
is past," we can hardly overlook the fact that small 
nations in general lack the conditions of true inde- 
pendence, and that they tend more and more by virtue 
of agreements and alliances, if not through conquest, 
to become dependent upon other powers. It is diffi- 
cult not to see in the Balkans an example of incom- 
plete integration, with Russia or German overlordship 
as a more probable prospect than separate independ- 
ence or even the formation of a Balkan state. The 
same is even more true of Turkey, whose territories 
still include the most of the southern littoral of the 
Black Sea. A revived Turkey, an independent Ar- 



THE CASE OF RUSSIA 209 

menia, a protectorate by some other great power? 
Any of these is less thinkable than an extension of 
Russia until her long arms at last embrace the Black 
Sea and clasp hands at the Dardanelles. It is need- 
less to say that Russian imagination hardly contem- 
plates any other outcome as possible. To her mind, 
therefore, the Dardanelles is the predestined gateway 
to Russia, and Black Sea interests are exclusively Rus- 
sian interests. A recent semi-official utterance has 
clearly enunciated this view. 

This, therefore, is the supreme goal of all Russian 
imperialism. To secure this she would, now as a cen- 
tury ago, make any sacrifice, even to the extent of los- 
ing for the present her position in the Baltic and the 
Pacific — the more so perhaps because the possession 
of Constantinople would almost certainly insure her 
possession, in the end, of anything else she might seek. 
It was to secure this outlet that she fought the Cri- 
mean war against four great powers whose sole object 
in their turn was to prevent that possession. It was 
for this purpose that she attacked Turkey in 1877, 
and her participation in the present war is motived 
solely by her interest in the same highway. She will 
fight any number of wars for that end. 

It is perhaps the appreciation of this fact, in part, 
which induces Britain to desist from her long contin- 
ued opposition to Russian policy, if it be true, as re- 
ported, that she has consented to the Russian occupa- 
tion of Constantinople. If in addition Britain has 
secured for herself a long control of the Persian Gulf, 
her action is still more intelligible. But perhaps after 
all there is another reason for her concession than 



1 



2io THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

even the Persian advantage or the German menace. 
For the Dardanelles, if impregnable, is easily block- 
aded, and, after all, Russia in the Mediterranean is 
still imprisoned, and Britain holds the key. 

Russia is certainly of those who have greatness 
thrust upon them. How can she stop short of acquir- 
ing Manchuria and its perennial ports? How can 
she accept less than the control of the Dardanelles? 
less even than the possession of the Danish straits? 
Less, of course, if less she must, but never willingly 
less, so long as political control has any value to com- 
merce, or any influence in shaping the destiny of a 
cherished civilisation. Even with the four outlets 
which we have considered, all in her possession, Rus- 
sia would be but meagrely supplied with doorways to 
the world. Favoured with overwhelming mass, the 
temptation of this Samson must still be to snap the 
bonds that irk but do not hold the giant's powers. 
Will the Adriatic seem a convenience? The southern 
Slavs will furnish the pretext. And then, where 
next? 



CHAPTER XII 

THE CASE OF GERMANY 

The German Empire was established in 1871 un- 
der the powerful stimulus of a great personality and 
a great victory. This late realisation of the manifest 
destiny of the German people was in an unusual sense 
the work of one man, the greatest statesman — per- 
haps the only great statesman — that modern Ger- 
many has produced. The task was deliberately un- 
dertaken, the various steps advisedly chosen, and the 
consequences clearly foreseen. All these elements en- 
tered into the formation of Bismarck's policy which is 
the necessary background of the existing situation. 

The first requisite was leadership. Most of the 
German states were too small to command the respect 
and confidence of the German peoples. The tradi- 
tional leader of the German states, Austria, was un- 
suited to the task. Its population was not German 
and was very slightly united by sympathies or other 
bonds, while its traditions, all built around an obso- 
lete ideal, were a fatal handicap for modern leader- 
ship. Prussia, on the other hand, was young, vigor- 
ous, and unhampered, with a brilliant record for suc- 
cessful expansion. Prussia, too, was German and 
commanded the confidence of those who were con- 
cerned for the triumph of German ideals. Above 

211 



212 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

all, Prussia had a Bismarck who could work from 
that base as he could not hope to do from that of Aus- 
tria. It was much like a dynastic struggle between a 
commonplace legitimate and a competent upstart. 
The elimination of Austria was effected by two wars, 
the first with Denmark, for possession of Schleswig- 
Holstein. This outpost was valuable for strategic 
reasons, as permitting the union of the Baltic and the 
North Sea by a canal under German control. But as 
it was claimed by Austria who had not yet outgrown 
the idea of a dismembered European empire, it was 
perfectly understood that it would lead to a war with 
that country, and was doubtless sought partly for that 
purpose. Bismarck knew that Prussia was prepared 
for such a struggle, and the quick and decisive victory 
which followed justified his confidence. The result 
established incontestably Prussia's superiority, and 
taught the South German states, some of which had 
imprudently shared Austria's fortunes, that their 
choice lay only between Prussia as a leader and Prus- 
sia as a master. 

A greater struggle was clearly foreseen and was 
not unwelcome. France had long been the acknowl- 
edged foremost power on the continent, and apart 
from general probabilities, diplomatic relations had 
clearly indicated that she would not look with indiffer- 
ence upon the rise of a rival such as a unified Germany 
would be. For this struggle Bismarck had need of 
all his resources. Hence incredible magnanimity was 
shown toward Austria and her south German allies. 
Contrary to all the traditions of war, seemingly con- 
trary to the policy of German unification, Bismarck 



THE CASE OF GERMANY 213 

refused to consent to the annexation of any hostile 
territory. This magnanimity seemed so monstrous 
that he found all interests against him. His desper- 
ate determination carried the day, we are told, only 
when his threat to resign was followed by a threat to 
commit suicide in the emperor's presence. 

The war with France, which found Austria neutral 
and the south German states in alliance with Prussia, 
justified to the minds of all, Bismarck's marvellous 
foresight. It resulted in the formation of the Ger- 
man Empire as the unquestioned first power on the 
continent, and the relegation of France to a place of 
seemingly hopeless subordination. 

With this consummation Bismarck seems to have 
rested measurably content. He seems not to have 
thought of further annexations as feasible or desir- 
able. There were still some millions of Germans 
outside the empire, notably in Austria, but consider- 
ing their entanglements and their traditions, the em- 
pire was stronger without them than with them. 
Moreover, they were likely to do more for Germany 
by holding down the dangerous Slav and Hungarian 
peoples under their partial control, than by withdraw- 
ing, to leave them in probable hostility. To take 
over the whole medley was certainly no part of Bis- 
marck's ideal. Nor did Belgium and Holland seem 
to tempt him, despite their Germanic population and 
geographic convenience. To the superficial apostle 
of Pan-Germanism they make a specious appeal. 
They are also vital to a policy of far reaching aggres- 
sion. But neither Pan-Germanism nor far reaching 
aggression entered into Bismarck's ideal. 



2i 4 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

The empire as thus constituted occupied an exceed- 
ingly strong position for a conservatively managed 
power. Against its one implacable enemy it was de- 
fended by a short and impregnable frontier. Its cen- 
tral location involved certain dangers, to be sure, and 
imposed the necessity of strong organisation and 
clever diplomacy, but given these conditions, its po- 
sition was commanding. Surrounding powers, if 
united, could crush her, but there was little reason 
why they should be united. The feud between Bri- 
tain and France was centuries old, and in Bismarck's 
time was acute. Britain and Russia were traditional 
enemies, opposed in all their race instincts and in their 
conflicting interests. Russia and Austria were gravi- 
tating toward inevitable conflict over the Balkan ap- 
proaches to the Dandanelles. Austria and Italy were 
fresh from war, and had perpetual cause of strife. 
Even Italy and France, an innocuous combination at 
best, seemed none too cordial. With abundance of 
inherited feuds and plenty of apples of discord, it 
would be a very clumsy manipulator who could not 
keep these warring rivals in check. Meanwhile, 
whatever the dispute, the mere menace of Germany's 
powerful intervention should suflice to secure a settle- 
ment in accordance with Germany's wishes. It was 
the old problem of the maintenance of the balance of 
power, a problem familiar to European diplomacy, 
and one in which Bismarck was exceptionally skilful, 
while Germany's central location offered unusual ad- 
vantages for the exercise of his skill. 

The foreign policy of Germany, as Bismarck saw 
it, followed logically from the geographical and his- 



THE CASE OF GERMANY 215 

toric environment with which we are familiar. To- 
ward France, whose hostility must be expected, Ger- 
many must maintain a bold front and strengthen to 
the utmost her admirable strategic frontier. Belgium 
and Holland, incapable of being enemies, must be 
kept as useful friends and invaluable defences. The 
seaboard need fear no attack unless wantonly pro- 
voked. The southern frontier was the safest imagin- 
able. To the east and southeast lay Germany's 
problem. In the absence of a defensible frontier, 
Germany's safety must be sought in a careful main- 
tenance of rivalry between her powerful neighbours. 
This was the easier because their interests were 
sharply opposed. The great danger was that by lack 
of diplomatic skill, Germany might be drawn into 
this conflict of interests, thus acquiring the perma- 
nent enmity of the one party or the other, as has in 
fact since happened. But at the outset there were 
no such entanglements, and the relations between the 
three great empires were cordial. There was im- 
mense advantage in the fact that Germany had no col- 
onies or distant territorial ambitions. It was thus 
that when the war between Russia and Turkey kept 
Austria on the anxious seat and almost drew her into 
the conflict, Germany looked on in friendly indiffer- 
ence, and later, in the capacity of benevolent host, in- 
vited the Powers to meet in Berlin for the vexed set- 
tlement. It is easy to see how the commanding fig- 
ure of Bismarck, unhampered by German claims, 
could impress all with the importance of Germany as 
the great arbiter, and of Berlin as the diplomatic capi- 
tal of Europe. So in the strained relation of Britain 



216 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

and France over Egypt, Germany looked on from the 
safe position of disinterestedness. It is true that this 
ideal attitude was not easily maintained. Even while 
the great chancellor was still at the helm, relations 
with Russia became so strained that an alliance with 
Austria seemed necessary to avert an open rupture, 
while Bismarck's suspicion of the too rapidly recov- 
ering France led him to coerce unwilling Italy into the 
combination. But it was announced with all possible 
emphasis that the alliance was purely defensive, and 
there can be no reasonable doubt that it was so in- 
tended. Of course the value of such an intention may 
quite disappear, if it suits the purpose of the allies to 
construe defence in a liberal sense, as we have seen in 
an earlier chapter, but there is no reason to believe 
that there was any disposition at the outset so to con- 
strue it. Nor did the alliance prevent Bismarck from 
throwing out an anchor to windward in the shape of 
a secret agreement with Russia of quite contrary pur- 
port, suited to secure Russian acquiescence and leave 
Germany free to choose in an emergency. 

It is impossible to survey this early German pol- 
icy without speculating as to its possible alternates. 
Suppose Germany had leaned to the side of Russia 
instead of siding with Austria. What a vista that 
opens up to the imagination ! There would have 
been no Franco-Russian alliance, but a Franco-Ital- 
ian alliance instead, with the possible addition of Aus- 
tria. Or again, could not Germany have conciliated 
France and made her an ally? Of course this would 
have required an exercise of magnanimity like that so 
lately shown to Austria. There could have been no 



THE CASE OF GERMANY 217 

annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. There is reason to 
believe that this would have been acceptable to Bis- 
marck, and though coercion rather than conciliation is 
associated with his name, his powers in the latter di- 
rection were not inconsiderable, as the case of Aus- 
tria and the South German states shows. Might he 
not have succeeded here by magnanimity and patience? 
A working alliance between Germany and France 
would have been a combination of immense strength 
and its consequences would have been revolutionary. 
But no such policy was possible, not because France 
could not be conciliated, but because Germany could 
not be magnanimous. It has often been said that the 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was Bismarck's one 
fatal mistake. So be it, but it was a mistake which 
he was compelled to make unless he renounced his 
whole purpose. He had had experience with resist- 
ing the passions engendered by victory, and he knew 
that resistance was now impossible. The strategists 
demanded the fortresses of Strassburg and Metz as 
necessary to the defence of the realm; the South Ger- 
man states refused to enter the empire unless these 
mountain provinces were interposed between them and 
hostile France, while back of all, and more potent 
than all, was the demand of an unthinking but exul- 
tant people who would not see the flag come down 
where the prowess of German arms had planted it. 
If we could not lower our flag in the Philippines where 
there was so little except war sentiment to justify its 
presence, surely the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine 
could not be avoided. A mistake perhaps, but a mis- 
take that had to be made. 



2i8 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Bismarck's career involved so much of coercion and 
aggression, that we are apt to overlook the most pro- 
nounced characteristic of his policy, namely, its con- 
servatism. His vigorous self-assertion was always 
tempered by a remarkable self-restraint. This re- 
straint was manifest in the exclusion of Austria as un- 
manageable and unassimilable. Most significant of 
all, however, is his apathy toward colonies and all re- 
mote and detached interests. His ideal was a com- 
pact empire of the solidly unified German people, 
strong to resist the surrounding peoples who by virtue 
of superior organisation had so long tyrannised over 
a distracted and divided Germany. That an empire 
so organised and strong to maintain itself within es- 
tablished limits could play its due part in the world 
and get its share of the good things of life, admitted 
of no reasonable doubt. He did not see that colonies 
or further annexations in Europe would contribute to 
that end. If they had another value, it was one to 
which his experience and his habits of thought made 
him insensible. He seemed to lack imagination of 
the modern sort. Or did he see the modern vision 
and judge differently its feasibility and its promised 
good? 

If Bismarck had died with the old emperor in 1888, 
he would have closed his eyes upon a seemingly fin- 
ished work. There was plenty still to do in perfect- 
ing administrative machinery and winning the sym- 
pathies of a long divided people, but this was only the 
normal routine of statesmanship. Foreign relations 
presented a difficult problem and must continue to do 
so, but with boundaries fixed and a conservative tra- 



THE CASE OF GERMANY 219 

dition established, success might be expected. All 
tasks should be easy, now that the supreme task was 
accomplished. 

But Bismarck lived to see himself retired in hu- 
miliation and his great work endangered if not un- 
done. His conservative policy was abandoned for a 
policy of adventure, whose perils he clearly saw, and 
whose outcome he profoundly distrusted. This was 
the policy of expansion or imperialism, the marked 
characteristic of political life in our time. It is un- 
necessary to seek any other cause for it than this uni- 
versal tendency, the contagion of which no country 
could resist, even though held in leash by a Bismarck. 
The fact that the change coincides with the accession 
of a new emperor, doubtless has a certain significance, 
though the influence of individuals, even in high posi- 
tion, is usually exaggerated. The new policy has 
found in Emperor William its most conspicuous, but 
not its extremest champion. The policy which a 
Bismarck could not prevent, a William could not in- 
augurate. The spirit of an age never owns an indi- 
vidual as its creator. Nor would Emperor William 
have first claim to that honor if awarded. 

But our concern for the moment is not with origins 
but with facts. What does the new policy propose? 

In its mildest form it looks to the extension of Ger- 
man commerce, and to that alone. It seeks no colo- 
nies, no neighbour provinces. All energies are to be 
devoted to the development of industry at home with 
the fullest extension of its concomitant foreign trade. 
The power of government is to be exerted to secure 
trade privileges and protect trade interests. Dis- 



220 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

ciples of this school would leave to other powers the 
empty and costly honour of administering the terri- 
tories of backward peoples, and bearing the white 
man's burden, but would insist that German commerce 
be admitted without handicap in the regions thus sub- 
dued. This, it is argued, it would be increasingly 
easy to do. The nations that scatter their forces and 
waste their resources on distant colonies, weaken 
themselves thereby, while those that forego such ex- 
pensive luxuries and conserve their resources, have 
the colonial powers increasingly at their mercy. 
Their argument is that so often urged in England by 
the so-called " Little Englanders," who contend that 
the British colonies entail a heavy burden upon the 
national exchequer for imperial defence, and that they 
are valuable chiefly to outsiders who enjoy commer- 
cial privileges at Britain's expense. That there are 
those in Germany who hold these opinions, is prob- 
ably true, but their number is limited. The writer, 
after several years' residence and numerous visits 
there, has been unable to find a single representative. 
It may be noted in passing, that imperialism in this 
mild form is quite consistent with Bismarckian conser- 
vatism. It proposes no change in political boundaries, 
and demands nothing which is not freely accorded, in 
theory at least. It derives its importance from the 
enormous development of industry and commerce in 
recent years, which has doubtless quite exceeded any- 
thing that Bismarck expected. This in itself, making 
Germany a great manufacturing and food importing 
country, instead of the self-sufficing area which Bis- 
marck knew and possibly preferred, quite shifts the 



THE CASE OF GERMANY 221 

centre of gravity of German interests and entails im- 
portant changes in German policy. In fact it leads 
quite inevitably to the next form of imperialism which 
we may call the commercial-colonial policy. 

The champions of this policy still recognise com- 
merce as the goal of imperialism, and deprecate any 
extension of rule or exercise of authority for other 
ends. But they maintain that foreign commerce can- 
not safely be left in the control of rival powers. 
Commercial privileges are not willingly conceded, and 
promises are easily evaded by those in control. The 
pressure of governmental authority is always neces- 
sary, and this cannot be exerted far from its base. 
Therefore colonies, at least as bases of authority, are a 
commercial necessity. There need be no annexation 
of neighbouring provinces or states, but there must be 
naval and commercial bases overseas. This is the 
contention of Herr Ballin, the greatest captain of in- 
dustry in Germany and the head of her united foreign 
commerce. 

It is clear that this theory also is quite compatible 
with Bismarckian tradition, and it is in fact to this 
mild policy of peaceable colonial expansion that Bis- 
marck seems to have given his adherence in his later 
years. It induced him to appropriate certain un- 
claimed territories of little value overseas, but we 
have reason to believe that he was opposed to a col- 
onial policy which risked a conflict with other powers. 
This policy of moderate colonial expansion solely in 
the interest of commerce is the faith of a certain ele- 
ment in the German people. Their number it is im- 
possible to ascertain, but that they are a small minor- 



222 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

ity can hardly be doubted. The writer recalls meet- 
ing one or two representatives of this faith. 

The third party repudiate commerce as their ob- 
jective. Their object is rather the maintenance and 
extension of the German civilisation, the much ma- 
ligned " Kultur." They are essentially idealists, 
though their ideals are of the humble sort which are 
common to common folk in all lands, rather than the 
visions of great minds. To them the German speech 
is familiar, and it holds their thoughts, their songs, 
their prayers, in its keeping. They have heard it 
from their mothers' lips, and in all the fondest re- 
lations of life. They are wonted to German ways in 
the home, the school, the church, the market place, 
the camp, in the thousand and one indifferent things 
that, taken together, make up the substance of their 
lives. These things are congenial in the forms in 
which they know them, and repugnant in other forms. 
To pass judgment on their real merits is utterly be- 
yond their power. They know these, and because 
they know them, they love them and wish them to pre- 
vail. This love and this wish are their patriotism, the 
common characteristic of all sane and healthy peoples. 
While they love, they cannot judge, yet love they must, 
or there will soon be nothing left to judge. The 
judgment will be passed in due time by a more impar- 
tial tribunal, and something is likely to be found 
among these accidents of their blind devotion which is 
worthy to endure and find wider acceptance. We will 
not carp at their overconfidence. Have we not urged 
American democracy as a cure for German militar- 
ism, and how many a foolish prescription besides? 



THE CASE OF GERMANY 223 

We have all alike the same confidence that things and 
ways are adapted to all, merely because a few of us 
have adapted ourselves to them. The positiveness of 
our faith and the fervour of our faith measure the 
vitality — nay, they are the vitality of our civilisation. 
We do well to endue this offspring of our race with 
all the vitality we can. Civilisations, like individuals, 
have a right to live — if they can — merely because 
they are born, a right to grow to their full stature, and 
a right to outgrow and outlive those of less vitality, 
subject only to the live-and-let-live limits which the 
great struggle itself imposes. 

It is in this cult of Germanism that we trace the 
origin of the newer imperial policy which is not an 
outgrowth of the Bismarckian tradition, but a distinct 
negation of it. It repudiates the sordid motive of 
commercial gain as the mainspring of national policy. 
To prove that a proposed territory or province will 
not become profitable, is no deterrent. It is enough 
that it become German. The purpose of the German 
empire is not merely to make comfortable and secure 
the Germans of to-day, but to make them the leaven 
that shall leaven the lump. It is a larger and more 
difficult ideal, and if we can look at it from the stand- 
point of our own ideals, a far nobler one. It is the 
natural and spontaneous expression of the instinct of 
nationality in a powerful and exceptionally progres- 
sive people. Such a people can hardly help feeling 
the temptation to culture aggression. If people re- 
fuse to recognise a good thing when they see it, there 
is need, it may be argued, for benevolent coercion. 
In some such sense must be interpreted the reported 



224 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

statement of the German envoy to Sweden, that the 
German people, as the greatest of all organisers, had 
" a right " to organise the less advanced peoples of 
the world. The national cult thus becomes propagan- 
dist in its character, and, conscious of a mission, it 
goes forth conquering and to conquer. Again, be it 
remembered, that there is nothing exceptional or il- 
legitimate in this attitude. The German zealot is no 
more ambitious or presuming than a Cecil Rhodes in 
South Africa, or a Whitman in Oregon. The one 
champions " liberty," and the other champions " or- 
der," both good things, and both sometimes bought 
too dear. 

To men thus minded — and they are the enormous 
majority of the German people — it is clear that the 
conservative programme of Bismarck and the materi- 
alistic programme of the commercial party were alike 
inadequate. It was not enough to be cosily housed 
and secured from menace in Europe while other flags, 
other tongues and other ways took possession of the 
unpeopled spaces. Every year spent in this prosper- 
ous seclusion lessened the chances that German civili- 
sation would be one of those to inherit the earth. 
National growth, no matter how vigorous, must soon 
be arrested by the narrow habitat of a land no bigger 
than Texas, while the redundant energy of the race 
went in a never ending stream to reinforce the life 
of alien and seemingly inferior civilisations. 

But it was not merely a question of the expansion 
of the German civilisation. It was a question of its 
ultimate existence. The vast area of Russia and the 
rapid increase of her people have been noted. For 



THE CASE OF GERMANY 225 

the present they do not endanger Germany, but sup- 
pose Germany adopts the conservative policy of Bis- 
marck and the commercial pacifists, and for a couple 
of centuries remains peacefully within her boundaries? 
The Russian people may well number two thousand 
millions by that time, while Germany, with less than a 
fortieth her area, will scarcely be able to muster a 
tenth that number. What will be the relation of the 
two countries at that time? Simply that which it 
pleases Russia to permit. It will be merely a question 
of what Russia will do, for she can do anything. All 
such considerations are wont to seem fanciful and un- 
real to those whose national situation exposes their 
civilisation to no such dangers and prompts them to 
no such reflections. But the German people have be- 
come wonted in a high degree to consider such dan- 
gers and to reflect upon problems of race evolution 
and ultimate destiny. They have come to appreciate 
keenly what the rest of the world has scarcely per- 
ceived, that mere quiescence on their part spells doom 
for their national civilisation. Granting that they are 
never the victims of war, the mere push of national 
protoplasm will reduce them to insignificance, if it 
does not crowd them into the sea. 

Confronted with this danger, the whole instinct of 
national life rouses them to secure a broader base for 
their civilisation, ere it is too late. Unfortunately 
their rivals have stolen a march on them. The Span- 
ish and the Portuguese, least competent of colonists, 
absorbed all of South America and the Anglo-Saxon 
nearly all of North America while Germany was still 
unborn. Then came Australia, New Zealand and the 



226 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Cape, while still Germany showed no sign. India 
and Egypt, countries suitable not for colonies but for 
commerce, passed under the British flag. Less no- 
ticed and less hindered, the great void of Siberia was 
pre-empted for the growth of the Russian people. 
France, worsted in the struggle with Germany for the 
primacy of the continent, sought empire and future 
greatness in Algeria, in Tunis, in Morocco, and drew 
her frontier round the rich African tropics. All this 
time Germany was busy with her problems of unifica- 
tion and internal organisation. When at last she 
awoke it was to discover that her future had been 
fatally compromised, that the white man's land had 
dwindled to the vanishing point, and that her rivals 
had left her no " place in the sun." 1 To get that 
place has been the constant aim of her statesmanship 
for the last twenty years. To get that place she will 
make — any intelligent people will make — any sacri- 
fice. Her achievements to date, the seizure of Tsing- 
tao and of some colonies of doubtful value in Africa, 
have been insignificant, but her designs have been stu- 
pendous, and the present conflict is but a supreme ef- 
fort for their realisation. 

Nothing brings us so near the heart of the Euro- 
pean problem as a brief survey of the plans for ex- 

1 This phrase has become classic. Its meaning as here given 
is familiar to all Germans and to all students of German policy. 
One of the subtle sophistries of Herr Dernburg in his appeal to 
the American people was the statement that Germany was fight- 
ing " to keep her place in the sun," the implication being that she 
sought only to retain what she had held and so was on the defensive. 
In the larger and remoter sense above indicated, Germany is 
fighting for her existence, but not in the more immediate sense 
that these and other like utterances imply. 



THE CASE OF GERMANY 227 

pansion which Germany has had up for consideration. 
We are of course dealing only with projects, and are 
in the realm of diplomatic disavowal, but there is fair 
certainty with regard to the following at least. 

Attention first turned naturally to South America, 
the second largest grand division of the globe and one 
from which the original colonisers had virtually been 
expelled. Their feeble efforts had neither peopled 
nor organised the country in a way legitimately to de- 
ter a virile colonising people, and the absence of claim- 
ants among the European powers seemed to render 
the enterprise easy. To Germany's surprise and un- 
concealed annoyance, objection was encountered on 
the part of the United States, the Monroe Doctrine 
being conveniently extended for the purpose. The 
opinion prevails in America that Germany reluctantly 
backed down in the face of our opposition. The con- 
clusion is quite unwarranted. The Monroe Doctrine 
was indignantly repudiated as having no standing in 
international law — as indeed it has none — and the 
project was continued, but with the circumspection and 
the prolonged preparation which our attitude necessi- 
tated. Probably our objection has made very little 
difference. A long preliminary of peaceful penetra- 
tion was required in any case, and this has gone stead- 
ily forward. Foreign commerce in the South Ameri- 
can countries has passed steadily into German hands. 
Few persons are aware that an entire province in 
Southern Brazil is almost wholly peopled by Germans 
who preserve their language and their civilisation in- 
tact. With such a start it requires little imagination 
to picture a grievance, an ultimatum, an intervention 



228 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

and a permanent occupation with subsequent indefinite 
expansion, all as convenience may dictate. Whether 
the United States could or would oppose effective re- 
sistance to such an enterprise would probably depend 
on political accident. The prospect is not such as 
effectually to deter its promoters. 

South Africa offered a second tempting field. 
When German expansionist policy was first formu- 
lated, the Boer republics were still autonomous, and 
much at odds with their British suzerain. The pos- 
sibilities of German expansion in this quarter looked 
promising and were eagerly canvassed. Britain's 
knowledge of these designs and of the widespread 
German intrigue connected therewith, had much to 
do with her drastic action in bringing these republics 
under her sway. Germany still counted, however, on 
their secession whenever the British should be embar- 
rassed. Probably no incident in her expansionist ca- 
reer has been so disappointing to Germany as the 
voluntary adherence of the Boers to the British cause 
in the present war. 

Northern Africa remained in part, though Algeria 
had long been appropriated, to be followed first by 
Egypt and then by Tunis. As the Mediterranean 
powers began to draw their toils around Morocco, 
Germany roused herself for the effort that could no 
longer be postponed. Landing at Tangiers, as we 
have said before, the German emperor announced to 
the world through an address to the German colony 
there, that there could be no settlement of the Mo- 
roccan question without the participation and consent 
of Germany. On German initiative a conference of 



THE CASE OF GERMANY 229 

the Powers was called at Algeclras, Spanish neighbour 
of Gibraltar, and the struggle began which is not 
ended yet. Britain and France knew that a German 
foothold in Morocco meant a base there for the Ger- 
man navy, within easy striking distance of the line of 
communications both to Suez and to the Cape. Every 
effort was made to soften the refusal, but the de- 
sired foothold was not granted. Morocco passed un- 
der the sway of Spain and France. 

Two years passed, and the world was startled to 
learn that a German warship lay at anchor in the Mo- 
roccan port of Agadir. Questioned as to what she 
meant by this expedition, Germany frankly stated that 
she intended to reopen the Moroccan question. 
Again the long struggle, with weeks and months of 
grim preparation and terrible suspense. Again Ger- 
many went home with other and lesser fruits than 
those sought, specious concessions in other quar- 
ters, where her rivals felt that concession was possible. 
The dangerous concession asked could not be granted. 
Germany's chagrin was unconcealed, and none could 
fail to see that she was resolved no more to parley, 
but to use at her convenience the weapon which seemed 
alone fitted to her hand. That she did not then draw 
the sword was due to the fact that her rivals had 
skilfully ensnared her in the toils of finance. When 
the emperor, long a tenacious advocate of peace, saw 
the futility of negotiation, he is said to have asked the 
German bankers whether they were ready to finance 
a war, and learning that they were not, he replied: 
" Then get ready. From now on, I shall adopt a new 
policy." 



s 



230 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Meanwhile another and vaster project had been 
elaborated and slowly advanced toward realisation. 
The prospect for white man's land in America or 
Africa was none too good, and if secured it would 
long be a source of weakness rather than of strength. 
The empire, even if successfully enlarged, would be a 
sort of inverted pyramid, resting on too narrow a 
base of homeland to be stable or assured. Against 
odds, however heavy, the German home frontiers 
must be extended. But how, in what direction? To 
west, to north, to east, all was alike impossible, or 
at best remote. Belgium and Holland, sometime, no 
doubt, but they would add little at present, and if 
grudging, nothing at all. They could safely be left 
till circumstances might give to annexation the guise 
of protection and deliverance, the more so as there 
was small chance of other claimants. The one chance 
which beckoned was Austria, half German and now 
sore bested. And after Austria, lesser and weaker 
folk with emptier and richer lands, on, on to the Bos- 
porus and the Dardanelles, to the valleys of Asia 
Minor and the long neglected plains of Mesopotamia, 
to historic Bagdad and Nineveh and Babylon and 
finally to the Persian Gulf. The German plan as thus 
outlined was to mow a swath as wide as Germany it- 
self across two continents, from the Baltic to the con- 
fines of India. At least twenty years ago this plan 
was outlined in the mind of the versatile young mon- 
arch who made his debut in world politics by a sensa- 
tional visit to Constantinople and the Holy Land. 
Since that time the vast project has been unremit- 
tingly pushed. 



THE CASE OF GERMANY 231 

This was at once the most daring, the most diffi- 
cult, and the most hopeful of German plans of ex- 
pansion. It involved a practical merger with an old 
and proud empire still sore over Prussian aggression, 
and the absorption through conquest or friendship — 
each alike deadly — of numerous and increasingly 
alien elements. Its demands upon the capital and or- 
ganising energy of the dominant power were prodi- 
gious. But worst of all it involved the control of 
Constantinople and access to the Persian Gulf against 
which both Russia and Britain were sure to set their 
faces as a flint. But there were encouraging features 
as well. Austria, if not the leader in the enterprise, 
was sure to be its immediate beneficiary and to see in 
it the realisation of her cherished ambitions. Con- 
stantly in fear of Russian advance through the Bal- 
kans toward Constantinople, she might justly hope to 
see in alliance with the puissant northern empire an 
easy superiority. The domination of the southern 
Slavs would be difficult for her singlehanded, impos- 
sible if they were backed by Russia, but with Ger- 
many's aid it would be a matter of course. Turkey, 
too, always between the devil and the deep sea, would 
be likely to accept a German protectorate half uncon- 
sciously, under the guise of an alliance, German offi- 
cers in the army and German warships in the Bos- 
porus lending emphasis to the emperor's wishes. Fi- 
nally, the certain opposition of Russia and Britain 
might easily neutralise itself in some moment when 
the two were at loggerheads, and Germany might by 
judicious assistance purchase the consent of the one 
and compel the consent of the other. And if once 



232 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

realised, what a consummation! An imperial do- 
main with whole provinces of virgin territory, with 
ample harbours and great highways of commerce, and 
with Constantinople above all. Surely an imperial 
concept. 

It is needless to say that any such design would be 
repudiated by the German government. Formally, 
the repudiation would be warranted. Germany con- 
templates no immediate subjugation of Turkey and 
the Balkan states, no formal merger with Austria. 
Susceptibilities are not to be thus openly affronted. 
Alliance, naval and military " missions," entangling 
financial arrangements, and above all investments of 
German capital in railways and other industries, are 
the means wisely chosen for the great work, the whole 
being supplemented by military force as emergencies 
might require. The much contested Bagdad railway 
concession, the subject of a battle royal in which Bri- 
tain finally secured the southern end and thus retained 
control of the Persian Gulf, has been the mutter be- 
fore the coming storm. Diplomatic manoeuvres have 
made Constantinople once more the centre of Euro- 
pean interest. And finally the great act in the drama 
is before us. 

It is important to note in connection with this many 
sided policy of German expansion, the inevitable con- 
flict which has developed between Britain and Ger- 
many. Under Bismarck's policy Britain regarded 
German development with comparative indifference. 
So long as Germany did not become really master of 
the continent, Britain could be neutral in her contests, 
could even quarrel safely with Germany's foes. But 



THE CASE OF GERMANY 233 

when Germany's designs upon South Africa became 
evident, Britain became circumspect. An incredibly 
foolish telegram from the German emperor to the 
Boer president, greatly aggravated a delicate situa- 
tion. The determined attempts upon Morocco, upon 
Tripoli, and above all upon the Persian Gulf, brought 
out energetic opposition. Thus balked, Germany 
turned at her new antagonist. Secure against land at- 
tack, she determined to contest Britain's control of the 
sea. Then began the race for naval supremacy which 
ended in Germany's withdrawal from the race, when 
Britain's colonies began to send battleships to her 
fleet. Meanwhile the new danger forced Britain into 
the arms of her age long foe, and the entente cordiale, 
strangest assorting of bedfellows that necessity has 
made, was the result. Then Russia, menaced in Con- 
stantinople, and Britain, menaced in the Persian Gulf, 
made up their quarrel, and parcelled out Persia be- 
tween them, to forestall further trouble. The mine 
was laid for the great explosion. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE CASE OF BRITAIN 

Our purpose does not require us to review the 
building of the British Empire. It will be sufficient 
if we take note of certain important changes that have 
taken place in the century just passed. By the begin- 
ning of that century the vast fabric was nearly com- 
plete. The empire had received nearly all of its ac- 
cessions, and had suffered its one great loss. Eng- 
land had also attained that industrial leadership and 
that naval supremacy which have characterised her 
throughout the nineteenth century, and which it is now 
her great effort to maintain. 

This empire had been unplanned, unwilled and un- 
foreseen. Every step of the advance had been 
stoutly contested and stoutly defended, but rather as 
an incident to some other cause than on its own ac- 
count. It is doubtful if a single one of its annexa- 
tions would have been countenanced by a deliberate 
vote of the English people, if it had been anticipated. 
A typical case is seen in Gibraltar, that key to the 
Mediterranean, which Britain now guards as the 
apple of her eye. It was captured by a British force 
acting purely as the agent of Austria, and being 
fiercely attacked in efforts for its recovery, and held 
until British sentiment was aroused and its importance 
at last realised, it was retained. Not unlike is the 

234 



THE CASE OF BRITAIN 235 

story of the empire. Even so late an acquisition as 
Egypt was made beyond question with neither expecta- 
tion nor wish that it be retained, yet the British pub- 
lic with practical unanimity now insist on its retention. 
This blind and often blundering imperialism whose 
wisdom has always been taught by the event, rather 
than the event guided by its wisdom, is characteristic 
of this " largest empire that hath been." 

It is noteworthy that the territories absorbed have 
never been those of peoples whose civilisation was on 
a par with that of the imperial power. They have all 
been essentially unpeopled, like Canada and Australia, 
and therefore suitable for a rapidly expanding Brit- 
ish colonial population, or like India, peopled by a 
race less organised and less advanced than the Brit- 
ish. The one has expanded the British race, the other 
has expanded the British genius and increased British 
wealth, both with perfect legitimacy, for British ad- 
ministration has everywhere been better than that 
which it displaced, and Britain has never derived 
wealth from a colony which did not itself grow richer 
in the process. Be its legitimacy what it may, this 
peculiar character of the empire requires careful note. 
Nowhere have the British attempted to bring under 
their rule a race that could be accounted their peers. 
They have repeatedly fought such races and as often 
defeated and despoiled them, but they have never tried 
to subject or assimilate them. We may attribute this 
to cowardice or to wisdom according to our sympa- 
thies, or more justly than either, to the fortune of 
their insular position which permitted expansion of the 
kind noted. The result has been peculiarly fortunate. 



236 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

The enlarging structure of the empire has been built 
upon an ever broadening base of British population, 
whose loyalty the world over is unquestioned, and 
who are safely trusted with an unparalleled degree of 
real independence. It is even possible to grant to col- 
onies of alien population a degree of independence 
which would not be safe if it were not for the proxim- 
ity and the example of colonies peopled by the British 
race. Witness the case of the Boers, who were 
granted autonomy on the morrow of defeat, and have 
so amply justified the gift. 

The result is a remarkable looseness of organisa- 
tion easily mistaken by the superficial observer for 
weakness. The world is familiar with the oft-re- 
peated words of a hostile critic that the British empire 
was a sham which would fall to pieces at a touch. 
What could be expected, it might be argued, from an 
empire whose parts called themselves dominions and 
reserved the right to decide for themselves whether 
they would stand by the empire in case of war? The 
British empire has in fact placed its reliance to a re- 
markable degree in purely psychic bonds. Canada 
could not have been induced to pledge her aid, as Italy 
pledged her aid to Germany, but she gave it, and 
Italy did not. Perhaps here again we have to do less 
with British wisdom than with favouring circumstance, 
but the advantage is none the less real. The empire 
as thus constituted, involving a maximum of liberty 
and a minimum of race suppression and smothered 
grievance, is a unique historic phenomenon. It is in 
sharpest contrast with the would-be empire of Napo- 
leon, made so largely of conquered equals, or with the 



THE CASE OF BRITAIN 237 

Russian empire, which subjects higher to lower civili- 
sations, or with the German empire, which begins by 
a vain effort to assimilate Alsace-Lorraine, continues 
with Belgium, and looks forward to Austria and its 
proud alien wards. It is not implied that these em- 
pires are attempting the impossible, for Rome ab- 
sorbed Carthage, her superior in civilisation, and even 
taught the Greek to boast of his Roman citizenship. 
But their task is an infinitely harder task than that of 
Britain, and assimilation of the Roman sort is pain- 
fully like destruction. Have we not heard from the 
empire builders of to-day words startlingly like old 
Cato's: Carthago delenda est. Only at this price 
can empires be built out of developed and divergent 
races without their free consent. The result may be 
worth the price — the world owes much to Rome — 
but we have here to note that whatever it owes to 
Britain, it has purchased at a far lower price. 

The challenge of Napoleon having been success- 
fully met, the British empire was occupied for some 
decades with problems of internal organisation. 
These included such revolutionary changes as the 
transfer of India from the British East India Com- 
pany to the direct control of the British Parliament, 
and the establishment of trade relations with the Far 
East, but these were too logical to attract attention. 
Meanwhile England herself unwittingly gave hostages 
to fortune in a way that sold her into bondage to im- 
perialism. In 1846, as the result of prolonged agita- 
tion and local famine, the corn laws were abolished, 
and food was allowed free entry to the United King- 
dom. The purpose, aside from relieving the famine 



238 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

in Ireland, was to provide cheaper food for the in- 
dustrial population of England, already sufficiently 
numerous to make its wishes prevail over the strenu- 
ous opposition of the landowners. The appeal of so 
large a part of the population for cheap food was a 
strong one, but it is doubtful whether the public-spir- 
ited statesmen who effected this change, appreciated 
what its secondary effects would be. It may be said 
that the whole problem of statesmanship, as indeed of 
all human wisdom, is to anticipate secondary reactions. 
The immediate reaction of giving to beggars is to re- 
lieve want, by relieving the beggars' needs. The sec- 
ondary reaction is to create want by increasing the 
number of beggars. Something like this is involved 
in many of the statesman's problems. In the present 
case the immediate reaction was to better the condi- 
tion of the labourers. The secondary reaction was 
to increase their number. In 1851 the population of 
England and Wales was less than eighteen millions. 
In 191 1 it was above thirty-six millions, or 619 to the 
square mile, a population more dense than that of 
China, India or Japan. To this increase all factors 
contributed. England had learned the new secret of 
machine industry, and was stimulated by its huge 
initial profits to expand her industries as rapidly as 
possible. She had abundance of coal, iron and tin. \ 
A concurrent development of agriculture in new coun- | 
tries kept food cheap and interposed no check to the 
expanding population. With an increase of wealth 
even more rapid than that of population, it was diffi- 
cult to see in it all a sign of anything but prosperity 
and matter for congratulation. 



THE CASE OF BRITAIN 239 

But it goes without saying that this population could 
not be fed from English fields. Slowly, England be- 
came one vast industrial plant, great cities almost 
touching one another, chimneys scarce ever out of 
sight. Meanwhile the grain ships from America, 
from Argentina, from the Black Sea, in never ending 
procession, made their way into her harbours, bring- 
ing the nation's food. The arrangement was all very 
satisfactory if uninterrupted, but there was the rub. 
Slowly it dawned upon the British consciousness that 
the procession might be interrupted. The thought oc- 
curred to her enemies too, and they made no secret of 
their intention some day to strike at this vulnerable 
point in England's defences. Slowly the conscious- 
ness deepened, until it has become an obsession of the 
British mind, one thoroughly justified withal, for there 
is no need like the need of food, and starvation is the 
most frightful of spectres. We are witnessing at 
present the attempt which England has feared. Few 
persons realise how appalling is England's danger. 
It is probable that if her foreign food supply were 
cut off to-day, she would feel the pinch of famine this 
day week, and a month hence she would surrender on 
any terms whatever. Other nations, it may be urged, 
are in something the same situation, but the difference 
is great and fundamental. Other nations depend on 
foreign products for many of the conveniences, not to 
say necessities, of life. They do in fact import con- 
siderable quantities of food. To cut off their foreign 
trade causes them enormous inconvenience and loss, 
through the dislocation of industry, the cessation of 
normal employment, and temporary shortage of food, 



2 4 o THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

due to imprudent specialisation. But given time for 
readjustment, and there is probably no great nation 
except England that cannot raise enough to exist. 
People would suffer, but it is doubtful if any would 
die from hunger. But in England a year's isolation 
would result in actual death for millions of persons. 

It will of course occur to the reader that no power, 
not even the most brutal conqueror, would thus act- 
ually permit England to starve. Undoubtedly not. 
The conqueror would distribute rations, and England 
would eat, but she would eat the bread of a slave. 
More literally, if a hostile power succeeded in wrest- 
ing from England the control of the sea, England 
would make peace on terms dictated by her enemy. 
That would mean, we are told, in certain eventuali- 
ties, the loss of all her colonies, probably also the loss 
of her special functions as the financial headquarters 
of the commercial world, and the continuance of the 
island kingdom as a centre of busy but waning indus- 
try, and having a voice in world affairs like that of 
Holland or Denmark to-day. Her people might still 
be prosperous and comfortable, and there are those 
who think these are the essential things. It is the 
obstinate peculiarity of the British people that they 
do not. 

England's problem is therefore the control of the 
sea. No other power and no combination of powers 
which is liable to be hostile to England, must be al- 
lowed to overmatch her. Why should England con- 
trol the sea, rather than Germany or the United 
States? The answer is easy, at least to a Briton, per- 
haps to the disinterested as well. Control of the sea 



THE CASE OF BRITAIN 241 

would be an advantage to any power; it is a necessity 
to England. Others may be inconvenienced without 
it; England is ruined without it. This may not be a 
reason why Germany or others should grant it. It is 
certainly a reason why England should seek it, die for 
it if she must. 

We have now reached the most vital point in our 
inquiry. The European conflict is settling down into 
one vast struggle between these two aspirants for the 
purple. Other powers, even mighty Russia, range 
themselves under the one or the other leader. Why 
this implacable feud? Why should Britain head off 
Germany, no matter what move she makes? Why 
should Germany seek to build an empire whose bene- 
fits are problematical, upon the ruins of one whose 
benefits are assured? Why, it may be asked, can they 
not work harmoniously together to subdue the waste 
places, instead of bending all their energies, the one 
to prevent, the other to destroy its rival's work? If 
there is no real reason why this harmonious co-opera- 
tion might not be, we must indeed deprecate the sense- 
less rivalries which have convulsed the world. 

Once more remembering that we are dealing with 
very finite men, the answer to our inquiry is to be 
found in two great facts already noted, the necessity 
for Germany to expand, if the civilisation which is in 
her keeping is to have a real chance to count for any- 
thing in the world and her own people is to be really 
independent alongside her growing neighbour, and the 
necessity for England to protect her food supply and 
so her civilisation and her independent existence by 
maintaining control of the sea. Looked at broadly 



242 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

and over long periods of time, the problem is for each 
a problem of existence, not physical existence, of 
course, for the citizens of either country are welcome 
to live and multiply under the rule of the other, not 
economic existence, for people that forego the priv- 
ilege of culture leadership and avoid its burdens may 
easily make money by so doing, but national exist- 
ence, the privilege of embodying great ideals of na- 
tional life in the shape of enduring institutions and 
concrete civilisation. To do this — and it is some- 
thing that every people may justly and commendably 
aspire to do — England must be secure on the sea, 
and Germany must have room for a thousand millions 
who are committed to her " Kultur." Can these 
things be? 

We must assume, however reluctantly, that neither 
can at present trust the other to provide what it re- 
quires. No matter how great Germany's need of ter- 
ritory, England would hardly surrender Australia or 
Canada, even though in excess of her own require- 
ments. (We would not even sell the Philippines to 
Germany, no matter how tired we might be of them.) 
Nor could England trust to Germany to protect her 
grain ships, for that would be to surrender the inde- 
pendence that she seeks. Each must do for herself. 

Such being the case, it must be clear that England 
cannot view without apprehension the acquisition by 
Germany of possessions overseas. Such possessions 
create problems of sea communications, and inevitably 
raise the question of sea control. Even though inter- 
ruption of sea communications might not mean star- 
vation to Germany, as it does to England, it would 



THE CASE OF BRITAIN 243 

mean great loss and inconvenience, and Germany- 
would certainly desire to put herself in a position 
where she could not be interfered with, which would 
mean a position where she could interfere with Eng- 
land's communications. The fact that France, Hol- 
land and other powers have such possessions, of 
course furnishes plenty of precedent, but it does not 
in the least reconcile England to having more of the 
same sort of thing. Even with the harmlessness of 
Holland and the friendliness of France, she has her 
hands quite full enough. 

In the second place, she cannot consent to any ex- 
pansion of Germany on the continent of Europe which 
would bring her terrible army and her always con- 
siderable navy within striking distance of her own 
vital possessions. This negatives all plans that in- 
clude Belgium or Constantinople or the Persian Gulf. 
From Belgian or Dutch ports Germany could organ- 
ise an attack against which it is doubtful if England 
could possibly protect herself. The invasion of Bel- 
gium was a sufficient reason for England's entering 
the present conflict, quite without assuming any al- 
truistic interest on her part in treaty guarantees or 
the existence of small nations. When some years ago 
Holland started to fortify a certain harbour as a naval 
base, England, as we have seen, peremptorily for- 
bade it, knowing that Germany could seize and use it 
against herself. 

Constantinople would be equally dangerous, con- 
trolling absolutely the grain shipments from the Black 
Sea, and hardly less effectually, all shipments passing 
through the Mediterranean, while possession of the 



244 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Persian Gulf would expose India to attack from which 
nothing but a large navy could protect her. It was 
cheaper and safer to prevent the naval base than to 
maintain a big navy against it. And if territories 
tipped out with naval bases were inadmissible, still 
more so were naval bases as such. The possibility 
of a German base in Morocco or Tripoli from which 
commerce raiders could issue to attack the steamships 
plying to Suez or the Cape, and to which they could 
run to cover, aroused England to the most strenuous 
and hazardous exertion to protect what could not 
otherwise be safeguarded, and whose loss would have 
jeopardised her existence. 

Nay more, it was hardly possible for Germany to 
get the territory that she wanted and needed without 
taking it from Britain herself. The growing room of 
the white man was pre-empted by other races. There 
was room in America, but the obstacles were great, 
and for the present it was not the line of least re- 
sistance. In the old world all the white man's land 
was held by Russia or Britain. The Russian terri- 
tory was compact, and the whole Russian people had 
camped, as it were, close to the German frontier, as a 
guard to the virgin acres in the rear. Australia was 
British; South Africa after a moment of tantalising 
uncertainty, became British; Egypt was British; Mo- 
rocco remained, but as Germany grasped, Britain gave 
it to her friend, lest it neutralise Gibraltar. There 
was nothing else. Unlike the Russian land reserves, 
Britain's dependencies were as accessible to Germany 
as to Britain on the same condition, namely, the de- 
velopment of sea power. Britain must disgorge. 



THE CASE OF BRITAIN 245 

Germany said it, and England heard. Here was no 
mere conflict of malicious wills. The very existence 
of the British empire was a checkmate to every Ger- 
man move. The very existence of Germany, as the 
embodiment of imperial purpose, menaced the em- 
pire of Britain. The British fetter, however unin- 
tended, must be broken, or Germany must renounce 
all hope of an imperial future in the realm of matter 
or spirit. Germany must be deprived of her sting, 
like her earlier rivals, Holland and Spain, or Britain 
must herself lay aside the purple and step down to a 
humble seat among the has-beens. Here was a con- 
flict due not to misunderstanding, but to understand- 
ing, a conflict not imagined, not even willed, but in- 
herent in the permanent nature of man, and predes- 
tined in the shape of the planet. 

It was from considerations such as these that Ger- 
many reached the conclusion that she must challenge 
Britain's control of the sea. The attempt seemed 
foolhardy, for England's navy was double that of 
any other power, and as she made it her fixed policy to 
lay down two ships to her competitors' one, it seemed 
hopeless to try to overcome her lead. For a long 
time the expensive rivalry continued, when, curiously 
enough England, by a great improvement in naval 
construction, suddenly gave away her lead, and the 
two rivals stood almost shoulder to shoulder. This 
was due to the building of the Dreadnought, a ship so 
superior to previous constructions that it virtually 
consigned them all to the scrap heap. While Eng- 
land was congratulating herself on the new weapon, 
Germany was quick to seize her opportunity. Naval 



246 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

battles would henceforth be decided by dreadnoughts. 
The older ships would not count. England had but 
one dreadnought, and had therefore a lead of but 
a single ship. Could not Germany perhaps build 
dreadnoughts as fast as England? She would stake 
her all on the attempt. 

Probably never since Waterloo has England felt 
the alarm which she experienced when she discovered 
that Germany had thirteen dreadnoughts in course of 
construction. With a convulsive effort she quickened 
her programme of naval construction, pressing all 
available shipyards into the service, and away went 
the mad race. Soon her superior facilities told, and 
she gained on her opponent, but she was never able 
to regain her old lead of two to one. Not till the col- 
onies began to bring their contributions, New Zea- 
land, for instance, presenting a dreadnought that cost 
a gold sovereign for every man, woman and child in 
the colony, did Germany give up the hopeless race. 
This decision was announced in the statement of Ad- 
miral von Tirpitz, her naval head, that the ratio of 
sixteen to ten (the lead which England had attained) 
was entirely satisfactory to Germany. 

The new rivalry had, however, driven England to 
other and unprecedented expedients. By her league 
with Japan, she was enabled (not without misgivings, 
we may imagine) to withdraw her ships from the Pa- 
cific, leaving Japan to guard. By her understanding 
with France, the latter became custodian of the Medi- 
terranean, while England undertook to defend the 
French coasts in the north and west. She paid us 
the compliment of withdrawing her ships from Ameri- 



THE CASE OF BRITAIN 247 

can waters without other guarantee than our friend- 
ship. This concentration of her forces in home 
waters greatly increased their effectiveness against the 
one enemy, but it added a new dependence to her other 
causes of anxiety, for Japan and France were now 
guarding her empire, an arrangement not wholly re- 
assuring to some of her Eastern dependencies. 

England went even farther and held out the olive 
branch, in the shape of a proposition of mutual limi- | 
tation. This offer was contemptuously declined. It \ 
did not require very profound insight to perceive the 
purport of all this. Even von Tirpitz' acceptance of 
the ratio of sixteen to ten was not a surrender, as 
England very well knew, but a change of tactics. It 
was the submarine and not the battleship in which 
reliance was placed, and the race was continued un- 
derseas, which had been abandoned on the surface. 

Seldom does the problem of national rivalry and 
national existence become as feverishly concentrated 
as here. Let the British navy be once outclassed, and 
a single battle might decide the fate of England. No 
invasion and prolonged siege would be necessary, only 
a naval patrol to intercept the grain ships until starva- 
tion broke the spirit of the proud foe. The spoils 
of the world's greatest empire would thus be staked 
upon a single throw of the dice. If she wins, Ger- 
many becomes another and a greater Rome, and Brit- 
ain must learn to kiss the hand that imposes the pax 
teutonica. If she fails, she becomes merely one of 
the powers who, under the slow pressure of the Mus- 
covite advance, are merged into the unity of the West- 
ern world. 



248 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Whatever the outcome of the great conflict, it has 
already altered the position of Britain in the world 
in a way not to be overlooked. It is but a few years 
since British statesmen spoke of the " magnificent iso- 
lation " of England. Impregnable for defence, and 
all-powerful as a deciding factor in any continental 
conflict, she stood aloof, proud and self-sufficient. 
She not only ruled all seas but policed them from the 
least unto the greatest. To-day she dares not scat- 
ter her navy, and confides the custody of her most 
frequented seas to powers whose co-operation is based 
on mere mutual need. She seeks alliances, and so 
gives hostages to fortune. It is doubtful if England 
will ever again be able to dispense with allies. She 
has seen the last of her magnificent isolation. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE CASE OF FRANCE 

The situation of France in the European family is 
unique. Territorily she has been rarely favoured. 
Her territory is one of those that have been sharply 
delimited by nature, and of all those so delimited, it is 
the largest. It is a characteristic of such territories, 
that their population becomes sooner assimilated to a 
single type and organised as a political unit than ter- 
ritories whose boundaries are artificial. The early 
unification of France and the very late unification of 
Germany are cases in point. The influence of Rome 
may account in part for this difference, but centuries 
of feudalism so disintegrated Roman Gaul that it is 
doubtful if the Roman tradition exerted much influ- 
ence on the modern development from the time of 
Philip Augustus to that of Louis XIII, when the pres- 
ent unification was effected. On the other hand, a cer- 
tain considerable size is necessary to secure and main- 
tain this unity. Italy is a natural unity, but its small 
size, coupled with important historic accidents, which 
we need not stop to consider here, have made her the 
prey of larger powers. 

France has been further fortunate in her location. 
Her frontage on three seas gives her commercial ad- 
vantages which no other nation enjoys. She is the 

249 



250 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

only great European nation that can reach both the 
Atlantic and the Mediterranean without making the 
detour of the Spanish peninsula and passing the Straits 
of Gibraltar. Both by land and sea she is in closer 
touch with both Northern and Southern Europe than 
any other power. 

In war also she enjoys marked advantages. On 
the south her only neighbour is smaller and necessarily 
less populous than herself, and even when allied with 
other powers has never been a redoubtable antagonist, 
while the sharp crests of the Pyrenees make boundary 
lines easy to draw and easy to defend. On the east, 
where the vast bulk of Central and Eastern Europe 
could seemingly overwhelm her, nature has provided 
admirable defences, and further, has split the oppos- 
ing territory by the great barrier of the Alps in such 
a way as to make combination almost impossible. 
The fate of France would have been very different had 
Switzerland been a plain and a single power been able 
to marshal all the forces from Hamburg to Naples. 
The sea frontier has been less fortunate, partly be- 
cause of proximity to Britain, whose insular character 
made the development of maritime commerce and 
naval power much more imperative than in the case 
of France, and partly because France has fewer and 
less satisfactory harbours than her rival. It is for 
these reasons that the role of France upon the sea, 
though always considerable, has been constantly in- 
ferior to that of Britain, and that the centuries of 
naval rivalry between the two powers have been for 
France an almost uninterrupted chronicle of defeat. 
But while the sea has not opened to France an oppor- 



THE CASE OF FRANCE 251 

tunity for successful aggression, it has on the whole 
proved a sufficient defence. France has had little to 
fear in recent times from invasion by sea. 

In this favoured position, the French people, uni- 
fied at a much earlier date than their eastern neigh- 
bours, became for a time the first nation of Europe in 
point of both wealth and military power. They ex- 
perienced in consequence the inevitable temptation to 
aggression, often obtaining ephemeral success, but as 
constantly losing, when the pressure exerted by their 
aggression united for a time their scattered enemies 
against them. Then, just as regularly, the French 
were driven back within their boundaries. The ex- 
treme limit of French aggression was reached under 
Napoleon, who also witnessed its complete defeat. 
But no rebuff seemed permanently to repress this tend- 
ency to aggression, or to destroy the superiority of 
France on the continent until Germany, in 1870-71 
inflicted upon her a defeat which put an end to her 
primacy and left Germany unquestionably the first 
military power of Europe. 

It is important to note why this defeat has had 
seemingly permanent results. In itself the defeat was 
no more crushing than that sustained by France at 
the close of the Napoleonic era and perhaps on former 
occasions. But until now the combination which had 
overwhelmed France had always been temporary. 
Once their purpose effected, the allies had resumed 
their independent and even hostile attitude toward one 
another. This of course removed the pressure on 
France and left her free to renew her attempt when 
opportunity offered, as it always did. Now for the 



252 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

first time her rivals formed a permanent combination 
of greater extent and better organisation than her 
own. This made permanent the result which had 
hitherto been but temporarily accomplished. 

Since this great defeat, France may be said to have 
been on the defensive and to have become measurably 
reconciled to staying at home and taking the second 
place among continental powers. It is true that the 
loss of Alsace-Lorraine left bitter heart-burnings, and 
that France continued for a generation to breathe out 
threatenings and slaughter against Germany, but it is 
difficult to hand down such sentiments and pass on 
such resolves from father to son, and as the genera- 
tion that first felt the smart has passed away, the re- 
conciliation with the spoiler and renunciation of the 
spoil has seemed increasingly possible. For after all 
the French title to Alsace-Lorraine was much the same 
as the title which Germany had acquired, only older, 
an important difference, but one that tends to disap- 
pear with time. 

This tendency was greatly accentuated by certain 
peculiarities of the French people which are in marked 
contrast with the German stock. For a long time the 
French birth-rate has been diminishing, and at last 
the population has become stationary, possibly even 
declining, in marked contrast with that of Germany, 
which is increasing at a rate which, though lessening, 
is still second only to that of Russia. Hence the 
population of France, which in 1870 was about equal 
to that of Germany, is now hardly more than half as 
large. This, of course, has discouraged plans for the 
forceful recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, or other mili- 



THE CASE OF FRANCE 253 

tary adventure in Europe. Further, the rapid de- 
velopment of German industry has furnished a profit- 
able field for the investment of the large surplus capi- 
tal of France, an opportunity of which her financiers 
have not failed to avail themselves. All this has 
tended increasingly to make friendly relations profit- 
able and war hopeless. If the two countries had had 
nothing to quarrel about except Alsace-Lorraine, there 
is reason to believe that peace might have become 
permanent between them. 

But no nation in this age, if indeed in any age, 
contentedly relinquishes the hope of expansion. No 
matter how often rebuffed, the impulse soon reasserts 
itself with the renewing youth of the people. This 
impulse the French people have felt to the full. 
Their devotion to their language, their literature, 
their art, to all the warp and woof of their national 
life, is perhaps more intense than that of any other 
people, and the common homage of mankind goes far 
to justify their passion. They are as eager to make 
the world French as their neighbours are to make it 
German or British, and with quite as good reason. 
This impulse of culture expansion is to the national 
life what the impulse of growth is to the individual 
life, an impulse heedless of protest and careless of 
justification. Repressed at one point, it reasserts 
itself at another. When French expansion was 
checked in Europe, it went overseas. 

During the period of colonisation and commercial 
expansion which followed the age of discovery, 
France was the rival of England in almost every field, 
in America, in India, and in the islands of all seas. 



254 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Their wars were waged in these fields as well as in 
Europe, the advantage in both cases being usually with 
England. Nevertheless at the close of the eighteenth 
century France still possessed valuable colonies. The 
Napoleonic era saw most of these outlying interests 
sacrificed, partly as the result of French defeat, but 
in part as the deliberate policy of the emperor, who 
knew that in the struggle in which he was engaged in 
Europe, colonies could not help him to win, but could 
be had for the winning. This sound policy of con- 
centration therefore witnessed an almost complete 
subsidence of colonial effort. 

Conversely, the downfall of Napoleon and the ces- 
sation of his efforts to master Europe witnessed a re- 
vival of the effort to acquire foreign possessions. Of 
these, Algeria, occupied in 1827, was the first and 
most important. As a nest of pirates and a menace 
to ocean commerce, it had given every provocation, 
but while the seizure found in this its pretext, it was 
doubtless motived by different considerations. The 
country was rich, undeveloped, and conveniently situ- 
ated. The insatiate desire of the French peasant for 
land might reasonably tempt him to settle here, thus 
expanding and strengthening the French race. These 
were reasonable expectations, though they have been 
but partially realised. There was the farther con- 
sideration of defence. There was no telling what 
other power might get a foothold there if not fore- 
stalled, or what complications might thus be intro- 
duced into the Mediterranean situation. The exten- 
sion of French control to the east and west was un- 
doubtedly contemplated from the first. A glance at 



THE CASE OF FRANCE 255 

the map will show that the Mediterranean is almost 
completely divided into two great basins, and that the 
possession of the African coast from Gibraltar to 
Cape Bon puts the great western or French basin com- 
pletely into the control of France, the much weaker 
powers of Italy and Spain being the only other inter- 
ested parties. The importance of this control was 
apparent even to the dimmer consciousness of early 
diplomacy, and has been much emphasised by later 
developments. 

Under the second empire a series of European 
wars again fixed attention upon nearer interests, but 
with the renewed and final collapse of imperial ambi- 
tions in that field, this irrepressible people again 
turned its attention to more distant possibilities. 
This time Tongkin and Annam were annexed to the 
earlier colony of Cambodia and Cochin China. Even 
British interests were threatened, and Britain has- 
tened to annex Burma. The much attenuated buffer 
state of Siam seemed destined to be a prey and per- 
haps a pitfall to the strenuous rivals, when the pres- 
ence of a new and dangerous competitor brought them 
together in a common policy of colonial defence and 
an agreement to settle their claims and divide the re- 
maining opportunities of expansion between them. 
The result of this agreement and various measures 
preceding and following it was to give to France, in 
addition to Algeria and her possessions in southeastern 
Asia, the island of Madagascar and vast possessions 
in equatorial Africa, then Tunis, and last of all Mo- 
rocco, a colonial empire twenty times the size of 
France herself. This colonial empire, to be sure, is 



256 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

decidedly a second choice, the first choice having 
passed to Britain as the result of discovery, success in 
war, and the policy of Napoleon. Only certain por- 
tions of northern Africa are suited to colonisation by 
the French people, and the remainder is sparsely in- 
habited, containing only about one-tenth the popula- 
tion of the British colonial empire. Even so, it was 
immensely valuable, and has proved quite sufficient 
to excite the cupidity of her newest rival. 

We have already noticed that Alsace-Lorraine, the 
traditional cause of hostility between Germany and 
France, had ceased to divide them in the same degree 
as at first. While France had never definitely re- 
nounced her ambition to recover the lost provinces, 
she had in fact become largely reconciled to the exist- 
ing arrangement, while financial arrangements of a 
profitable nature contributed farther to their recon- 
ciliation. Nevertheless, the one certain thing in the 
forecast of the present war was the hostility of Ger- 
many and France. Germany hoped to avoid war 
with Britain, but she never thought — no one thought 
— of the possibility of peace between herself and 
France. Why this undying hostility in the face of a 
growing co-operation and a dying grudge ? 

The explanation is to be found in the growth of the 
French colonial empire. This growth took place 
quietly during the time when Germany was absorbed 
with the problem of organising her empire at home. 
It did not occur to her that her humiliated antagonist 
was stealing a march on her and forestalling the next 
step in her advance. When she woke up to the situa- 
tion, it was just in time to see her two great rivals 



THE CASE OF FRANCE 257 

grasp the remaining morsels of the world which they 
had already pretty much divided between them. 
Germany's efforts to secure a foothold in Morocco 
and her disappointment and consequent decision to try 
the arbitrament of the sword, have already been re- 
counted. We have now to notice merely the new 
relation thus established between Germany and 
France. France had been conquered at Sedan and 
Paris, but Germany had been conquered at Algeciras 
and Agadir. She was humiliated and aggrieved. 
Her grievance did not pass, but grew with time. 

It is therefore folly to assume, as is sometimes 
done, that the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine would 
remove all cause of war between the two countries. 
It would remove an ancient grievance to France, but 
that is well-nigh a dead grievance in any case. To re- 
move it would remove the desire of France to attack 
Germany, but France has no desire — has long had 
no desire — to attack Germany. The trouble comes 
from the other side. It is Germany that has the 
grievance, the living and growing grievance, and the 
desire to remove it even at the cost of war. To de- 
prive her of Alsace-Lorraine would only add another 
grievance, a living grievance, to the one already felt, 
and so increase her impulse to disturb the peace of 
Europe. The social philosopher who still sees in 
Alsace-Lorraine the crux of the Franco-German prob- 
lem is simply a Rip Van Winkle who has slept for 
forty years. 

If then the real problem is colonial, is there a 
chance of appeasing Germany by reasonable conces- 
sions in this quarter? Were it a question of mere 



2 5 8 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

acreage, such a concession would be thinkable, though 
extremely difficult, for national sentiment clings to 
territory with unreasoning tenacity and has so long 
been wont to yield it only to the conqueror, that even 
the most reasonable surrender is apt to inspire feel- 
ings of humiliation and disgrace. It is noteworthy 
that a certain amount of concession has been made in 
the very connection and for the very purpose here 
suggested. When the German warship was sent to 
I Agadir to reopen the Moroccan question, the result- 
' ing negotiation which brought Europe to the brink of 
war, was finally settled by the cession of a consider- 
able tract of the French Congo to Germany. But 
this concession, unsatisfactory as it was to the French 
people, was even more unsatisfactory to Germany. 
Even this was not accepted until Germany found that 
the French financiers had her foul, and that war was 
momentarily impossible. So far from being ap- 
peased, it was at that very moment that Germany re- 
solved upon war and even set the tentative date, as 
was later revealed. France and her allies seem per- 
fectly to have understood that the concession was fu- 
tile and that war was only postponed. That such a 
concession was made merely to postpone war is one of 
many proofs that France had become thoroughly pa- 
cific toward Germany, as indeed she had every reason 
to be. Under no probable circumstances would she 
have risked a war to recover Alsace-Lorraine. The 
dead past had buried its dead. 

Why then was Germany so dissatisfied? Because 
she wanted Morocco, where her people could live and 
multiply, and not equatorial Africa, where they could 



THE CASE OF FRANCE 259 

only buy rubber. The new acquisitions were lauded, 
of course, as of immense value, that the government 
might snatch victory from defeat in the eyes of a 
sorely disappointed people, but the disappointment 
was none the less apparent. 

Why, then, was not Morocco, or some part of it, 
conceded in the interest of a possible permanent 
peace? Because Morocco is more than a dwelling 
for white men. It is a guardian of the Mediter- 
ranean, a neighbour of Algeria, and of France, a 
naval base ; in short, a position from which Germany 
with her powerful navy could have dominated the 
French Mediterranean and more. Nor were Ger- 
man ambitions so modest that France could hope to 
satisfy them by any such concession as Morocco. 
This would be merely a base from which the German 
advance would be pushed farther, with results not 
difficult to foresee. It would be the camel's head in- 
side the tent. Until there is a marked change in hu- I 
man nature and in German nature particularly, all the 
counsels of traditional prudence will caution France 
and Britain not to permit Germany to secure a foot- 
hold on the shores of the Mediterranean. 

Such being the new and potent ground of conflict 
between the two great western powers, the increasing 
disparity of forces between them could not fail to 
drive France, and in turn, Germany as well, to com- 
bine with other powers. We have seen that Ger- 
many at first maintained friendly relations with both 
Russia and Austria, but gravitated to the latter, when 
Balkan interests began to antagonise the two, the 
more so as the new German imperialism began to 



2 6o THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

identify itself with that of Austria. Russia, thus es- 
tranged, became the ally of France for the sole rea- 
son that each feared Germany. This accession of 
power to France and her unexpectedly rapid recovery 
made Germany uneasy in turn, and Italy was added 
under duress as a counterweight. The Alps no 
longer divided the enemies of France. Still Ger- 
many grew in power, in wealth, and in efficiency — 
grew as no other nation in Europe grew. And as she 
grew, her demand for a place in the sun became ever 
more importunate. The power of the Triple Alli- 
ance from its immensely strong central position to en- 
force its demands became ever more threatening. 
The ambitions of Germany and her allies, as more 
clearly outlined, crossed the interests of every great 
power in Europe. She crossed swords with Russia 
at Constantinople, with Britain in Mesopotamia, with 
France in Morocco, and with both in Belgium and 
throughout the whole extent of their colonial empires. 
She had entered the dreadnought race with England 
for the control of the sea. Banking too confidently 
upon the long standing enmities between these coun- 
tries, she incautiously forced a combination against 
herself which nothing else would have made possible. 
France and England have been longer enemies than 
any other two nations in Europe, and on the recent 
occasion when they co-operated, it was against Rus- 
sia. Britain and Russia had conflicting interests, and 
for years each had seen its chief danger in the other. 
Russia grasping and untrustworthy, Britain suspicious 
and stubborn, France proud and sensitive, all chiefly 



THE CASE OF FRANCE 261 

toward one another, what a menace must have been 
required to unite them in a common cause ! 

Russia, humiliated by Japan, with farsighted con- 
nivance of Britain, becomes tractable, and the feud of 
the Persian border is settled with mutual concessions 
that possibly pave the way for a durable peace. 
French susceptibilities are courted by the tactful Ed- 
ward and humoured by the clever courtesy of the Al- 
geciras conference, and the quick response of French 
enthusiasm results in the entente cordiale, so soon to 
loom large in the European consciousness. 

It is noteworthy that the new bond upon which so 
much depended, was an entente, an understanding, 
rather than an alliance. It may be safely assumed 
that in like case Germany would have sought an alli- 
ance, a more definite agreement. The more definite 
pledge would seem to be stronger. It is characteris- 
tic of English diplomacy to prefer the looser agree- 
ment. The unsympathetic will see in this a desire to 
play fast and loose. The more penetrating will see 
in it a recognition that the vaguer understanding is the 
stronger. An alliance must be specific. It is neces- 
sary, therefore, to foresee exactly the situation to 
which it applies. But the situation has a perverse 
way of shaping up somewhat unexpectedly. This 
gives to the party adversely affected a chance to quib- 
ble and evade the spirit of the agreement. " Is it so 
nominated in the bond?" is a favourite evasion, the 
more effectual when insistence has been laid upon the 
nomination in question. It is noteworthy that treaties 
of so recent origin as that between Servia and Bulga- 



262 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

ria and between Servia and Greece, not to mention the 
recently renewed Triple Alliance, have been evaded 
on technical grounds, while the " cordial understand- 
ing " has held, because it was a cordial recognition of 
mutual interests and had no technicalities. 

Of France even more than of Britain it must be 
noted that the old time possibility of independent ac- 
tion is past, seemingly forever. The nations will no 
longer be played off one against the other, but stand 
in more or less permanent groups, groups so large, so 
solid, that no one power can hope to resist them, or 
singly to be safe from their inevitable aggressions. 
France has enjoyed a wonderful advantage in her po- 
sition and her resources, but these can no longer suf- 
fice. Her advantage has passed forever to a group, 
possibly of changing constituency, of which she must 
form a part. 



CHAPTER XV 

THE CASE OF ITALY 

Italy occupies a somewhat uncertain place among 
the powers of Europe. Usually included among the 
first class powers, her rank is quite plainly the sixth or 
lowest in the group, a position almost as easily included 
in the second class as in the first. Her population is 
not very different from that of Britain or France, but 
her wealth is far inferior to either, and she has but a 
feeble beginning of their vast colonial empire. Her 
recognition as a first class power has doubtless been 
due quite as much to her association with Germany 
and Austria on terms of nominal equality as to her 
actual resources. This association at the outset laid 
upon her a burden under which she perceptibly stag- 
gered, but one to which she successfully adjusted her- 
self in later years. 

Italy furnishes a striking example of geographical 
predestination. Civilisation first appeared at the 
eastern end of the Mediterranean. When, under the 
eighteenth Egyptian dynasty, it first discovered the 
possibilities of the sea as a medium of diffusion, the 
eastern Mediterranean became its seat, with Syria and 
Greece as its limits, and Crete as its dominating cen- 
tre. Its farther advance, of necessity toward the 
west, carried it to Italy, and Greece became its centre. 

263 



264 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

The next limit was Gibraltar, with the Mediterranean 
as the connecting area, and now Italy, the geograph- 
ical centre, became dominant. Beyond Gibraltar 
progress was not easy, and it was impossible to take 
the long stride across the Atlantic until civilisation had 
gotten a firmer footing, and had mastered the re- 
sources of all western Europe. Then, at last, rein- 
forced and reorganised, the great step is taken across 
the Atlantic, and western Europe becomes the inevi- 
table centre, while Italy suffers neglect and long 
eclipse. We need not follow civilisation on its next 
long stride or note its inevitable new and broader 
base. To indulge in American complacency is no 
part of our purpose. Besides, the last step has not 
been taken. America is not the broadest nor the last 
base of civilisation. The largest and best endowed 
area must seemingly dominate world counsels in the 
end, and that is not our own. There is no danger of 
our losing our primacy for some time to come. In- 
deed we have not won it yet. But the great advance 
is passing our way, and must needs bivouac for many 
centuries with us. Beyond that, prophecy is profitless 
and premature. 

Thus naturally superseded, Italy was peculiarly 
sidetracked in the onward movement of civilisation. 
That movement now necessarily swerved far to the 
north as its line of least resistance, and Italy was left 
far to one side, a long finger pointing toward nothing, 
and a road leading nowhere. For be it noted, civili- 
sation in pursuit of farther conquests had found it 
expedient to abandon in a measure the western Medi- 
terranean basin, the latest addition to its domain. 



THE CASE OF ITALY 267 

From the Levant to the headquarters of western civili- 
sation the Adriatic furnished the most direct available 
route with some point at its head as the natural trans- 
shipment station. Italy was only a breakwater. 

This passing of Italy was accentuated by other fac- 
tors, natural and political. Abandoned as a political 
headquarters, it remained as the headquarters of the 
more conservative religious establishment, whose im- 
mense influence, if unable to rule, could still ruin any 
possible competitor. It is unlikely under any circum- 
stances that Italy would have been the seat of a strong 
political power, say from the sixth to the sixteenth 
centuries, but if there had been such a possibility in- 
herent in land and location, the presence of the papal 
establishment would have frustrated any attempt of 
the kind. The fiction of universal spiritual dominion 
necessarily translated itself into a feeble temporal 
rule, too local and half-hearted to meet political re- 
quirements, yet sufficiently substantial to be intolerant 
of a real political competitor. The attempt of the 
Lombards in the seventh century to reorganise the 
distracted and devastated country was frustrated pri- 
marily by the presence of this ecclesiastical power 
whose policy it was then as always to keep Italy di- 
vided and the papacy locally supreme. The same 
policy was continued with the same result for twelve 
hundred years. 

A second important fact is the comparative meagre- 
ness of Italy's natural resources. The surface re- 
sources utilised by earlier civilisations, timber, fertil- 
ity of the soil, etc., had been much depleted, especially 
by mediaeval improvidence, and the deeper resources 



268 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

are wanting. When material culture, after the long 
prostration of the middle ages, revived through the 
medium of the textile industries, the petty city states 
of Italy experienced a new accession of wealth and 
power, with the Italian Renaissance as their perma- 
nent achievement. But as the centre of gravity of 
modern industrial civilisation passed from the textiles 
to iron, and its motive power from human muscle to 
coal, Italy was again set aside, for Italy has neither 
iron nor coal. Her case seemed hopeless. 

Strangely enough, Italy in the last hundred years 
has risen steadily to new influence and power. Al- 
most every political crisis in Europe has turned to her 
advantage, whether as the result of her own wisdom, 
or through mere luck, it is sometimes difficult to deter- 
mine. Certainly her wisdom has been of an extraor- 
dinary kind, often contradicting the best established 
maxims of political prudence. 

The reconstruction of Europe following the Na- 
poleonic era, proceeded on the general principle of re- 
storing the conditions antecedent to that era. This, 
although only partially accomplished, left Italy di- 
vided into a number of petty states, some of them in- 
dependent, in the measure that small states can be in- 
dependent, while other and important districts were 
under Austrian rule. The movement for unification 
started early in the century and under the remarkable 
leadership of Cavour, was well advanced, when the 
outbreak of the Crimean war presented to astonished 
Europe the spectacle of this fledgling power in alli- 
ance with England and France, fighting for a cause 
in which she seemed not to have the slightest concern. 



THE CASE OF ITALY 269 

She was poor, but feebly organised, with problems 
near home of the most pressing urgency, which 
seemed to prohibit a policy of foreign adventure. 
The conservative critic found an easy mark in the 
jingoism of Cavour. But the result justified the fore- 
sight or the fortune of the daring statesman, and 
through the allies thus secured, Cavour was able ma- 
terially to advance the cause of Italian unification 
against a power which Italy could not hope to meet 
unaided. 

But if France aided the unification of Italy as 
against Austria, she sternly resisted any encroachment 
upon the Papal States which now bisected the new 
kingdom in a most embarrassing manner. To main- 
tain the papal power, France kept a garrison in Rome 
as a sign of a power which Italy was compelled to 
respect. The war between Germany and France 
compelled the withdrawal of this garrison and gave 
Italy an opportunity, which she promptly utilised, of 
putting an end to this anomaly in the political organi- 
sation of Europe. The peninsula was now united 
under the rule of the House of Savoy, except small 
areas in the Alps where the Italian language is spoken, 
of which the oft mentioned Trentino is the most im- 
portant. These territories, with their somewhat in- 
definite extension round the north and east coasts of 
the Adriatic, formed the remaining subject of agita- 
tion on the part of the unification party now called 
irridentists, that is, champions of Italia irridenta, un- 
redeemed Italy. It may be noted in passing that the 
process by which Italy has been unified, has been a 
gradual one, additions having been made piece by 



2 7 o THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

piece, with considerable intervals of time between. 
It is therefore quite natural for Italian patriots and 
enthusiasts to think of the recent quiet as merely one 
more lull in the intermittent process, and to look for- 
ward to the next step as quite inevitable, especially as 
long as they hear Italian still spoken across the bor- 
der. When these are added and Italy is fully re- 
deemed, it is to be feared that other arguments will 
take the place of the one that has thus far done duty, 
and that the redeeming process will still go on. 

It is but fair to add, however, that something more 
than race kinship or community of language impels 
Italy to push her Austrian frontier somewhat farther 
back. As at present located, that frontier makes Aus- 
tria invulnerable, while leaving Italy comparatively 
defenceless. All the strong natural defences with 
which this region is so abundantly provided are on the 
Austrian side of the line, an arrangement in which 
Italy can hardly be expected to acquiesce willingly. 

We have already seen how the stern resolve of 
Britain and France that Germany should not acquire 
a base on the Mediterranean coast, required the ap- 
propriation of the Tripolitan coast. The natural 
thing would have been to add this to Egypt, and so 
bring it under British control. But the problem con- 
fronting Britain is far too complex to permit of such 
an easy solution. Such an appropriation would have 
been deeply resented by Turkey, no matter how care- 
fully the fiction of Turkish suzerainty was maintained. 
This resentment would have disturbed the Moslem 
population of other lands, the great majority of whom 
are under British rule. In turn, it would have been 



THE CASE OF ITALY 271 

resented by Italy whose aspirations in this direction 
have long been recognised, and so would have driven 
her into closer relation with her allies. Finally it 
would have brought British and French possessions 
into contact, with the likelihood of friction and 
estrangement. 

Conversely, to install Italy there would gratify her 
and tend to detach her from her not too well liked al- 
lies. It would stop the mouth of Germany, who 
could hardly protest against this aggrandisement of 
her ally. It would make Italy the enemy of Turkey, 
with the likelihood that the threatened accession of 
Turkey to the Triple Alliance would be prevented, or 
the defection of Italy precipitated. And it would lay 
upon Italy the odium of this new attack upon Islam 
which England and France would have found em- 
barrassing. Once again the political necessities of 
Europe played into the hand of Italian ambition, and 
irridentism passed into imperialism, with what result 
to Italy's future remains to be seen. The immediate 
result was an addition to Italy's burdens quite beyond 
what had been contemplated, but equally, it launched 
Italy on the path of imperialism quite beyond the lim- 
its that had been set. The Tripolitan defence was 
unexpectedly prolonged and stubborn, with resulting 
heavy cost, but when finally broken, the Turkish gov- 
ernment obstinately refused to make peace. Turkey 
was cornered, but she was not to be driven from her 
corner. So Italy looked about for some other op- 
portunity to put pressure on her foe. An attack on 
Albania, then under Turkish rule, was considered, but 
Austria, jealous lest her ally establish herself on both 



272 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

sides the Strait of Otranto, vetoed the move. Ulti- 
mately the required coercion was applied by the sei- 
zure of twelve islands at the southeastern corner of 
the iEgean, the so-called Dodecanese. These islands 
were far from the contemplated sphere of Italian in- 
fluence, and their seizure was purely a war measure. 
Turkey still remained obstinate, however, and refused 
to make peace until the attack of the Balkan states 
drove her to a hurried reconciliation with Italy, in 
order that she might the better meet the new danger 
which threatened her. Even so, the adventure was 
not concluded. By the terms of the peace then ar- 
ranged, Turkey was to pay an indemnity to Italy, 
and the latter was to hold the islands until this in- 
demnity was paid. The close of the Balkan wars left 
Turkey in no condition to pay indemnities, and mean- 
while continued occupation of the Dodecanese, with 
the establishment of steamship lines and a more fixed 
administrative system, found the Italians less and less 
disposed to withdraw. Soon it was reported that 
Italy had decided not to withdraw, unless in exchange 
for substantial concessions on the adjoining mainland 
of Asia Minor. In other words, she would give up 
her foothold in the Dodecanese only in exchange for 
a better one on the mainland. Italy was in Asia to 
stay. 

Meanwhile with the outbreak of the present war, 
Italy at once perceived that she could not risk an at- 
tack from France and Britain whose naval power had 
her utterly at its mercy. Having therefore decided 
that her alliance with Germany and Austria did not 
bind her to aid them against the Allies, she became the 



THE CASE OF ITALY 273 

object of an assiduous courtship on the part of both 
the contesting groups, the one urging her to neutral- 
ity, the other to co-operation. Her final decision to 
enter the lists against her former allies was the re- 
sult of prolonged deliberation and followed nego- 
tiations of the most exhaustive character. It would 
be unsympathetic and probably untrue to say that 
Italy sold her aid to the highest bidder, for Italy had 
sympathies quite as pronounced and quite as disin- 
terested as those of any other power, but it is none 
the less true that while following her inclinations and 
seeking her most coveted ends, she was in a position 
to sell her services on most advantageous terms. It 
was the misfortune of the Central Powers that the 
things that Italy wanted were among their most val- 
ued possessions, and they were therefore in no posi- 
tion to bid against their enemies. The Allies could 
promise Italy almost anything she wanted at the ex- 
pense of Austria and Turkey, especially if she would 
be to the trouble of taking possession, while Austria 
and Turkey could hardly be so generous. So the 
Allies won, just as the Central Powers later won with 
Bulgaria, because they could promise anything she 
wished in Servia, whereas the Allies, being friends and 
allies of Servia, could hardly be so liberal. The 
terms of the agreement between Italy and the Allies 
can only be surmised, but it may be safely assumed 
that they cover three important points. 

First, the Italian speaking provinces of Austria, 
at least as far as Trieste, and the western half of the 
Istrian peninsula, possibly including the Austrian na- 
val base of Pola. Undoubtedly the limits of this 



274 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

concession will be determined largely by the actual re- 
sults of the campaign, as indeed upon its successful 
conclusion must depend any concession whatever. 
There can be no question that Italy will carry her 
arms around the Adriatic as far as she is able, and in 
particular, that she hopes to annex all or parts of the 
Adriatic islands, thus turning the tables on her enemy. 
To this programme it will be difficult for the Allies to 
object. 

Second, it is certain that Italy hopes to secure a 
permanent foothold on the Albanian coast, thus com- 
pletely controlling the entrance to the Adriatic. 
Even before entering the war, she had seized Avlona, 
the famous key to the Adriatic, and it is difficult to be- 
lieve that the Allies, having received her with Avlona 
in her possession, can fail to support her there in the 
event of their joint success. 

Third, as the success of the Allies can hardly fail to 
result in the partial or complete dismemberment of 
Turkey, it is all but certain that Italy will be a sharer 
in the spoils. She has probably been promised both 
the Dodecanese and a territory on the mainland. 

So much for promises. Fulfilment must depend, of 
course, on the power of the Allies to " deliver the 
goods," and largely on the prowess of Italy herself. 
The realisation of these hopes is not impossible. 
Even if but partially realised, they will have perma- 
nent results. Already Italian statesmen have ceased 
to talk about unredeemed Italy and are affirming that 
Italy must realise her " legitimate national aspira- 
tions," a phrase of eminent good form and indefinite 



THE CASE OF ITALY 275 

elasticity. Whatever the territorial acquisitions of 
Italy in the present war, it is pretty certain that she 
will acquire quite a new set of " legitimate aspira- 
tions," and that these are likely to have a momentous 
effect upon her political future, perhaps even upon 
the future of Europe. Let us note the position in 
which she is thus placed. 

Until the outbreak of the war with Turkey, Italy 
was one of the best defined territories in Europe. 
Her boundaries were nearly all seacoast, and included 
not only the peninsula but the adjacent islands. With 
the possible exception of Corsica and Malta, nature's 
intentions seemed to have been realised, and these ex- 
ceptions were not strategic for her purposes. The 
short Austrian frontier needed some straightening, 
particularly by the transfer of the Trentino to Italy, 
but it was admirably defended by natural bulwarks. 
The territory thus sharply defined is not large, nor is 
its soil exceptionally productive, being largely moun- 
tainous, while the absence of iron and coal limits the 
development of an industrial society. This last de- 
fect, to be sure, is partly compensated by abundant 
water power, which, with the development of electri- 
cal transmission, largely takes the place of coal. But 
when all is said, the country seems intended by nature 
for a modest state, self contained and admirably de- 
fended, but neither large enough nor richly enough 
endowed to be the secure base of a large modern im- 
perial dominion. 

Such a dominion, however, it seems the present pur- 
pose of Italy to establish. The accessions now 



276 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

sought, the " legitimate aspirations " now asserted, 
quite exceed the limits thus indicated by nature. This 
it is important to notice in detail. 

The extension of Italian territory round the head 
of the Adriatic will immensely lengthen the frontier 
to be defended, against an enemy of vastly greater 
size and resource, and rendered ever more hostile by 
these encroachments. The farther the Italian tentacle 
wraps itself round the head of the Adriatic, the more 
implacable becomes the enemy and the more indefen- 
sible the frontier. When it is remembered that this 
is Austria's only seacoast, a short one at the best, and 
that it is all but indispensable to Austria, while all but 
useless to Italy, who would never export a pound of 
merchandise from the peninsula by way of Trieste, it 
will be apparent that the mere use of the Italian lan- 
guage on this eastern coast is a slender base upon 
which to build the claims of unredeemed Italy. The 
transfer of the islands, or a vital part of them, to 
Italian control would indeed rid Italy of a constant 
menace, but only to turn it upon Austria, with an 
added strain in the situation and a more pronounced 
unnaturalness in the relation involved. When we 
recall the struggle which little Servia has made to get 
to the sea, we can form some idea of the protest 
Austria would make if imprisoned thus behind the 
barrier of a thin Italian coast strip. The recent sit- 
uation in the Adriatic has been unstable enough, but 
any considerable extension of Italian territory round 
the Austrian side of the Adriatic would make it far 
more so. 

The same holds with almost equal force of the 



THE CASE OF ITALY 277 

lodgment at Avlona. Austria is keenly sensitive to 
the possibilities of a foreign outpost on her side of 
the Adriatic and especially at so strategic a point as 
Avlona. To prevent even such powers as Servia and 
Greece from occupying this point of vantage both 
Austria and Italy were ready to take up arms during 
the Balkan wars, though the possibility of harm would 
certainly be slight, and Austria could count on Italy 
to aid her against any danger from such a quarter. 
How much more pronounced must be her objection to 
its occupation by a greater power like Italy, against 
which she would have to protect herself unaided. 
Such an isolated position as this, however strong, 
would be most precarious, in view of the certain hos- 
tility of the greater neighbour power. 

The conclusion seems inevitable that any Italian 
advance on the east side of the Adriatic will be a 
menace to the peace of this region and a source of 
weakness rather than of strength to Italy. It is diffi- 
cult to find a rational explanation for it except on the 
supposition of a farther advance. The strip must 
widen out into a broad hinterland and furnish the 
forces to defend its own frontiers and the resources 
to keep busy its harbours. The Albanian outpost 
must be linked up with other trans-Adriatic posses- 
sions if it is to be solidly held. Italy must encircle 
the Adriatic, reaching out to take a firm grip on the 
interior of the Balkan peninsula, absorbing a people 
not its kin and a stranger to its language and its 
faith, if its adventure is to be substantial and endur- 
ing. Probably few if any Italians have so conceived 
the logic of their " legitimate aspirations." Sufficient 



278 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

to the day is the evil thereof. The new frontier with 
its new difficulties will produce its own aspirations 
and efforts. Let us judge these as we will, it is im- 
possible to overlook the hazard involved, and the 
change from comparatively stable to unstable equilib- 
rium in this part of the world. 

If this is true of the expansion of the home fron- 
tiers, it is hardly less so of the ventures overseas. 
The Tripolitan acquisition is comparatively safe, with 
friendly powers on either side and the desert behind, 
although its economic possibilities are for the present 
far from reassuring. Opinions differ as to whether 
it will ultimately be self supporting, but none think it 
can be so now or soon. Italy can hardly be indif- 
ferent to this consideration, but as always, the ques- 
tion is decided on other than economic grounds. 

In Asia the situation is less reassuring. A station 
there, especially on the mainland, must be precarious 
and costly, unless it expands to large proportions and 
becomes self supporting and self defended. Such ex- 
pansion must be not only against native protest, but 
against the virile competition of the other European 
powers, for Italy will not be the only heir to the in- 
heritance of the Turk. Here will be renewed the 
rivalries of western Europe. To this divided terri- 
tory will be transferred the wars which originate in 
Europe, and this territory may in its turn originate 
disputes for Europe to fight out. It is infinite pity 
that the needful consolidation should so often involve 
disintegration in its turn. 

Will the crises of European politics continue to 
pave the way for Italy's advance, as in the past? 



THE CASE OF ITALY 279 

Will she always find her enemies locked in death 
grapple and ready to yield what she covets as the 
price of her aid? She has always taken big risks, but 
hitherto for the most legitimate and necessary ends. 
The risks are increasing, and the ends seem less in- 
dispensable, despite their assertion of legitimacy. 
Nay, may it not be their very questionableness which 
evokes the loud assertion of legitimacy? 

But we are not judging; we are learning. Italy 
furnishes an extreme example of the fascination of 
nationalist ideals and the disregard of practical con- 
siderations in their pursuit. To live safe and pros- 
perous, to be content with a humble place, while other 
tongues and other customs slowly win the allegiance 
of mankind, this is not the temper of those whose 
sires built the eternal city. Let us applaud or con- 
demn as we will, but let us understand. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE CASE OF THE MINOR POWERS 

The minor powers of Europe have little in com- 
mon except their relative weakness. They owe their 
existence to the most diverse causes, and their pres- 
ent status and their political prospects manifest equal 
diversity. Some are natural, others artificial; some 
are relics, others beginnings; some seem destined to 
endure, possibly even to grow, while others tend to 
disappear. In most cases they owe their continued 
existence to conflicts of interest between the great 
powers whose struggles they watch with breathless but 
helpless interest, knowing too well in many cases that 
a decisive issue to the struggle means their undoing, 
while its continuance means their ruin. 

These powers constitute four groups widely sepa- 
rated in locality, character and interests. The first of 
these groups, that of the Balkan states, is so impor- 
tant in the problem of international relations in Eu- 
rope, that it has necessarily occupied the first place in 
our inquiry. It is doubtless the least stable of all the 
groups, representing essentially incomplete integra- 
tion in a territory where such integration seems in- 
evitable. Nowhere do the passions of men, and su- 
perficial differences of race and speech, oppose one 
another to less purpose, but nowhere is the opposition 

280 



THE CASE OF THE MINOR POWERS 281 

more indubitable. Of all the minor powers, these 
seem the first and most certainly doomed. 

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 

This group is at once the most natural and the most 
artificial of the four; natural in that the peninsula 
occupied by the two countries is naturally isolated and 
well defined, and so situated that it neither blocks 
the path of the other powers nor finds its path blocked 
by them in turn; and artificial in that nature has fur- 
nished almost no excuse for the division of the country 
between two powers. Their separation, which is 
marked neither by natural barriers nor by pronounced 
differences of language or race, is none the less signifi- 
cant. 

The comparative detachment of the peninsula from 
the continent of Europe does not in itself account for 
its immunity from the European turmoil. Italy is 
quite as sharply defined by nature, and England even 
more so, yet both are in the present conflict and seem 
likely to be in any other which may convulse Europe, 
while the participation of Spain has hardly been 
thought of. Even her alliance seems hardly to be 
sought. The reason would seem to be that Spain has 
nothing that anybody wants. It cannot be too often 
insisted that mere extension of territory, when it in- 
volves no strategic point, and especially when it of- 
fers no opportunity for colonisation and the expansion 
of the ruling race, appeals very little to the modern 
statesman or even to popular imperialism. This is 
especially true in countries where government has be- 
come dependent upon public opinion. If Spain were 



282 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

unoccupied, or occupied by a feeble race, no doubt 
France would welcome its annexation, but the problem 
of French politics would be hopelessly complicated by 
the annexation of the Spanish people. The crude 
autocratic imperialism which could contemplate the 
subjection and incorporation of such a people has dis- 
appeared, at least in western Europe. No nation 
wants Spain for her own sake. 

And no one now courts Spain for her possessions. 
Curiously enough, she owes her present immunity 
largely to her great losses. These losses are of two 
kinds, strategic and territorial. Under the first head 
comes Gibraltar. The territorial loss here involved 
was insignificant — only about three and a half square 
miles — but the strategic importance of " the Rock," 
as we have seen, is enormous. It is not that this is 
the only point where a naval base and a powerful 
fleet might dominate the straits, but that this, unques- 
tionably the best point, once in the possession of the 
greatest naval power, no other can be tolerated. 
Hence Spain, the natural guardian of the Straits and 
mistress of the Mediterranean, is completely relieved 
of that responsibility. Imagine to what courtship 
and what coercion Spain would be exposed, if she 
really possessed this first class fortress and held un- 
questioned command of the Straits through navy, 
mines, or submarines. But this carefree existence, it 
may be safely asserted, is one little appreciated by the 
country, which in more than two hundred years has 
not been able to reconcile itself to the foreign occu- 
pation of Gibraltar. It is said that the Spanish gov- 
ernor of the adjacent mainland still announces himself 



THE CASE OF THE MINOR POWERS 283 

as " Governor of Algeciras and of Gibraltar in tern- J 
porary possession of the British." The plain fact is i 
that people do not prize tranquillity above all other 
goods. They desire influence and power, and are 
willing to accept the responsibilities and the suffering 
that these entail. 

The second loss which Spain has experienced is that 
of her colonies. Her colonial empire, once the most 
extensive in the world, fell to pieces of its own weight 
during the nineteenth century, the final denouement 
being aided by a brief war with America. It would 
take us far from our quest to moralise on this disas- 
trous experiment in imperialism. Its lessons are 
everywhere conceded and in some degree heeded by 
those now chiefly concerned. It interests us merely to 
note that, having no territory available either for race 
expansion or for strategic control, Spain is undis- 
turbed in our much disturbed world. 

But Spain is restive under this condition of things, 
and actively seeks the troubles she is spared. She has 
in fact long held Ceuta, a point on the African coast 
opposite Gibraltar and potentially its rival. This is 
tolerated by Britain on condition that it remain un- 
fortified and in the hands of a harmless power. Any 
sign of transfer to, or alliance with, a dangerous 
power would be immediately opposed. For the pur- 
pose of keeping Ceuta safely innocuous, Spain is ad- 
mirably adapted, a sufficient commentary on her rank 
among the powers. 

The beginnings of a new Spanish imperialism are 
to be noted in the assignment to Spain of a " sphere 
of influence " in Morocco, and her joint obligation 



284 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

with France to preserve the peace of that country. 
Such arrangements as these phrases suggest are of 
course purely transitional, and in the ordinary course 
of events must develop into full occupation. Am- 
bitious railway projects, including a tunnel under the 
Straits, add to the possibilities and the dangers of the 
scheme. Doubtless France is not enthusiastic over 
this partnership, but it was plainly politic. It insures 
the co-operation of Spain with the entente powers in 
any matter affecting this part of the world, and in par- 
ticular, removes all likelihood that Spain might will- 
ingly serve as a base for a hostile power threatening 
the control of the Mediterranean or colonial posses- 
sions in Morocco. Spain has given hostages to Bri- 
tain and France in return for her sphere of influence 
in Morocco. She has bartered away her immunity 
in an eager effort to get back into the game. 

Portugal, though naturally a part of Spain, is politi- 
cally peculiarly distinct. This is due to the fact that 
for more than two hundred years Portugal has been 
virtually an appanage of Britain. This curious and 
little noticed partnership can be traced back more than 
seven hundred years, when English knights aided Por- 
tugal in her wars of liberation from the Moors. In 
the early wars which England waged against France, 
in her later wars against Spain, and in her mighty 
struggle with Napoleon, Portugal, with its harbours 
on the western sea offered a most advantageous base 
for British operations. British influence was there- 
fore enlisted always on the side of separatist tenden- 
cies. The merger with Spain, which seemed at one 
time an accomplished fact, might have had disastrous 



THE CASE OF THE MINOR POWERS 285 

consequences for Britain, to whose influence is per- 
haps due in part the failure of the unionist movement 
in the peninsula during the last century. This rela- 
tion of dependence was embodied in a treaty in 1703 
which virtually made Portugal a British protectorate, 
as regards foreign affairs, while leaving domestic in- 
terests to her own exceedingly incompetent adminis- 
tration. That relation has never since been dis- 
turbed. During the Napoleonic wars, when the Por- 
tuguese monarch took refuge in Brazil, the country 
was for a time directly ruled by a British admiral. 
It is significant that when the present republic was 
established, one of the first announcements of the pro- 
visional president was that the relation with Great 
Britain would not be modified. Since the outbreak 
of the present war Portugal has repeatedly offered 
her assistance to the Allies and has probably co-oper- 
ated to some extent in Africa. But as she is one of 
the smallest countries in Europe and burdened with 
a debt equal to thirty-five or forty per cent, of her 
wealth, she is a negligible factor in the allied camp. 
Still, she is there, necessarily there, if Britain calls, as 
she is likely to do only in extreme need. 

Insignificant as Portugal is, however, she still has 
colonies, and colonies of some value. These include 
extensive territories in east and west Africa, and 
numerous islands, Madeira, the Azores, etc., of great 
strategic importance. That she still holds these val- 
uable possessions, which certain powers would gladly 
acquire by purchase or otherwise, is of course due to 
the same British backing to which she owes her sepa- 
rate existence. So well recognised is the British claim 



286 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

that Britain freely crossed Portuguese territories dur- 
ing the Boer war, and later, in an~effort to reach an 
understanding with Germany, arranged their definite 
partition between Germany and herself. If there 
was Portuguese protest to these proposals, it was 
hardly noticed or worthy of notice. 

In brief, Portugal has no basis for separate exist- 
ence. She is in effect an outpost of Britain, preserved 
as a political anomaly, to serve the far-seeing pur- 
poses of the British Empire. 

THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES 

The Scandinavian countries form a group of con- 
siderable size and importance, with an area half larger 
than that of Germany, and a population of ever ten 
millions. Their importance, however, is primarily 
due to their position, which gives them not only har- 
bours and a valuable seaboard, but command of the 
Baltic. This position they are quite unable to hold 
by their own strength. Their independent existence 
they hold on suffrance, or more exactly, by virtue of 
the deadlock between their powerful neighbours. 
The main rivalry is between Russia and Germany, but 
Britain is interested not only in the general question of 
national preponderance, but also in the naval possibili- 
ties of the Norway coast. Russia and Germany are 
therefore interested in securing control of the Scan- 
dinavian countries each for herself, and in preventing 
control by the other. Britain is interested in prevent- 
ing control by either. So long as these powers have 
anything like their present relative strength, the Scan- 
dinavian countries are secure. When either Ger- 



THE CASE OF THE MINOR POWERS 287 

many or Russia becomes sufficiently powerful to resist 
the other two, their independence will become nominal 
and may quite disappear. Whether their status will 
be that of Finland or that of Portugal, matters little. 

It may be worth while to notice the strength of the 
opposing claims, though no consideration of the equi- 
ties involved is likely to have much influence on the re- 
sult. 

The claim of Russia is certainly a strong one. It 
is simply the necessity of controlling the door to her 
own house, so that none may close it against her. 
Sweden and Denmark will not, dare not, do so, but 
Germany can, and may easily feel so disposed. But 
the Scandinavian peoples are alien to Russia, and her 
rule, however tempered, would rest heavily upon 
them. 

The claim of Germany is as clear. To be sure, she 
is not directly dependent upon the Baltic, even for 
access to her Baltic provinces, but she can hardly help 
regarding Russian control as the ultimate alternative 
to her own, and the full realisation of the Russian 
ideal would push the Russian advance west to Berlin. 
The logic of that advance is too inexorable to be 
overlooked, the more so as nature has provided no 
bulwark between the two countries. The Scandina- 
vian peoples, too, are Teutonic, and although nowise 
minded to become German, have far more in common 
with Germany than with Russia. Subjugation or an- 
nexation would be bitterly resented, but would involve 
far less real hardship in the case of Germany than in 
the case of Russia. 

Britain's interest is that of self protection. She 



288 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

desires neither annexation nor paramount influence 
in this quarter, but the real independence of the Scan- 
dinavian powers. They will never harm her, 
whereas either of the greater powers could and sooner 
or later would, if they occupied the Scandinavian 
coasts. They might never attack her, but they would 
always be there, towering, gigantic, in the background 
of her consciousness. It would not do for her to pro- 
voke an attack. Thus under the slow attrition of con- 
tinued subserviency, British independence would be 
sapped, and in a crisis the vast fabric of empire which 
her sons have inherited and her statesmen are set to 
guard, would fall in ruin. 

Is it possible to imagine that any of these three 
powers will voluntarily abandon a policy born of such 
vital needs? Can they prudently do so with human 
nature as it is now? Can we expect a country like 
Russia to rest content without a doorway of its own? 
Can Britain or Germany tolerate Russian control of 
the Danish Straits? If not, we can expect only an 
unstable equilibrium, a long standing one perhaps, for 
the great rivals have other and more pressing cares, 
but unstable nevertheless because due to a conflict of 
vital interests, interests which none can surrender and 
which none can as yet make prevail. The Scandina- 
vian countries are in no immediate danger, but it is 
difficult to read a promise of independence in their 
horoscope. 

THE LOW COUNTRIES 

This name is now used to designate the two small 
countries of Belgium and Holland, the former of 



THE CASE OF THE MINOR POWERS 289 

which has come into sudden prominence as a result of 
its unfortunate part in the present war. As at pres-', 
ent constituted, these little kingdoms date from 1838,! 
but they rest upon historical foundations which are \ 
very much older. Holland, indeed, is the somewhat 
reduced survival of a one-time considerable power, 
the precursor of Britain in foreign commerce, finan- 
cial leadership and naval power. This supremacy 
was long ago lost to Britain, whose size and island lo- 
cation offered a much better base for it than Holland 
afforded, but the successful rival has by no means de- 
spoiled her of all her possessions. She holds not only 
Java and Sumatra, perhaps the most valuable of all 
tropical possessions, but nearly all of the great group 
of East India islands, an area nearly sixty times that 
of the little kingdom itself. Her possessions being 
all islands, only two of which she shares with other 
powers, she has almost no problem of defence or 
boundary disputes, except the all important problem 
of maintaining her existence as an independent power. 
This problem is serious enough. Her position as a 
strip of coast land lying between Germany's produc- 
tive districts and the sea, subjects her to an importu- 
nate wooing, the fervour of which is not lessened by 
the knowledge of her magnificent dowry. Were it 
not for the fear of her stern guardians, it may be as- 
sumed that no protest of hers would prevent the ar- 
dently desired union. The chief objector is of course 
Britain, who sees herself menaced in her most vital 
interests by the establishment of a strong and poten- 
tially hostile power in the nearby harbours of the 
Dutch coast. Her protest against the fortification of 



2 9 o THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

these harbours with the possibility that they might be 
seized by Germany for use against Britain has already 
been mentioned. 

In passing it may be noted that the Dutch colonial 
empire as now constituted is the result of a protracted 
struggle between Holland and Britain, involving both 
coercion and bargain, an instance of the latter being 
Britain's surrender of Java for the Dutch possessions 
in India. The general result of the whole was to 
give Holland an empire of tropical islands while Brit- 
ain secured the continental possessions. This was 
eminently appropriate in view of the fact that conti- 
nental possessions are harder to defend, and boundary 
disputes might have involved the little country in wars 
at home which would have jeopardised her existence. 
Thus, Britain fought several wars with France before 
her position in India was established. For Holland, 
such a war would have meant annihilation. 

But another result of this very sensible arrange- 
ment is more important, though possibly unforeseen. 
Holland received tropical colonies, and with them 
wealth and tranquillity. Britain received in northern 
India, and especially in South Africa, temperate 
climes, and with them dangers and arduous tasks, but 
withal the possibility of growth for her own people. 
The white man's land of the world is filling up with 
Britons and not with Dutchmen. This broadening 
base of the British race is the supreme fact in the Brit- 
ish empire. 

The kingdom of Belgium is the result of a secession 
from Holland in 1838. No very substantial base of 
union, historical or natural, justified the union, and 



THE CASE OF THE MINOR POWERS 291 

the advantage of size in this case was doubtful. Both 
together would still be smaller than any of their dan- 
gerous neighbours, and union would only expose both 
parts to dangers that would otherwise threaten but 
one. Singly or united they must still exist by the tol- 
erance and the backing of the great powers, and, this 
being the case, a division along lines of religious and 
other characteristics, and administrative convenience 
was advantageous. How far these considerations 
were influential in securing the result, it is impossible 
to say. They at least go far to justify it. 

The great importance attaching to Belgium has re- 
cently been enhanced by the acquisition of the Congo 
Free State, an immense territory in central Africa, 
which has had a peculiar and significant history. It 
was originally constituted in a chimerical attempt to 
stay the encroachments of the great powers in Africa. 
Its freedom was to be guaranteed by international 
agreement, and its administration provided for by 
private organisation. The king of the Belgians was 
chosen as its administrative head, both because of his 
ability and because of his detachment from all colo- 
nial powers. So far so good, but the problem of 
financing a vast tropical state proved too much for its 
custodians, with the result that administration quite 
naturally degenerated into exploitation, with abuses 
which shocked humanity and a demand that the re- 
sponsibilities of administration be assumed by more 
responsible powers. The old problem of rivalry 
among African colonial powers having been nowise 
solved in the meantime, there was nothing to do but 
entrust Belgium with the burdensome honour, which 



292 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

she accepted with mingled elation and anxiety. Bel- 
gium thus entered the list of the colonial powers with 
foreign possessions having an area eighty times that 
of the kingdom itself, and bordered by the possessions 
of all her great European neighbours. It is thus ap- 
parent that the chances of trouble with these neigh- 
bours, or of injury incident to these troubles with one 
another have been measurably increased. It is true 
that the perpetual neutrality of the Congo has been 
guaranteed by treaty, like that of Belgium itself, and 
that a further agreement pledged the great powers not 
to fight out their European quarrels on African soil, 
but these treaties have been violated, and it is now 
known that at least one power has long deliberately 
contemplated their violation. 

But the supreme significance of Belgium lies in its 
location relative to the three great powers whose 
rivalries have so long disturbed the peace of Europe. 
It has been noted that a natural barrier of mountain 
and river, extending northward from the Alps, di- 
vides the plain of central Europe into two portions, 
the habitat of the French and German peoples. But 
this barrier is not complete. After maintaining its 
height for some two hundred miles (the present 
boundary between Germany and France) it drops into 
low hills, and beyond the river Meuse the hills dis- 
appear altogether, leaving a broad strip of lowland, 
which forms a natural highway between France and 
Germany. This is not only the easy route, it is the 
most direct route. A bee line from Berlin to Paris 
will cross Belgium a little south of Liege and Namur. 
The mountain barrier which extends from Switzer- 



THE CASE OF THE MINOR POWERS 293 

land to Belgium is always difficult to cross, and has 
at times been impregnable. Through this Belgian 
gateway, therefore, have passed nearly all the armies 
which have invaded the one country or the other. 

But Belgium is also the natural point of contact 
between England and the continent. Its harbours 
are not quite so near to England as those of north- 
eastern France, but they are much more practicable, 
and political conditions have usually increased their 
availability, for Belgium, being between Germany and 
France and not quite a part of either, has usually 
been semi-independent and so open to foreign aggres- 
sion. Belgium is therefore more than a gateway. 
It is a crossroads or junction point where three high- 
ways of the nations meet. Let any two or all three 
of these powers go to war, and there is an immediate 
rush for Belgium. It was in Belgium that Welling- 
ton landed to oppose Napoleon, who had at once di- 
rected his movements thither, and it was through Bel- 
gium that Blucher and his Prussians marched to 
Wellington's assistance, and Waterloo was added to 
the long list of Belgium's decisive battles. Let 
France or Germany establish herself in Belgium in 
advance of her opponent, and she can usually count on 
saving her own territory from invasion. Here, too, 
she can best co-operate with or repel a British expe- 
ditionary force. Let any one of these powers be es- 
tablished there permanently, and its ultimate ascend- 
ancy over the other two is assured. 

It was these considerations which led the powers in 
1838 to sign the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality 
of Belgium. Self interest was of course the motive, 



294 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

must always be the motive in such a transaction. 
Each feared the occupation of Belgium by an enemy, 
and especially its joint occupation by two enemies. 
Each realised that the others were manoeuvring for 
position, not only with forced marches in time of war, 
but with diplomatic intrigue in time of peace. Both 
forms of advance were forbidden by the treaty, which, 
while guaranteeing her against invasion, also de- 
barred her from alliance with foreign powers. 

The violation of this treaty by Germany has per- 
haps attracted undue attention on the part of hostile 
and neutral powers. It is doubtful whether its fram- 
ers regarded it as more than a temporary diplomatic 
expedient, or expected it to be permanently binding. 
Certain it is that more than one of the contracting 
powers has, at one time or another, considered its ab- 
rogation. The government of Napoleon III opened 
negotiations with Bismarck relative to the annexation 
of Belgium to France, and while nothing came of it, 
the proposal seems to have neither shocked nor as- 
tonished the world. Our own breaches of faith with 
the Indians, with China, and even with other powers 
have been flagrant, and while these have elicited some- 
thing of academic protest, it is easy to see that the 
moral sense of our people has condoned them as justi- 
fied by unforeseen conditions. Indeed, it is appalling 
to think what would have happened if we had kept all 
pur treaty pledges, though made in perfect gopd_faith. 
It may be said that the moral sense of mankind in 
general regards the obligation of treaties as far less 
than absolute or perpetual, an obligation to be set 



THE CASE OF THE MINOR POWERS 295 

aside or relaxed, as we set aside the bankrupt's obli- 
gations, when their enforcement would mean ruin. 

Nor is the plea that the Allies are championing the 
cause of the little nations to be taken much more se- 
riously. As matters stand, it happens to be true, for 
there is not a little state in Europe which it is not to 
the interest of at least England and France to main- 
tain. But France did not espouse the cause of the 
little nations when she negotiated for Belgium in the 
sixties, nor Britain when she incorporated the Boer 
republics a few years ago, though it is now plain to 
all reasonable persons that she did the only right or 
possible thing. Both nations were acting then, as 
they are acting now, in the interest of their own safety 
and to such acts the conscience of the world becomes 
reconciled. 

It is much to be regretted that Germany did not 
stand by the first straightforward announcement of 
her chancellor, and continue to defend her act on the 
ground of military necessity. Her plea on this 
ground was incontestable, for though the military re- 
sults of the movement have been disappointing, the 
judgment of all authorities would agree that this was 
her one chance of success. The later shuffling and 
evasion, both of the chancellor himself and of his 
inept defenders, has seriously weakened their case. 
The alleged conspiracy of Belgium with the Allies was 
disproved by the very documents cited in evidence, 
while the network of double-tracked German railways 
leading to the Belgian frontier, which had no possible 
industrial justification, had long advertised Germany's 



296 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

intention and justified any defensive agreements which 
Belgium might have made. 

But no wisdom of defence could have saved Ger- 
many from the storm of indignation which burst upon 
her from the four quarters of the globe. This storm 
was due to no mere violation of treaty. That in it- 
self is an ugly fact, but it was neither unprecedented 
nor peculiarly outrageous as international transactions 
go. Had it been effected with due regard for its in- 
nocent victims and by a people whose cause com- 
manded the sympathy of mankind, it would have 
passed as an ordinary incident in the none too moral 
game of war. As it was, two dramatic incidents com- 
pletely obscured the real issue and roused the indolent 
conscience of mankind to an almost frenzied denun- 
ciation. 

The first of these was the unparalleled harshness 
with which the Belgians were treated, partly as a mat- 
ter of military policy and partly through personal bru- 
tality which found in military policy its incitement and 
its occasion. There is much reason to fear that these 
characteristics have grown upon Germany during re- 
cent years. Her campaign of 1870 left her with no 
such stain, but her record in China a quarter of a cen- 
tury later should have prepared the world for recent 
events. It would be interesting to trace the origin 
and development of this unfortunate tendency, but it 
would not be germane to our purpose. 

The second of these dramatic facts was the heroic 
defence of the Belgians. The incident is instructive 
to those who would understand the motives of war. 
With amazing obtuseness Germany had reckoned that 



THE CASE OF THE MINOR POWERS 297 

Belgium would count the odds against her, and yield 
to the irresistible. With unconscious cynicism her 
spokesman expostulated with Belgium for the folly of 
her sacrifice. Does the tigress count her foes when 
she defends her cubs? When the last great issue is 
joined there lives not a people so tiny or so base that 
they will not do what Belgium did, and if Germany is 
to become a leader among the nations, it behooves her 
to learn the lesson that Belgium taught. With the 
fury of a beast at bay this little people whom the na- 
tions had forbidden to fight and had promised to de- 
fend, leaped upon its giant antagonist and gripped 
him; gripped him and held him; held him until, for 
him, it was too late. Had the world's sympathies 
been with the German cause, this appeal to the world's 
chivalry would have strained its sympathies sorely. 

But the world's sympathies were not with the Ger- 
man cause. Its power was too menacing, its proce- 
dure too ruthless, its grievance too obscure, its designs 
too vast, its temper too arrogant, and its sensibilities 
too obtuse. The case was prejudged, because Ger- 
many had been judged. The violation of Belgian 
neutrality was an unpardonable offence, because Ger- 
many was an unpardonable offender. 

Removed from this complicating environment of 
national feeling, the violation of Belgian neutrality 
has its lesson for the many who would fain fetter the 
passions of men with treaty agreements. Will na- 
tions keep such promises? The answer in this con- 
nection is not difficult. They will keep them if it does 
not involve too great a sacrifice to do so. But if cir- 
cumstances so change that the keeping of promises in- 



298 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

volves the destruction or the crippling of national life, 
then promises will be evaded or broken, and the judg- 
ment of mankind will justify the act. 

And, in general, circumstances will so change with 
the lapse of time. Treaties die of old age and func- 
tional derangement like individuals. Death here as 
elsewhere may give occasion for tears, but not for sur- 
prise to those who are in touch with reality. This 
does not mean that moral forces are powerless to safe- 
guard human interests. It means rather that moral 
forces must always be sought in the living present and 
not in the dead past. We may some day be ruled by 
righteousness, but never by the dead hand. Nor does 
this mean that treaties have no value or that they 
should be lightly disregarded. They involve a seri- 
ous forecast of the future, and serious people will 
respect them until misadjustment makes further ob- 
servance unreasonably hampering to the vital forces 
which they were designed to protect. Then revision 
becomes the only reasonable thing, revision by com- 
mon consent if possible, as in our agreement with Eng- 
land concerning Panama, without consent if necessary, 
as in the case of our treaty with China concerning im- 
migration. It will be our wisdom not to expect the 
impossible of finite foresight and finite faith. 

What of the future of the two kingdoms? That 
depends on the future of the great powers, whose con- 
flicting interests determine their fate. If Britain be- 
comes unquestionably supreme, she will maintain their 
independence, not for righteousness' sake, but for 
Britain's sake, though she will derive sincere satisfac- 
tion from the fact that the two interests coincide. If 



THE CASE OF THE MINOR POWERS 299 

Germany triumphs she will absorb them, with or 
without a disguise. Whether they have the status of 
provinces or become protectorates under the euphe- 
mism of " allies " is a minor matter. Belgium will be 
simply annexed — has been annexed, if the Allies can- 
not tear her loose. With Holland, thus encircled by 
German arms, there will be no occasion for hurry. A 
treaty of alliance, a customs union, these are the fa- 
miliar steps toward painless incorporation. Between 
these two extremes of British and German supremacy 
lie various degrees of unstable equilibrium in whose 
uncertainties the Low Countries must share. The re- 
lation established by conflicting interests and balanced 
forces may be, probably will be, expressed in new trea- 
ties, but it will be these forces and interests, as living 
things, and not treaties, that will determine their fate. 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE CASE OF CHINA AND JAPAN 

In considering the case of individual countries we 
have thus far confined our attention to nations having 
their headquarters in Europe. Turkey and Russia, 
to be sure, extend across the European frontier in un- 
broken expanse, a majority of their territory lying in 
Asia, and most of the other nations considered, rule 
over colonies beyond the confines of Europe. But all 
of these countries are in a more or less important 
sense, European. We now turn to countries having 
no territorial interests whatever in Europe, and lying 
at the extreme opposite end of the eastern hemi- 
sphere. Why this exception? 

Simply because politically the entire eastern hemi- 
sphere consists of Europe and Japan. Africa is par- 
celled out among the European powers. The excep- 
tions are nominal and negligible. They include Abys- 
sinia, an interned nation, half entrenched and half 
imprisoned in a hill country which it has not been 
worth any one's while as yet to conquer, and Liberia, 
a negligible territory and sentimental appanage of the 
United States. Aside from these two mere left-overs 
whose appropriation awaits the convenience of Eu- 
rope, Africa is a European estate. 

The same is true of Asia with the single important 

300 



THE CASE OF CHINA AND JAPAN 301 

exception noted. The whole northern half is Rus- 
sian. The southern peninsulas are British and 
French. The islands are Dutch and British. It is 
true that the Sultan of Oman, the King of Siam, 
and the Shah of Persia rule over nominally inde- 
pendent peoples; it is hardly necessary to discuss 
the value of independence in countries which are 
openly included in the " sphere of influence " of na- 
tions like Britain and Russia. In the case of China 
independence wears a little more the aspect of reality, 
and hovers in the debatable region between fiction and 
fact. How much of present and prospective inde- 
pendence we are to credit to this huge inert mass, we 
have soon to consider, but spheres of influence have 
been openly mapped out here, and partition among the 
powers will be prevented, if at all, more by their jeal- 
ousies than by China's self-assertion. The most that 
can be said of China is that she is debatable ground, 
a half way term between the European dependencies 
like India, Tonkin and Siberia, and the one power 
whose independence is indubitable, Japan. So while 
it may be convenient still to speak of Europe, Asia 
and Africa in other connections, if we are concerned 
wholly with existing governments it is appropriate to 
speak of the eastern hemisphere as consisting of Eu- 
rope and Japan. 

The recent history of Japan is perhaps the most sig- 
nificant, as it certainly is the most fascinating of any 
in the world. Her purely native and oriental devel- 
opment may be said to have culminated in the early 
seventeenth century, when the famous Tokugawa Sho- 
guns devised the remarkable administrative mecha- 



302 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

nism and put the finishing touches upon the social or- 
ganisation which were to render such noteworthy 
service to the country for two hundred and fifty years. 
An important feature of the work of these famous 
rulers was the absolute isolation of Japan, foreigners 
being forbidden to visit and natives to leave Japan 
under pain of death. We need not concern ourselves 
with the events which led to the adoption of this re- 
markable policy. It is sufficient to note that it left 
Japan in almost complete ignorance of what was going 
on in the world during two centuries and a half of ex- 
ceptional progress. When we think of all that hap- 
pened between Elizabeth and Victoria — the building 
of the European empires, the wars of Napoleon, the 
invention of railroads and steamships, the settling of 
the western hemisphere, and the developments in in- 
dustry and commerce, we can form a faint idea of 
what Japan missed by these centuries of absolute iso- 
lation. Possibly, too, she missed one more thing 
which we might not think of, subjugation. 

About the middle of the nineteenth century this pol- 
icy of isolation broke down. Russia had expanded 
into contact with Japan, and American whaling vessels 
hovered near her coasts. The inevitable change took 
place rather suddenly under the bold and tactful in- 
itiative of the United States, followed by the exceed- 
ingly vigorous and far-seeing constructive work of 
Britain, whose representative, the famous Sir Harry 
Parkes, was responsible for the introduction of the 
system of Capitulations, previously confined to Tur- 
key, for the regulation of the relations between Japan 
and foreign powers. The essence of this arrange- 



THE CASE OF CHINA AND JAPAN 303 

ment was that foreign powers retained full jurisdic- 
tion over their own citizens while in Japan, holding 
them amenable to their own laws rather than to the 
laws of Japan, and making their houses and places of 
business inviolable to all Japanese authorities, and ex- 
empting them from the payment of taxes and the 
other obligations of Japanese citizens. It will be seen 
at a glance that this was equivalent to establishing for- 
eign rule on portions of Japanese territory, and was a 
mark of subordination which the Japanese could not 
fail at last to feel keenly. 

This change of policy, though made peaceably, 
was made most unwillingly. Only the exceptional 
tact of Commodore Perry averted a clash. As it 
was, he came at first with a small fleet, made his re- 
quest for a treaty of friendship, and sailed away, 
promising to return the next year. In this interval 
the Japanese exhausted every resource in preparation 
to resist an attack from Perry on his return. To 
their credit be it said, that they convinced themselves 
by this effort that their case was, for the time being, 
hopeless, and so when Perry returned with a larger 
fleet, they made the best of it and signed the desired 
treaty. It is all but certain that they were temporis- 
ing, that they opened their country to the western 
world only to learn its secret and gain the power to 
expel it again. In a modified sense that has remained 
the consistent policy of Japan. 

The immediate result, however, was to intoxicate 
this long isolated people with the new wine of the 
West. A craze for westernisation spread over the 
country, affecting every department of life and play- 



3 o 4 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

ing havoc with its exquisite hothouse civilisation. 
The havoc wrought in these frenzied years has been 
a source of keen regret not only to the patriotic Japa- 
nese of a later generation, but to all lovers of refine- 
ment and culture. Incidentally, a political revolution 
jwas necessary to confirm the reform, which ultimately 
swept away much of the very fabric of civilisation it- 
self. We may well exert our utmost imagination to 
appreciate the social changes involved in this revolu- 
tion. Take the single item of the abolition of classes. 
Perhaps the most characteristic institution of the ear- 
lier Japan was the warrior caste, the famous samurai. 
Born of the civil wars which ushered in the Toku- 
gawa regime, this class enjoyed extraordinary privi- 
leges and prestige. They were both exempt and de- 
barred from labour, commerce and gainful occupa- 
tions. They were proudly ignorant of the relative 
value of coins in common use. As retainers of the 
nobility they lived upon the moderate ration which 
their lords furnished, seldom acquiring property and 
never honoured for such acquisition. Their ideal, if 
imperfect, was probably more perfectly obeyed than 
any other known to us. When they met a commoner 
in the way, he must step quite out of the road and bow 
till his face touched the ground, a sign hardly exag- 
gerated of the respect actually felt for this remark- 
able caste. And this class, with their immense en- 
dowment of privilege and their paltry wealth, was 
turned loose, as it were, in a day to become household 
menials, policemen, and petty servants of the new 
government machine. With the sword so long in 
their exclusive keeping, such submission seems incredi- 



THE CASE OF CHINA AND JAPAN 305 

ble. It is to be attributed to the wave of patriotic 
exaltation which has so many wonders recorded to its 
credit. This disendowed class has been to Japan a 
moral patrimony from which she has drawn her pa- 
triots and high-minded statesmen, the latter beyond 
question the ablest group of men that any country has 
produced in the closing decades of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. 

The mental revolution was perhaps still more strik- 
ing. When we recall the long isolation and the inter- 
nal completeness of the Japanese civilisation, it will 
be apparent that we have here ideal conditions for 
intellectual conservatism. The political revolution 
above noted, revivified the atrophied monarchy at a 
moment when a young man of marked ability was 
about to ascend the throne. In accordance with 
Japanese tradition, he adopted a throne name which 
was to designate his reign during his lifetime and him- 
self after his death. This term, Meiji, enlighten- 
ment, justly characterises the chief of the good resolu- 
tions adopted at this wonderful period, and the only 
one from which Japan has never departed. Japan 
resolved to know all that the western nations had 
learned, and to discover the secret of their power, A 
simple resolve, but one which no other people ever 
made, much less carried through. Think of the hesi- 
tancy with which western nations have accepted the 
Copernican theory, the Darwinian theory, and others, 
a hesitation due to no intellectual doubts, but to su- 
perstition and prejudice. The writer well recalls the 
dismay of his pious mother when as a youth he de- 
cided to attend a state university instead of the in- 



306 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

tended religious institution. The fear was that the 
instruction there received would " unsettle his be- 
liefs." This fear, which is normal to individuals and 
nations, usually presents enormous resistance to the 
progress of enlightenment, and makes martyrs of its 
pioneers. It had previously done so in Japan. But 
at the period which we are considering, the leaders of 
the nation and virtually the nation as a whole held 
this fear in abeyance, and accorded a welcome to ideas 
more revolutionary than any that ever confronted a 
western people. How completely the knowledge of 
the western world has been received recent events 
have demonstrated. Such a policy has its dangers — 
every policy has — and Japan has not taken the risk 
without loss, but her achievement is the more remark- 
able when it is remembered that along with all this 
acquisition of the knowledge and power of the West, 
she has found a way to save her own civilisation in its 
essential character. The writer once asked a Japa- 
nese scholar how far contact with the West had modi- 
fied Japanese civilisation. He replied: "The life 
of Japan is like the ocean. The rivers muddy it 
along the edge, but the great ocean knows nothing of 
the rivers." This would seem to be essentially the 
truth, though embodied in permissible hyperbole. 

If Japan ever entertained the idea of again closing 
the door she had so reluctantly opened, that idea was 
necessarily abandoned. The door was opened to 
stay. But she not the less resolutely determined to 
be mistress in her own house. Gradually, with unre- 
mitting effort, she combined modern commercial and 
industrial methods with her own superior frugality, 



THE CASE OF CHINA AND JAPAN 307 

until she recovered the export and import trade which 
had fallen at first to foreigners. Native engineers, 
chemists, mechanics and experts of every sort gradu- 
ally displaced the westerners at first called to her aid. 
Universities grew up on western models, and bid 
against our own for the patronage of Chinese and 
other students. The army and navy were put on a 
modern basis and supplied with munitions of the lat- 
est type. Most remarkable of all, though least no- 
ticed, she worked out a complete system of law and 
judicial procedure on western lines, and administered 
it with so much impartiality that the western nations 
were compelled to overcome their reluctance and al- 
low her full jurisdiction over their subjects living in 
Japan. All this, it must be remembered, was accom- 
plished in a single generation, an achievement un- 
equalled in the history of any other people. 

But these achievements have been obscured by the 
more conspicuous (though not more significant) 
achievements on the field of battle. The new rela- 
tion with foreign powers had hardly been established 
before it became apparent to the keen eye of Japanese 
statesmanship, that danger threatened from without. 
Russia had expanded to the Pacific, had seized the 
great island of Saghalien, though largely peopled by 
Japanese, and was obviously planning to annex Korea 
and Manchuria, thus acquiring at least half control 
of the Japan Sea and full control of the all-important 
Yellow Sea and its gateway to the East. These ter- 
ritories belonged to China, but China could not pro- 
tect them. It is much to the credit of Japanese states- 
manship that it perceived the danger and recognised 



3 o8 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

the helplessness of China while Europe was as yet 
dimly conscious of either. In 1885 China fought a 
war with France from which she emerged with con- 
siderable prestige, while French chagrin produced a 
reaction at home which was fraught with the most 
momentous consequences. It was therefore with 
some hardihood that Japan, a few years later, decided 
to try out her new army and navy in a struggle with 
the oriental colossus. The occasion of the war need 
not detain us. Suffice it to say that Japan had a clear 
case technically. But it is clear that her real purpose 
was to forestall Russia by establishing her own as- 
cendency in the region under debate. Europe looked 
on with astonishment to see the newcomer snatch vic- 
tory after victory from superior numbers, where she 
herself had so recently been worsted. In the result- 
ing peace China was compelled to cede the island of 
Formosa, to recognise the complete independence of 
Korea, and to lease to Japan for a term of years the 
tip of the famous Liaotung peninsula, with Port Ar- 
thur, the Gibraltar of the East. The masterly strat- 
egy of these peace terms surpassed the strategy of the 
war. 

Russia took alarm at once, and since France was 
now her ally, and Germany found co-operation ad- 
vantageous, the three powers addressed a joint note 
to Japan stating that her occupation of Port Arthur 
endangered the peace of the East, and advising her 
to restore the peninsula to China. As this " danger 
to the peace of the East " was merely a way of saying 
that these powers would make war on her if she did 
not comply, Japan wisely yielded, whereupon Russia 



THE CASE OF CHINA AND JAPAN 309 

took possession of Port Arthur, while Germany and 
Britain established themselves on the peninsula of 
Shantung. These three great powers thus secured 
effectual control of the gateway to the East. Russia 
proceeded without delay to build railways, ports and 
fortresses, and to push her aggressions in northern 
Korea, all in a way that plainly implied that she had 
no thought of anything but permanent occupation. 
Japan's silence concealed her stern resolve with a 
self-control characteristic of true greatness, and seem- 
ingly quite disarmed the suspicions of Europe. 

The years that followed were not only years of 
quiet preparation but of tenacious diplomatic strug- 
gle, especially in Korea, whose weakness and corrup- 
tion left her the plaything of contending powers. 
Here Japan was worsted, for a stand-in with Russia 
seemed to Korea to be obviously the safer policy. 
The more important struggle, however, was with the 
three great powers that controlled the eastern situa- 
tion. Japan could not think of opposing all of them, 
or even two of them. The move was to make 
friends with Britain, then the rival and potential en- 
emy of the other two. The Anglo-Japanese alliance 
pledged both parties to come to each other's aid if 
either was attacked by two other powers in Asia. 
Neither France nor Germany, therefore, could aid 
Russia without having to reckon with the British 
navy, which would have made the transport of troops 
impossible. Japan was thus left free to deal with 
Russia alone, with results that we now know, but re- 
sults for which Europe was totally unprepared. 
Peace established Japan in possession of Port Arthur 



310 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

and Dairen, in control of the South Manchurian Rail- 
way as far as her armies had gone — nearly five hun- 
dred miles — and recognised her paramount interest 
in Korea, an interest which was soon given concrete 
form by complete annexation. 

Once more we may ignore the concrete grievances 
which were made the pretext for the war. Such 
grievances always loom large at the moment, and 
Japan perfectly appreciates their value as an appeal 
to the patriotism of her people. But history knows 
nothing of them. The one fact worth recording is 
that Japan saw her independence menaced by the Rus- 
sian occupation of Port Arthur and the forthcoming 
Russian control of Korea, and she staked all on its 
maintenance. Her judgment was perfectly sound. 
There is no evidence that Russia ever contemplated 
the conquest of Japan, but it cannot be too often in- 
sisted that the real danger to national independence 
is not conquest but overshadowing superiority in 
arms, in wealth, in size, and in their inevitable con- 
comitants of glamour and prestige. Conceding that 
Japan might never have been invaded, her civilisation 
would have become shy, inert and apologetic and her 
national policy obsequious and subservient, if a power 
as vast as Russia had established her undisputed sway 
on the whole northern Asiatic continent. It is vain 
to tell a people so menaced that the passive role will 
conserve their material well-being, that all that is of 
value in their civilisation will be absorbed into the 
cosmic culture of the future. Not so do they con- 
ceive their loves and their hopes. As well console the 
man whose body is threatened with decay with the 



THE CASE OF CHINA AND JAPAN 311 

thought that his substance shall reappear in some 
higher organism in an unknown future. He will have 
none of it. The things that we love and which our 
love is meant to conserve are concrete things of the 
here and now, comely things and wonted ways that 
we cannot but strive to make prevail. Japan risked 
her life to save her soul. 

The enormous prestige which Japan won in her 
war with Russia did not blind her statesmen to the 
extreme danger of her position. Russia, no matter 
how neighbourly for the time being, must inevitably 
renew the attempt to secure an outlet to the open sea. 
Germany had a naval station near her borders. 
China with her vast resources was sure to be mobilised 
by her own leaders or by foreign powers. Japan's 
resources were scanty, her territory small, and her 
finances mortgaged to the creditors of Europe. To 
maintain her position she must broaden her base of 
support. She must have more citizens, more fields, 
more food, more wealth. Japan is like Britain minus 
her colonies, superbly situated for convenience and 
control of wealth producing dependencies, but a noth- 
ing in herself. Half occupied Korea and Manchuria 
with their vast mineral and agricultural resources 
must be peopled and developed, and that without de- 
lay. The task was undertaken with feverish energy. 

Meanwhile opposition has arisen from another 
quarter, and that quite legitimately. China has come 
rather suddenly into a consciousness of her danger 
and her possibilities. Foreign occupied fortresses 
and foreign owned railroads have become objects of 
suspicion. Manchuria is still hers, and she is but too 



3 i2 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

anxious to oust her unwelcome tenants. Not yet able 
to control, she is able to embarrass without limit, and 
she shows every disposition to do so. Her fears are 
altogether justified, and her policy perfectly legiti- 
mate, though infinitely exasperating in its shifts, eva- 
sions and procrastinations, the natural resource of a 
weak power against threatened attack. 

The present war has given Japan a much desired 
opportunity to confirm her position in the East, a po- 
sition, it may be well to repeat, of enormous power 
which she cannot relinquish, and of enormous danger, 
which she cannot avoid. Her recent moves appar- 
ently look to the lessening of her danger rather than 
to the increase of her power. 

In accordance with her treaty with Britain, and pos- 
sibly at the latter's behest, Japan early notified Ger- 
many to evacuate her post in Shantung. It was not 
without a certain finesse that this notice was couched 
in the identical terms used by Germany, Russia and 
France twenty years before, when they warned Japan 
that her occupation of Port Arthur " endangered the 
peace of the East." Failing to comply, Germany was 
summarily ejected. Her ejection from her island 
possessions in the southern Pacific followed, the latter 
being turned over to the Australian representatives 
of Japan's ally. With regard to Tsingtao, the Shan- 
tung post, the announcement was first made that it was 
taken for restitution to China ; later, that it would be 
held till the end of the war, when it would be made 
the subject of negotiations between the two countries. 
Still later, this postponement in turn seems to have 
been deemed inadvisable, and advantage was taken of 



THE CASE OF CHINA AND JAPAN 313 

the preoccupation of the powers to press China for a 
settlement of all outstanding problems, or more 
strictly, perhaps, to secure from China what Japan 
believed necessary for the realisation of her national 
ambitions. The nature and scope of these demands 
require brief consideration. 

The first group of these demands had to do with 
Manchuria. Japan held Port Arthur and Dairen by 
leases taken over from Russia, the term for one port 
being only twenty-five years. The South Manchurian 
Railway, secured in the same manner, was subject to 
purchase by China in thirty-six years, and it was cer- 
tain that China would seek to avail herself of this 
privilege. Of these short leases, which Russia of 
course intended to extend at her pleasure, seventeen 
years had already expired. Japan therefore saw her 
tenancy drawing to a close. Meanwhile the railroad 
and the harbour at Dairen represented a large invest- 
ment and potentially a very profitable one. The 
rapid development of Manchuria had taxed the capac- 
ity of both railroad and port to the breaking point, 
and there was a loud call for large additions to track- 
age, rolling stock, and, above all, for additional docks 
and warehouses. It was important for the country 
and for Japanese finances that this demand be met. 
But capitalists refused to advance funds because of 
Japan's brief tenure, and their entire distrust of Chi- 
nese management which was to follow. Japan there- 
fore demanded an extension of these various leases to 
ninety-nine years. There was much to be said for 
such an extension, but it dashed the Chinese dream 
of early recovery of Manchuria, and naturally was 



3 i 4 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

bitterly opposed. The citizen or friend of either 
country can easily find opportunity for passionate 
championship. The impartial observer, on the other 
hand, will see here the old struggle between aggressive 
efficiency and traditional right, a struggle in which 
each side has a case. 

A more startling demand was that Inner Mongolia 
should be added to Manchuria as regards all matters 
in which Japan was concerned. The significance of 
this demand will be appreciated if we glance at the 
map. Manchuria is a most irregular territory, 
though not by any freak of nature. It is a political 
accident and not a natural unit. Yet there is a nat- 
ural unit here which is very definitely marked, a broad 
valley running north from the gulf between two moun- 
tain chains. To the west of this valley and its moun- 
tain boundary lies the vast plateau of Mongolia, 
which has no natural connection with the valley plain 
lying to the east. Yet political accident has willed 
that Mongolia should spill over her mountain border 
and deluge a great rectangle in the heart of nature's 
Manchuria, crowding the latter over into the eastern 
side of the valley in its southern part, while wrapping 
all round Mongolia to the north. This Mongolian 
overflow or excrescence is known as Inner Mongolia, 
and this Japan asks to have incorporated, for eco- 
nomic purposes, in Manchuria, where it belongs. 

But this again dashes one of China's pet hopes, 
which is to build a competing railway on this western 
side of the Manchurian valley, or to threaten to do so, 
and so to bring Japan to terms. Our own experience 
with parallel railways makes us familiar with these 



THE CASE OF CHINA AND JAPAN 315 

tactics. From a business standpoint Japan's conten- 
tion is sound and China's plan indefensible. But 
from the standpoint of Chinese territorial interests, 
this, like all other concessions, was objectionable. 
Japan is pushing her territorial aggression with the 
argument of sound finance. 

The next demands take us far from Manchuria 
to the shores of southern China. It will be remem- 
bered that the large island of Formosa lying off this 
coast was ceded to Japan as one result of her victory 
over China. Later developments in naval science 
have warned Japan that a strong power could easily 
attack Formosa from the mainland. She therefore 
demands that none of this part of the Chinese coast 
shall ever be alienated to a foreign power, without 
her consent. Her interest is obvious, and in view of 
the alienation of Tsingtao, Wei-hai-wei, and Port Ar- 
thur, her demand seems pertinent. China can hardly 
object except on the ground of pride. The real point 
of the demand, however, is to give warning to foreign 
powers and to justify protest and even intervention on 
the part of Japan if need arises. The demand is dis- 
turbing, but not unreasonable, if we concede Japan's 
right to take far-reaching measures for her own 
safety. 

More doubtful is the demand that Japan be admit- 
ted to partnership and virtual control in the great 
steel works at Han-yang in central China. This is 
industrial strategy of a daring order. That such a 
position would have vast possibilities no one will 
doubt who knows anything of the coal fields and iron 
deposits of China. A great English authority is 



3 i6 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

quoted as saying that the time will come when the 
steamships of the world will be built on the banks of 
the Yangtse rather than on the banks of the Clyde. 
A powerful corporation located at this " Chicago of 
China " and backed by government authority, would 
be a power to be reckoned with in the industrial devel- 
opment of the future. But Japan lacks capital, and 
the undertaking has deterrent risks. It is doubtful 
if it would tempt her usually prudent statesmen, were 
it not for the danger amounting to certainty that other 
foreign interests will entrench themselves there if 
Japan does not. The vast natural wealth of China 
and her industrial incompetency is a constant tempta- 
tion to western interests to establish themselves there. 
It is the consistent purpose of Japan to get them 
out and keep them out. China cannot do it. 
Agreements and warnings are of little avail. The 
only sure way is to occupy the danger points her- 
self. 

It was in pursuance of this same policy that Japan 
made a further series of demands of a still more un- 
usual and questionable nature. These were, in effect, 
that in so far as China saw fit to employ foreigners to 
organise her new administrative machinery, her 
postal, customs, and financial departments, her army, 
navy, and so forth, she should give the preference to 
Japanese. It is difficult at first to realise the sweep- 
ing nature of these demands. China will be obliged 
for a long time to come to employ large numbers of 
foreign experts in every branch of her government, as 
Japan did a few years ago. During this period of 
transition, the government will be practically con- 



THE CASE OF CHINA AND JAPAN 317 

trolled by these experts. China now pursues the pru- 
dent policy of taking her advisers and experts from 
many nations, themselves rivals in Oriental matters 
and therefore quite incapable of making common 
cause. To choose them all from a single nation, and 
that nation one more likely than any other to en- 
croachment upon her territory or her sovereignty, is 
quite another matter. It is easy to understand Ja- 
pan's anxiety to get rid of these potent representatives 
of the European powers, but it is clear that China can- 
not bind herself to accept the guidance of a single na- 
tion without surrendering her independence. 

China showed the utmost reluctance to accede to 
these demands, a reluctance which increased as she 
passed from group to group. Japan's argument was 
in essence : " We want to save you from the western 
powers." China's objection was in essence: " Who 
will save us from you? " Both dangers are real and 
both arguments justified. The strain of the situation 
became intense, and for a time the two countries were 
on the brink of war. Such a war would have over- 
whelmed China and would have ruined Japan. Each 
power sounded the other until it ascertained how much 
it would yield rather than fight. These points fortu- 
nately coincided, and war was averted. China yielded 
the first four points, giving Japan her long claim on 
Manchuria and the railroad, adding Inner Mongolia 
to her sphere of influence, promising not to alienate 
the coast opposite Formosa, and giving to Japan the 
desired interest in the great Yangtse industry. But 
Japan's demand that only Japanese experts and advis- 
ers be employed was " postponed." The last word is 



3 i 8 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

ominous and suggests the possibility of further trou- 
ble. 

Two questions suggest themselves in this connec- 
tion. First, as to Japan's good faith. No one can 
doubt her ability to reorganise China and develop her 
power, but would she do so, or would she, in her own 
interest, keep China weak? Above all, would she 
give China back to herself? It is safe to say that 
Japan will act in her own interest, as other nations are 
wont to do. If she is guided as she has been for half 
a century, she will seek her interest wisely; but if her 
statesmen are replaced by demagogues, her action is 
difficult to predict. Assuming that her action will be 
prudent, as we thus far have reason to do, it may be 
doubted whether she will attempt to delay or misguide 
China's transformation. The abuse could not go un- 
noticed, and it is not likely that it would go un- 
avenged. In no way would Japan defeat her pur- 
pose so surely as to give China reason to throw her- 
self into the arms of the western powers. Nor is it 
likely that she would long attempt any actual domina- 
tion of China. Such a rider on such a steed would 
certainly be riding for a fall. The doctrine of the 
Orient for the Orientals can be maintained only by an 
Orient that is developed and united. 

This brings us to the second question: Is Japan's 
action wise ? It has been urged with much force that 
by coercing instead of persuading, Japan has embit- 
tered China and jeopardised that unity in the Orient 
which is so necessary for the realisation of her hopes. 
She is not done with Russia yet, perhaps not with 
Germany. In a world divided between Europe and 



THE CASE OF CHINA AND JAPAN 319 

Japan, the odds seem fearfully against her. When 
the new testing comes, Japan will need China. Will 
she have her whole-hearted, or only her perfunctory 
assistance, perhaps even her hostility? A generous 
policy of live-and-let-live commends itself to the far 
away observer, a wooing rather than an abduction. 
But the case is not clear. China moves slowly, so 
very slowly! Her weakness invites the marauder, 
and makes her useless in the common defence. The 
plot thickens and the crisis may come quickly. The 
Orient must, in self-defence, goad China to a quicker 
pace. China smarts under the goad and resents the 
unwelcome pressure. But most of the Chinese hardly 
know what has happened, and their resentment is not 
likely to be enduring. Japan has probably counted 
the cost. 

Will Europe permit this organisation of the Orient 
under Japanese hegemony? Not willingly, but per- 
haps of necessity. Every day that the present war 
continues lessens the likelihood of effective interfer- 
ence. Japan's case is hopeless if she is confronted by 
a united, or even by an indifferent Europe. But Eu- 
rope divided against herself is temporarily and may 
be permanently unable to resist her advance. Let 
this helplessness continue long enough, and the Orient 
will not need to concern itself with the attitude of Eu- 
rope. 

At the moment of writing, China mildly astonishes 
the world by announcing the restoration of her em- 
pire. The powers, including Japan, have filed their 
protest, fearing lest disorders ensue which should en- 
danger the interests of their citizens at a time when 



3 20 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

they are unable to protect them. China politely per- 
sists. Thereupon China is invited, probably at her 
own suggestion, to join the league of the Allies, a 
group to which Japan also belongs. Japan protests, 
alleging, somewhat baldly, that this would be deroga- 
tory to her own position as the paramount power in 
the Orient. The incident is suggestive. Britain and 
France wish to enlist China in passive hostility to 
Germany, whose intrigues in the Far East are far 
reaching and disquieting to her great rivals. China, 
'in turn, wishes recognition as the equal of Japan. 
Then when the Allies finally come together to settle all 
their differences, China would get a new hearing and 
Japan perhaps be called to account. Japan promptly 
refuses either to recognise the equality of China or to 
submit their agreement to revision. Her position is 
that of the paramount power. This is plain fact and 
she insists upon its recognition. 

It is common in these latter days to decry the Japa- 
nese. They are said to be tricky and unreliable, to 
be spoiled by their success, boastful and conceited. 
The writer, after some little opportunity for observa- 
tion, finds little to justify such charges. When we 
consider the industrial revolution through which they 
have passed, it must be said that their business moral- 
ity has shown remarkable stability. The oft re- 
peated statement that Japanese banks employ Chinese 
because they cannot trust their fellow countrymen, is 
not true and never has been true. The only founda- 
tion for the myth is the establishment in Japan of 
branches of Shanghai and Hong Kong banks, with the 
transfer (for quite other reasons) of a part of their 



THE CASE OF CHINA AND JAPAN 321 

trained Chinese staff. The charge of boastfulness 
and conceit comes with poor grace from American 
critics. The writer has slowly come to the conclusion 
that the Japanese are disliked, not for their boasts, 
but for their achievements. The Occidental is wont 
to expect in the Oriental an easy mark. The Japa- 
nese disappoints these expectations. Given a fair I 
field and no favours, and the Japanese outclasses the 
westerner in most of the activities in which they come 
into competition. He is driving the foreign mer- 
chants out of Kobe and is establishing his own mer- 
chants in London. When the Russian war cloud low- 
ered, a Russian official was asked if he thought there 
would be a war. " No," he replied, " the Japanese 
will threaten, but they will not fight. And if they do, 
we will be in Tokyo in two weeks." These rude 
awakenings are disconcerting, and that western dis- 
pleasure should not give wholly ingenuous reasons for 
itself is not surprising. It is impossible, however, to 
see in Japanese successes a series of lucky accidents. 
They have learned the western science and have ap- 
plied it with more than western diligence, that is all. 
And the end is not yet. 

In considering the relation of the Orient to the 
western powers, and incidentally to ourselves, it is to 
be noted that as organisation advances, the likelihood 
of united action will diminish. A real China will not 
long be subservient to Japan, and the feuds that 
paralyse Europe are likely to be reproduced in the 
Orient. In our criticism of Japanese aggression and 
our sympathy for injured China, a permissible regard 
for our own self interest may reconcile us in part to 



322 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

the divisive tendencies in the Orient. With a united 
Orient and a divided Occident, the prospect for our 
cherished western civilisation would not be a pleas- 
ant one to contemplate. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

A CASE IN POINT 

If the foregoing chapters have been written to any 
purpose, it will be apparent that the present war is not 
due wholly to personal ambitions or to defective po- 
litical institutions. Underneath these transient influ- 
ences there are stubborn facts of a far more perma- 
nent and compelling nature, which predispose men to 
a certain line of action. We will not beg the question 
of the ages by asserting that men have no choice in 
the matter. It is sufficient to note that in certain sit- 
uations their choice can be pretty safely predicted. As 
we note the uniformity with which the currents of 
human passion have surged through the great historic 
channels, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that 
these channels have had much to do with the passions 
themselves. The ambitions of princes, the intrigues 
of diplomats, the hates and enthusiasms of peoples, 
all these are precipitating causes of war and must be 
held to their share of accountability. But closer ob- 
servation usually discloses the fact that these forces of 
sentiment themselves correspond pretty closely to 
facts of environment. If that environment involves 
permanent dangers or needs, these soon become the 
object of a persistent purpose, the centre of a cult 
which enlists in its service all the energy and devo- 

323 



3 2 4 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

tion of the race. This devotion to a hereditary faith 
may become automatic and blind. That is true of the 
cults of war as of peace. The oft repeated criticism 
that the soldier does not know what he is fighting 
about, proves neither his indifference nor the futility 
of his sacrifice. How many of us can give any other 
reason for nine-tenths of the things we do, than that 
we follow the example or the behest of our people? 
This ritualising of life, by which concert action be- 
comes automatic and unthinking, is the essence of all 
social procedure. 

What then determines this ritual which is handed 
down from generation to generation, which is chanted 
by babes and veterans? Whence this legacy of un- 
swerving purpose, of persistent jealousy and hate? 
Only one answer has any significance. The mind of 
the race shapes itself to its environment. Every fea- 
ture of the landscape, as it were, generates its ap- 
propriate sentiment. Each bulwark gives confidence, 
each opportunity rouses ambition, each danger engen- 
ders suspicion and distrust. And as these potentiali- 
ties are realised in experience, their corresponding 
sentiments are modified and reinforced. Continued 
success along lines of natural opportunity, will give 
momentum to ambition, until expansion becomes a 
habit of thought, not to say a gospel, while repeated 
checks at the point of national need, or disasters from 
the danger quarter will leave their legacy of sullen- 
ness and hate. 

This does not mean that environment is everything, 
but it does mean that it is very much. Even if we 
turn from the problems of land and sea to study the 



A CASE IN POINT 325 

human factor, we are still confronted with environ- 
ment as expressed in the persistent sentiments which 
it engenders. In these paramount facts which form 
the physical basis of the life of races, we must seek the 
chief causes of war. The acts of rulers, statesmen 
and governments furnish only the occasion. 

Never was this truth so exemplified as in the case 
of the present war. It is in a sense a peculiarly nor- 
mal or typical war. Any number of minor incidents 
might have been different, but its main features were 
inevitable. Every nation involved has a case. Not 
one could have done differently without violating all 
traditional standards of prudence and patriotism. 
Not one would have acted differently from any other, 
if it had been in that other's place. Nor could one 
of them have acted differently without the danger, 
almost the certainty of disaster. To illustrate : Ja- 
pan, in Germany's place, would not have perpetrated 
the Belgian atrocities (the Boxer campaign proved 
that) but she would have invaded Belgium. So 
would England or France or the United States. Con- 
versely, Germany in Japan's place, would have ousted 
her rival from Tsingtao. If Britain had been in the 
place of Germany, she would never have submitted to 
permanent repression and exclusion from all possibil- 
ity of colonial expansion, with the certainty of being 
outgrown and outclassed, and equally, Germany in 
Britain's place would not have entertained for a mo- 
ment the idea of parting with her colonies or jeopard- 
ising the security of their possession. These de- 
cisions are absolute, these interests vital, as human 
nature now stands. Never was a war so long fore- 



326 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

seen, so deliberate, so free from misunderstanding. 
There was plenty of inveterate hate, but no sudden 
tempest of passion which swept men off their feet and 
befogged their senses. All participants, of course, 
have played to the galleries and pettifogged their 
case, as men are wont to do in war and peace, seeking 
to marshal the sentiments of men to their advantage 
or to the embarrassment of their opponents, but only 
the willing are deceived. 

Who was responsible for the war? Servia, says 
Austria, for if she had ceased her agitation we should 
have dwelt in peace; Austria, says Russia, for had she 
not demanded the impossible, Servia would have 
yielded all; Russia, says Germany, for had she not in- 
terfered in a quarrel that was none of her affair, 
Servia would have yielded; Germany, says Britain, 
for a word from her would have restrained Austria; 
Britain, says Germany, for Russia would not have in- 
terfered unless assured of British support. And all 
are true. There is not one of these, from the least 
unto the greatest, that could not have stopped the war 
by refraining from the fatal step. And there is not 
one of them that could have refrained without sacrific- 
ing its vital interests. Servia, by ceasing its agitation, 
would have abandoned her hope of uniting her people 
and reaching the sea. Austria, by lessening her de- 
mands, would have risked the integrity of her empire. 
Russia, by holding aloof, would have lost to a rival 
the key to her own empire. Germany, by restrain- 
ing Austria, would have closed up the only escape 
from her prison, and would have accepted for her- 
self and her civilisation the status of another Holland. 



A CASE IN POINT 327 

Britain, if she had held aloof, would have ensured 
Germany's victory, would have lost her command of 
the sea, and would have ceased to be an empire. 
Peace can always be purchased, but sometimes the 
price is one which men are not willing to pay. 

Ought men to pay the price ? For outsiders, dimly 
conscious or wholly oblivious of the interests at stake, 
it is easy to urge compromise, concession, conciliation. 
Let us successively become patriots of the different 
countries involved, seeing the problem of the national 
life, so far as we may, as they see it. What would 
we as patriots — honest, reasonable patriots — coun- 
sel them to do? 

We are Servians for the moment, simple, rustic 
and plodding. We have suffered from Turkish op- 
pression and shaken ourselves free. We have raised 
our grain and our cattle for the markets of Europe, 
and have seen them held up at the border while our 
neighbour's flocks drove by. We have reached out 
our hands to our kinsmen who held the ports which we 
needed, and we have seen these kinsmen over- 
whelmed by an alien power and stationed as an un- 
willing barrier between ourselves and the sea. Re- 
luctantly, we have turned away from our fettered kins- 
men to seek elsewhere a route for our commerce, at 
the same time avenging old oppression and ending 
modern abuse. And lo, our old enemy of the North 
appears again and drives us back into the woods. 
Again we have appealed to our kinsmen, this time 
more passionately than before, to release us from our 
prison, and they begin to listen and to turn against 
their oppressor and ours. And now comes the sum- 



328 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

mons from the arch enemy, surrender or be annihi- 
lated. What will we do? 

Austria speaks. Let us pause and summon all our 
self control, for we have undertaken a difficult trans- 
mutation. We are to become Austrians now, born to 
the part, and knowing no other. The blind law of 
loyalty which is the inheritance of all men, predisposes 
us to see Austria's dangers rather than Austria's 
sins. There are jars in the household — none with- 
out know it so well as we — but thanks to the law 
of the household, they are only jars and not fratri- 
cidal feuds. We shudder to think what would hap- 
pen if that restraining bond were removed. And 
now that danger threatens. A neighbour, with ways 
that are dark, is inciting the least loyal among us to 
open revolt and hostility. We court the neighbour's 
friendship, but in vain. We debar him from neigh- 
bour privileges, but to no purpose. Sullen and re- 
sentful, he establishes himself in our doorway, and 
we eject him as a matter of the simplest prudence. 
But he has won adherents in our midst, and our des- 
tined leader falls under the assassin's hand. What 
shall we do? We know whence the trouble comes, 
know that there is more trouble to come from that 
source, know that ruin will be the penalty for indul- 
gence. What shall we do? 

Again a long breath and a difficult transition. We 
are to become Russians now, loyal children of the 
" little father." Our land is broad and backward, 
and we are rude and poor. Perhaps we are at fault, 
but we cannot quite see why. The fact is that it is 
not easy to get about in our land, and we have no sure 



A CASE IN POINT 329 

exit to the lands of others. The ease of communica- 
tion and the interplay of influence which characterise 
the peninsulas of western Europe, we have never 
known, and that is why we are where we are. Slowly 
the best thought of our people has fixed upon this as 
the one great need — outlet to the world. At the 
best we must always be cramped. If we had all the 
outlets that nature has provided, we should still be 
the most isolated, the most imprisoned of nations. 
But of the outlets which nature has provided we pos- 
sess not one. For each and all, a neighbour and a 
rival holds the key. The outlet that is most vital, 
greatest and best of all, has been closed three times 
within a decade. We cannot tolerate such interrup- 
tions from local quarrels; still less can we submit to 
see our one great gateway held by a powerful enemy. 
Every consideration of self-interest and of equity 
makes that gateway ours. 

And now Austria, backed by Germany, whose hos- 
tility is almost a foregone conclusion, approaches 
Constantinople with plausible pretext but with unmis- 
takable intent. Servia once occupied, our chance is 
gone. There will be no arguing with such a gate- 
keeper. If we go in and out this door, it will be on 
Germany's terms. Shall we accept this inevitable re- 
tardation of our progress, this handicap on our com- 
merce and our intercourse with other peoples? Shall 
we tolerate the annexation of Servia ? 

Let us turn to Germany. As we approach the 
storm centre of the present conflict, our precautions 
must be increased. If to any of the readers of this 
book, an invitation to become German in sympathy, 



330 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

merely for purposes of exposition, comes as an un- 
welcome suggestion, it must be remembered that noth- 
ing less than this will give us even an approach to 
equity or understanding. As Germans we shall view 
the situation with passionate prejudice, but with minds 
accustomed in an unusual degree to take a look far 
into the future. For the present, all is well. We are 
strong, and no nation will dare attack us. We are 
prosperous, our industry and our commerce having 
gained rapidly on all rivals. We are united. If there 
are jars, they are born of the confidence of unity, the 
impossibility of sedition. What more do we want? 

We want a future, and if we sit still and diligently 
farm our little estate we shall not have it. We have 
thought far enough ahead to realise that in the great 
arena of civilisation, the number of contestants is 
diminishing and their size is increasing. We are not 
small enough to give up without trying, but we are 
too small to stand the slightest chance of being in 
at the finals. We have tried to become larger and 
have failed. The owners will not part with their 
holdings. We are doomed. 

Our situation is peculiarly trying. We have 
learned to think about this danger of the future as 
others have not. So they, seeing only our present 
well being, chide us for our discontent. We are 
dimly conscious, too, that we have not the gift of win- 
ning sympathy or of persuasively presenting our case. 
It is a cheerless task, this pleading of a cause whose 
need is obscured by present affluence, and before a 
tribunal incapable of sympathy. Yet no one has a 
clearer case, or a more desperate need. 



A CASE IN POINT 331 

These reflections have long ago led us to the only 
feasible plan of escape. We must move south and 
east, annexing, absorbing, subduing as need may be, 
till we have passed the Bosporus and reached the Per- 
sian Gulf, and won an empire that touches the four 
great seas. We shall have all Europe against us, the 
needy because they want what we are after, and the 
possessing because they fear to lose what they possess, 
but every day we wait increases the odds against us. 
We cannot outgrow them. We can possibly outfight 
them — if we do not delay. 

And now Russia reaches out for Servia which is 
one of our stepping stones. Indeed we have pro- 
voked the challenge, knowing that it will come to- 
morrow if not to-day. It is an awful responsibility, 
but awful is the alternative. Present ease and com- 
fort, and after that, insignificance in a world whose 
destinies we were meant to shape. What is that but 
the choice of Esau, the sale of our birthright for a 
mess of pottage? 

Does all this seem far fetched? Not so to a Ger- 
man. Expansion or extinction; so he reads his horo- 
scope, and he reads it right. 

The case of France scarce calls for discussion. By 
common consent, her role was inevitable. The sym- 
pathy of the world has been hers, even the sympathy 
of her enemies. Had she been allowed to choose, she 
could scarce have hesitated, but she was spared the 
necessity of choice. Germany could take no chances. 
As a probable antagonist, France must be the first in 
the field, and so the first to be attacked. As French- ' 
men, we should have made the Frenchman's choice. 



332 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Belgium had an option, the option of ignominious 
surrender, or of resistance and ruin. We all see the 
option and honour the choice she made. The thing 
we do not see is that other countries were confronted 
by the same option and made the same choice. Is it 
any more noble to fight for an existence that is doomed 
to-day, than to light for an existence that is doomed 
in a hundred years? It is merely easier to see one's 
way and feel one's duty. 

For most of us it will probably be easiest to take 
our imaginary places as citizens of Britain, not be- 
cause her course is clearer — it is nothing like so clear 
as that of Belgium or France, for her interests are 
more complex and inharmonious — but because we 
are sharers in her civilisation and in her great mis- 
sion, in which our own must ultimately be merged. 
It will be unnecessary to invoke our sympathy, but the 
more necessary to appeal to our fairness. 

Suppose Britain had remained neutral. Germany 
would have invaded Belgium and overrun France. 
Both would have been forced into an alliance with 
Germany, which, however unwilling, would have 
given Germany control of the French navy, and the 
French and Belgian ports. She would have estab- 
lished herself in Morocco and matched Gibraltar. 
She would have established a naval base in French 
China and neutralised Hong Kong. Above all, she 
would have won in the present war, and would have 
become unmistakably dominant on the continent. 
There might never have been a war with Britain; in- 
deed, there probably would have been none, for the 
reason that war for Britain would have been hopeless. 



A CASE IN POINT 333 

Britain would have been isolated. She could never 
hope to meet Germany on land, and as Germany by 
controlling the continent, could control its navies, 
Britain could never hope to meet her on the sea. If 
Britain retained her colonies, it would be because Ger- 
many did not care to take them. Judging by many 
pronouncements, Britain would not have retained 
them. The present conflict sufficiently indicates what 
a single handed conflict between Britain and Germany 
would be. In a word, neutrality for Britain meant 
surrender and disintegration. If the choice of war 
is ever legitimate, this was a legitimate choice. 

The case of Italy was less clear than the rest, and 
her action, for that reason perhaps, more hesitant. 
Italy has a real case against Austria which she is prob- 
ably inclined to push too far. The Trentino should 
be hers. To extend her coast line round the head of 
the Adriatic to Trieste and Pola would give her an 
extended frontier to defend, and a narrow and un- 
profitable strip of territory, while it would be a serious 
loss to Austria with her meagre coast line, and would 
give her the strongest possible incentive to recover the 
needed coast at the first opportunity. To carry her 
acquisition still farther down the Dalmatian coast, 
and among the protecting islands, would still further 
cripple Austria, but would hardly help Italy, except 
by this same crippling. The expansion which it is 
feared that Italy contemplates, would not make for 
stability in this much troubled region. Meanwhile 
we are reminded that all that Italy could prudently 
accept, Austria offered as the price of Italian neu- 
trality. 



334 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

But two things must be remembered before we de- 
cide the wisdom or folly of Italy's course. The first 
is the distrust between the two countries, which made 
an amicable transfer impossible. Austria would not 
surrender the offered territory until the close of the 
war, lest Italy, once established there, should decide 
later to push farther, on some pretext too easily 
found. And Italy would not wait, lest Austria, once 
free from other enemies, should refuse to deliver. 
Neither supposition was unreasonable. 

The other fact is the danger to Italy of a victorious 
Austria. Italy had forfeited the friendship of the 
Central Powers at the outset by refusing to come to 
their aid as they thought her under obligation to do. 
There had been threats of summary vengeance. Con- 
cessions extorted from Austria under duress would 
hardly be respected when she was free, and retaliation 
might not stop with the restoration of recent frontiers. 
For the Austrians remember that the monarch who 
now sits upon their throne once ruled all Italy down 
to Milan and the Po. Italy can hardly be blamed, in 
the light of history, for not trusting to Austrian con- 
siderateness or honour. The only Austria that could 
be trusted not to injure Italy would be an Austria 
humbled and impotent. Hence Italy's decision, and 
her programme of possibly excessive encroachment. 

And so the close linked circle closes. Necessity 
is riveted in every link. To challenge this necessity 
is to challenge the right of nations to grow or to com- 
pete for the requisites of their being and growth. It 
is hardly possible to concede their right to be, without 
conceding their right to strive for necessary, even 



A CASE IN POINT 335 

favourable, conditions of being. And this point con- 
ceded, we are faced with the disturbing fact that na- 
ture has not fashioned the world into natural areas 
for nations to occupy, each with its needed resources 
and its suitable approaches and defences, like well 
planned houses in a street, but has so arranged things 
that no possible division can give to each the simplest 
requirements of independence and protection. What 
is more fundamental than that each should have its 
own doorway? Yet there are nothing like enough 
doorways to go round. What more reasonable than 
that each should have protection for its premises? 
Yet there are neighbour families that are separated 
by nothing but a chalk line on the floor. Nor could 
any man or body of men arrange a division of Europe 
among existing nations which would be free from 
these provocations to strife. Verily, the stars in their 
courses fight against nationalism as a static fact among 
men. 

In the two remaining chapters it will be our pur- 
pose to consider what useful conclusions we can draw 
from these studies. The western mind is not in the 
habit of accepting necessity as the last word. Sooner 
or later — and usually all too soon — we leap to the 
inquiry: " What are we going to do about it?" 
That we can do something about it, is taken for 
granted, sometimes quite too precipitately. All hon- 
our to the puissant conviction that " nothing that 
ought not to be, need be." For faith were better 
than fatalism, even were fatalism true. 



CHAPTER XIX 

PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR 

Two facts must be borne clearly in mind by those 
who would consider this subject to any purpose. The 
first is that war is a very ancient fact and one origi- 
nally much more frequent than now. The evidence 
is conclusive that in the early stages of social evolu- 
tion, war was chronic. . A constant experience con- 
tinued through many thousands of years invariably 
leaves tenacious instincts in the constitution of the 
race, instincts which often outlive the conditions 
which created them. Witness the duel as a method 
of settling disputes. This is a survival of the old 
institution of the ordeal, the essence of which was a 
belief that the innocent party was saved by a miracu- 
; lous intervention. Hardly any one believes in such 
1 intervention to-day, yet there are millions who believe 
themselves in honour bound to submit their personal 
differences to the chance of the duel, though without 
the factor of miraculous intervention, the test is 
wholly irrational. In the same way, war has been so 
long the habit of human societies, that it is maintained, 
not by reasons, but by instincts, the most stubborn of 
all stand-patters. 

Moreover, as in all such cases, the long continued 
experience has developed emotional compensations 

336 



PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR 337 

and safeguards. We have not only learned to feel 
that we must fight, but we have learned to like to fight. 
The sufferings of war are terrible, but they are borne 
willingly, even gladly, as the athlete or the ascetic 
bears his self imposed hardships, for the sake of com- 
pensations which are of a very real character. The 
sense of achievement — never more real than in over- 
coming an enemy — the recognition of our fellows, 
most potent of all social incentives, these and other 
compensations war has made its own. The pacifist 
who is inclined to stake his case on the suffering 
caused by war, should first try commiserating a foot- 
ball team on its bruises and broken bones. 

Equally significant and more often overlooked, are 
the protective instincts of war. Killing is a promi- 
nent incident of war, yet it is demonstrable that it has 
no such reaction upon the soldier as killing under 
other circumstances. Long continued war sometimes 
results in economic disturbance which paralyses in- 
dustry and forces disbanded soldiers and others into 
criminal activity, as an alternative to starvation, but 
precisely the same happens in peace, when industry 
is disorganised by discovery or invention or hostile 
tariffs. The soldier who has accustomed himself to 
carnage, comes back to private life quite as peaceable 
as he left it and no more disposed to take the life of 
his fellows. War creates its own moral immunities 
or preserving instincts when it is conducted on lines 
which have received the sanction of self respecting 
peoples. The pacifist who begins his indictment of 
war by remarks about " wholesale murder " and other 
like epithets, forfeits his right to a serious hearing. 



338 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

The second great fact which we have to remember 
is that war is functional, that is, it performs a real 
service for societies in certain situations. It may very 
well be that this service could be performed in some 
other way — indeed, that is the implication of our 
whole inquiry — but it must not be overlooked that it 
performs such a service. If we are to find a remedy 
for war, it must be of the nature of a substitute, an 
agency which can perform the same service at less 
cost. If we assume that men are fighting for nothing, 
we rule ourselves out of court at the very outset. It 
has been the purpose of the foregoing chapters to in- 
dicate some of the real interests which European wars 
are fought to secure or to preserve. 

In this connection it must be noted that the reality 
of these interests does not depend upon universal per- 
ception of the concrete relations involved. It is one 
of the commonest of errors to assume that popular 
ignorance of the issue proves popular indifference or 
even unwillingness. Thus a recent writer tells us : * 
" Wars are made by governments. . . . Before the 
present war broke out nobody outside governmental 
and journalistic circles was expecting it. Nobody de- 
sired it. . . . The millions who are carrying on the 
war, at the cost of incalculable suffering, would never 
have made it if the decision had rested with them. 
That is the one indisputable fact." And again the 
same writer: " ' Germany,' we say, * made the war.' 
Germany? But what is Germany? The German 
people? The peasants? The factory labourers? 

1 G. Lowes Dickinson; The War and the Way Out; Atlantic 
Monthly for December, 1914, and April, 1915. 



PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR 339 

The millions of Social Democrats? They made the 
war? Is it likely? Ten days before the war broke 
out, they, like the people everywhere, were working, 
resting, eating, sleeping, dreaming of nothing less 
than war. War came upon them like a thunder- 
clap. . . . Whoever made the war, it was not any of 
the peoples. " This is a typical sophistry of the kind 
we must avoid. Governments, no matter of what 
kind, have no such power as that here claimed for 
them. The war was unexpected as regards the 
moment of its outbreak, but these peoples had been 
expecting it for twenty years. If it had their dis- 
approbation, they had had time and opportunity to 
make that disapprobation known. " Nobody desired 
it." Certainly not, or next to nobody, but all desired 
something which they thought it would secure, and 
most were willing to pay the price. Nobody likes to 
spend money, but most of us like to buy things, and we 
are willing to spend the money in order to get the 
things. The fact that they " were working, eating, 
sleeping, dreaming of nothing less than war," merely 
means that they were trusting to the sentinels they 
had put on guard while they went about their business. 
When the sentinels gave the alarm, they rushed to 
arms. An army doesn't have to be all on sentinel 
duty to prove its loyalty. This misinterpreted differ- 
ence between government and people implies no oppo- 
sition of purpose, but merely division of labour. As 
a matter of fact, modern peoples are more belligerent 
than their governments, for their passions are less re- 
strained by knowledge of difficulties. It was the peo- 
ple who forced our country into war with Spain 



340 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

against the will of our president and of a majority of 
our government representatives. There cannot be 
the slightest question that a similar relation exists in 
all the countries now at war. 

To summarise the conditions antecedent to our in- 
quiry. War is as old as human society and is deeply 
entrenched in human instinct. War brings suffering, 
but it also brings large emotional compensations. 
War suspends the protections of peace, but it safe- 
guards the protective instincts. War renders a real 
service, and its cost is voluntarily incurred for that 
end. Finally, this attitude toward war is that of 
peoples and not merely of their governments, the lat- 
ter being merely its specialised agents, a lookout and 
signal corps. 

To all of this must be added the fact already much 
insisted upon, that peoples in their larger corporate 
activities are not mercenary, but idealist. They 
know that wars do not " pay " in the low, material 
sense. They are not seeking present ease and com- 
fort, seldom a present good of any kind, but the tri- 
umph of an ideal which they associate with their 
national life. Their method may be wrong, but their 
purpose is essentially altruistic, perhaps the least 
selfish of any activity we know. 

Can anything else take the place of war? 

Arbitration is naturally the first suggestion. It has 
been much discussed, and what is more important, it 
has been much tried. It already has a long record 
of successful achievement. It is a frequent argument 
that the constantly increasing number of successful 
arbitrations has but to be increased by patient effort 



PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR 341 

until confidence in the new principle is established, to 
insure the reference of all differences to some sort of 
judicial tribunal and the elimination of war. Is that 
hope justified? 

It may be freely conceded at once that arbitration 
has a very large field of usefulness. A large number 
of disputes which arise between nations can be settled 
in this way and every possible encouragement should 
be given to all to settle their misunderstandings in 
some peaceable manner. The development of regu- 
lar machinery for that purpose and the formulation 
of arbitral procedure may be expected to increase the 
number of disputes that are settled in that way. 

But has arbitration averted war? It must be re- 
membered that nations have still a third method of 
settling their differences, namely diplomacy. Their 
diplomats and foreign ministers are essentially claim 
agents, and most claims are settled through these 
agents. Arbitration is a relatively modern agency 
which has been devised to meet certain special classes 
of cases. It is like a new court of specialised juris- 
diction added to an existing judicial system. Its value 
is indubitable, but its function is easily misunderstood. 

Has arbitration encroached upon the field of war 
or of diplomacy? More exactly, if there had been 
no arbitration, would the dispute have led to war? 
We can best answer by considering a few typical 
cases. 

The Canadian boundary dispute was settled by a 
joint high commission consisting of three British and 
three American representatives. This was but a 
slight adaptation of ordinary diplomacy, the two 



342 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

parties to the dispute being equally matched and no 
third party represented. The sole purpose in this 
case was to isolate the problem and to avoid leaving 
upon the minds of the Canadians the impression that 
Britain's concessions had sold them out in deference 
to interests in some other quarter. 

The Fisheries dispute between the United States 
and Great Britain was referred to the Hague tribunal, 
by whom it was decided in our favour. Here was a 
real difference of view and a real arbitration, but it is 
certain that in this case as in the last, war was impos- 
sible. The decision was most useful as removing 
causes of friction, but in both cases these causes of 
friction had continued for many years, and war had 
never been thought of. If they had continued an- 
other century, no war would have resulted. In a 
word, war was excluded before arbitration was 
agreed to. 

A third case is that of the famous Venezuelan 
boundary dispute. In this case Great Britain was 
about to assert her claim against Venezuela by force, 
when the United States intervened and demanded that 
the case be referred to arbitration, which was done. 
Here is a case where arbitration seemingly averted 
war, but reflection clearly indicates that the deciding 
factor was our intervention. Britain was prepared to 
coerce Venezuela, but not to embroil herself with us. 
The possibility of arbitration made our intervention 
easy, but it is all but certain that intervention on any 
basis would have had the same result. War was 
averted, not by arbitration, but by alliance — the al- 
liance of the United States with Venezuela. The 



PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR 343 

deciding fact in all these cases was the same, the abso- 
lute determination of Great Britain not to go to war 
with the United States, a determination which, we 
hope, was fully mutual. And this determination on 
either side was due primarily to the fact that our in- 
terests nowhere clashed seriously, while the necessity 
of co-operation was clearly foreseen. 

Let us now take one or two cases where arbitra- 
tion failed. Such was the proposal of Spain to arbi- 
trate the case of the sinking of the Maine, and that of 
Servia to arbitrate the extremest of Austria's de- 
mands. In both cases the offer was instantly rejected. 
Why? Because back of the ostensible subject of dis- 
pute there was a larger issue which each nation in- 
stinctively felt could not be settled by arbitration. In 
our own case it was impatience with Spanish incompe- 
tency and a determination to dispossess a nation that 
had not made good. In the other case, it was a de- 
termination on the part of the Teutonic powers to en- 
large their territories at the expense of weaker peo- 
ples, as a condition of successful maintenance against 
rivals more amply endowed. 

Could these questions have been referred to arbi- 
tration? Imagine the attempt. The court meets in 
dignified state, and the attorney reads the indictment 
of Spain and moves her expulsion. The judge would 
ask for evidence of title, of violation of agreement, 
and the like. Spain's case would be perfect. But 
the indictment charges that Spain is one of the unfit, 
and under the law of the survival of the fittest, she 
should be dispossessed. Imagine a tribunal passing 
on such a question. But, it will be objected, the con- 



344 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

crete issue was the blowing up of the Maine. That 
much could at least be referred. Certainly, and with 
what result? Either the court finds that Spain is not 
guilty, or else that she is guilty, in which case she 
must give apologies and indemnity. In either case 
Spain stays in Cuba, and that is why we refuse to 
arbitrate, because we want to get her out. Similarly, 
to arbitrate the Servian case would leave Servia inde- 
pendent, no matter what the decision, and Austria had 
decided on her subjection. In both these cases the 
proposal to arbitrate was refused because the real 
purpose was one which is inherently beyond the scope 
of arbitration. No human tribunal can ever decide 
the question of the fitness of a race to survive or the 
right of another to displace it. 

But some one will be quick to object: " Has any 
nation such a right? Has Austria any right to subject 
Servia?" We can best answer by continuing our 
questions along this line. Had we a right to dispos- 
sess Spain of Cuba? Had we a right to take Cali- 
fornia from Mexico? Had we a right to take this 
country from the Indians? It is possible to object at 
every step, but it is impossible not to be glad that some 
of these things were done. Does anybody wish that 
California were still Mexican, or that New England 
were still inhabited by the descendants of Massa- 
soit? 

Our conclusion is that arbitration is a most useful 
adjunct to the machinery of international relations, 
removing difficulties that would otherwise fester in 
the national flesh, but that it is a supplement to diplo- 
macy rather than a substitute for war. It may be 



PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR 345 

doubted whether arbitration ever yet averted war. 
The fundamental cause of war, race competition and 
struggle for survival, is permanently beyond the scope 
of arbitration. 

Before leaving the subject it is necessary to note 
another and very practical difficulty in the way of arbi- 
tration, namely the difficulty of securing its enforce- 
ment. This appears in two forms, first that of per- 
suading nations to arbitrate, and second, that of 
enforcing the award. The former is the greater. 
When a nation once consents to arbitrate, it not only 
virtually pledges itself to accept the award, but it has 
already decided by that act, that it is in no mood to 
go to war about the case. In short, no nation will 
consent to arbitration till it has made up its mind that 
the case is one that it can afford to lose. And this 
decision once reached, it is not likely to resume its 
claim under the added handicap of an unfavourable 
decision. 

To secure a guarantee of arbitration it has been 
proposed to establish an international army or police, 
under a league of peace, to coerce any state that should 
resort to war against the will of the league. Such a 
suggestion shows a singular unconsciousness of the 
realities which we have been considering. Its first 
requisite is of course the league itself. This league 
must pledge itself to keep the peace, and since differ- 
ences must always arise, it must also pledge its mem- 
bers to submit all such differences to some tribunal, 
that is, to arbitration in some form. Universal arbi- 
tratioiijjtherefore, is its first requisite. There can be 
no international police and no league until we have 



346 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

overcome the first and greatest difficulty in the way of 
arbitration, namely, the reluctance of nations to sub- 
mit cases affecting race survival to its adjudication. 
It is doubtful, as we have seen, whether we have yet 
made any progress toward such a decision. 

But this decision reached and the league formed, it 
is recognised that there might be defections from the 
league. For this emergency, an international police 
would be formed of contingents from all the leaguers, 
sufficient to coerce any recalcitrant member, even the 
strongest. Evidently the member just at present 
would be Germany. To maintain an international 
force capable of coercing Germany would in itself con- 
vert Europe into an armed camp. But that is but 
the beginning of difficulties. A part of this force 
would necessarily be German, and the first sign of 
secession would undoubtedly be the secession of this 
part of the police force itself. Properly manipulated 
pretexts would enable this to be done in all good con- 
science, and the moment would be chosen when this 
force was so located as to make success assured. 

But this is not the worst. The proposal presup- 
poses a single seceding member. This war should 
teach us that we have no longer to deal with single 
nations. A dozen nations are now at war, and it is 
doubtful if any European nation will ever again go to 
war without allies. Nothing less than a police force 
that can coerce half of Europe will meet the theoret- 
ical requirements. This would put us about where we 
are now. It is obvious that secession from such a 
league would take exactly this form, namely, a split 



PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR 347 

or schism in the league itself, for which there would 
never be any lack of pretexts. 

And who would command such a force? What 
man or body could be trusted with such a responsi- 
bility? Naive indeed must be the enthusiast who 
would exchange the system of patriotic nationalism 
for this modern Praetorian Guard, men without a coun- 
try, so far as their oath of allegiance goes, conscious 
of their power to set up and put down kings at their 
pleasure. Be their sincerity ever so great, their con- 
sciousness that they were the sole repository of power, 
would develop traditions of class solidarity and inter- 
est which would ultimately obscure the general wel- 
fare which they had been set to guard. New re- 
cruits would come under the spell of established 
tradition. The governments of Europe would be 
powerless to destroy, and so, powerless to control the 
power they had created. All Europe would succumb 
beneath the rule of these janissaries, to a military 
despotism from which it could escape only by a final 
orgy of anarchy and carnage. The militarism of to- 
day is at least patriotic. That of the system proposed 
would lack that saving grace. 

Closely akin to the pledge of arbitration, is the 
pledge involved in the treaties associated with Mr. 
Bryan's name. The essence of this pledge is delay. 
It is argued that if nations postpone for a year the 
appeal to arms, that appeal will not be necessary. 
That all depends on the nature of the case. Such a 
postponement would not have stopped the present war, 
or either of the Balkan wars. All these wars were 



348 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

perfectly deliberate, and in fact the great war at least, 
was once postponed for a year after the date had been 
definitely set. It is doubtful if deliberation would 
have averted our war with Spain, the most impulsive 
war of modern times. On the other hand, when the 
rupture has become imminent, delay would often com- 
pletely shift the advantage from one contestant to the 
other. The proponents of this panacea naively as- 
sume that wars are fought between approximate 
equals who face each other with much the same weap- 
ons, and who can wait a year without disturbing their 
relative chances. This is almost never the case. 
The contestants are usually very unequal if pitted 
against each other under identical conditions. The 
only chance of the weaker lies in surprise. Sup- 
pose Japan and Russia had waited a year after war 
had become clearly possible. Russia would have 
had a million men in Manchuria and would have 
had the trans-Siberian doubletracked. Suppose the 
present war had been delayed a year after the impasse 
was reached. The Central Powers would have found 
ten million men lined up on their frontier. Or if we 
naively assume that such mobilisation could have been 
prevented by a paper promise, munitions at least could 
have been accumulated in a way to destroy completely 
Germany's lead. Is it to be supposed that Germany 
or Japan will be oblivious of such possibilities and 
will invite destruction by a delay which can inure only 
to the advantage of their adversaries? Most wars 
are deliberate rather than impulsive, and the aggressor 
counts largely on surprise as an aid to his cause. 
Against such wars proposals of delay are unavailing. 



PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR 349 

A somewhat more hopeful proposal is the inter- 
nationalisation of danger points, the principle of inter- 
national police being locally applied to secure obedi- 
ence. This proposal has been oftenest made with 
regard to Constantinople, whose immense importance 
and small area fit it peculiarly for such an experiment. 
Such an arrangement would of course imply that the 
Dardanelles and the Bosporus were to be open to all 
nations on equal terms, and with limitations designed 
to prevent the undue influence of any. The authority 
for such control would be derived from a concert of 
the powers. Whether such an arrangement could be 
made is uncertain. The question for the moment is 
whether it would work. The first problem would be 
to get an authority sufficiently detached from any one 
power or group of powers. The suggestion that the 
great responsibility be entrusted to King Albert of 
Belgium puts the question in concrete form. Would 
he be acceptable to Germany and Austria? Would 
he — could he — be fair? American control has 
been suggested (by some one seemingly not too anx- 
ious to keep us out of trouble) but again, would Ger- 
many and Austria be satisfied? How would we take 
to a German princeling as governor of Panama? For 
these new international or supernational functions we 
must take men from intensely national environments, 
and these men would be, or would be believed to be, 
partial. But this may not be, and probably is not, an 
insuperable difficulty. We may assume that for our 
new international establishment a suitable personnel 
has been found. What then? 

It is much to be feared that such an establishment 



350 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

would become the object of persistent diplomatic in- 
trigue in which civilians, merchants, contractors, and 
the like, would take a hand. Whether the establish- 
ment succumbed to a particular influence or not, the 
suspicion of it would go far to neutralise the benefits 
derived from the scheme. In the light of what we 
now know about German intrigue, in all parts of the 
world, how would the world feel about a colony of 
German merchants living in an internationalised Con- 
stantinople? And what would such a colony, aided 
by consuls and ambassadors and German trained ad- 
venturers, be likely to do in preparation for a possi- 
ble war between the fatherland and Russia? We 
may be quite sure that when Germany or Russia got 
ready to take Constantinople and thought the moment 
opportune, they would have a carefully prepared set 
of grievances, a damning indictment of international 
management as partial and inimical to their interests, 
all ready for their justification. Nations contemplat- 
ing aggression prepare pretexts and store up griev- 
ances as they do munitions. Have we not heard that 
Belgium had already violated her neutrality? 

It may be mentioned in passing that the principle 
has been more nearly realised than has usually been 
supposed. Belgium, Holland and Denmark are all 
strategic and much contested sites. All exist under 
international agreement and are prohibited from mak- 
ing alliances which would be to the advantage of one 
power and to the detriment of another. That is very 
nearly the internationalisation proposed. Its value 
has been somewhat put to the test in the present war. 

It is unnecessary to enlarge upon these difficulties. 



PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR 351 

Much can come from arbitration, something, perhaps, 
from postponement, something from international- 
isation, but it is chimerical to hope to stop war by 
contrivances so long as the disposition to war re- 
mains. 

Against all the foregoing proposals an objection 
holds which is far more fundamental than any thus far 
considered. They all assume that present boundaries 
are satisfactory, and that the political accidents of to- 
day are to be perpetuated like so many personalities 
whose stature and shape are predetermined. Nations 
must stay in their boundaries as men stay in their skins. 
As a matter of fact no such fixedness exists or ever 
has existed, and no such finality has been reached. 
If we have the slightest regard for suitableness, for 
commercial convenience, for avoidance of friction, in 
short, for adaptation of conditions to vital needs, 
these arrangements ought not to remain as they are. 
The whole Balkan peninsula is one huge misfit, was so 
before the Balkan wars and remains so since. The 
Trentino, and perhaps more, should go to Italy, Bess- 
arabia to Rumania, and so on, to mention the least 
and simplest problems. Carry the same principle a 
step farther, and some states ought to cease alto- 
gether, and erase their boundary lines in the interest 
of human convenience. Any solution of the vexed 
problem which would perpetuate present territorial 
divisions would fail and should fail, because these 
divisions are wrong. Can we, along wMf~6u? pro- 
vision against war, devise methods for the rectifica- 
tion of frontiers ? Several proposals have been made. 

One is that territories in dispute, like Alsace-Lor- 



352 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

raine, Poland, and the like, be erected into independ- 
ent buffer states. This is a move in exactly the wrong 
direction. Such states are weak and can exist only 
on suffrance. They multiply customs barriers and 
the frontier personnel. They are unable to provide 
the best facilities or to minimise the cost of govern- 
ment. For many centuries European progress has 
been in the direction of continued integration, and the 
difficulties of Europe seem to consist largely in the 
incompleteness of the process. An independent Al- 
sace-Lorraine would not be independent, and would 
not be a buffer, but merely a cause of mutual heart- 
burnings and a hotbed of intrigue. 

Another proposes that doubtful affinities be settled 
by a plebiscite, This was done in the case of the 
Ionian islands, which voted, about half a century ago, 
to join Greece instead of remaining in the possession 
of Great Britain. But it is all but certain that such 
an experience could not be repeated. Such a vote in 
Alsace-Lorraine would show indecisive and patchy re- 
sults which would increase the difficulties in the way 
of the desired adjustment, besides giving to the losing 
party a sense of grievance not previously felt. Bet- 
ter that the Alsatians should feel bitter toward Berlin 
than toward their neighbours. But the all sufficient 
objection to the plebiscite is that the inhabitants of 
the debatable territory know nothing about the larger 
problem. Imagine submitting the question of Con- 
stantinople to a vote of its inhabitants ! The Greeks 
would vote for Greek rule, the Turks for Turkish 
rule, the Armenians for Armenian rule, etc. But even 
supposing they reached a harmonious decision, scarcely 



PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR 353 

one would vote with any consciousness of the hun- 
dreds of millions of people whose interests are pro- 
foundly affected by their choice. As well allow the 
hybrid population of Gibraltar to decide the fate of 
the British Empire. It is significant that those who 
have most confidently urged the plebiscite, have usually 
disparaged the importance of national boundaries and 
decried nationalism altogether. They start with the 
assumption that it makes no difference to a man 
whether the state he lives in be large or small, well 
or ill equipped, so long as he is allowed to plough and 
sow. unhindered. The number, size and location of 
states being a matter of no concern, territorial ar- 
rangements may well be left to local prejudice. We 
can come to any conclusion we please if we will calmly 
; obliterate whatever master passion stands in our way, 
j and preface our proposal with a revision of human 
1 nature. The plain fact is that men do care enor- 
mously about the size and character of the country 
which owes allegiance to their flag, and that they care 
more that their civilisation should prevail in the 
world than that they should be privileged to sow and 
reap undisturbed. Call this folly if we will, but it 
is fact, and it is folly to declaim against it. 

Another proposal which has the merit of recognis- 
ing the unsatisfactoriness of present boundaries, seeks 
to remove this patent cause of war by reconstituting 
nations on a true etrmia basis. A recent writer who 
notes the persistent demand of Italians, Rumanians, 
etc., to be united to their kin, conceives this to be the 
root of all unrest among the nations, and adjures the 
Powers, when next they meet to settle the peace of 



354 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

the world, to make this the guiding principle of their 
action. A true Italian unity, a Rumanian unity, a 
Polish or perhaps a Slavic unity, these he thinks would 
be stable and insure peace and contentment. 

A glance at an ethnographic map will enlighten us 
as to the possibilities and difficulties of such a pro- 
posal. A reconstruction of European nations along 
ethnic lines would produce some strange results. The 
eastern projection of Prussia, which already seems 
to reach one or two hundred miles too far, would be 
prolonged almost to the gates of Petrograd, while 
just behind this narrow strip of coastland, Russia 
would stretch out to westward almost to the gates of 
Berlin. It would extend Italy clear round the Adri- 
atic and Greece clear round the iEgean, but would not 
give to either of them a strip ten miles wide. Im- 
practicable as such an arrangement would be, with 
its slender chain of coast settlements holding in irk- 
some dependence the hinterland, it is not the worst. 
Such a strip of country at least has the merit of con- 
tinuity. But in other cases this would be lacking. 
Take the case of Rumania, perhaps the most pro- 
nounced of all existing demands for ethnic unity. 
The much talked of Rumanians of Transylvania form 
a solid mass of comparatively pure Rumanian stock, 
but a mass completely surrounded by a broad terri- 
tory whose population is equally pure Hungarian. If 
we are to have an ethnic unity, Rumania must consist 
of two separate portions, one of them completely 
embedded in the tissue of another and rival, not to 
say hostile, people. Imagine the administrative prob- 
lem in a country where an official could not get from 



PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR 357 

one part of the country to another without crossing 
foreign territory. The world has had large experi- 
ence with such states and draws a sigh of relief to 
think that that experiment at least is done forever. 

But there are still more fatal objections to such a 
proposal. It would deprive certain peoples of the 
most elemental requirements of convenience and 
safety, and in particular of access to the sea. The 
Hungarians, a potent and richly endowed people, 
dwell wholly inland, and must get access to the sea 
and the outer world entirely through territories occu- 
pied by other races. The experience of Servia may 
enlighten us as to the mischievous possibilities of such 
a situation when not assured by political control. 
Even Rumania, foremost champion of the principle of 
ethnic unity, would suffer disastrously by its consistent 
application, for the Dobrudja, the long coast prov- 
ince which gives her her considerable frontage on the 
Black Sea, by a strange chance has one of the most 
purely Turkish populations in Europe. 

It is hardly necessary to urge other practical diffi- 
culties which will occur to any thoughtful person ; the 
regions — some of them supremely important, like 
Constantinople — where no race is clearly in the as- 
cendant and which would thus become more than ever 
apples of discord; the impossibility of defining ethnic 
unity, even by the tangible criterion of speech, when 
every language is seamed with dialectal divisions, and 
drawn by ties of varying kinship. Where is the fron- 
tier of German speech? Will it include the Dutch, 
which is scarce more than a dialect? And if so, how 
about Danish and Norwegian and Swedish, all of them 



358 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

first cousins? Is there to be a Slavic unity, or are 
there to be a dozen Slavic unities, and if so which? 
It has been well said that nature knows centres but no 
circumferences. These ethnic unities have distinctive 
centres, but their edges are nebulous and we pass from 
one unity to another by insensible gradations. [To the 
traveller who crosses a modern frontier the transi- 
tion may seem marked, but that sharp edge is official 
and arbitrary, a grievance in itself. It would be dif- 
ficult to imagine a subject more prolific of discord than 
this indefinable and unworkable criterion of ethnic 
unity. 

The fact is that ethnic unity is neither the only nor 
the chief interest which impels nations to extend their 
borders. These interests are essentially three, com- 
mercial facilities, defence, and ethnic unity, and of 
these three, ethnic unity is the least important and the 
least potent in influencing the action of peoples. We 
may add that in the age in which we live it is steadily 
dwindling in its influence. On the other hand, it is 
the one of the three which appeals to all the people 
of a nation. A nation under the spell of the blind 
instinct of expansion, will therefore always use this 
as a slogan if it can be done with any show of plausi- 
bility. The Italian peasant knows nothing about the 
strategic frontier in the Alps which is a matter of so 
grave concern to the strategist, but talk to him of un- 
redeemed Italy, and his heart warms to the tartan. 
Rumania talks of her exiled brethren, because it hap- 
pens that Rumanian is spoken in adjacent territory, 
but she did not hesitate to begin her expansion by 
annexing a province which contained almost no Ru- 



PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR 359 

manians at all. Germany isn't talking of unredeemed 
Germany for the reason that there are few Germans 
in the territory that she covets. We need not con- 
clude that this slogan of ethnic unity is insincere, but 
it is never the only cause, seldom even the chief cause 
of national unrest. To reconstruct Europe along 
ethnic lines would not only be impracticable, but would 
immeasurably aggravate the influences which now dis- 
turb her peace. 

There remains one more proposal, most serious, 
most hopeful, and most difficult of all, federation. 
This is an old dream, having been entertained, it is 
said, by Henry IV of France. It is often suggested 
in the present crisis, especially by Americans, who are 
perhaps prejudiced in its favour. The suggestion 
raises two questions: can it be introduced? would it 
work if introduced? On the first point, reference to 
our own history is not reassuring. Our federation 
was formed of thirteen small states mostly of Eng- 
lish origin, and all speaking the English language and 
having similar institutions, all long united under one 
sovereign power, and later drawn together by a seven 
years' conflict with that power, and by the fear of fur- 
ther need of like kind. At no time in their history 
had they been at war with one another. Yet even 
so, the formation of a union was a matter of the ut- 
most difficulty. The articles of union were adopted 
only by leaving them ambiguous on certain vital points, 
and by something akin to coercion on the latest acces- 
sions. Even so the union would hardly have endured 
had not these thirteen states been overwhelmed by 
nearly three times as many more, created by the fed- 



360 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

eration itself and never independent. Finally, with 
all these unifying influences, the federation broke up, 
and was reformed and consolidated by the time hon- 
oured method of conquest. Have we realised that 
our Union is not a voluntary one, but a product of 
war? 

Europe consists of about a score of states which 
differ in almost every conceivable respect. They are 
of different race, different speech, different religion 
and different civilisation. They are accustomed to 
different forms of government. They have fought 
with one another for centuries and have vast legacies 
of suspicion and hate. They have had a glorious past 
and have inherited traditions of heroic conflict with 
one another. To overcome these obstacles to union 
is a task almost inconceivably difficult. One-tenth the 
difficulties here encountered would have made Ameri- 
can federation impossible. 

The reply is sometimes made that we have in our 
own country all these elements, these differences, these 
legacies and traditions, yet the Union survives. It 
is difficult to take such an answer seriously. The 
Italian or Hungarian or Hebrew who comes to our 
shore, renounces all these things in spirit when he 
sets foot on the steamer's deck. He comes to learn 
our language, to adopt our ways, to obey our laws. 
In the vast majority of cases, he comes with a con- 
suming passion to effect the transformation as soon 
as possible. Even were he far less willing, the en- 
vironment into which he comes, exercises a compel- 
ling influence upon him and still more upon his chil- 
dren. Be the rallying prompt or slow, we at least 



PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR 361 

know what we rally to. But to what would federated 
Europeans rally? What would be their language, 
their religion, their political ideals? Which civilisa- 
tion or political system would be dominant? There 
can be but one answer. None would be dominant. 
It must be noted that all the salient things that make 
for American unity are lacking in Europe, and just 
because they are lacking, they make against it. There 
is no common speech to unite them, but there are dif- 
ferent speeches, proud and rich in treasure, to divide 
them. There is no common ideal of government to 
bind them together, but there are powerful and cher- 
ished ideals to keep them hopelessly apart. 

But suppose that by some miraculous chance the 
European nations waive their differences and federate. 
Would such a federation work? Would it effectively 
provide for the needs of these varied peoples? It 
is much to be feared that it would not. Again the 
experience of our own country may be instructive. 
Our federation works, but not too easily, and it car- 
ries about all the burden that federation seems able 
to bear. For a generation we have kept an obsolete 
currency system which no one approved, because the 
West was jealous of the East, and they could not 
agree on a change. Our sectional jealousies between 
North and South are notorious. How would the age 
long jealousies of Teuton and Celt accommodate 
themselves to a federated authority? Underneath 
any ostensible community of action there would line 
up the old ententes and alliances, or new ones, and the 
old battles would be refought with results hardly less 
disastrous than those of to-day. 



362 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

All our inquiry brings us round to this one great 
fact, which we can never take to heart too much. 
Federation does not create union, but union creates 
federation. 






CHAPTER XX 

THE FUTURE OF WAR 

Among the readers of these pages there will prob- 
ably not be found one who regards war as beneficent. 
The great majority will be of those generous spirits 
who regard it as a scourge and are chiefly concerned 
to stop its ravages. With these right minded natures 
the writer finds himself in instinctive sympathy. It 
is therefore not without misgivings that he has led 
them, as seemingly he must, under sombre skies and 
to a viewpoint whence the outlook is not immediately 
reassuring. More than once, perhaps, the sanguine 
reader has flung the book aside, impatient at the de- 
pressing outcome of our inquiry. Those with whom 
the wish is habitually the father of the thought, may 
even conclude that the unwelcome thought is here 
fathered by an unholy wish, and that the book is a 
disguised plea for war. The inquirer who is sincere 
in his search for truth must risk such misunderstand- 
ings. These last pages are written with the same 
wish for peace on earth and good will toward men, 
that may have inspired the sanguine reader's protest. 
If the writer seems less ardent than some to set things 
right, it is perhaps because he is more confident than 
some that things will set themselves right. Great is 
the faith of those who believe that " nothing that 

363 



364 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

ought not to be, need be," * but not greater than the 
faith of those who believe that nothing that ought 
not to be, can be. This inquiry closes, therefore, not 
with the proposal of another " remedy," but with a 
suggestion of the grounds of this soberer confidence. 

Our inquiry has seemed to point to two conclusions 
which must be borne in mind as the condition of any 
profitable forecast. 

First, the causes of war are to be found in the 
conformation of the planet rather than in the caprices 
of men. More exactly, war is a phase of the strug- 
gle between civilisations and the peoples who are 
their exponents, the objective being the possession of 
certain areas or points of vantage which vitally affect 
the future of the civilisations and peoples concerned. 
The things thus fought for are real things, important 
things, things worth fighting for, if they cannot be got- 
ten in any other way. They are so fundamental that 
they are felt rather than seen, and are safeguarded 
by instincts rather than by reasoned considerations of 
self interest, as are all really vital interests. 

Second, the remedies usually proposed are futile, 
because the causes of war are misjudged. It is as- 
sumed that wars are due to misunderstandings, that 
they are fought for unimportant or trivial interests, 
that they are willed by the few and fought unwillingly 
by the many, and that the elimination of war is merely 
a question of suppressing a few disturbers of the 
peace. These assumptions are one and all false, and 
all proposals based on them are necessarily doomed 
to failure. The misunderstandings and controversies 

1 Phillips Brooks. 



THE FUTURE OF WAR 365 

which accompany war, have to do with its pretexts and 
surface incidents, rather than with its real issues, re- 
garding which instinct is quite as unerring as in other 
connections. The issues are more vital and are cham- 
pioned with more unanimity than are the issues of 
peace. All people judge, and rightly judge, that their 
civilisation is more important than the comfort or 
even the lives of the individuals of a given genera- 
tion. It alone endures; it alone gives value to the 
individual life. 

Broadly speaking, nations arbitrate or negotiate 
matters affecting their comfort and convenience; they 
settle by war matters affecting their existence. Na- 
tions should not fight, and seldom do fight, for any- 
thing less than their existence. But they never refer 
to any court their right to exist, nor is it likely that 
any court would acknowledge jurisdiction in such a 
case. National existence as it stands, no matter how 
imperfect or transitory, must always be the fixed 
premise of judicial procedure. Yet national exist- 
ence in its present form is not a fixture, and the possi- 
bility of modifying it is an essential condition of hu- 
man progress and ultimate welfare. War has hith- 
erto been the chief agency for effecting these changes. 
Can a less costly and more efficient agency be secured? 
If so, we may be able to eliminate war, but we can 
never do so by petrifying nations as they are. Na- 
tions as they now are, represent only a temporary 
stage in a continuing process, a stage which shows no 
sign of finality or complete adaptation. We may 
change the agency and the method if we can, but the 
process must and will go on. We may dry up a river 



366 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

bed by providing a new channel, but never by damming 
the stream. 

If we examine the crazyquilt map of mediaeval Eu- 
rope, it will be clear at a glance that the direction of 
this evolution has been toward a steadily increasing 
integration. And when we note that the highways 
and tollgates of commerce which the nations are so 
eager to control, are nowise enough to go round, it 
is impossible to escape the conclusion that the process 
must go farther. It would not help matters to have 
more nations. There must be fewer and larger po- 
litical units. The Balkan peninsula must be united. 
There can be no other satisfactory settlement of its 
vexed problems. Local differences may be humoured 
and local liberties retained, but the barriers which 
hamper commerce and impede intercourse must dis- 
appear. An independent Alsace-Lorraine would be 
an absurd anachronism, justified, if at all, only as a 
temporary expedient after an indecisive war. It 
would be helpless alike in war and in peace. We may 
be sure that its own inhabitants would not vote for it. 
There is reason to doubt whether the much abused 
Poles would voluntarily accept the responsibilities and 
limitations of complete independence. It is still more 
doubtful whether they could maintain it, or would find 
it advantageous to do so. 

We must not be misled by the fact that along with 
this process of progressive consolidation, there is a 
certain amount of disintegration. We make bad be- 
ginnings, which we have to undo and try over again. 
It was absurd to give the Netherlands to Austria, or 
Naples and Sicily to Spain. It was unfortunate to 



THE FUTURE OF WAR 367 

divide Poland, and distribute the fragments as was 
done. Such combinations have to be broken up in 
order that more suitable ones may be formed. Other 
combinations are purely nominal, merely a disguise 
for essential independence, as was the case in Eu- 
ropean Turkey. Disintegration in such cases has no 
real significance. The real movement is all the other 
way. 

Can this consolidation be effected without war? If 
so, it must be in one of two ways. Nations must unite 
or regroup their territories of their own accord, or 
they must be united and readjusted by a council of na- 
tions, the will of the whole group being imposed upon 
the individuals affected. The first is essentially the 
principle of voluntary federation already considered. 
It may be doubted whether any such voluntary com- 
bination has ever been effected. The voluntary union 
of the two parts of modern Rumania and of the two 
parts of Bulgaria against the will of their sponsors 
may be cited, but this was not a true union in either 
case. It was rather an assertion of union on the 
part of peoples that Europe was trying to divide. 
The only voluntary unions on record are mere trans- 
fers from one power to another. The Ionian Islands 
and Crete both entered the kingdom of Greece with 
enthusiasm, but neither had ever known independence, 
and their choice was merely a preference of one al- 
legiance to another. The one significant example of 
our own country rather lessens than increases our 
faith in this principle. With little to separate us and 
everything to unite us, we still had to be unified by 
war. 



368 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

Of unions imposed by a concert of the powers we 
also have seeming examples, the unification of Italy- 
being the most conspicuous. The transfer of Bosnia, 
Cyprus, etc., may perhaps be mentioned as lesser exer- 
cises of the same power, as also the confirmation of 
states like Greece and Belgium. But with trifling ex- 
ceptions, these decisions created no states and effected 
no unions. They merely ratified the results of war. 
Political integration has thus far been effected only 
by war. 

Why? Because men have limited ability to sym- 
pathise with others and to adjust themselves to them. 
How jealously we guard the barriers even between 
neighbour families ! The most expensive of all our 
luxuries is exclusiveness. This is not in the least a 
criticism. The surest way to break down the social 
instinct is to overtax it. We can like some people 
much and many people some, but not all people any. 
" The love of all! At the bottom it is empti- 
ness." 1 It is useless to chide our finiteness in this 
respect. We can no more sympathise indefinitely 
than we can lift weights indefinitely. We have our 
limit. 

It is further to be noted that this provincialism be- 
comes intensified by time. The longer we are iden- 
tified with a given group in the family, the community 
or the state, the more complete our adjustment to 
their ways becomes. To enter another group, or to 
take others into our group, otherwise than as servants, 
causes immense discomfort and calls forth vigorous 

1 L'amour de tous! Au fond c'est le vide. Victor Hugo, Quatre- 
vingt-treize. 



THE FUTURE OF WAR 369 

protest. No matter how desirable the change, we 
do not like it. The more perfect the adjustment, the 
stronger our protest against anything that disturbs it. 
It is useless to ask a people thus circumstanced to unite 
with another on a basis of mutual concession. We 
are willing enough to unite, if the other will pay the 
bill, that is, if the other will make all the concession 
and come in submissively, assuring the supremacy of 
our race and our culture, but we object to bearing the 
discomfort of readjustment ourselves. And besides, 
our way is the right way, you know, and we ought 
not to change it. It is even doubtful whether we 
ought not to impose it upon others in their own inter- 
est. 

Hence it comes that all integrations, even the most 
necessary and wholesome, require an element of co- 
ercion. Men like the relation well enough when the 
readjustment is effected. None of our southern states 
now desire to secede. Burgundy and Anjou now think 
no thought but the thought of France. But without 
coercion the southern states would now be separate, 
and Burgundy and Anjou would be petty, independent 
states. Nay, without the coercion of an earlier day, 
not even that much would be possible, and the co- 
operation upon which all our civilisation depends 
would not have begun. This coercion it is the func- \ 
tion of war to furnish. It seems to be a blind and 
heedless process, but so is the whole struggle for exist- 
ence, which has been nature's programme for the last 
few million years. Intelligence and guidance are not 
in it, but behind it, over it, God alone knows where. 
It must not be forgotten, however, that undiscrimi- 



370 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

nating as war seems to be, it furnishes at least a cer- 
tain criterion of fitness and merit. Conquest is not 
the result of mere torrential energy, but of organisa- 
tion and team work. These are necessary conditions 
of civilisation, and their triumph is something of a 
guarantee of its advancement. No matter how odious 
its manifestation or its representatives, the triumph 
of organisation and collective efficiency is a contribu- 
tion to fitness which is the one assurance of survival. 
It is all well enough to say that we prefer something 
else than efficiency. Neither we nor our preference 
will long be here, if we do. 

But equally this integration requires something else 
than coercion. Without coercion union can never be 
effected; without conciliation it can never be main- 
tained. Empires without number have been formed 
by Alexanders and Napoleons and Tamerlanes, but 
unless circumstance and policy conspire to woo the 
peoples won, the results are ephemeral. Equally, 
then, survival must depend on the power to conciliate, 
upon a wise combination of coercion and conciliation 
in proportions suited to its varying circumstances. It 
is doubtful if the recipe can be learned otherwise than 
in the school of experience. 

Has war done its work? No. There are parts of 
the world where its task seems finished. It is to be 
hoped that our own union will not again fall to pieces, 
and that no further welding of war will be needed. 
In western Europe national lines represent approxi- 
mate adjustment to condition, and it is difficult to see 
how forcible change of boundaries could profit one or 
another. Far more significant than these approaches 



THE FUTURE OF WAR 371 

to finality is the growth of group consciousness and 
group sympathy on the part of existing nations. To 
this development recent wars have powerfully contrib- 
uted. Our war with Spain produced a change in our 
feeling toward Great Britain which was little less than 
revolutionary. The present war has added enor- 
mously to our mutual sympathy and has brought other 
countries within the penumbra of its influence. Under 
favourable conditions these sympathies are likely to ex- 
press themselves in co-operation, and repeated co- 
operation tends to harden into permanent alliance and 
actual union, so far as matters of general interest are 
concerned. It is not by any means impossible that 
this slow triumph of the centripetal over the cen- 
trifugal forces may lead to a permanent, though loose, 
integration of the Anglo-Saxon world. Left to itself, 
such a combination would almost certainly break to 
pieces, to be renewed by conquest, as was our union 
of American states. But it is not likely to be left 
to itself. There is some reason to believe that, as 
regards relations among themselves, a number of the 
nations of the world have completed the probation 
of war. 

As we move eastward in Europe the process of in- 
tegration seems less and less complete. There are 
jealousies and antipathies in Germany which have no 
counterpart in France. These in turn are as noth- 
ing to the divisive forces in Austria, while in the 
Balkan states we have merely the raw material of na- 
tions yet to be. There is no valid reason for the 
separate existence of Servia and Bulgaria, yet no- 
where are antipathies more bitter. The world might 



372 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

coax till doomsday, and these neighbours would not 
forget their feud. Or if they did, it would not be till 
they had festered in the flesh of Europe for centuries, 
and poisoned and endangered its whole life. Nor 
would the union of these two warring states be enough. 
Union with South and North is a necessity of conveni- 
ence, of efficiency, of peace itself. Nay, more still. 
Something very like the German dream of a union 
from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf must some day 
be realised. It is a sane and reasonable dream that 
the train that starts from London should some day 
dash through the Dover tunnel, on to Cologne and 
Munich, to Vienna and Budapest, to Belgrade and 
Sofia and Stamboul, on through the Bosporus tunnel 
to Asia, to Bagdad and Babylon, to Nineveh and 
Bosrah, and the steamers that weigh anchor for India 
and Araby the Blest. But such a route must not be 
barred by meaningless boundaries or mined by local 
feuds. Nor will the world wait forever. It has too 
much at stake to wait while these folklets get over 
their grudges, the more so as the grudges seem to 
grow by exercise. Heavy hammering is still needed 
to forge these shapeless fragments into an instrument 
for the world's use. 

It is no part of the writer's purpose to prescribe a 
remedy for war. As well prescribe a remedy for la- 
bour pains. The one pertinent inquiry is whether we 
can see a probable outcome. In some measure we can. 
There must be fewer and larger nations, larger polit- 
ical unities, if we are to have the territorial freedom 
and the full utilisation of natural facilities, short of 
which integration should not and will not stop. 



THE FUTURE OF WAR 373 

These may be expected to take all manner of forms 
and to represent all manner of anomalies of organisa- 
tion. There will be annexations, federations, customs 
unions, alliances, ententes — no matter. The essen- 
tial thing will be that they represent mergers as re- 
gards these interests where division is impracticable, 
or involves a sacrifice of efficiency. These will not be 
formed spontaneously out of sympathy or perception 
of the advantages of co-operation. Adjustments are 
too irksome to be effected without constraint. They 
will be the result of pressure, either war with result- 
ing conquest, or the fear of war which drives nations 
into an otherwise unwilling union. 

Must war continue until complete unity is finally 
effected? Probably not. The experience of industry 
may here instruct us. Competition — the war of in- 
dustry — continues with increasing virulence, destroy- 
ing small competitors and forcing larger and larger 
combinations, until a certain limit has been reached 
when the competitors are able to put their heads to- 
gether and substitute agreement for competition. But 
all this is impossible till the field is narrowed and the 
few survivors are farseeing and trustworthy. So 
long as there are many competitors, and of all sizes 
and degrees of intelligence, no live-and-let-live agree- 
ment is possible. It is war to the knife. 

Similarly, war seems essential to the earlier stages 
of integration, and under its influence nations be- 
come fewer and larger, until a point is reached — not 
the logical end — where they are so large and so few 
that they can safely conspire for the general interest 
instead of scheming solely for their own. It would 



374 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

be pleasant to believe that we had reached that point, 
but present indications do not justify so comfortable 
a conclusion. 

Can we forecast the new cohesions which are in 
store? Not with much certainty or profit. It will 
be harmless to indulge our fancy in a matter over 
which we have so little control, remembering that in 
connections like this the wish is apt to be father of the 
thought. If danger threatens, two combinations seem 
probable, which peace would never effect. The most 
obvious is the combination of the Central Powers, 
with losses of territory if they are beaten in the pres- 
ent war, and with additions in the Balkans and per- 
haps elsewhere if they win. The continued pressure 
of Russia seems so certain that it is hard to believe 
that their union can be other than permanent. At 
present it is uncongenial to Austria, but that is usu- 
ally the case, and argues neither the undesirability nor 
the impracticability of the union. 

A second plausible union — under some form, no 
matter how loose — is that of the United States and 
the British Empire. Their separation was the trag- 
edy of English history, though inevitable and whole- 
some in its reactions upon both. There is no possi- 
ble union of major powers for which sentiment speaks 
so strongly, but sentiment does not form such unions, 
nor can it alone preserve them when formed. If the 
Anglo-Saxon world is ever united — a condition es- 
sential to its ultimate success — it will be through the 
pressure of a common danger. That pressure is likely 
to be forthcoming. 

Will the " Allies," so called, in the present war, 



THE FUTURE OF WAR 375 

effect a permanent union? It seems most unlikely. 
It is true that German pressure has forced the settle- 
ment of their outstanding difficulties, which were many. 
It is much to have reached a definite understanding. 
But these understandings are after all only agree- 
ments, and not by any means always harmonies of 
interest. Conflicts of interest between the two great- 
est Asiatic powers seem probable, and agreements 
will not protect them any more than they protected 
Belgium. 

The case of Britain and France seems more hope- 
ful. France is not a growing power, and her policy 
will not feel the pressure of a redundant population. 
As large possessors of colonies, both have much to 
defend, and as there is little to be won by aggression, 
however successful, they seem committed to a con- 
servative policy. Unless the present war changes 
their status, both are likely to act henceforth on the 
defensive. As regards each other, their territories 
are well defined and involve little conflict of interests. 
Above all, both are likely to be long exposed to the 
same dangers and to have need of each other. Any- 
thing like a culture merger is incomparably more diffi- 
cult than in the case of Britain and the United States, 
but Britain is less likely than any other country to ask 
the impossible. 

It is impossible, however, for those who recognise 
the biological basis of national life, not to see in the 
mere growth of the Russian people a factor destined 
to change the entire alignment of the European pow- 
ers. No matter what the outcome of the present war, 
the time will come when Germany and her ally cannot 



376 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 

brave both East and West. The time will almost cer- 
tainly come when she cannot brave the East alone. 
Then the true relation of interests will reveal itself, 
and Germany will combine with western Europe for 
defence against the power whose mass makes her ir- 
resistible, and whose unripeness makes her dangerous. 
The essentials of such a combination will be a Teu- 
tonic unity, in which Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon 
and German will be but branches from a single stem. 
No thought could be more abhorrent in this moment 
of bitter hostility, but this is but a moment. 

We have already wandered far, perhaps quite be- 
yond the limits of prudent prophecy. As we gaze 
farther the mists quite obscure our vision. What of 
Asia and South America? Is one of these vaster 
unities building in the Far East? Will the South 
American republics unite to form another? Who 
knows ? 



EPILOGUE 

I will close this book, as I began it, with a per- 
sonal plea. The first was a plea for dispassionate 
inquiry; this shall be a plea for passionate sympathy. 
I have girded myself for the stoical task of passion- 
less survey. To all these peoples at whose fireside 
I have sat, I have pledged a fair hearing, both for 
myself and for the reader who sits with me in judg- 
ment. I have kept the faith. In these pages they all 
appear finite but human, precarious tenants on a soil 
that knows no guaranteed tenure, striving to meet the 
difficult conditions which shall ensure that they dwell 
long in the land, and shall safeguard the ideals which 
they value above their individual being. I have 
drawn the portrait of no hypocrite, no marauder, no 
blind slave of selfish tyranny, among all the nations. 
The most elementary fairness compels us to reject 
these foolish caricatures of national character. 

But impartiality is not indifference, and in all that 
I have written there is not a vestige of excuse for neu- 
trality on the part of the American people. I make 
no plea for armed intervention — not because it would 
be wrong, but because I do not know that it would be 
good strategy. I have no mind to discuss the atti- 
tude of our government, that straw upon the surface 
which is as likely to be caught by the eddy as carried 
by the stream. But anything like neutrality of heart 

377 



378 EPILOGUE 

on the part of the American people at this time would 
argue a blindness to their own interest and an indiffer- 
ence to their ideals which would prove them unable 
and unworthy to safeguard their civilisation. 

To concede the legitimacy of a people's ambition 
does not mean that we must give them the right of 
way. If their ambitions are legitimate, so are ours, 
and those of our kin. If their aggression is but the 
pressure of race protoplasm, then it is sure to be both 
pitiless and unrelenting. We are blind with our see- 
ing eyes, if we do not see destiny sitting in judgment 
upon us this day. 

Let us simplify our problem, eliminating all irrel- 
evant terms. Never mind France; there are others 
Iwill mind her. Waste no time on Russia; her hour; 
is not yet come. Ignore Japan; the yellow peril may 
never materialise. Fling aside Turkey, Servia, Bul- 
garia, the potsherds of a broken past, or the clay of a 
potter to come. The present hour has just one issue. 
Shall Germany or Britain prevail? Which of these 
master hands shall shape the ideals and the institutions 
of the future? 

I will lay but little stress on the problem of relative 
fitness. That each has large elements of efficiency is 
clear. Germany and her disciple, Japan, stand for 
physical science. They have formulated physical 
laws, as revealed by science, into a regime of life which 
is obeyed by a docile people, as nowhere else on earth. 
\ A Japanese army on the march waits before drinking 
| until the bacteriologist examines the water. An Eng- 
lish bacteriologist can detect the germs as easily, but 
he cannot keep a British soldier from drinking. A 



EPILOGUE 379 

British soldier, or merchant, or statesman, is resource- 
ful in emergencies, but the German knows no emer- 
gencies. All is foreseen, forecalculated, forestalled. 
The trajectory of a German shell is almost as cal- 
culable as the orbit of a planet. The mental trajec- 
tory of a German soldier is hardly less so. But Ger- 
many cannot calculate the orbit of feeling in a free 
people within a whole diameter. With all her own 
undoubted patriotism, she still thought she could bully 
the Belgian and buy the Briton, or failing that, that 
she could incite the Irish and intimidate the Italian 
and bribe the Boer. Her obtuseness to the laws of 
human sentiment and free volition has had no parallel 
in recent history, and is the perfect corollary of her 
engrossment in the problems of physical force. In 
Germany's marvellous scheme of things, the individ- 
ual must take his place as does the cell in the tissue 
of an organism. 

The British principle is utterly unlike. The social, 
industrial and political organisation is infinitely looser. 
While Germany calls a class to the colours, British 
ministers plead for volunteers. While the mighty 
Krupp mechanism grinds out its fearful grist unceas- 
ingly, and unhampered, a British statesman pleads 
with labour unions to allow more workers in the muni- 
tion shops, a spectacle for gods and men. Light in- 
deed is the yoke which Britain lays upon her sons. 

But that yoke rests secure upon half of a restive 
world which would not brook a tighter rein. Coax- 
ing may be undignified, but coaxing succeeds where 
coercion fails. No coercion that is within Britain's 
power could have held the Boer in a crisis like this 



3 8o EPILOGUE 

as Britain's daring conciliation has done. They have 
been won to loyalty while still smarting from defeat, 
but Alsace-Lorraine is still unreconciled to German 
rule, and passes on her protest from father to son. 
Germany boasts of her power of organisation, albeit 
conceding Britain's greater power of conciliation. 
But if we are dealing with men, men who still have 
thought and feeling in a measure unconstrained, or- 
ganisation and conciliation are almost interchangeable 
terms. German organisation is mechanism, the or- 
ganisation of passive material into an effective instru- 
ment. British organisation is the bringing of sentient 
beings into voluntary and efficient co-operation. The 
one is effective with homogeneous units powerfully 
subordinated in initiative and volition. The other is 
suited to heterogeneous and independent units who 
will not submit to repression of initiative and volition, 
or who would be fatally weakened by such repression. 
Germany, with all her imperialism, is the least im- 
perially minded of all great powers. She brings to 
her dreams of world dominion an utterly provincial 
ideal. 

Which will win? I do not know. Which is best? 
I will not say. But one thing I do know and will say. 
Yea, I will proclaim it from the housetops. The 
British civilisation is ours. In it we live and move 
and have our being. Outside it we have no future. 
Let no man deceive us. Let us listen to no specious 
sophistries about our composite people and our dis- 
tinctive civilisation. We speak one language, we 
cherish one literature, we recognise one political prin- 
ciple of temperate central rule and local freedom, and 



EPILOGUE 381 

these are the language, the literature and the ideal of 
Britain. We know nothing of the autocracy of Ger- 
many, nothing even of the centralised democracy of 
France. We have millions of Germans, but we are 
not German. We have Scandinavians and Hungari- 
ans and Poles, but they have brought us nothing of 
their institutions. They were not charter members 
of our commonwealth. Our civilisation, like our lan- 
guage, is the gift of a single people, and the difference 
between here and there is hardly greater in civilisa- 
tion than in speech. There are local differences in 
Australia and America, as there are in Yorkshire and 
Devon, but the unity is as clear in the one case as in 
the other. 

And this civilisation will survive or perish as a 
unit. If it triumphs in the present struggle, we share 
in its triumph. The instincts which we have inherited 
and the institutions that we have built will stand ap-\ 
proved, and we may expect with confidence to see 
them prevail. If it fails, we shall as certainly see 
these instincts and these institutions discredited and 
ultimately discarded. The unthinking optimist among 
us may contemptuously repudiate the menace of Ger- 
man invasion. That is not the question. Germany 
may never invade us, but Germanism will. German 
conscription will invade us, with German much-gov- 
ernment and German officialism and German mechan- 
ism in its train. We shall defend ourselves against 
Germany in the flesh, by surrendering to Germany in 
the spirit. && .^-la 

In the face of such a possibility, how petty is our 
protest over the brief interruption of commercial priv- 



382 EPILOGUE 

ilege ! How contemptible our murmuring because we 
have lost our profit on the cotton that would have fur- 
nished high explosives to destroy us ! There is not 
a people in the present struggle that does not perceive 
the larger meaning of that struggle, and its bearing on 
their ultimate destiny. Are we alone purblind or 
asleep? There is not a nation from the least unto the 
greatest that is not freely offering its ease, its treas- 
ure and its blood in the service of its ideals. Is Amer- 
ica alone craven? 

" Then Mordecai commanded to answer Esther, 
Think not with thyself that thou shalt escape in the 
king's house, more than all the Jews. For if thou 
altogether holdest thy peace at such a time, then shall 
there enlargement and deliverance arise to the Jews 
from another place; but thou and thy father's house 
shall be destroyed: and who knoweth whether thou 
art come to the kingdom for such a time as this ? " 



THE END 



PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



THE following pages contain advertisements of a 
few of the Macmillan books by the same author 
or on kindred subjects. 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 

H. H. POWERS, Ph.D. 
President of the Bureau of University Travel 
Author of " Mornings with Masters of Art " 

The Message of Greek Art 

Standard Library Edition, $.50; Decorated cloth, 8vo, $2.00 

This is not a history of Greek Art. Still less is it a 
record of personal research or exploration beyond the limits 
of previous knowledge. The writer is deeply conscious of 
the debt which he and others owe to the patient scholarship 
which has rescued from oblivion so much that he values, 
but he claims no part in the honour of this achievement. He 
has found in the civilization thus rescued a thing inspiring 
and enjoyable beyond any other. While sharing with 
scholars the regret that so much still remains unknown, he 
has even greater regret that the known is so inaccessible, that 
so few enjoy what he has found enjoyable or feel the in- 
spiration which he has felt. This regret is the occasion of 
this book, and sufficiently suggests its purpose. 

As the title of the book implies, the subject here chiefly 
discussed is Greek Art, but with emphasis rather upon the 
adjective than upon the noun. The subject is never dis- 
sociated in thought from its great background of Greek 
civilization and history, and it derives its chief interest to 
the writer from the fact that it so constantly reveals and 
interprets this larger fact. It is therefore the message of 
Greek Art, what it has to tell us of the Greeks, of their 
personality, their ideals and their experiences, that will 
chiefly concern us, rather than considerations of process or 
later accident. — From the Author's Introduction. 



More than 150 Illustrations 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 
H. H. POWERS, Ph.D. 

Mornings with Masters of Art 

NEW EDITION 
Cloth, i2mo, illustrated, $2.00 net 

" The result of his daily contact with the greatest works 
of modern artists is to give his book a certain freshness and 
originality that is not found in the work of those who delib- 
erately prepare for the writing of a book. The author takes 
up all the great Italian painters, but his discussions of Bot- 
ticelli, Donatello, Leonardo, Raphael, and Michael Angelo 
are especially full and satisfying. He is one of those who 
can see little in ' The Last Judgment,' although his apprecia- 
tion of the work on the vaulted ceiling of the Sistine Chapel 
is the best that we have ever seen. The book is elaborately 
illustrated from photographs, many of which are not com- 
mon." — San Francisco Chronicle. 

" That the author is a scholar and a connoisseur of dis- 
tinction in Italian art appears very clearly from his work, 
which, let us add, is quite free from dry-as-dust pedantry 
and cannot but prove of interest to any reader not utterly 
devoid of anything like love of art." — Chicago Inter-Ocean. 

" Mr. Powers' work is of value to persons seriously inter- 
ested in art, and particularly worth while to those who prize 
most in art its spiritual values." — Boston Advertiser. 

" Mr. Powers has produced one of the most stimulating 
books that have been written on this important subject. His 
style is lucid and his thought is free and individual." — Phila- 
delphia Public Ledger. 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 



Japanese Expansion and American 
Policies 



By J. F. ABBOTT 

Of Washington University 



Cloth, i2tno, $1.50 



Here Professor Abbott sums up dispassionately and 
impartially the history of the diplomatic and social rela- 
tions of Japan with the United States, and in particular 
gives the facts that will enable an American to form his 
own opinion as to the possibility of future conflicts be- 
tween these two countries. The work is neither pro-Japan 
nor anti-Japan, but seeks, rather, to present the case 
justly. The author emphasizes the importance of an in- 
telligent understanding of the subject, believing that in 
spite of the present lull owing to acute interest in Euro- 
pean affairs, it is yet a problem that will periodically and 
persistently come to the fore until it is satisfactorily 
solved. Professor Abbott has given careful study to Far 
Eastern matters for the past fifteen years, has traveled at 
various times throughout the Orient and previous to the 
Russian War was an instructor in the Imperial Japanese 
Naval Academy. 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 



The Diplomacy of the Great War 

By ARTHUR BULLARD 



Cloth, i2mo, $1.50 

A book which contributes to an understanding 
of the war by revealing something of the diplomatic 
negotiations that preceded it. The author gives 
the history of international politics in Europe since 
the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and considers the 
new ideals that have grown up about the function 
of diplomacy during the last generation, so that the 
reader is in full possession of the general trend of 
diplomatic development. There is added a chapter 
of constructive suggestions in respect to the prob- 
able diplomatic settlements resulting from the war, 
and a consideration of the relations between the 
United States and Europe. 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Publisher b 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 



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